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See the animal in its cage that you built 
Are you sure what side you're on? 
... 
What if everything around you 
Isn't quite as it seems? 
What if all the world you think you know 
Is an elaborate dream? 
And if you look at your reflection 
Is it all you wanted to be? 
What if you could look right through the cracks? 
Would you find yourself 
Find yourself afraid to see? 
 –  Trent Reznor, Right Where It Belongs (2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
“Heard every word you said,” I muttered, [...]  
“... an’ they all thought it was Stoner’s Boy messin’ up their 
clubhouse an’ throwin’ ink all over it an’ [...]  
they chased him ‘n’ never could catch him  
‘cause they didn’t know what he looked like,  
an’ Atticus, when they finally saw him,  
why he hadn’t done any of those things ...  
Atticus, he was really nice...” 
“Most people are, Scout, when you finally see them.” 
–  Harper Lee, To Kill A Mockingbird (1960) 
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INTRODUCTION 
“Seriously, those Arabs are totally different. You can see that in the reports on television, 
they sit in cafes all day long or go begging. And they have 14 kids.”1 
Arabs and Muslims have a difficult position in the West today. If we look, for example, at public 
opinion in countries like Germany, we see that in the GFE Survey of 2005, over 60 % of 
interviewees agreed with the statement that Islamic terrorists find strong support among the 
Muslim population and that those terrorists are even admired as heroes by many Muslims.2 
Similarly in the United States, according to a poll carried out by CBS News and the NEW YORK 
TIMES in September 2006, 76 % of the interviewees supported the opinion that the terrorist 
threat from Islamic fundamentalism is constantly growing and presents a real, immediate danger 
to the U.S. Furthermore, a poll carried out by CNN, USA TODAY, and Gallup in 
February/March 2006 revealed that even when Arab countries are part of the anti-terror coalition 
that the American president declared after the attacks, they cannot really be trusted: 51 % of the 
interviewees said that the U.S. government should trust them less than its other allies.3 
And are they not right? Do we not learn every second day of another terrorist attack in the 
Middle East? Do we not read every second day of suicide bombers blowing themselves up in 
downtown Baghdad, and do we not feel a slight doubt that the attempts to establish democratic 
structures in Iraq might fail due to the increasing strength of radical forces in the country? Are we 
not confirmed in the perception that Arabs and Muslims do not fully support Western standards 
like freedom of speech when – in the context of the controversy about the Mohammad cartoons 
that were published in a Danish newspaper in 2006 and the ensuing riots – we see aggressive 
demonstrators in the Middle East and Muslim countries who burn effigies of the American 
president and destroy a Danish embassy building? 
And when we look at the relationship between Arab or Muslim minorities and their German and 
U.S. host societies, we see that people in Germany and the U.S. have a rather skeptical attitude 
towards those minorities as well. The German GFE Survey of 2005 found that over 70 % of the 
people interviewed say that Muslims in Germany do not want to integrate but instead segregate 
themselves from German society. Furthermore, over 70 % also say that the Muslim culture does 
not fit into the Western world. In the United States, according to a Gallup poll carried out for 
USA TODAY in July 2006, only half the interviewed American adults agreed with the statement 
                                                           
1 Own translation; original statement in German: “Die Araber, also ehrlich, die sind ganz anders. Das sieht man ja 
auch im Fernsehen in den Reportagen, die sitzen den ganzen Tag im Cafe oder gehen betteln. Und haben 14 
Kinder.” This statement was made by a German woman in an interview with Staud (2006: 238) that was published in 
DEUTSCHE ZUSTÄNDE, issue 4. 
2 The survey on group-focused enmity (GFE) is carried out annually by the GFE project. The results are published 
in the German book series DEUTSCHE ZUSTÄNDE. The GFE survey data in this chapter is taken from Leibold and 
Kühnel (2006). 
3 www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm, accessed May 25, 2007. 
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that Muslims in the U.S. are loyal to their country, while 34 % of the interviewees believed that 
Muslim Americans in the U.S. sympathize with the al Qaeda terrorist organization.4 
And is this skeptical attitude not also justifiable? In England, the suicide attackers of the 2005 
London bombings were all British citizens who were seemingly integrated in British society but 
who turned out to disapprove of or even hate it. The Islamist Mohammed Bouyeri, who 
assassinated the Dutch film director and writer Theo van Gogh, was a Dutch citizen who was 
said to be well-educated and apparently well-integrated.5 And the 9/11 terrorists are said to have 
lived for years in the United States and in Germany – inconspicuous and seemingly integrated – 
before they carried out their deadly attacks. 
Thus, when we want to describe the relationship between Western countries and Arab and 
Muslim countries or immigrants in the West, we could immediately say that it is a conflictual 
relationship, one that is shaped by a large degree of skepticism within German and U.S. society 
and by great perceived distance between both sides. But where do the distance, the skepticism, 
and the conflict come from? One answer that seems plausible, and that is also often cited by 
politicians, experts, and the mass media, is the 9/11 attacks in 2001. As the media and public 
reactions after the attacks often put it, the 9/11 attacks changed the world. The INTERNATIONAL 
HERALD TRIBUNE wrote two days after the event that “the new world order is a clash of 
civilizations,”6 and since 2001 we are constantly reminded that the 9/11 attacks have heralded a 
new form of “war” that 49 % of all interviewees of a 2006 Pew Research survey see as a new 
major conflict between the people of America and Europe and the people of Islam.7 
It seems obvious that the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims today is basically the result 
of events like the attacks in the United States in September 2001, the Madrid bombings in March 
2004, and the London bombings in July 2005. But is that so? Was it the attacks of 9/11 that 
created the perception in the West that there is a large gap, a significant distance, an antithetical 
difference between the West and Arab and Muslim countries? As the title of the book suggests, 
the image of Arabs and Muslims is not the only information that is communicated when mass 
media or politicians talk about them. The confrontation between civilization and barbarism is 
also about civilization. This side was in play when the U.S. President George W. Bush addressed 
his nation on the evening after the 9/11 attacks with the words: 
                                                           
4 USA TODAY/Gallup Poll, July 28-30, 2006, from www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm, accessed May 25, 2007. 
5 Van Gogh directed the controversial short movie Submission, which dealt with the topic of violence against women 
in Islamic societies by telling the stories of four abused Muslim women. The movie caused huge discussion especially 
because of its depiction of naked women veiled with semi-transparent shrouds as they kneel in prayer and tell their 
stories as if they are speaking to Allah. 
6 INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, September 13, 2001, p. 2 
7 According to a survey carried out by the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press in August 2006, from 
www.pollingreport.com/terror.htm, accessed May 25, 2007. We can furthermore say that politically as well as 
militarily, the consequences of the event have been enormous. The American government declared the start of a 
“war on terrorism” against all those countries that support terrorism and harbor terrorists. Before 2001 was over, 
U.S. military forces in a “coalition of the willing” waged a military offensive against Afghanistan and the Taliban 
regime which was believed to harbor bin Laden, the mastermind behind the attacks on New York and Washington. 
And also the military invasion in Iraq in March 2003 by a U.S.-led coalition was argued to be another step in this new 
“war on terrorism.” 
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Today […] our very freedom came under attack in a series of deliberate and deadly terrorist 
attacks. […] America was targeted for attack because we’re the brightest beacon for freedom 
and opportunity in the world. […] Today, our nation saw evil, the very worst of human 
nature.8  
And this side of the Self was also included when German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder 
addressed the German Bundestag a week after the 9/11 attacks with the words… 
This is not only a war against the United States; this is a war against the civilized world.9 
… and thereby indicated that not only had the United States been a victim of the incident, but 
that Germany had also been symbolically attacked. 
Thus, at the same time as we talk about the uncivilized, barbaric, and evil Other, we also learn 
something about ourselves. The question that arises from that diagnosis is whether we actually 
learn more about our own image and self-perception than about the “real” image of Arabs and 
Muslims? 
To answer this question, this book takes a closer look at the interplay between the German and 
US-American perception of Arabs and Muslims and the national self-perception of both 
countries. One central assumption of this book is that the German or U.S. self-perception has a 
decisive influence on the way in which others (in this case Arabs and Muslims) are seen, and that 
in this context, events like the 9/11 attacks are only one factor that shapes the perception of the 
other side. Another assumption is that the image of and the assumed distance and difference 
between Arabs and Muslims, on one side, and Germany and the United States, on the other side, 
already existed before the attacks. But if it already existed before the event that “changed the 
world,” what are the basic parameters that shape the images of Arabs and Muslims? The 
perspective that is taken up in this book is that self-perception plays a decisive role for this 
construction of image, and that an analysis therefore has to include two sides when it wants to 
answer the question of where the image that we (as Germans or as part of the so-called Western 
world) have of Arabs and Muslims comes from, and why the image is as it is. The side of the 
perceived Other AND the side of the perceiving Self. 
Therefore, the main questions to be answered in this book are (1) why Arabs and Muslims are 
perceived as they are portrayed, (2) if and how the German and American national concept of 
self shapes the perception and the images of Arabs and Muslims, and (3) (combining these two 
sides) how different and distant from the German and American Self Arabs and Muslims are 
regarded to be. 
To answer those questions, I analyze the single source from which we learn most about Arabs 
and Muslims – not only those who live abroad and who we never really see in person or who do 
not affect our everyday life directly, but also those who live right next to us. This source is of 
                                                           
8 Address to the Nation, September 11, 2001, www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/09/20010911-16.html, 
accessed June 5, 2007. 
9 Statement of the German chancellor in the German Bundestag am September 19, 2001, 
http://dip.bundestag.de/btp/14/14187.pdf, accessed June 4, 2007. Original quote in German: “Dies ist nicht nur 
ein Krieg gegen die USA, dies ist ein Krieg gegen die zivilisierte Welt.” 
Introduction 
 
 - 4 -
course the mass media. In an age in which people more and more rely on the mass media for 
their information about the world, and in many cases know certain parts of the world only from 
the realities and information they are provided with by mass media, it seems important to discuss 
not only what we know about others from mass media but also what we can learn about 
ourselves in these contexts. Thus, the topics, the actors, and the stories that are communicated by 
mass media are very central to our perception of the environment that surrounds us and that 
forms our reality. To answer the questions that have been raised before, the book will proceed 
according to the following structure: 
 
Structure of the Book 
CHAPTER ONE looks at the state of research on the media portrayal of Arabs and Muslims in 
German and American mass media and at the way in which national concepts of self are defined 
and national identity is constructed. The chapter includes a survey of the studies that have already 
been done on national and Western self-perceptions and identity construction, and of studies that 
have already analyzed images of Arabs and Muslims in Western mass media. I will point out the 
limits of these studies with regard to the research questions of the book, listed above. For 
instance, it will be shown that the existing studies provide some information about how Germany 
and the United States define themselves, but that this information does not stem from mass 
media analyses. Furthermore, some information can be gained about the question of how 
German and U.S. media see Arabs and Muslims. However, most of those studies fail to combine 
the two sides of self-perception and perception of the Other, and fail to focus on the question of 
what relevance self-image has for the perception and portrayal of Arabs and Muslims – and vice 
versa. 
CHAPTER TWO introduces the main theoretical hypotheses that have been developed to 
answer those research questions. Three basic theoretical elements have been combined here. First 
of all, I examine some general considerations about the concept of a world society and cultural 
patterns that define and structure social life, to outline the central criteria that shape the German 
and U.S. concept of belonging (II.1). I proceed from the basic assumption that a set of Western 
principles, norms, values, and myths (such as democracy, equality, belief in progress, etc.), form 
the evaluation pattern according to which Western countries like Germany and the United States 
observe and evaluate their environment, i.e. other countries and actors. 
A second aspect that is crucial for the Western perception of Arab and Muslim countries is 
introduced in the second subchapter (II.2): the Oriental myth. I assume here that this myth 
shapes the perception of Arabs and Muslims in the sense that it provides the implicit knowledge 
that Arabs and Muslims are part of an overall Oriental Other that represents the antithesis to 
Western culture and values. This myth strongly shapes the perception and the evaluation of the 
focused outgroup in both Germany and the United States. 
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Thirdly, another crucial assumption of the book is that from the perspective of intergroup 
relations, and with regard to collectivity construction, collective (national) groups need a certain 
outgroup if they are to construct national collectivity, which means that in the analysis of the 
image of Arabs and Muslims, the self-perception and self-depiction of Germany and the United 
States will also have to be taken into account. This aspect will be further outlined in the third 
subchapter (II.3). It will be argued that the construction of collectivity mainly works via 
demarcation from an outside Other. In addition to that demarcation, the outgroup is also 
measured by the Self in order to enhance the own ingroup status and to strengthen the ingroup 
coherence.10 Arabs and Muslims are regarded to be a central potential outgroup that is 
particularly focused on and demarcated in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks due to the 
circumstances of the event. 
These theoretical assumptions lead to several more concrete research questions that guide the 
process of analysis. To reveal the worldview and self-perception of Germany and the United 
States, I analyze whether and how both countries reflect upon themselves in the mass media 
contexts in which Arabs and Muslims are portrayed. I will answer the question what basic 
Western principles are emphasized in these self-descriptions, and whether the German self-
perception differs from the American self-image. To explore the images of the Other, I ask what 
actors and countries the mass media of both countries focus on and how those actors and 
countries are portrayed. Finally, to illustrate how difference is constructed between German and 
U.S. Self and Arabs and Muslims, I look especially for differences among the portrayed Arabs 
and Muslims in German and U.S. media. I analyze what levels of difference can be identified 
between Other and observing Self in the images of the different Arab and Muslim actors in both 
countries’ mass media, and I look at what happens when the geographical distance between Self 
and Other is diminished, i.e. when Arab and Muslim actors cross the geographical boundaries 
and enter the Western space. I also examine the impact of the crucial event – the 9/11 attacks – 
on the German and U.S. perception of Arabs and Muslims, and find out how central the Oriental 
myth really is for the Western worldview before and after 9/11. 
CHAPTER THREE outlines the composition of the data sample (III.1) and explains the used 
research methods. In the first step, the newspaper articles are analyzed with the method of a 
quantifying qualitative content analysis to identify occurring Arab and Muslim actors, describe the 
ways in which German and U.S. newspaper articles portray them, and to reveal the German and 
U.S. self-perceptions that are implicitly and explicitly communicated in these contexts (III.2). 
This first step aims at reducing the complexity and variety of the information that is found in the 
data sample. In a second step, the gathered images of Arab and Muslim actors and countries are 
classified and described on the basis of a typological analysis (III.3). This step forms the basis for 
answering the question of how different Arabs and Muslims are from the German and U.S. Self 
and on what criteria this difference is constructed. The actor typology is empirically based, i.e. 
actors types are formed from the actual images of occurring actors in the data sample. 
                                                           
10 In this book, “ingroup” basically refers to the communicated perception of the German or U.S. nation state as a 
collective concept of belonging. 
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The results of the quantifying qualitative content analysis are described in chapters IV and V. 
CHAPTER FOUR first of all summarizes the frequency of articles in which Arabs and Muslims 
are constructed before and after 9/11. I show that the media focus on this group increased 
tremendously after the attacks, but that Arabs and Muslims were already an integral part of the 
daily news coverage before 9/11 (IV.1). Furthermore, the most relevant contexts and topics in 
which the focused actors appear are outlined (IV.2). Last but not least, the composition of the 
Arab and Muslim Other is described, i.e. what kinds of actors occur in both countries’ analyzed 
print media (IV.3). 
Chapter four also includes information about the quantitative significance of occurring actors and 
of the topics that are focused on. I show that the media contexts in which Arabs and Muslims 
appear are largely similar in German and U.S. print media, and that the occurring actors come 
from all parts of society. Altogether, the overall image of Arab and Muslim actors is 
predominantly shaped by an external focus on foreign news. Arabs and Muslims within both 
countries are referred to only marginally before the attacks, although their quantitative relevance 
changes to some extent after 9/11. Nevertheless, one initial finding is that the image of Arabs 
and Muslims in both countries is shaped by geographical distance. 
However, CHAPTER FIVE shows that geographical distance is not the only characteristic of the 
majority of Arabs and Muslims. In this chapter I outline additional central facets that shape the 
German and U.S. self-perception and the image of the Arab and Muslim countries and actors as 
they are communicated in mass media contexts and discussed in connection with the 9/11 
attacks. I demonstrate that the overall picture of Arabs and Muslim is multifaceted, and that the 
images of Arab and Muslim actors in both countries’ print media can be described according to 
five dimensions: a political (V.1), a cultural (V.2), a personal (V.3), a social and economic 
dimension (V.4), as well as a dimension of delinquency (V.5) on which actors are described, for 
instance, as criminal, violent, or as terrorists. 
With regard to the image of self, I show that the Other is first and foremost an implicit counter-
image of the Self, but both countries also explicitly refer to the own concepts of national identity, 
especially after 9/11. Differences between the German and the American images are few. One 
aspect that is emphasized more in the U.S. print media than in the German context is the 
comparison of the technological progress of American Self and Arab and Muslim Other. 
Compared to that, German print media more often see a cultural difference between a German 
or Western Self and Arab and Muslim otherness, and here especially emphasize the religious 
affiliation of occurring actors. 
However, the chapter also reveals that in the overall image of Arabs and Muslims we find a 
number of facets that can be regarded as favored characteristics for the Self.  This observation 
indicates that the dichotomy between a German and U.S. self and Arab and Muslim otherness is 
not only based on antithetical difference. Rather, we also find a certain degree of similarity 
between Self and Other, and some Arab and Muslim actors in the mass media possess features 
that are promoted as central for the German and U.S. concept of self as well. 
Introduction 
 
 - 7 -
CHAPTER SIX goes on to look at this phenomenon of similarity more closely. Here, I present 
the results of the typological analysis and present a more detailed analysis of the internal 
composition of the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other as it was outlined in chapter 
five. I elaborate how the Other is evaluated and subclassified on the basis of the Western 
standards and principles that are central for the German and U.S. self-concept. Chapter six 
illustrates the complexity of Arab and Muslim media images by introducing the different types of 
actors that have been formed with the typological analysis (VI.1-6), and by demonstrating that we 
cannot simply summarize the media perceptions of Arabs and Muslims as completely different 
and distant from the West. Instead, I show how multifaceted the difference between the German 
and U.S. concept of self and the Arab and Muslim countries and actors in question is 
constructed, and that the Arab and Muslim Other can be regarded as similar and different or 
similar and distant at the same time: 
The majority of Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. media receive devaluated images 
that predominantly consist of features, views and actions etc. that the observing German and 
U.S. Self disapproves of or criticizes with the Other. Those actors can be classified as most 
different from the German and U.S. self-concept, and several types of devaluated actors can be 
introduced here (VI.2). 
We also find a large group of Arab and Muslim actors that are regarded as similar to a certain 
degree. Some of those actors reveal a certain similarity with the Self, either because they share the 
views of the Self but are not able to accomplish them in their own societies or communities, or 
because they share the disapproval of certain views with the Self. In both cases, what is crucial 
about those Others is that they are not really able to change those negative conditions. The third 
subchapter (VI.3) will give examples of those actor types. 
The fourth subchapter (VI.4) introduces actor types which summarize similar actors that are, 
however, critically observed by the Self with regard to their similarity. Especially after 9/11, this 
perspective on Arab and Muslim actors becomes increasingly relevant and reflects the increased 
uncertainty and skepticism that arose from the 9/11 attacks with respect to the Arab and Muslim 
Other. Those actors are only seemingly similar to the Self, and are thus difficult to classify with 
regard to their relationship and distance towards the Self. Boundaries between Self and Other 
seem to blur here because either the Other or the Self strategically conceals the difference 
between the own group and the respective counterpart. 
Last but not least, Arabs and Muslim can also form a mirror image of the German and U.S. 
concept of self. Some actors are described in German and U.S. print media as positive and only 
possess features or reflect standards and principles that the Self regards as central for its own 
society as well. The fifth subchapter (VI.5) will introduce actor types that fall into this category. 
These similar Arabs and Muslims are quantitatively least relevant and are simply eclipsed by the 
dominant quantitative occurrence of the negative or ambivalent and weakened Arabs and 
Muslims. Furthermore, they are also less relevant with regard to their qualitative significance for 
the different topics and issues that are discussed in German and U.S. media. 
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Subchapter six (VI.6), finally, discusses how internal Arabs and Muslims, i.e. Arab and Muslim 
immigrants and minorities in Germany or the United States, are distinguished and distanced from 
the national concepts of self of both countries. I show that geographical distance is not the 
crucial criterion to distinguish between German and U.S. Self and Arab and Muslim Other. 
Similar to external Arabs and Muslims, also internal Arabs and Muslims are distinguished 
according to different degrees of similarity with the Self. Some internal actors possess a large 
difference and distance to the German or American concepts of self and belonging; others reveal 
a rather high degree of similarity or are even portrayed as part of the national Self (the latter being 
the case for some actors in the American media especially). Compared to that, internal Arabs and 
Muslims in the German context are viewed much more skeptically and are to a large extent still 
regarded as different, mainly due to their religion and cultural facets, but also and especially after 
9/11 due to the suspicion of terrorism that is expressed by the Self with reference to the internal 
Others. 
CHAPTER SEVEN summarizes the basic findings of the analysis with regard to the research 
aims that were outlined in the beginning (VII.1-3). I discuss the benefits and the limits of the 
introduced study, and give suggestions for further studies (VII.4). One central result of the media 
analysis is, for instance, that Arabs and Muslims are predominantly constructed as different from 
the national Self in German and U.S. media, but that both countries also appreciate and portray 
similarities between German and U.S. Self and Arab and Muslim actors and countries. The 
criteria according to which Arabs and Muslims are evaluated can be summarized as a basic set of 
Western principles, values, and ideals that are used by both Germany and the U.S. to deal with 
the complexity of their environment and to either integrate the Other in the national concept of 
self or exclude it from it. 
The analysis shows that the perception of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. mass media is 
significantly shaped by the national concept of self of both countries. Furthermore, the 
observation of Arabs and Muslims is not an objective process, since the national concept of self 
is regarded as the ideal. The observation of Arabs and Muslims is additionally shaped and 
distorted by certain myths that have an influence on the evaluation of those people. Even though 
events like the 9/11 attacks do not create images of Arabs and Muslims, they may strengthened 
certain assumptions about and facets of the observed outgroup that were already part of the 
image before the event. The 9/11 attacks can thus rather be seen as a catalyst that sharpened the 
focus on Arabs and Muslims and intensified the attempts of the German and U.S. Self to 
distance and demarcate itself from large parts of this focused group. 
Finally, it is emphasized that further studies should thus look more closely at the constructions of 
self and otherness with regard to other ethnic groups, countries and actors to see whether the 
introduced forms of portrayal are reduced to the group of Arabs and Muslims or not. In addition 
to that, studies should also focus on the question of the impact that the constructions of Self and 
Other (and the images that result from those differentiation processes) may have – not only on 
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the members of the ingroup, i.e. of the German or U.S. society and their view and perception of 
Arabs and Muslims, but also on the portrayed Other. 
The book closes with some final remarks on the question whether we are able to unmake 
difference. 
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I. THE STATE OF RESEARCH 
Let us, first of all, look at those studies that have already been done on the questions that are 
relevant for the following analysis. The two research areas that might help to answer those 
questions are studies that – so far – have either looked at national and Western self-perceptions 
and identity construction, or analyzed the images of Arabs and Muslims in Western mass media. 
In the following two subchapters, the most relevant of those studies with regard to our research 
questions will be introduced. 
 
1. German and American National Self-Perceptions 
First of all, we will take a closer look at the aspect of German and American national self-
perception: In general, people may ascribe themselves to a number of different social groups or 
culturally relevant parameters. They can be members of a certain ethnic group, of a political 
party, of a family; they can have a certain life style, or be devoted to a certain kind of music. What 
is central for the following analysis however, is the membership of individuals to a national, or 
even transnational, collectivity and the criteria that are consulted by the members of this 
collectivity to describe and define this group concept. 
When we look at existing scientific approaches to learn more about such concepts as national 
identity, nationalism, or nation states, we are confronted with a wide-ranging research field. As 
this book does not aim to review the whole of this research field, we will in the following only 
look at selective studies that may offer an idea of what national self-images can be identified in 
Germany and the United States, and that may help to understand the German and American 
perspective on other countries. 
In a first step, we will approach the concept of a national self-perception in more general terms 
to define what we are looking at in the context of this analysis. It has to be noted, first of all, that 
in most studies the self-concept is equated with the term “identity”: As Poole (1999) argues, 
“when we imagine the nation we do not merely construct an object of consciousness but we also 
form a conception of ourselves as existing in relation to that object” (Poole 1999: 12). Thus, 
members of a nation also recognize themselves through their concept of nation, and according to 
Poole, the nation is therefore also a form of identity, since it exists as an object of consciousness 
(Poole 1999: 13). Thus, when in the following we talk of national self-perceptions this largely 
refers to what most of the authors that are quoted would refer to as national identity as well. 
The basic elements that are regarded as relevant for a national self-conception can be 
summarized as follows. According to Poole (1999), national (and other collective) self-concepts 
have two sides. On the one side, people conceive themselves as belonging to a certain imagined 
community and on the other side, the respective concept of community informs the way in 
which those people live, relate with others, and thus are located in their social environment 
(Poole 1999: 11). Hereby, constructionist views like that of Anderson (2005) regard nations less 
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as a material phenomenon but more as a concept of belief, which thus have to be regarded as a 
constructed concept of collectivity. However, national concepts of belonging also have real 
effects: As other approaches argue, nations as national group concepts have become a material 
reality, since they are institutionalized, for instance, in the education system, political and social 
rituals, cultural institutions, and the media (Piper 1998: 54).1 
Nevertheless, approaching the concept of a national collectivity from a constructivist point of 
view, it is relevant to emphasize that an objective, fixed, and overall definition of such a concept 
cannot be given. Therefore the following analysis does not strive for a comparison of the ways in 
which national group concepts are constructed and communicated in German and American 
mass media with a fixed definition or even a written document that objectively defines the 
German or American national identity. Such a universal definition does not exist. National 
identities are permanently negotiated and defined in the context of different situations, under 
different circumstances, and with different attempts and aims, and they can be relevant to a 
different degree depending on those circumstances. 
We may come to a different result, for example, when we analyze political speeches, watch a 
German or American movie in which this question is debated, or ask people in the street about 
their national self-concept. In Germany, the Bundeszentrale für Politische Bildung (BPB), for 
instance, on its website summarizes central facts about German institutions and principles. In this 
context, the BPB also lists some basic rules for social life as they are written down in the German 
Constitution and other documents. In the United States, the same formal definition for social 
rules can be found in such documents as the Declaration of Independence, the U.S. Constitution, 
or the amended Bill of Rights. Those documents to some extent also reflect upon the definition 
of being American or German and define the criteria that are crucial for this national self-
concept. 
This rather basic self-definition on the basis of certain documents can be augmented with a few 
more abstract theoretical aspects that are also relevant for a national self-concept. As a number of 
authors have defined it, we can summarize four central elements that form the basis of national 
sentiment.2 
Every national group concept is centrally defined by a commonly shared territory that forms the 
space for which the identity is defined. Herb (2004) refers to this aspect of national identity as 
territorial differentiation, in which a bounded geographic entity is created by excluding other 
geographic entities and the people associated with them (Dittmer 2005: 633; originally Herb 
2004: 144). Thus, a certain homeland territory can be seen as the literal ground for a national 
identity. 
Second, the sharing of a culture and a common history, i.e. of collective symbols, values, 
principles and myths, national heroes, historic sites, or battlefields is also crucial for a national 
                                                           
1 See also Heckmann (1992). 
2 See for instance Billig (1995), Bohn and Hahn (2002), Dittmer (2005), Gauger (1984), Poole (1999), Salazar (1998), 
or Schirmer (1998). 
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identity. Especially a commonly shared language is regarded as relevant. Furthermore, in the 
context of public debates on national identities there is often discussion of what values, ideals 
and norms shape a society and are crucial for its members. As Haque (1995) argues, “values are 
basic to a culture because they provide a framework for evaluating what is desirable or 
undesirable, admirable or despicable, in life and society” (Haque 1995: 21). Thus, values and 
commonly shared societal principles can be seen as the standards or criteria that guide the actions 
of a group’s members and provide a pattern with which the members of the group can structure, 
evaluate, and understand their environment (Haque 1995: 21-22). Certain ideal models like that 
of a democratic, free, and open society and other worldviews can have a crucial meaning for the 
formation and cohesion of a nation, as they define more or less the rules for the members of this 
collectivity. Or, as mentioned in the first pages of this book, when German politicians ask for 
stronger integration of Muslims in the German society, they often ask those Muslims (and 
immigrants in general) to declare their belief in the German values and norms. And a commonly 
shared history provides stories of triumphs, tragedies, victories, and betrayals that shape the 
national collectivity (Poole 1999: 17).3 
Third, ethnicity or, as Salazar (1998) labels it, the idea of “myths of descent,” is regarded as 
crucial for the membership of this national collectivity insofar as it raises the criterion of 
common origin. The sharing of a culture and ethnicity may also be labeled as territorial bonding. 
As Herb (2004) defines it, this bonding creates a common emotional linkage to a territory, which 
enables citizens to establish the notion of a collective “we” (Dittmer 2005: 633; originally Herb 
2004: 153). 
And finally, Salazar (1998) mentions the state as a fourth element of the national sentiment that 
supplies the institutional, ideological, and structural frame for its members (see Salazar 1998: 116-
119). The institution of national citizenship, and citizenship or immigration laws, for instance, 
can be seen as mechanisms for a nation state to determine on a political and legal level who is a 
member of a nation and who is not, since this granting or denial of membership is combined 
with privileges, like political participation or residence rights, that non-citizens do not have. 
At the same time, what may also be relevant for the context of our analysis are approaches that 
have looked at the dimension of individual feelings and attitudes and have explored the way in 
which national self-concepts shape the interaction of people. On a social-psychological and 
individual dimension, a number of studies have in addition analyzed the way in which the 
individual acquires its own identity and how individuals integrate or demarcate others from their 
own collective group. As Mummendey and Simon (1997) have noticed,4 feelings of dislike of 
other groups or the degree of self-reflection are crucial for a group’s perception of the 
                                                           
3 A large part of the research on national identities and self-images focuses on the historical formation of nation 
states and the nationalism and collective identities that accompany or have resulted from this state formation 
process. See here for instance Anderson (2005), Billig (1995), Greenfeld (1992), Llobera (1994), or Mann (1992). 
4 But see also Tajfel (1982) or Turner (1987). 
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environment and of other groups, and can be taken as possible explanations for such phenomena 
as racism, xenophobia, or group-focused enmity.5 
But also other sociological perspectives can be mentioned here. As Stäheli and Stichweh (2002) 
have outlined, poststructuralist approaches have looked at the constitution of identities as a 
precarious process of identification, which inevitably depends on creating an area of exclusion 
and the excluded. In this context, poststructuralists mainly look at the processes and modes of 
drawing frontiers, or at the way in which the included is affected by those whom he or she 
excludes. Thus, identity definition is constantly negotiated (Stäheli and Stichweh 2002: 3). And 
systems theory has also looked at collective identities – here mainly in the context of inclusion 
and exclusion processes, arguing mainly that these twin concepts are a correlate of functional 
differentiation (Stäheli and Stichweh 2002: 3-4). According to this perspective, no individual is 
completely integrated into only one function system, but can be included in different systems and 
concepts of collectivity as well, which would mean that the national self-concept is not the only 
concept that forms the perspective of individuals on their environment. Nevertheless, the authors 
argue that inclusion necessarily implies the counter-concept of exclusion, and thus indicate what 
will be of relevance for the following work as well, namely that the possibility of universal overall 
inclusion of individuals cannot be achieved. 
Therefore, we can first and foremost summarize here that it is the commonly shared values, 
histories, territories, and experiences that form a collectivity, create a social unity, and form a 
perception of belonging. Thus, what is emphasized when the national Self defines its own group 
are aspects like the commonly shared religion, descent, language, history, but also the society’s 
own institutions and structures. At the same time, those self-concepts also shape the way in 
which the national collective group perceives others, i.e. other national groups or, in more general 
terms, its environment. But before we turn to this “outside” Other, a few words will be added 
about the basic features that are assumed to shape the German and American national self-
concept as it can be derived from the state of research so far: The following summary does not 
aim at drawing a complete and absolute picture and definition of both countries’ self-images, of 
course, since that would form a research project of its own. 
The first aspect that has been distinguished with regard to the self-concepts of both Germany 
and the United States is the distinction between an individualistic, civic nationalism and a 
particularistic nationalism. As, for example, Piper (1998) defines it, the first form of nationalism 
principally regards nationality as open and voluntaristic, and the United States is regarded as one 
example here. Particularistic nationalism summarizes the perception that nationality is seen as 
inherent, and Germany can serve as an example here (Piper 1998: 53). This difference has 
consequences for the way both countries deal with their own identity definition. 
 
                                                           
5 See for instance the numerous studies of the research group of Heitmeyer et al. that have been published for 
example in DEUTSCHE ZUSTÄNDE (2003-2007). 
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German National Collectivity 
According to Schirmer (1998), the traditional German identity rests primarily on the nonpolitical 
and supposedly primordial factors of a homogenous ethnicity or descent and a common language 
and culture. As Schirmer (1998) emphasizes, even during the forty years of the German division 
both regimes agreed on a commonly shared culture and a commonly shared language. This 
culture consists, for instance, of cultural heroes like Goethe and Schiller, or legendary heroes that 
“emerge from the deep and dark world of ancient Teutonic myths,” like Barbarossa or Hermann 
(Schirmer 1998: 117). 
A number of studies on German nationalism have focused on the historical development of the 
Germany nation state, and have specifically looked at the development of the German national 
identity in the context of the Third Reich or the impact of the German division on the national 
concepts after World War II.6 As Piper (1998) argues, German national consciousness developed 
very rapidly in the beginning of the nineteenth century, and was largely initiated by the educated 
middle classes (the “Bildungsbürgertum”). Central elements of the developing character of 
German national consciousness are the German language, the emphasis of territory, and 
membership based on inheritance (Piper 1998: 56; Schirmer 1998: 117). Especially the aspect of 
language has remained crucial for German identity until today, as the discussions about the 
naturalization and integration of immigrants reflect. 
After World War II and as a result of extreme nationalism and the indoctrination of a national 
identity concept that was strictly based on racial purity and demarcation, the German self-concept 
was shattered: As Piper (1998) argues, the complete destruction in 1945, the experiences of 
atrocities and the feeling of shame and guilt resulted in a self-image that reflected fragility and 
ambiguity. In the collective consciousness, the self-definition as German was regarded as highly 
problematic, and a positive self-image was now emotionally burdened and not possible, since the 
memory of National Socialism blocked the positive use of nationalism as a source of identity. 
Thus, and as Piper (1998), Schirmer (1998), and others have outlined,7 this either led to a 
complete and total rejection of any national reference, or national “pride” was deflected to other 
forms of positive self-conception that were shaped for instance by a high degree of “economic 
patriotism” or led to a stronger integration into transnational political and other alliances like 
NATO8 or the European Union (EU) (Piper 1998: 66). 
European integration can be seen as a substitute for a national identity. The positive parameters 
of this transnational group concept became economic growth, prosperity, individual wealth, 
social peace, and international recognition (Schirmer 1998: 118). As a result, as Knischewski 
(1996) remarks, Germans strongly identify with the economic achievements of the country and 
emphasize the social security system, but at the same time they also reveal a strong fixation on 
                                                           
6 For the historical development of the German nation state and national identity, see, for instance, Piper (1998), 
Weidenfeld and Korte (1991), or Weigelt (1984). 
7 Piper (1998) here largely refers to Weidenfeld and Korte (1991). 
8 North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
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crises and anxieties and a strong need for security with regard to those achievements 
(Knischewski 1996: 130-131). 
One group that is frequently discussed to threaten the economic security but more recently also 
the security of the public safety is the group of immigrants, which brings us to a second aspect 
that shaped the German self-perception since World War II – the shift from being an emigration 
country to a country that has now increasingly experienced large-scale net immigration over 
recent decades. This immigration was to some extent actively pushed due to work migration 
processes. But apart from the influx of guest workers and their families, also a large number of 
refugees came to the country. This immigration has confronted the country with a new 
permanent “foreign” population of a considerable size (Piper 1998: 62-63), and has also 
challenged the question of German national citizenship, an aspect that will become relevant in 
the following analysis with regard to the internal Arabs and Muslims as well. The influx of 
immigrants led to the establishment of “new” ethnic minorities. However, as Piper (1998) argues, 
this fact was for a very long time “ignored” more or less by a German policy towards immigrant 
groups that maintained a legal and political distinction between German citizens and foreigners. 
This growing immigration, however, challenged the traditional concept of the German nation 
that asked for blood-relatedness to gain citizenship and be naturalized (Piper 1998: 66). To this 
day, Germany struggles with the notion of being an immigration country, and the aspect of 
belonging and what criteria are required for membership are still debated controversially. It is 
especially this struggle that we have to keep in mind when we look at the way in which Arabs and 
Muslims within Germany are portrayed in German mass media. 
 
American National Collectivity 
Very similar to the German identity concept, the United States is characterized by a collective 
identity concept that is founded on political values, and here foremost the symbolic duality of 
democracy and freedom. Like the German self-concept, the American identity concept is also 
characterized by an emphasis on common Enlightenment values like liberty, freedom, 
democracy, equality, individualism, and self-government (Dittmer 2005: 630). This common 
consensus about basic values, beliefs, and political principles is expressed in a number of 
historical texts or cultural symbols like the Statue of Liberty etc. The wealth of the country, and 
the confidence and optimism that flowed from it, have formed a strong belief in a secure and 
prosperous future of the country. The American culture is shaped by a well-known set of 
national heroes or semi-divinities like former presidents such as Abraham Lincoln, scriptures like 
the Constitution and the Declaration of Independence, and mythic narrations that relate to the 
American Dream, a commonly shared notion of individual freedom, equal opportunity, and the 
pursuit of happiness (Schirmer 1998: 101-102). 
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What is mainly referred to in scientific discourse when American self-conceptions are discussed is 
the notion of the American “civil religion.” First introduced by Bellah in 1967,9 the term refers to 
a set of values, symbols, and rituals that are institutionalized as the central framework for the 
America national collectivity. As a concept that follows the rhetoric of religion, it draws certain 
guidelines for the American Self and provides the basis for the foundation mythology that shapes 
the American self-perception and that promotes the notion of a commonly shared mission and 
exceptionalism of the American people. According to Bellah (2005), this foundation mythology 
includes the assumption that the American people are regarded as “God’s chosen people” who 
have fled from the political and religious repression of the “old world” (Europe) and have 
established a new country in the “promised land” (Bellah 2005: 45-46). These religious notions of 
the founding myth of the nation have outlived their Puritan origin and can be traced into the 
present, for instance in political rhetoric (see also Vorländer 2001: 23-25). This aspect of the 
American self-perception may become relevant when we look at the way in which other nations 
(and here especially Arab and Muslim ones) are perceived from the American mass media 
perspective. 
Another aspect that contributes to this notion of exceptionalism is that the country is not 
founded on supposedly primordial factors such as ethnic and cultural homogeneity, tradition, or 
language, since the country was mainly formed by immigration (Schirmer 1998: 101). According 
to Han (2000), one of the dominant ideological concepts that shaped the immigration history of 
the United States up to the 1950s was that it is possible to completely integrate and even 
assimilate the large numbers of immigrants that came to the country every year, and to form a 
single American society across different ethnicities, races, and cultural differences. This ideology 
never fully reflected the American reality, since American society was always shaped by racial and 
ethnic discrimination as well, as slavery and immigration regulations like the Immigration Act of 
1924 indicate.10 Integration was long equated with the simple assimilation of the immigrants into 
a dominant White Anglo-Saxon Protestant (WASP) culture. Nevertheless, and especially with the 
ideological idea of “cultural pluralism” that has developed since the 1950s,11 the American self-
perception of being a nation of people of remarkably diverse racial, religious, and ethnic origins 
and variety has strengthened (Han 2000: 289-292). 
As Mintzel (1997) summarizes it, the central aim of this integration still is the melting of the 
immigrants into a new “race” of men on the basis of new universalistic ideas (Mintzel 1997: 60). 
This aspect may become relevant again when we look at the perception of Arab and Muslim 
immigrants in the United States as it is reflected in mass media portrayals. Maidment and 
McGrew (1991) argue, that even though other states also possess a social and religious diversity, 
                                                           
9 As one source, for a reprint of this article see for instance Bellah (2005; reprint) but also Bellah and Hammond 
(1980). 
10 This act set up a quota system for immigration according to which the quota for immigrants from non-European 
and eastern European countries were drastically lowered, whereas the quota for north-western European nations 
remained high, to prevent further changes in the ethnic composition of American society. See also Bernard (1998) or 
Marger (1991). 
11 I.e. the idea that ethnic groups can also be integrated into the American culture without losing their own cultural 
heritage 
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what characterizes the American self-perception is that people see themselves as “a people apart” 
who possess a unique past and regard themselves as destined to be the “chosen” people to 
establish and promote a new social order – and thus see themselves as exceptional (Maidment 
and McGrew 1991: 12-16).12 
Altogether, what can be said about the analyses that have been introduced so far is that they do 
not mainly refer to mass media contexts in their discussions of national identity concepts and 
construction processes. Furthermore, they only marginally discuss more closely those people that 
are not regarded as members of a nation. Some of the authors do mention or refer to the outside 
of a national concept of belonging. Dittmer (2005), for instance, argues that central group values 
like liberty, freedom, or equality have to be contrasted against other nations to become 
meaningful, thus indicating that an Other is relevant and has to be consulted to define the Self. 
Other authors indicate that identity concepts work with the process of social comparison, within 
a national context but also towards an outside Other. For example, in their definition of national 
identity Bohn and Hahn (2002) have also pointed out that this identity cannot be produced 
without a corresponding definition of the foreign (see Bohn and Hahn 2002: 21-23). This foreign 
could also be called an Other and thus does not automatically have to be located in another 
country, but can also represent an ethnic minority or immigrant group within the national 
boundaries. For the following analysis we should keep in mind these aspects when we look at the 
way in which Arabs and Muslims are described in German and American mass media. 
However, as noted before in the analyses that have been mentioned so far, this other side from 
which a German or U.S. national self-concept is demarcated is mostly not further examined. 
Therefore, as our second research question aims at identifying and explaining the perception of 
Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. society (and mass media in particular), we may take a 
second look at those studies that have already studied Arab and Muslim mass media images. 
 
2. Arab and Muslim Mass Media Images 
The studies that can be mentioned here differ mainly according to their focus. They either 
analyze the foreign news coverage on Arab and Muslim countries, or they look at the way in 
which internal Arabs and Muslims in Germany or the United States are portrayed in the media. 
 
2.1. External Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Mass Media 
When we look at foreign news coverage, the imaging of Arab and Muslim countries and actors 
becomes relevant, for example, in contexts where certain events, conflicts, crises, violent acts (like 
terrorism), or even wars are focused on in Arab and Muslim countries. Thus, one field of media 
research has looked at the way in which Arab and Muslim actors and countries are portrayed in 
                                                           
12 For further elaborations on American exceptionalism and the historical development of American national identity 
see, for instance, Maidment and McGrew (1991). 
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foreign news coverage on those events. Such events are, for example, the Iranian Revolution in 
1978-79, the Iranian hostage crisis, or the war in Lebanon in 1982. 
The first author that might be mentioned here is Ghareeb (1983) who has compiled studies that 
look at the role of the media in shaping American perceptions of Arabs and, in this context, has 
pointed out some of the exaggerations with which mass media work. One part of the book 
presents interviews with American journalists in which the imbalances in the American media are 
discussed. In the second part, the media products are focused on more closely. In this context, a 
number of different authors look at the image of the Arabs on American television, Arab 
stereotyping in contemporary American political cartoons, or the effect of American perceptions 
of Arabs on Middle Eastern news coverage. One article that is especially relevant for the context 
of the following analysis analyzes the U.S. print media and TV news coverage of events like the 
Iranian Revolution, the Iran-Iraq war of 1980-88, or the war in Lebanon in 1982. 
According to Ghareeb (1983), the war in Lebanon offers a good example of the superficial and 
distorted coverage of Middle Eastern issues by the American media. The author especially 
criticizes that during the seven years of the “Lebanon crisis” the media and many Middle East 
experts rarely looked at the Lebanese side of the conflict but tended to see the crisis mainly as 
one between Israel and Palestine.13 This changed, however, with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon 
and the bombing and occupation of West Beirut in 1982. As Ghareeb (1983) argues, this incident 
led to greater objectivity and balance in the coverage not only of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
but also of the Lebanese side and a stronger focus on the victims of this conflict (Ghareeb 1983: 
164-186). 
In the same book, McDavid (1983) has especially looked at the different stages of news coverage 
of the TV networks and the print media coverage that went from a simple adoption of the Israeli 
perspective on the conflict to an increasingly critical perspective which also led to a public debate 
on the question of how biased U.S. politics and media should be towards Israel (McDavid 1983: 
299-300). As Ghareeb (1983) argues, especially the Israeli government’s mishandling of the press 
and the attempts to influence the coverage by heavy censorship increased the doubts about “the 
wisdom or humanness of Israeli’s actions” (Ghareeb 1983: 184). 
In both Germany and the United States we also find a number of analyses that look at the media 
coverage of the 1991 Gulf War.14 Artz and Pollock (1995), for example, have done a rhetorical 
analysis of the dominant images of the Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi people in 
several different American newspapers from August to December 1990. The authors point out 
that the American media’s “symbolic aggression” against Iraq in the context of the Gulf War may 
                                                           
13 The author refers mainly to the second civil war that started in 1975 and was closely interwoven with the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict due to the increasing political activity of Palestinian guerrilla groups against Israel that was carried 
out from Lebanese territory and caused retaliatory attacks by the Israeli military against Lebanon. In 1982, Israeli 
military forces invaded the country and bombed and occupied West Beirut. The PLO (Palestinian Liberation 
Organization) and its military forces were driven out of Lebanon. 
14 In addition to the authors mentioned here, see also Liebes (1992) who looked at the differences in the news 
coverage on the First Palestinian Intifada (1987-1994) and the Gulf War in 1991 in American and Israeli television, 
or Bennett and Paletz (1991). 
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also explain the high degree of public support for the American offensive in the Persian Gulf. 
And Palmbach and Kempf (1994), for example, analyzed – from a social-psychological point of 
view – the construction of the hostile stereotype of Saddam Hussein in German national 
newspapers in the context of the 1991 Gulf War. Altogether we can say that Saddam Hussein is 
the centrally focused actor in the context of this event. 
Similar to that, but focusing on yet another enemy, Iversen (2004) compared the image of Osama 
bin Laden, the man behind the 9/11 attacks, with that of Timothy McVeigh, the man who killed 
168 people with a car bomb in Oklahoma city in 1995.15 Among other things, the author’s 
analysis is guided by the question, how different or similar American (McVeigh) and non-
American (bin Laden) Evil are represented in the selected American news magazines. Iversen 
(2004) argues here that in the American perception after 9/11, bin Laden presents the evil 
manifestation of the Oriental Other. 
Apart from those studies that have been introduced so far and that mainly focus on certain 
events, another set of studies analyzed the portrayal of certain Arab and Muslim countries in the 
news media over a certain timeframe. In the American context, Mousa (1984), for example, has 
done a content analysis of articles in the NEW YORK TIMES between 1917 and 1947 that focus on 
the Middle East, presenting a very broad analysis of a timeframe that is rarely focused. In another 
early analysis, Belkaoui (1978) compared the images of Arabs and Israelis in the American press 
between 1966 and 1974 in the context of a variety of Middle Eastern issues.16 The author hereby 
looks at a broad spectrum of different Arab countries that are directly or indirectly involved in 
the conflict between Israel and Palestine. 
One very comprehensive study on Arab and Muslim countries can be found in the anthology 
THE U.S. MEDIA AND THE MIDDLE EAST: IMAGE AND PERCEPTION that was edited by 
Kamalipour (1995). In this book, Zaharna (1995) described the historical development of the 
perception and depiction of the Palestinian people and its leadership from 1948 until 1993. Here, 
the author especially highlights the transformation of the Palestinian image in U.S. media from 
invisibility to high visibility and illustrates the change from a direct opposition of the images of 
the leadership as the “villain” and the Palestinian people as the “victims” or “helpless refugees” 
to an increasing congruence of both images. In two other studies in the book, Naficy (1995) 
looked at the representation of the Muslim country of Iran in American popular culture since the 
Iranian revolution in 1978-79, whereas Bieber-Roberts (1995) analyzed the American perspective 
on Turkey from 1950 to 1990.17 Similarly, Quandt (1995) analyzed the image of Turkey in 
German print media and TV channels over a timeframe of two months in 1995, and Gür (1998) 
                                                           
15 The qualitative analysis of nine articles focuses on the American news magazines TIME INTERNATIONAL and 
NEWSWEEK. The author compared the portraits of both men in the different articles. 
16 The content analysis included the American news magazines TIME, NEWSWEEK, U.S. NEWS, and WORLD 
REPORT, and the Sunday NEW YORK TIMES. Furthermore, the results of the media analysis were combined and 
compared with opinion poll data that reflected public opinion towards both groups. 
17 All of the authors used a large variety of different methods: Zaharna (1995) did a qualitative content analysis, 
whereas Naficy (1995) used psychoanalytical approaches. 
I. State of Research 
 - 21 -
has done a content analysis of the Turkish image in German national newspapers from 1987 to 
1995, here especially looking at the portrayal of the relationship between Turkey and the EU. 
Especially interesting for the research questions of the following analysis is the study of Hashem 
(1995). The author has done a quantitative analysis of the complexity of the media portrayal of 
Arabs in the American news magazines TIME and NEWSWEEK over a time period of four years 
(1990-93). In this context, Hashem (1995) gathered all relevant terms that are used to describe 
the occurring Arab actors in the two news magazines, and classified them into favorable, neutral, 
and unfavorable terms to derive the attitudes of the respective media towards those actors. 
For the German context, the most comprehensive and for our context most interesting study so 
far was carried out by Hafez (2002), who analyzed the image of Islam and the Middle East in the 
German press over a timeframe of nearly fifty years (1947-94).18 The study identifies and 
summarizes the image of the region and of Islamic religion in German print media, and offers a 
comprehensive overview over the major topics, focused countries, and the general tendency of 
the news coverage on Middle Eastern countries and Islam. A detailed summary of his results will 
not be given here (for more details see Hafez 2002) but it can be noted that for the German 
context the study presents an important groundwork research about the media perspective on the 
Middle East and Islam in Western Germany since the 1950s. 
A longtime analysis for the U.S. media context, covering the timeframe between 1945 and 2003, 
has been done by McAlister (2005) who examined how popular culture has shaped the 
parameters of U.S. national political or economic interests in the Middle East. As the author 
argues on a very broad level, U.S. foreign policy, while grounded in material and military realities, 
is also developed in a cultural context. As a consequence, the U.S. understanding of the Middle 
East is to a large extent shaped by the way in which this region is reviewed in the news media and 
popular culture. McAlister (2005) argues, for that “to understand these multifaceted relationships 
[between the U.S. and the Middle East] we must consider the politics of representation: that is 
the negotiation of political and moral values, as well as the development of an uneven and 
contested public understanding of history and its significance” (McAlister 2005: 3). 
Last but not least, one author that also has to be mentioned here, even though his analyses have 
mainly focused on television and American film portrayals, is Shaheen (1984, 2001). His film and 
television analyses are among the most comprehensive and keen studies on the use and 
formation of Arab and Muslim stereotypes and one-sided negative images in the American mass 
media. Even though basically focusing on television and film images of Arabs and Muslims, his 
results have been picked up and quoted by a large number of scholars. Furthermore, the images 
that can be derived from television and film also have to be seen as a basis for the imaging that is 
done in the press, and both sides influence each other, since popular culture and news reports do 
not operate in a vacuum but observe and influence each other. 
                                                           
18 In a combination of a quantitative long-term analysis and qualitative case studies 
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The majority of these introduced studies note that altogether Arab and Muslim countries and 
actors are predominantly focused on in the context of political and violent conflicts and 
incidents. Hashem (1995), for instance, reports that both of the news magazines he analyzed 
extensively discuss the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in the Middle East. And also for the German 
context, Hafez (2002) notes that the German focus on the Middle East mainly concentrates on 
political issues, followed by economic topics as the second most relevant focus. Compared to 
that, cultural, religious, or social issues are only minor relevant (Hafez 2002: 114-127). 
A number of the authors have identified and often also emphatically emphasize negative actor 
images. Others argue that since the news coverage predominantly concentrates on violence and 
conflicts, the majority of the images of occurring actors are also shaped by the negative contexts 
in which they appear. For example, El-Farra (1996) reports that newspapers often use certain key 
terms like “extremists,” “terrorists” and “fanatics” to describe Arab actors. The author claims 
that this form of portrayal, “these distortions of the Arab people” may be seen as one cause for 
the general mistrust and dislike for Arabs among Americans (El-Farra 1996: 1).19 
Similarly, Ghareeb (1983) reports that in U.S. media up to the 1970s Arab countries have been 
predominantly contrasted with Israel, and that this contrast created an image of overall 
backwardness compared to the portrayal of the Western-oriented, middle-class Israelis. 
Furthermore, despite major differences among Arab states, the press mainly classifies all Arabs as 
part of one great mass. As Ghareeb (1983) argues, “Arabs are portrayed as either desert-dwelling 
Bedouins or millionaires; little attention is paid to the strong urban and rural origins of the vast 
majority of the Arab people” (Ghareeb 1983: 22-23). Most mass media also miss out on including 
information about the origins and history of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in their news coverage 
(Ghareeb 1983: 19). Artz and Pollock (1995) even argue that American media’s symbolic 
aggression against Iraq in the context of the Gulf War and the media employment of culturally 
acceptable anti-Arab images can be seen as one explanation for the predominant public support 
for the American offensive in the Persian Gulf (Artz and Pollock 1995: 120-121). Altogether, 
most of the previous studies come to the conclusion that the overall image of external Arabs and 
Muslims in German and U.S. mass media is negative. 
However, some authors also trace positive images in the analyzed media. McDavid (1983), for 
instance, argues that the U.S. news coverage on the war in Lebanon in 1982 is – in the beginning 
of the crisis – strongly influenced by the censorship of information that was given out by the 
Israeli government and military. However, in the course of the conflict the U.S. media 
increasingly went beyond reporting the official Israeli version, and in the latter stages of the 
conflict even moved towards a more objective news coverage that also produced more positive 
images of the Lebanese side (McDavid 1983: 299-300). And Belkaoui (1978) argues that the 
                                                           
19 El-Farra (1996) notes in this context that when the same acts are presented in connection with non-Arab actors 
the press seems to be more eager to communicate a more neutral and less biased and one-sided image. One example 
he refers to in this context for the American news coverage is the construction of McVeigh, the Oklahoma City 
bomber. Within minutes after the attack, the American press had assumed that the culprit had to be an Arab or Arab 
American. Raised with unpopular stereotypes of Arabs, the American public was quick to develop images of Arab 
terrorists destroying American property, especially with the 1993 World Trade Center bombing in mind. 
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serious American press at that time has a rather contradictory perception of Arab actors (and 
here especially Arab leaders), in the course of the analyzed time shifting from a negative villain 
image to more positive hero images (Belkaoui 1978: 737-38). 
Nevertheless, according to El-Farra (1996) these positive images in most cases only exist as long 
as the focused countries remain positively affiliated with the U.S. on foreign policy issues (El-
Farra 1996: 2-3). Similar to that, also in Hashem’s study (1995) it is noted that even though the 
portrayal of the occurring actors is mostly negative, a somewhat positive shift can also be 
identified over the analyzed time period, which the author mainly puts down to new alliances that 
resulted from the 1991 Gulf War and certain improvements in the peace negotiation process 
between Palestine and Israel (Hashem 1995: 159-160). Last but not least, Shaheen (1984, 2001) 
also admits that a small number of television documentaries and films can be found in his 
analyzed data set that have attempted to present a more accurate portrayal of Arabs and also of 
Arab and Muslim Americans, but that the image of Arabs presented in entertainment programs 
and film can still be summarized as predominantly negative. This image can be broadly 
summarized with a quote from Shaheen (1984) who in his first study outlined four major myths 
that shape the Arab and Muslim stereotype: 
They are all fabulously wealthy, they are barbarians and uncultured, they are sex maniacs with a penchant 
for white slavery, and they revel in acts of terrorism. (Shaheen 1984: 4) 
Thus, the introduced studies already indicate that not all Arab and Muslim actors are bad guys, 
enemies, or fanatics, but that positive images are still quantitatively rare. 
 
2.2. Internal Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Media 
A second research field focuses on the internal media news coverage and the portrayal of ethnic 
minorities and “foreigners” in German and U.S. media.20 First of all, and before we look at those 
studies, a few words will be said about the societal background in Germany and the United States 
to see what and how many Arabs and Muslims do actually live in the two countries. This is also 
done to understand the slightly different research foci of both countries with regard to these 
internal Arabs and Muslims that will be outlined subsequent to that. 
 
 
 
                                                           
20 In German public discourse, the term “foreigner” is largely used to refer to all kinds of people with a “migration 
background,” i.e. who themselves or whose families have migrated to Germany and are thus of not of German 
ethnic origin. From a legal perspective, the German Federal Statistical Office distinguishes between “citizens” (which 
can also be people with a migration background who have already received German citizenship, like the so-called 
“Spätaussiedler” from Eastern Europe or former Turkish immigrants), “foreigners” (i.e. immigrants who have not 
yet received German citizenship or are only in residence for a certain period of time, for example because they are 
students) and “asylum seekers.” Depending on what categories are included when media or politicians refer to 
foreigners, this results in rather different numbers (for a more detailed overview of the different legal status groups 
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Arab and Muslim Minorities in German and U.S. Society 
According to the German Federal Statistical Office, by the end of 2005 the number of foreigners 
living in Germany was 7.7 million.21 Among those foreigners, Turkish immigrants form the 
largest immigration group. By the end of 2005, more than 1.7 million Turkish immigrants lived in 
Germany. These people are mainly descendants of so-called guest workers and their relatives who 
started coming to Germany in 1961. After the recruitment stop in 1973, many of the former 
guest workers (and their families who also immigrated to Germany to join them) stayed and 
settled permanently in the country. Turkish immigrants have now been in the country for three 
generations, some of them have received German citizenship. Nevertheless, in public discourse 
or in German mass media contexts, people of Turkish origin are often still perceived and referred 
to as “Turkish immigrants,” or they are labeled as “foreign.” 
But also other Arab and Muslim “foreigners” live in Germany. We also find immigrants from 
Morocco (71,600), Iran (61,800), Afghanistan (55,100), Lebanon (40,100), and Pakistan (30,000) 
in the country.22 Furthermore, there are a number of people from countries like Lebanon, Syria, 
Iran, Turkey, or Iraq who have applied for asylum and who are thus formally categorized as 
asylum seekers.23 
With regard to the religious affiliation to Islam in Germany, the BPB reported in 2004 that more 
than 3 million Muslims live in Germany.24 The majority of them have an immigration 
background, more than 700,000 of them are German citizens of which again only a small number 
is of German origin however. As the BPB reports, Muslims in Germany differ not only according 
to their ethnicity,25 but can also be distinguished with regard to their religious branches26 or their 
religious-political orientations.27 
Compared to that, in the United States the first wave of Arab immigrants arrived already in the 
late nineteenth and early twentieth century. These immigrants largely came from the province of 
Greater Syria in the Ottoman Empire, the area of present-day Lebanon and Syria. Later 
immigrants came from nearly every Arabic-speaking area. Since the 1970s, the influx of highly 
politicized immigrants from Palestine also led to an increasing political activism among Arab 
Americans, especially in the context of the Israeli conflict.28 The most recent immigrants have 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
for people with a migration background in Germany, see www.destatis.de/basis/d/bevoe/bevoetab9.php, accessed 
Jun 5, 2007. 
21 So-called “Spätaussiedler” are not included in these numbers, since they have German citizenship, even though 
they could be regarded as immigrants since they have only recently migrated to Germany. 
22 Figures from www.destatis.de/themen/d/thm_bevoelk.php, accessed June 5, 2007. 
23 The figures from the German Federal Statistical Office here are less significant since they only reflect how many 
applications for asylum have been made over a certain timeframe. The countries that have been listed here present 
some of those countries from which most asylum seekers have come who have applied for asylum in the timeframe 
between January and April 2007 (see also www.destatis.de/themen/d/thm_bevoelk.php or www.bamf.de). 
24 Figures from www.bpb.de/themen/G1RPNN,0,0,Was_ist_Islam.html, accessed June 5, 2007. 
25 Most of them being of Turkish, Bosnian, Arab, Pakistani, or Albanian origin. 
26 Most of them being Sunnis or Shiites. 
27 Being conservative-orthodox, Islamist, or secular. 
28 For instance, in 1973 the National Association of Arab Americans was founded to encourage political activity and 
to present a unified voice on the U.S. Middle East policy, and Arab and Muslim American interest groups 
increasingly criticized the unfavorable Arab images in the U.S. mass media in this context (Jackson 2001: 109-111). 
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been mainly Muslims, fleeing from wars and persecution not only in Arab countries but also in 
Sudan and Somalia (Jackson 2001: 109-111). 
Until 2001, quantitative data of a classification of Arab Americans as a distinct ethnic group were 
difficult to find, as, for instance, the U.S. Census 2000 did not list them as a distinct ethnic or 
cultural group, but classified them as whites and/or Caucasians,29 and only distinguished 
immigrants according to their national origin. However, in 2003 and 2005, the Census has 
subsequently issued two reports that specifically analyze the 2000 Census data with regard to the 
composition of the Arab population in the United States.30 This was done to contribute to the 
ongoing research about people in the U.S. who identify an Arab ancestry, and was especially 
influenced by the increasing criticism from the Arab community, as Naber (2000) has pointed 
out. According to those new Census reports, 1.2 million people in the U.S. reported Arab 
ancestry in 2000. The largest proportion of those people reported coming from Lebanon (one 
third of the Arab population), followed by people of Egyptian, Syrian, and Palestinian origin. 
Furthermore, 20 % of the Arab population identified their ancestry with the general term “Arab” 
or “Arabic.” 
Since not all Arabs are Muslims we can not automatically equate those numbers with the Muslim 
population in the U.S.31 However, and as a very recent study by the Pew Research Center (2007) 
has pointed out, there exists no reliable scientific count of Muslims in the United States. The 
Census does not give any information for the Muslim American proportion, since no religious 
information is tabulated. Thus the Pew Research Center has developed a survey-based study 
design to collect those numbers. This study estimates that about 2.35 million Muslims live in the 
United States. According to the study, and just like in the German context, the U.S. Muslim 
population consists predominantly of Muslim immigrants (72 %), but also includes U.S.-born 
Muslims and converts to Islam.32 These numbers do not solely include Muslims from Arab or 
Muslim countries in the Middle East or South East Asia, but also the large group of African 
American Muslims. 
Thus, altogether we can say that in both countries Arab and Muslim immigrants come from a 
variety of different countries, and that the majority of Muslims are of foreign origin. This short 
                                                           
29 Since the Census only classifies the American population according to race, we only find a distinction being made 
between five different races (white; black or African American; American Indian and Alaska Native; Asian; Native 
Hawaiian and Other Pacific Islander) – see also www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/race.html, accessed 
June 4, 2007. 
30 Those two reports (“We the People of Arab Ancestry in the United States” and “The Arab Population: 2000”) 
have given a more detailed overview of the composition of the Arab population on the basis of the data on ancestry 
and national origin of immigrants – see also www.census.gov/population/www/ancestry.html and 
www.census.gov/population/www/cen2000/briefs.html, accessed June 4, 2007. 
31 For example, and as Jackson (2001) and others have pointed out as well, most of the Arab immigrants of the first 
wave were Christians. 
32 The numbers have been taken from http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf, accessed June 3, 
2007. 
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overview does not aim at summarizing the history of immigration of Arabs and Muslims to both 
countries, but only the most relevant facts are sketched here.33 
 
Arab and Muslim Minorities in German and U.S. Mass Media 
When we now look at the state of research on the portrayal of those Arab and Muslim 
immigrants and minorities in German and U.S. mass media, we first of all have to note that in 
both countries the analysis of ethnic minorities and immigrants in Western societies is a large 
research field that has produced a variety of studies which not only focus on mass media 
portrayals of those groups but also analyze aspects of integration, citizenship status, and conflicts 
with the German or American host societies. In the media sciences, the largest number of studies 
focuses on the analysis of they way in which minorities and ethnic groups are described in mass 
media. Especially in the U.S. but throughout the last years also increasingly in Germany we find a 
large variety of research on the mass media images of immigrant and ethnic groups in Germany 
and the U.S. 
In the German context, a number of those analyses look more generally at the news coverage of 
minorities or immigrants in the German press or on television – and in this context mainly refer 
to the group of Turkish immigrants, even though many of the studies often do not distinguish 
the focus according to different ethnicities or national backgrounds. Some of the rather 
“classical” studies that can be mentioned here are those of Delgado (1972),34 Ruhrmann and 
Kollmer (1987),35 or Merten and Ruhrmann (1986).36 
Throughout the last twenty years, the research on the news coverage of immigrants and 
foreigners has constantly increased. Especially since the early 1990s, a number of these studies 
have turned their focus to the question, what influence the German media coverage of foreigners 
and immigrants has on the development and strengthening of xenophobia, right-wing extremism, 
and violence, or has vice versa analyzed how xenophobic and stereotypical mass media images of 
immigrants and foreigners are. Studies like that of Predelli (1995),37 Funk and Weiss (1995), 
Hoemberg and Schlemmer (1995), or Ruhrmann and Demren (2000) have looked at the 
discourse on asylum and immigration in German print media or television, and have analyzed, for 
instance, how the affected actors are described in this context or have discussed the effects of the 
media coverage of foreigners on xenophobia and right-wing extremist violence. The book of 
Butterwegge et al. (1999) discusses the perspective of mass media on the multicultural society, 
and here specifically the German one. The authors in this anthology not only look at the question 
of whether the image of immigrants in German mass media is racist (Butterwegge 1999) or give a 
                                                           
33 For a more detailed overview on Arab and Muslim immigration to the United States see, for instance, Haddad 
(1991), Jackson (2001), Leonard (2003), Naber (2000), Suleiman (1988, 1999), Younis (1995), or Zogby (1990). For 
the German context see, for example, Bade (1992) or Wenning (1996). 
34 One of the first who analyzed the depiction of guest workers in the German press. 
35 Did a quantitative content analysis of the news coverage on foreigners and immigrants in six different local 
newspapers of Bielefeld, Germany between 1981 and 1983. 
36 Also did a quantitative content analysis over 8 months. 
37 Analyzed five national German newspapers over a timeframe of 2 ½ months in 1992. 
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more general survey on the media coverage of foreigners (Ruhrmann 1999), but also compare the 
way in which the press portrays German and foreign criminals and in this context also look at the 
depiction of Turkish culprits (Jäger 1999).38 
Delgado (1972) has, for example, found out that foreigners occur most of all in the context of 
topics like criminality or reports on the labor market. Ruhrmann and Kollmer (1987) have come 
to a similar result: They report that one third of the analyzed articles in their study have a criminal 
context. Moreover, Jäger (1999) argues that criminal acts of foreign criminals are then also 
described as far more brutal and dangerous than those of the German criminals, while we learn 
less about their motives (Jäger 1999: 121). This imaging reflects a German perception that – to 
some degree – regards immigrants as a threat for German society. 
However, the authors also mention positive images of foreigners, mainly in the local sections and 
when topics like the status or identity of foreign or immigrant actors are focused on. Merten and 
Ruhrmann (1986) come to the conclusion that especially the Turkish guest workers receive a 
rather negative image and are mostly referred to in combination with criminality. Similarly, 
Predelli (1995), who looked at articles in which foreigners are focused on as private actors, comes 
to the result that they are mainly depicted in connection with issues like immigration, criminality, 
or internal security. Furthermore, Predelli (1995) argues that the rather complex collective term 
“foreigner” actually summarizes a large variety of different nationalities and different forms of 
residence status of the respective actors, which is however not clearly distinguished in the news 
coverage (Predelli 1955: 121-24). 
Apart from the criminal focus, Jäger’s discourse analysis furthermore revealed that the national 
origin of foreign actors is also especially emphasized, and that immigrants are often highlighted 
with regard to their look or their lack of German language skills. If their nationality is not 
explicitly mentioned, their foreign status is identifiable via their foreign names (Jäger 1999: 121). 
And Farrokhzhad (2006), who analyzed the images of “foreign” women in German mass media 
and here especially focuses on the portrayals of Muslim and Turkish women, argues that by 
constantly depicting the suppression of and violence against Muslim women due to religious 
rules, etc. the German media also reflect a German self-perception according to which equality 
between men and women is a central standard in the own culture. The author also claims that the 
present-day image of the Turkish or Muslim woman in Germany is shaped by the headscarf and 
is predominantly assumed to reflect religious suppression and fundamentalism – ignoring that 
non-Muslim women also wear headscarves for religious reasons or as a fashion (Farrokhzhad 
2006: 55-73). Farrokhzhad’s study indicates that religion seems to be another central facet in the 
image of internal Arabs and Muslims in German mass media. In addition to that, the author 
presents one of only a few studies that explicitly look at the side of the self-perception as well. 
So altogether, German media studies predominantly focus on the images of foreigners and 
immigrants in more general terms, and only in some cases specifically focus on Arab or Muslim 
                                                           
38 Jäger (1999) did a discourse analysis of five German daily newspapers and one weekly news magazine over a 
timeframe of three months in 1997. 
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minorities. Nevertheless, we also have to note that – in the German context – the term 
“immigrant” or “foreigner” is to a large extent associated with people of Turkish origin. Thus, 
the results presented here are also relevant for our research questions, as they indirectly or 
directly provide information about the image of internal Arab and Muslim actors in German 
mass media. 
In the American context, the research on the images and perceptions of ethnic minorities in U.S. 
mass media has long been dominated by the focus on African Americans, Hispanics, or Native 
Americans.39 Some of those studies are interesting for the research questions of this book, 
because they approach the topic of ethnic minority images on a more general level. Chávez 
(2001), for instance, presented a cultural history of the immigration issue in the United States 
since 1965 using over seventy cover images from politically diverse magazines, including TIME, 
NEWSWEEK, U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, BUSINESS WEEK, THE NATION, and AMERICAN 
HERITAGE. He traced the connections between the social, legal, and economic conditions 
surrounding immigration and the images through which it is portrayed. One of the author’s 
results is that media images not only reflect the national mood but also play a powerful role in 
shaping national discourse. 
According to Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003), what is often critically remarked is that the images 
of those immigrant minorities are shaped by the tendency to highlight the extraordinary and to 
ignore aspects of everyday life in these communities. Such extraordinary facets do not have to be 
exclusively negative (criminality, poverty) but also include positive examples like successful 
careers in the music or sports section (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 135-136). Furthermore, 
and as was outlined in the last section, also the quantitative dominance of clichés and stereotypes 
to portray and characterize Muslims and Arabs is well documented. But what can we say about 
the specific portrayal of internal Arab and Muslim Americans? 
The media images of internal Arabs and Muslims in the United States have gained more and 
more attention in the last couple of years. Nevertheless, as Naber (2000), Shaheen (2001), or 
Jackson (2001) have pointed out, until 9/11 Arabs and Muslims within the United States could be 
largely described as an “invisible minority.” In the societal dimension, this is first of all largely due 
to the fact that they are not distinguished as an ethnic group in the American racial and ethnic 
classification system, and are simultaneously seen as whites and as non-whites (Naber 2000: 37). 
Secondly, this invisibility is also reflected in the fact that Arab and Muslim Americans are largely 
non-existent in the mass media, since Arab and Muslim characters in film, or figures in the news 
are to a large extent foreign. As Naber (2000) criticizes, this image ignores the fact that the Arab 
American community is very complex and diverse, belonging to a multiplicity of religious 
affiliations and coming from diverse regions (Naber 2000: 42). When internal actors are focused 
on, they are defined as a monolithic category in U.S. television, film, and the news media, and are 
– if they occur – described just like external Arabs and Muslims: as irrationally violent, 
particularly towards women. 
                                                           
39 See, for instance, Friedman (1991) or Miller (1980). 
I. State of Research 
 - 29 -
The invisibility of Arab and Muslim Americans turns into high visibility, however, after 9/11. 
One analysis that illustrates this change was carried out by Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003), who 
compared the way in which Muslim-Americans are portrayed before and after 9/11 in American 
print media and television.40 They shown that Muslim Americans and Arab-Americans are very 
seldom explicitly focused on in the U.S. press before 9/11, which may explain why there is not 
that much research on these internal groups before 9/11. Before the attacks the predominant 
news themes that related to Muslim Americans and Arab Americans reported on political issues 
and politics. Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) argue that foreign news coverage also affects the 
domestic stories in which internal Arabs and Muslims occurred, and here name the example of 
Arab American organizations and actors who are quoted with their opinion on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict, etc. Apart from those foreign political issues, internal Muslims and Arabs 
only significantly occur in the context of national or local political campaigns, either as politicians 
or as representatives in public opinion polls (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 150-152). 
After 9/11, the news coverage of internal Arabs and Muslims increases tremendously. They are 
now often quoted with their opinion on issues like the military actions against the Taliban or the 
“war on terrorism.” Some of the frequently covered topics about Muslim and Arab citizens and 
residents now deal with the civil liberties and civil rights of those groups. Furthermore, actors 
now frequently appear in the context of a more general debate on immigration and national 
security. What is also interesting for our research questions is that Nacos and Torres-Reyna 
(2003) report that according to their study the images of American Muslims and Arab Americans 
are more positive and less negative in the aftermath of the attacks compared to the previous year. 
Altogether, the authors see a quantitative shift from a fairly limited and stereotypical coverage 
before 9/11 to a more comprehensive, inclusive, and less stereotypical news presentation after 
the attacks (Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 150-152). 
Similar findings are presented by Weston (2003) who examined a similar timeframe to Nacos and 
Torres-Reyna (2003), but used a qualitative analysis method.41 The author reports that in the 
timeframe before 9/11, Arab Americans are not prominent in the press coverage. The dominant 
theme of the pre-9/11 articles revolves around Arab-American resistance to stereotypes and 
discrimination, and debates about civil rights. After 9/11, internal Arabs and Muslims surge onto 
the news agenda, and now are either portrayed sympathetically, as loyal patriotic members of the 
American national community, or as targets and victims of hate crimes and of government 
roundups and detentions (Weston 2003). 
                                                           
40 The quantitative study compared the amount and the valence of news coverage of Arab and Muslim Americans 
and Islam during the twelve months before 9/11 and six months afterwards, and included the NEW YORK TIMES, 
NEW YORK POST, DAILY NEWS, USA TODAY, and selected television news. 
41 The timeframe of analysis here covers three and one half months before and one month after 9/11, and apart 
from the major national newspapers like USA TODAY, HOUSTON CHRONICLE, or WASHINGTON POST, also the 
CHICAGO TRIBUNE and the DETROIT FREE PRESS were analyzed. 
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Nevertheless, as a study by Stone (2006) points out,42 internal Arabs and Muslims still 
predominantly occur in the context of issues like terrorism in U.S. media, or are even blamed for 
terrorist attacks against the U.S. or in general. Stone (2006) claims, that this is not only the case 
after but already before 9/11. According to the author, internal Arabs and Muslims are described 
predominantly as violent, before as well as after the attacks. Interestingly enough, though, Stone 
(2006) also notes that the number of positive images of Arab and Muslim Americans increases 
after the attacks (Stone 2006: 49-69). These findings suggest that it would be especially interesting 
to look more closely at those positive actor images in the following analysis to learn more about 
the German and U.S. perspective that shapes those images. 
 
2.3. The Media Image of Islam 
In addition to studies that focus on the media images of foreign or internal Arab or Muslim 
actors and groups, a third set of studies that is also relevant for our research questions analyzed 
the news coverage and the image of Islam in German and U.S. mass media, and in this context 
has also looked at the portrayal of Muslims. Especially in Germany, we find numerous media 
studies on this issue. Thofern (1998), for example, conducted a quantitative content analysis of 
the image of Islam in the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL.43 Similarly, Kliche et al. (1998, 
1999) analyzed the construction of Islam in the German press between 1993 and 1995 in the 
context of the news coverage on Algeria.44 In their discourse analysis, the authors among other 
things looked at the way in which actors are depicted. Hippler and Lueg (1995) analyzed central 
elements of the image of Islam and the construction of an Islamic threat in international media 
and here also examine how such perceptions arise and what functions they have. And Hafez 
(1999, 2002) analyzed the image of Islam in the context of the foreign news coverage. 
Two of the most recent studies come from Ateş (2006) and Schiffer (2005). Schiffer’s qualitative 
analysis concentrates on the linguistic and semiotic structure of print media perceptions of 
Islam.45 The author here specifically looks at the potential effects of the constructed image. Ateş 
(2006) focused especially on the image of Islam in German media after 9/11.46 The author’s 
qualitative content and image analysis examines the way in which Islam and Muslims are 
presented in the context of the media discourse on terrorism. Ateş (2006) especially emphasizes 
the relevance of mass media for the public’s perception of Muslims in the German context. The 
author argues that the commentaries and opinions that are offered to the reader or viewer include 
interpretation patterns (“Deutungsmuster”) for events and issues that the public is not able to 
                                                           
42 A quantitative content analysis that covers a timeframe of four years (from September 11, 1999 to September 11, 
2003) and includes several local and national newspapers. 
43 Spanning the long timeframe of nearly forty years (from 1950 to 1989). 
44 The authors analyzed fifty-three articles from three German news magazines, one weekly newspaper, and one daily 
newspaper. 
45 The analysis includes several different German print publications like the FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, the 
SÜDDEUTSCHE ZEITUNG, STERN or DIE ZEIT, etc. (see Schiffer 2005). 
46 The analyzed articles stem from the German KÖLNER EXPRESS and were published in the weeks after the 9/11 
attacks as well as from different weeks in 2003 (here focusing on articles that discuss the war in Iraq). 
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derive from direct observation. Thus, mass media have to be carefully examined to learn more 
about the knowledge about and perspectives on Muslims in a society (Ateş 2006: 153). 
For the American context, Said (1981) looked at the way in which U.S. media cover Islam. In this 
study, the author illustrates the methods of hyperbole, euphemism, baseless accusations, guilt by 
association, or extrapolation from the weakest evidence that lead to a discrediting image of Arabs 
and Islam. Similarly, Karim (1997) and Esposito (1992) traced and deconstructed the discourses 
on and perceptions of Islam in the West, and present examples from the U.S. press and 
television. Esposito (1992) thereby also aims at deconstructing the perceived Islamic threat to the 
West, for instance, by outlining the history of its relation with the West and by showing the large 
diversity of Islamic orientations. And Wiegand (2000) has discussed the media’s impact on the 
misperceptions of Islam in the West, arguing that it is especially the casual approach to ethnic 
and religious identity that furthers Western misperceptions about Muslims but also about ethnic 
conflicts in Muslim countries. As the author explains on the basis of the example of the Bosnian-
Serbian conflict, Western print media, for instance, frequently use a careless terminology or mix 
up religious and ethnic identities, which has contributed to a simplification and misperceptions 
among the Western audiences (Wiegand 2000: 246-247). 
Especially the German studies illustrate that the subject “Islam” belongs to those themes that are 
most often picked up in contexts in which also foreigners and immigrants occur. Furthermore, 
Islam becomes predominantly relevant in the context of events like terrorist attacks or in articles 
that treat violence in connection with Islamic extremism, religious faith, social conflicts, or 
cultural habits and ways of clothing of internal Muslims that seem to conflict with the German or 
U.S. host society. Thus, this connection of Islam and violence can be regarded as crucial for the 
mass media image of Islam – also before 9/11.47 
Thofern (1998) furthermore stresses that in the news magazine he analyzed Islam is mainly 
described as a backward, extremist religion that is hostile towards progress. Hippler and Lueg 
(1995) also report that the Western image of Islam is mainly characterized by ideas of aggression 
and brutality, fanaticism, irrationality, medieval backwardness, and antipathy towards women. 
Hostility towards progress, reactionary political ideas, and a desire to “return to the Middle Ages” 
are often attributed to Islamic fundamentalism. As the authors point out, the historical processes 
that have run through Islam since its early days and have influenced and changed it remain 
unconsidered. This may create the impression that practically no historical change has taken place 
in the religion Hippler and Lueg 1995: 7-13). The portrayed difference of Islam is predominantly 
evaluated negatively, and the West perceives Islam as a religion which is made out to be 
responsible for countless political, cultural, and social phenomena in Islamic countries (Hippler 
and Lueg 1995: 24-27). 
                                                           
47 Ghareeb (1983), for instance, presents an article from the CHICAGO TRIBUNE in 1981 that was entitled “Violence, 
the Islamic Curse” and that was accompanied by a cartoon which showed “four bearded figures wearing robes and 
stabbing each other in the back with daggers” (Ghareeb 1983: 161). 
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With the concrete example of Algeria, Kliche et al. (1998) report that aspects like despotism and 
totalitarism are frequently ascribed to the Algerian government but also to Islam in general. As 
the authors argue, “more or less explicitly the discourse labels all actors in Algeria as irrational” 
and this irrationality is also ascribed to the religion (Kliche et al. 1998: 100). This observation is 
also made by Hafez (2002) who argues that the German print media reflect the overall 
assumption that political Islam and radical fundamentalism are closely connected, that many 
Muslims are regarded as irrational and fanatic, and that political actions are predominantly 
religiously motivated. Furthermore, the author also points out that the image of Islam is shaped 
by the assumption of a unity of an Islamic world and a unity of political leadership and people, 
which largely ignores national, regional, and cultural differences (Hafez 2002: 300-303). Similarly, 
Said (1981) also points out the constant confusion of Iranians and Arabs and argues that 
“Muslims and Arabs are essentially covered, discussed, apprehended either as suppliers of oil or 
as potential terrorists. Very little of the detail, the human density, the passion of Arab-Muslim life 
has entered the awareness of even those people whose profession it is to report the Islamic 
world” (Said 1981: 26). 
Studies like those of Karim (1997) and Esposito (1992) also show that just like in the German 
mass media the image of Islam in U.S. media is largely reduced to fundamentalism and is strongly 
connected with violence. Like Wiegand (2000), Esposito (1992) says that even though it might be 
an understandable perception in the context of certain events like the Iranian Revolution or the 
1991 Gulf War, this portrayal fails to do justice to the complex realities in the Muslim world. It 
leads to an image of Muslims as one monolithic threatening mass, ignores the diversity of Islamic 
movements as well, and does not really give an insight into the real causes and reasons for those 
events in most cases (Esposito 1992: 172-174). 
For the timeframe after 9/11, Hafez (2002b) observes that the news coverage on Islam has 
improved slightly with regard to the mentioned aspects, arguing that the German press tries to 
distinguish more clearly between the religion of Islam and the peaceful Muslims, and hostile and 
violent fundamentalists. Still, as the author notes, these more positive articles also mainly focus 
on political Islam, and predominantly report on the religion in connection with a violent event 
(Hafez 2002b: 225-227). 
Many of the studies that have been mentioned here consider the image of Islam as a hostile 
stereotype, or as Esposito (1992) puts it, front cover headlines like “The Roots of Muslim Rage” 
in combination with a picture of a scowling, bearded and turbaned Muslim with an American flag 
in his glaring eyes48 create a confrontational undertone and a threatening motif (Esposito 1992: 
174). Furthermore, Hippler and Lueg (1995) point out that this hostile stereotype of Islam or an 
Islamic threat is not a new one, but has deep historical roots that date back as far as the Crusades 
(Hippler and Lueg 1995: 4). Ateş (2006) argues that this hostile stereotype reflects the perception 
on the part of the German Self that the Germans’ own societal concept is the only right one and 
that the Islamic Other is clearly demarcated from this concept (Ateş 2006: 163). Like Hafez 
                                                           
48 Which he found on the front cover of the ATLANTIC MONTHLY in 1990 (see Esposito 1992: 174). 
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(2002b), Ateş comes to the conclusion that after 9/11 the overall perception of Muslims and 
Islam has not changed really: it is still superficial, and it predominantly personalizes and 
emotionalizes the respective events and topics in which context Muslim actors or Islam become 
relevant. 
The last aspect that seems important to mention for many of the introduced studies is the 
argument that the images of Islam are shaped by the Western perception of a fundamental 
difference between an Islamic Orient and a Christian Occident.49 Hippler and Lueg (1995) argue 
that the current vogue of popular literature about the Islamic threat has more to do with Western 
thinking than with an actual threat. According to the authors, this Western perception is one 
result of the end of the Cold War and a shift towards more attention that is now drawn to the 
Islamic countries rather than to Communism. The authors say that the portrayal of Islam as 
violent, backward, irrational, and oppressive presents an easy way to externalize those facets from 
the West’s own culture. Instead of criticizing the faults of one’s own society and using the same 
yardsticks in criticism of other societies, mass media but also many scholars and writers set the 
two cultures against each other (Hippler and Lueg 1995: 1-2). As Karim (1997) notes, an “us 
versus them” constellation can be frequently found in news headlines, for instance, when the 
confrontation of “Islam versus the West” is constructed.50 The indication for the Western self-
image that can be derived from this perception is that, for example, the Enlightenment and the 
related separation of religion and state are regarded as indicators for a Western superiority in 
comparison to Islam. Islam thus presents the antithesis to the West, a polar opposite against 
which the West can assure itself of its own identity and values (Hippler and Lueg 1995: 20-24).51 
To sum it up, as the last subchapter has outlined, we find quite a number of media studies that 
have analyzed the images of Arabs, Muslims, or Islam in German and U.S. mass media already. 
The list of studies that have been introduced here is by far not complete.52 Nevertheless, I stop 
the review of the state of research at this point to indicate some of the gaps that most of the 
introduced studies in my view show with regard to the questions that have been raised in the 
beginning of this book. 
 
                                                           
49 See, among others, Hafez (2002), Hippler and Lueg (1995), or Kliche et al. (1998, 1999). 
50 For instance the reference to a “dark side” of Islam or the emphasis of Muslim rage in American news magazines 
like TIME (see Karim 1997: 155) 
51 As Terkessidis (2002) writes, when Islam is depicted as irrational, fanatical, and restrictive, the Self can also identify 
in this image the perception that “we” are rational, reasonable, and open (Terkessidis 2002: 35). 
52 Rodinson (1988) or Hentch (1992), for example, give a broad historical overview of the major developments in the 
perception of Islam in the West, and Daniel’s classic study (1960) explores the political and religious considerations 
behind distorted Western views of Islam, examining Christian-Muslim interaction from medieval times to the 
modern world. For a more detailed and well-discussed overview of other relevant studies see for instance Hafez 
(2002), Kamalipour (1995), or Schiffer (2005). 
I. State of Research 
 - 34 -
3. Conclusion: Open Questions and Research Aims 
Even though there is a large spectrum of media analyses on the image of Arabs and Muslims, 
these studies mostly only have a limited focus, i.e. looking only at portrayals of specific countries 
or actors like the Palestinian government, the Iranian or Turkish population, or the Iraqi 
president Saddam Hussein. Broader comparisons of different Arab and Muslim countries, to see 
whether the imaging of different countries and actors may be similar if not identical, do not take 
place. Also, comparisons between different countries’ media are rare with regard to the focused 
questions. Studies that do take a broader perspective (see Hafez 2002 or Nacos and Torres-Reyna 
2003) do not provide very detailed qualitative information on the images that are ascribed to the 
different actors and countries. Thus we do not learn whether all actors really have the same 
images, or whether there are differences between the individual actor profiles, which would then 
indicate that the German or American view of the Other is not one-sidedly negative or reveals a 
certain variety and complexity. The only analysis that does take a quantitative approach to actor 
imaging is Hashem (1995), but he does that only for the American context and he also leaves out 
the observation of the American perspective. 
Nearly all of the studies mentioned emphasize an overall negative image of Arabs and Muslims, 
internal as well as external, in German and U.S. media. Media attention is mainly directed towards 
conflict-laden or crisis-laden negative events. Arab and Muslim countries, and also migrants in 
Germany and the U.S., thus often occur in the context of problems and conflicts. The studies 
furthermore indicate that not only do popular press and entertainment media reveal one-sided 
images; the quality press and TV news programs do too. Nevertheless, a number of authors have 
also noted positive images. What is missing in their analysis however is a more detailed look at 
what those positive images look like in the context of the different articles. Furthermore, a 
detailed analysis of the change of the image of external Arabs and Muslim in German and U.S. 
media – especially around 9/11 – has so far not been done – most analyses have mainly looked at 
the changing perception of Arabs and Muslims within the West. 
Most of the media analyses that have been introduced in the last subchapter also do not go into 
much detail about the possible motivations or influences on behalf of the Self to perceive or 
portray the actors in a certain way, or – if we want to take back a little the intentional aspect of 
image construction – the perceptions or possible myths and stereotypes or other ideas about 
Arab and Muslims that shape the image of the actors. Most studies do not discuss the German or 
U.S. perspective that may form the roots for the media images but mainly concentrate on 
describing the images that they find in the articles. Studies that provide some insight into the 
perspective of the German and U.S. Self that creates the media images of Arabs and Muslims 
have mainly been identified in the third set of studies that looked at the image of Islam. Those 
analyses not only describe but also give interpretations for the occurring media images. 
However, these studies are often not based on a concrete set of media, but more or less broadly 
summarize the two countries’ media discourses on Islam, giving media examples that support 
their argument. Furthermore, from those studies we may derive that in German and U.S. media 
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we find a more or less homogenous image of Islam. We get the impression here that ALL actors 
are portrayed that way, ACROSS different Arab and Muslim countries, or ALL internal Arabs 
and Muslims. This would, however, contradict the results of other studies that have also 
identified positive actor images of Arabs and Muslims. So, how homogeneous is the image of 
Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. media? The positive images would not fit into a solely 
negative opposite image of an Oriental or Islamic Other. None of the analyses that have been 
introduced has discussed the question of how the possibility of similarity between Muslim actors 
and the West can be integrated in this two-sided contrast between Islam or a hostile stereotype of 
Arabs and Muslims and the West. 
Altogether, the studies that have been introduced lead us to the following fragments that seem to 
be the first step toward the explanation of the image of Arabs and Muslims in Western media. 
First of all, we could conclude that to construct a national self-concept it seems relevant to know 
the central criteria of this self-concept. However, as some of the introduced authors have already 
pointed out, to know that often includes knowing as well who is not part of this self-concept, 
which was assumed here to be for example Arab and Muslim countries. Thus, the look at the 
state of research has confirmed that to answer our research questions it is crucial to not only look 
at the way in which Arabs and Muslims are portrayed but to connect this analysis with a look at 
the way in which the German and U.S. Self is described in comparison to that, to understand 
how those people are described who are not members of the national self-concept. 
Up to this point we have already gained some information to answer the question of how 
Germany and the United States define themselves, but most of this information was not derived 
from mass media contents. Furthermore, we have gained information to answer the question of 
how German and U.S. media see Arabs and Muslims. But except for some studies on the imaging 
of Islam, most of those studies did not combine the two aspects. Thus, one of the questions for 
this research still remains unanswered: namely, what relevance does the self-image have for the 
perception and portrayal of Arabs and Muslims – and vice versa. A question that has become 
more crucial is why the image of Arabs and Muslims is so negative in both German and U.S. 
media? 
Therefore, the following analysis combines the two research fields that have been outlined in 
chapter I. To answer the raised questions, I will combine the individual aspects that have been 
focused on by other studies: By looking at the way in which a certain group of actors is 
constructed by Western media I would not only like to find out WHY this group is portrayed in a 
certain way. Instead, I argue that to answer that question we have to look at two aspects – images 
of Arab and Muslim Others and the German and U.S. Self – and have to analyze as well how 
difference between both sides is constructed and how similarities are integrated in the 
differentiation. 
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This book will therefore: 
(1) reveal the worldview of the Self and identify the national or even Western self-perceptions 
that play a role in contexts in which Arab and Muslim Others are observed, 
(2) summarize the image of Arabs and Muslims that results from the Western perception around 
the 9/11 attacks, and 
(3) illustrate how difference is constructed between Self and Other to reach a new perspective on 
the interplay between (national or Western) self-perceptions and the perception of (Arab and 
Muslim) otherness in Germany and the United States. 
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II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK: WESTERN RATIONAL PRINCIPLES AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF SELF AND OTHERNESS 
For each of the aims that have been listed in the last chapter, several theoretical assumptions 
have guided the analysis that will be outlined in the following chapter. With regard to the first aim 
– the analysis of the German and U.S. concepts of belonging – we will first of all have a look at 
some general consideration about the concept of a world society and cultural patterns that define 
and structure social life. On a more detailed level, we will then have a look at a concrete myth 
that shapes the Western perception of Arab and Muslim countries and that becomes relevant for 
the analysis of the mass media images of the same. And finally, and with reference to the 
question of collectivity construction and the concepts of Self and Other, the basic theoretical 
assumptions will be outlined for the question why collective (national) groups need to construct 
images of Self and Otherness. 
 
1. The Worldwide Diffusion of Western Rational Principles 
One central idea of this analysis is to show that the portrayals of Arabs and Muslims that can be 
found in German and U.S. mass media are to a decisive extent influenced by the worldviews of 
the Western observers that can, for instance, be traced in the mass media communication 
processes of both countries. 
Worldviews are conceptions for making sense of and interpreting the world. They are reflected 
for instance in a culture’s orientation towards such things as God, humanity, nature, the universe, 
and other philosophical issues that are concerned with the concept of being (Haque 1995: 18). 
According to Weber (1972),1 worldviews always imply a coherent set of values which relate 
“internally” to each other to varying degrees. They form a perspective on the environment that 
offers comprehensiveness for occurring phenomena in the same and can answer the fundamental 
questions of existence like the meaningful totality between humankind and the cosmos.2 The 
coherent and expansive value constellations and the ordered meaningfulness of a worldview can 
be either grounded in the supernatural or the “worldly” realm (Kahlberg 2004: 140-142). A 
supernatural basis can for instance be found in religious worldviews like Christianity, whereas the 
modern worldview of democracy is based on ideals like equality, individual rights, tolerance, 
personal liberties, or government by law and is thus established on the basis of worldly criteria. It 
has to be noted here that according to Weber (1972) the correctness and superiority of a 
worldview can never be definitely proven. Instead, the legitimacy of certain worldviews is 
acquired solely on the basis of a belief in it by those who adhere to it (Kahlberg 2004: 142). 
                                                 
1 The following summary of Weber’s concept of worldviews is largely taken from Kalberg (2004). 
2 As Kahlberg (2004) outlines, in Weber’s (1972) perspective prophets most strongly articulate worldviews and thus 
offer explanations for example for the existence of suffering and name possibilities and pathways to rescue believers 
from those sufferings. Other transmitters for worldviews can be intellectuals, or political and social movements (see 
also Kahlberg 2004: 142). 
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For our analysis I assume that worldviews have an influence not only on people’s beliefs, values, 
and attitudes but also on the way in which other people, societies, or cultures are observed, 
evaluated, and dealt with. In the following subchapter, some central facets will be introduced that 
are regarded as relevant for the worldview of societies like Germany and the United States: 
 
1.1. The Neo-Institutional World Polity Approach 
The analytical concept that will serve as a theoretical background for the following analysis is 
based on the sociological concepts of the neo-institutional world polity approach. This theory of 
the “topography of the world society” (Wobbe 2000: 26) was developed in the late 1970s by the 
research group around the American sociologist John W. Meyer and is often referred to as the 
“Stanford School.” According to Meyer and his colleagues (see 1994, 2005) the term “world 
society” first of all refers to a field of highly institutionalized cultural patterns that strongly 
structure the purposes and actions of nation states, organizations, and individuals, who are all 
regarded as collective or individual actors (Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 127). 
Second, the world polity approach sees world society as a level of interaction that determines or 
regulates other dimensions of social organization and that serves as a horizon of orientation for 
individual and collective actors. Third, the theory assumes a global framework of institutionalized 
values that form the frame of reference for the world society (Wobbe 2000: 38-39). In the 
following, the key terms of the world polity approach will be briefly introduced and the main 
theoretical assumptions for the upcoming analysis will be outlined. 
 
Institutions 
First of all, the approach assumes that individual behavior and social interaction are always 
embedded in institutions. Those institutions are basically assumed to be cognitive rules or, in 
other words, the cultural assumptions about reality that are generally known, taken for granted 
and shared by the members of (world) society. This view is combined with the assumption that 
individual and collective actors neither act exclusively goal-oriented and rationally nor are they 
solely guided by norms. Instead, their behavior often appears like a “dramatic execution of 
cultural standardizations, models, scripts or myths” (Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 129). 
The empirical studies of the Stanford School so far have mainly focused on the analysis of the 
formal, institutional structural principles of organizations and nation states, and have observed 
mainly the formal organizational structures on the national level.3 For those studies, world 
societal, i.e. global, phenomena are not solely derived from the interests and power relations of 
sovereign states but go beyond this level of interaction. 
                                                 
3 These studies have analyzed, for instance the level of structural isomorphism of different national education 
systems, of women’s rights, citizenship, or environment protection. 
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“Culture” as the Central Category 
In contrast, for example, to macro-realistic concepts like the World Systems Theory of Immanuel 
Wallerstein,4 world society is also not regarded as a system of economically determined 
dependent relations between a center and a periphery. Instead, world society is seen as a 
composition of cultural structures of expectations that define the legitimate forms, interests and 
relations between states, formal organizations, and individuals (Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 130).5 
Hereby, for the world polity approach, “culture” is the central category for the analysis of social 
processes and structures and is used here in a very broad sense: 
Society appears as culture and, more concrete, as the embodiment of Occidental rational principles whose 
worldwide diffusion is analyzed. […] These basic components of the Western society are regarded as an 
unchallengeable culture that precedes the actors and that pushes forward globalization as a world polity. 
(Krücken 2005: 10-11)6 
World culture can therefore be understood as an imagined world that consists of different value 
orientations and that constructs its actors according to those orientations. As Meyer et al. (1994: 
2005a) argue:  
[…] we conceptualize Western society as essentially a cultural project organizing human activity to forge 
the proper links between the moral and natural worlds. (Meyer et al. 1994: 11; 2005a: 17) 
The rules for social action in modern societies become manifested in cultural theories, ideologies, 
and rules that define the functioning of society, either as it can actually be found or as it should 
be from the perspective of collective aims. Meyer et al. (1994) phrase this as follows: 
Lines of thought treating culture as only rules of value and technique at the moral and natural boundaries 
of society ignore the fact that the central cultural myths of modern society are those giving meaning and 
value to society and its components. Beyond a sociology of religion or of science, a proper analysis must 
focus on institutions – the cultural rules of society itself. (Meyer et al. 1994: 17) 
Culture ascribes a reality to actors, actions and ends. In addition to that, culture also provides 
those actors, actions and ends with meaning and legitimacy. Thus, the term “culture” in the world 
polity definition is based on a cognitive concept that consists mainly of taken-for-granted myths, 
scripts, or rules which form institutions. The execution of institutional patterns – according to 
this constructivist view – is therefore based on imitation and routines of action (Wobbe 2000: 
39). 
In addition to that, at the level of nation states culture is not only regarded as a combination of 
values and norms but more as a set of cognitive models that define what criteria, goals, resources, 
technologies, or sovereignty a nation state has to have. Meyer (2005) argues that nation states 
mainly have to be viewed as “imagined communities” that are socially constructed via basic 
criteria of belonging and exclusion (Meyer 2005: 133).7 Nation states are imagined on the basis of 
                                                 
4 See for example Wallerstein (1986), Balibar and Wallerstein (1990) or Imbusch (1990). 
5 For further details see also Meyer (1980). 
6 Own translation, original quote in German: “Gesellschaft erscheint als Kultur, genauer; als Verkörperung 
okzidental-rationaler Grundprinzipien, deren weltweite Diffusion untersucht wird. […] Diese Grundbestandteile der 
westlichen Gesellschaft gelten als nicht-hinterfragbare Kultur, die den Akteuren vorausgeht und als ‘world polity’ die 
Globalisierung vorantreibt.” 
7 Here, Meyer (2005) follows Anderson (2005) who has defined the concept of “nation” as an “imagined political 
community” that is “imagined as being limited and sovereign.” The phrase “imagined” is used here because 
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models that have been established on the world societal level and can be seen as social 
institutions that offer possibilities for identification and – less self-reflexively phrased – 
integrative structures. 
 
Occidental Rational Principles 
These integrative structures are provided, for instance, by a set of cultural patterns and standards 
that define the criteria of belonging and exclusion. According to the authors, the cultural and 
structural patterns that are relevant, for example, for the analysis of the German and American 
self-concept have developed in the course of the Occidental rationalization (Krücken 2005: 10-
13). Here, the world polity approach adopts Max Weber’s concept of Occidental rationalization 
that defines “rationality” as a myth, rational action as a ritual act, and rationalization as the 
institutionalization of a cultural system of goals, goal/means attributions, and rational actors 
(Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 130-131).8 According to Meyer et al. (2005a) the cultural system of 
Occidental rationalism originates from the transformations of Christianity during the European 
early modern period and the development of a highly generalized, universalistic idea of the 
rational design of the world. Rationalization is not understood as an increase in efficiency but as a 
result of the institutionalization of rational actorhood. Also, the convergent development of 
different societies is not seen as the result of a functional adjustment but as a consequence of the 
adjustment and orientation of different societies towards legitimate cultural models of rationality 
(Dierkes and Koenig 2006: 131; Meyer et al. 2005a: 38-40). 
In the course of this rationalization and the removing of a divine authority from society the 
moral organization of society changes fundamentally, as we now find a central authority of 
abstract and universal principles that take the position of the formerly sacral authority of religion. 
However, Meyer et al. (2005a) here also note that despite the linguistic differentiation and the 
change of authority structure, the moral organization still has the same structure which defines 
the sacred and relates it to the profane: 
Thus the “secular” content of the world polity’s ontological structure is not less religious than that of the 
Christian church. (Meyer et al. 2005a: 40)9 
Only now, the central principles of the Western cultural account and modernity are identified as 
progress, equality and justice,10 and nationally institutionalized worldwide norms such as human 
rights (Meier 2004: 230).11 In the Western tradition, these institutionalized rules and principles 
                                                                                                                                                        
Anderson argues that “the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet 
them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 2005: 15).  
8 See also Weber (1988, reprint of 1920) or Collins (1980). 
9 See also Meyer et al. (1994: 22-23) 
10 The term “justice” here especially refers to individual chances of participation in society. 
11 This does not mean that religion has become completely irrelevant in the course of the Occidental rationalization 
process. Especially in the United States religion still functions as a decisive structure of meaning in which the society 
and the nation state expresses itself. As was already mentioned in chapter I.1, especially the American political 
culture is shaped by a civil religion that is marked by an idiosyncratic blend of the religious and the political. As 
Bellah (2005, reprint) outlined, the American civil religion as an ideology strongly adopts religious symbols and 
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embody universalized claims linked to moral purpose and rules of nature. Descriptions of social 
action (political, economic, etc.) thereby become more and more comprehensive. At the same 
time, the underlying cultural principles and rules become increasingly invisible and thereby more 
and more exclude alternative rules and possibilities of action. Consequently, these rules become 
more and more unassailable and thus are less manipulable by the involved actors. Actions are 
organized by institutionalization and are anchored in extending ideologies and theories which are 
functional and located on a normative and a descriptive dimension (Meyer et al. 2005a: 45-46). 
Thus, the social structures of modern societies can be regarded as ideological buildings which are 
made of institutionalized building blocks and which draw their authority from even more 
universal rules and conceptions (Meyer et al. 2005a: 40). 
Altogether, modernity and Western principles are regarded as a cultural frame with a Western 
origin that has however spread globally today (Meier 2004: 230). What results from the 
worldwide diffusion of those Occidental rational principles is a worldwide adaptation of cultural 
patterns, orientations and formal structures.12 This does not consequently mean that the countries 
of the world society all become undistinguishable. The spread of formal structures that have been 
imported or have diffused to other societies can remain exogenous and may be decoupled from 
the actual local practices. Besides that, in the course of the expansion of the Western world 
during the past centuries,13 the diffusion of a universalized culture had only slowly proceeded. In 
this process, Meyer et al. (2005b) argue that the members of non-Western societies were often 
regarded as morally and naturally different from the Western world, and were mostly viewed as 
inferior und unqualified for (Western) civilization. In the course of the Western expansion and 
the institutionalization of Western principles on a global level, those formerly “uncivilized” parts 
of the world are increasingly regarded as “candidates for a full-fledged membership in the global 
community of nations and individuals” (Meyer et al. 2005b: 129-130). 
For the following analysis, this assumption allows us to observe the perception and classifications 
of Arabs and Muslims in Western societies and derive those highly universal and far-reaching 
institutionalized rules from the different types of actors, like nation states, organizations but also 
medially observed actors like politicians, terrorist groups, or individual actors that occur in a 
world society as well as in the specific forms of actions that those types of actors occupy since: 
Actors enact as much as they act: What they do is inherent in the social definition of the actor itself. 
Consequently, rules constituting actors legitimate types of action, just as legitimated action constitutes and 
shapes the social actors. (Meyer et al. 2005a: 31)14 
                                                                                                                                                        
narrations (like Christian symbols, Old Testament metaphors, or the Protestant sense of mission) that shape the 
American self-perception. 
12 As Bös and Zimmer (2006) have argued for the example of the worldwide institutionalization of norms like the 
human rights, nation states as well actors in the same regard the adoption of worldwide standards as a chance to 
increase the legitimacy of their political action (Bös/Zimmer 2006: 223-224). 
13 That – according to Meyer et al. (2005b) – also involved the subjection and annexation of other societies in the 
rest of the world, as can be seen in the course of the Crusades but also the colonization era. 
14 Original quotation in German: “Akteure inszenieren ebensosehr, wie sie handeln. Die Handlungen von Akteuren 
sind in der sozialen Definition des Akteurs selbst schon enthalten. Es gilt also, daß Regeln ueber die Konstitution 
von Akteuren auch Handlungstypen legitimieren, ebenso wie legitimierte Handlungen soziale Akteure konstituieren 
und formen.” 
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In the case of the following analysis it is thus also assumed that Muslim and Arab countries and 
actors as well as their described actions are observed and valuated from a Western perspective 
according to the “Western rules.” 
Altogether, we can say that the world polity approach perceives modern cultural systems as 
“institutionalized accounts that map out the entities and processes of modern society and 
integrate them together within general frameworks” (Meyer et al. 1994: 11). Social actions in 
modern societies are highly structured by institutionalized rules and “those rules take the form of 
cultural theories, ideologies and prescriptions about how society works or should work to attain 
collective purposes, especially the comprehensive and evolving goals of justice and progress” 
(Meyer et al. 1994: 9). 
The empirical analyses of the Stanford School so far mainly focused on the structure and actions 
of collective actors on the organizational and on the state level. From this perspective, one of the 
focused institutions, the nation state, has two central functions. First of all it is regarded as a 
segment of the world society and therefore as an element of the internal differentiation of the 
same. Second, as an organization – and therefore as an agent of the world society – the nation 
state picks up and institutionalizes global expectations and thereby constitutes its own authority 
and world societal norms (Wobbe 2000: 34). 
What makes this approach interesting for the upcoming analysis is the thesis that an 
institutionalized set of rational principles have been spread and have become established on a 
global scale, i.e. that they have globally diffused on a very abstract level, for instance in form of 
structural similarities in nearly every country. As Meyer and Hannan (1979) argue: 
Common definitions of the (technical) nature of reality, of value, of the nature of man, and of equity, 
seem dominant in the modern system. The world system has moved towards a single stratification system, 
in which all nations compare their progress on the same scales. Differences among societies are seen more 
as inequalities and distributional inequities within a single system, rather than as a result of independent 
evolution of discrete units. (Meyer and Hannan 1979: 301) 
A second aspect that is relevant for the following analysis is that these principles and 
institutionalized rules not only can be used by actors of a society as theories and knowledge about 
the world and as concepts for actions but, at the same time, may also be used to valuate and 
classify other countries and actors themselves. With regard to Arab and Muslim countries this 
would mean that Germany and the United States compare their own progress and 
implementation of the defined principles with that of Arab and Muslim countries. 
Following the world polity approach we may thus assume that both Germany and the United 
States reveal similarities in their definition and conception of national collectivity. As the world 
polity approach suggests, the basic principles that shape their concept of collectivity (like equity, 
progress, or equality) are derived from the definitions and valuation rules of the global cultural 
account that springs from and is applied by Western societies for the explanation of global 
structures and phenomena in the context of globalization processes. It is expected that in the 
communication of their national self-concepts and the construction of Arab and Muslim 
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countries and actors both Germany and the United States consult this commonly shared set of 
Western principles. 
Several of the media analyses that have been introduced in the last chapter have revealed that 
Arab and Muslim actors and countries are predominantly described as “underdeveloped” in 
different societal dimensions.15 One question that arises from those observations is, to what 
extent Arab and Muslim actors and countries are (or are not) regarded as equal with regard to the 
Western “standard?” Are they – at least to some extent – identified as Westernized already, since 
they form nation states, have established constitutions and a legal system according to Western 
standards, or have economic systems that work according to capitalist principles? Or are Arab 
and Muslim countries and actors still predominantly regarded as completely non-Western in the 
different societal dimensions and are constructed as having not or not fully implemented the 
rules and principles according to the Western standards? 
 
Why Western Principles Have to Be Negotiated 
Last but not least, I assume that these principles have to be permanently negotiated. Meyer and 
his colleagues do not concentrate on this question in their analyses, but mainly focus on the 
simple relevance of the introduced principles in different societal contexts. For my analysis, 
however, one central assumption is that Western principles and norms are permanently 
communicated and moreover, permanently negotiated and filled with concrete meaning, even 
though we might assume we talk of commonly shared knowledge at the same time. Why this has 
to take place explicitly might be answered with four possible explanations: 
(1) One argument would be that principles, rules, and norms have to be communicated to 
emphasize their relevance. In contexts where we do not have an institutionalized fixation of those 
principles in form of constitutions or other written documents the principles have to be 
communicated to make clear that they are regarded as basic guidelines for the observation and 
evaluation of events and actions. 
(2) But also when those principles are constituted in rules and policies of institutions they exist 
on an abstract and rather invisible level and might be consulted and negotiated for different 
(strategic) reasons. We could say, for example, that one reason for the permanent usage of those 
principles in different communication processes might be that political, military, or economic 
steps and actions have to be permanently legitimated and those principles can serve as a basis for 
their legitimacy. 
(3) It could be also suggested that Western principles are used as criteria for the discussion and 
evaluation of events and issues that take place or come up every day. Societies consult central 
                                                 
15 For instance, some of the analyses have noted that in mass media Arab and Muslim actors are depicted to lack 
rationality since they are centrally described in the context of Islamic fundamentalism (irrational), personally ruffian 
(evil) or choleric (see El-Farra 1996, Ghareeb 1983, Kliche et al. 1998, Shaheen 2001, or Thofern 1998). 
II. Theoretical Framework 
 - 44 -
societal principles and standards to structure and classify the complexity of their respective 
environments and realities, and to evaluate other actors according to their own parameters. 
(4) And last but not least, the permanent negotiation of the rather abstract principles might be 
due to the fact that the abstractness has to be filled with concrete content and meanings. The 
different actors in the world society have to interpret those abstract principles and fill them with 
contextual meaning due to changing contexts of usage and due to changing relevancies.16 
Furthermore, societal principles also form the basis of a construct – the state – that itself has to 
be permanently negotiated and re-emphasized in its composition, to attach a symbolic meaning 
to this territory. As Dittmer (2005) phrased it, “as institutionalized regions, states are best 
understood as an ongoing process of creating and maintaining territorial practices and ideologies” 
(Dittmer 2005: 626). 
Thus, we can assume that even though Western principles and rules are globally spread they have 
to be permanently communicated as well as negotiated in the different contexts in which they are 
deployed. According to Meyer et al. (2005a), these negotiation processes of institutional universal 
rules and principles can not only be found in the legal, social scientific, or customary foundations 
of a society but also in the linguistic and other “cultural” foundations, and should therefore also 
be traceable in the communicated content of mass media (Meyer et al. 2005a: 31). In the 
upcoming analysis, this negotiation of Western principles will be observed when Germany and 
the United States refer to Arab or Muslim countries and actors. 
 
1.2. Mass Media as a Communication Platform for Western Principles and National Collectivity 
The following analysis will look at mass media as a platform where central German and American 
national rules, norms, or principles for the interpretation and construction of national collectivity 
are reflected in the way in which Arab and Muslim countries and actors are observed and 
portrayed. According to the world polity approach, the Western cultural ideas and scripts are 
diffused throughout the world society to a more or less institutionalized extent and are therefore 
expected to be traceable in the mass media communication as well. Furthermore, it is expected 
that in mass media, Western principles are negotiated and applied to the world society and the 
world’s societies. Since the world polity approach so far does not give any detailed analytical 
concepts about the conception and role of mass media in the world society, I will first of all 
shortly define the key terms that are worked with here. 
 
                                                 
16 Bös and Zimmer (2006) illustrated this negotiation of Western principles with the example of the norm adoption 
(here with the concrete example of the freedom of travel). The authors not only outlined the steps that are taken 
from the adoption of norms to their implementation in different societies, but also emphasized the problems that 
impede the implementation of the normative (theoretical) idea into praxis due to norm ambiguities, a possible 
conflict between norms and different needs in a society, or the problem of norm conformity, i.e. that the compliance 
with a norm cannot be fully guaranteed or controlled by a state (see also Bös and Zimmer 2006: 223-229). 
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The Mass Media System in Modern Society 
In the context of the following book, mass media are defined as those large-scale organizations 
and institutions of society that use technical tools of duplication to publish communication, like 
print, radio, or television. Thereby, mass media are no longer based on a direct interaction or 
direct communication between communicator (sender) and recipient, because this direct contact 
is impeded by the interposition of a technical instance (Luhmann 1996: 9-11).17 
From a differentiation theory perspective, mass media are furthermore regarded as a specialized 
subsystem that has developed in the course of the transition from a European pre-modern first 
primarily segmented then primarily hierarchically stratified society to a modern society that is 
primarily functionally differentiated. This transition is shaped by an increasing division of labor 
and a more and more exclusive specialization of different branches of society according to 
different functions. As a result, in modern societies we find specialized subsystems like the 
political, economic, legal, or educational system, and institutions like governments or 
universities.18 
Subsystems like mass media have developed to perform a specific function for the overall society 
that they are part of and at the same time fulfill a specific service for other function systems. 
According to the theoretical assumptions of the systems theory of Luhmann,19 society is regarded 
as reproducing itself on the operational basis of communication processes that strengthen the 
cohesion of society. From this perspective, mass media are a subsystem of society that is 
specialized on the societal integration of the different subsystems that form the complex, 
specialized, and functionally differentiated modern society. As Marcinkowski (2002) argues, the 
specific function of mass media is the self-observation and self-description of society, since: 
[…] With the medial system of society or rather with the produced description of reality from one 
moment to another that is produced in this system, we find a medium of the self-observation of modern 
societies, from which none is excluded in principle, and that in this respect can serve as a collective 
thematic frame of internal societal communication, since this frame cannot be provided by the individual 
horizon of experience of the systems of consciousness. (Marcinkowski 2002: 114)20 
Yet, Marcinkowski (2002) also emphasizes that mass media cannot accomplish the observation 
and description of the whole societal system, i.e. including all subsystems. Also mass media only 
observe and describe a certain part of reality, and only from a certain perspective. This 
                                                 
17 Exceptions in the form of direct communication, like letters to the editor etc., are defined as staged direct 
communications by Luhmann (1996). 
18 For a more detailed overview of the different theories of the structural differentiation of modern societies, see also 
Schimank (1996). 
19 In this context, considerations are incorporated that have roughly adopted the conceptions of Luhmann as they 
were captured in his book on the REALITY OF THE MASS MEDIA (1996) and as they have also been taken up by 
Marcinkowski (2002). 
20 Own translation; original quote in German: “[…] dass mit dem publizistischen System der Gesellschaft bzw. mit 
der von Moment zu Moment reproduzierten Beschreibung von Realität, die dort angefertigt wird, ein Medium der 
Selbstbeobachtung moderner Gesellschaften vorliegt, von dem prinzipiell niemand ausgeschlossen wird und das 
insoweit als gemeinsamer thematischer Rahmen gesellschaftsinterner Kommunikation fungieren kann, der von den 
individuellen Erfahrungshorizonten der Bewusstseinssysteme naheliegenderweise nicht angeliefert werden kann.” 
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perspective is shaped by the system’s own criteria of observation, the selection-code that 
distinguishes between information and non-information (Marcinkowski 2002: 114-115).21 
Thus, the role of mass media can be summarized as the overall guide and conductor of the self-
observations of modern society. Thereby, mass media merely provide a conglomerate of different 
descriptions that will not form an overall world until they are merged by the observer of those 
descriptions, i.e. the public as a recipient of the media communication (Marcinkowski 2002: 114-
115). Mass media make available certain forms of statements and views that can provide the 
recipient of mass media products with gathered and compact knowledge about issues, topics, and 
– in our concrete case – actors and countries of Arab and Muslim origin that appear in those 
contexts. 
 
Mass Media Reality 
The second term that has to be defined is that of “media reality.” As mass media research today 
is very complex and focuses on a variety of different topics,22 it has to be emphasized that the 
following work will focus on media content only. The following media analysis will not aim at 
distinguishing the differences between a “primary” reality and a “secondary” media reality, and it 
is not argued here that one of the two concepts is a mere reflection of the other. Furthermore, 
the analysis does not aim at elaborating the conditions under which media contents and messages 
are produced, as is done for example by the theories and empirical studies that focus on news 
selection.23 And third, the analysis also does not strive for an analysis of the patterns of 
presentation that is focused for instance by the tradition of the Media Bias Research or the 
analysts of media frames.24 
Mass media products are perceived as a form of constructed reality that is provided by the media 
system according to its own criteria. The reality of mass media is shaped by the system’s 
observation, reflection, and summary of overall communication and institutionalization processes 
of the society it reports on. In this context, the constructed media reality is not regarded as being 
                                                 
21 As Marcinkowski (2002) argues, social function systems do not consist of persons and human beings, and also not 
of actions or decisions; they solely consist of communications that are further taken up by following 
communications. Thereby the media system is self-reproductive (autopoetic), self-organized, structure-determined, 
and thereby functionally closed. The system demarcates itself from an environment of non-corresponding 
communications via its own specific semantics. According to this view, mass media exclusively orientate their 
selection and further processing of information on the basis of their own binary code that differentiates between 
“information” and “non-information” (Marcinkowski 2002: 112). 
22 Altogether, we may distinguish four central areas of research today: media content studies, media system studies 
that deal with the operations of mass media etc., research that focuses on media production and the ideological 
background of the producers of media contents, and research into media effects. 
23 One approach here is the tradition of research on so-called “gate-keeping” mechanisms which focuses on the 
selection processes in media production and has produced for example the news value theory. Research with this 
perspective mainly focuses on documentary media content. For more information on this research field see among 
others Bonfadelli (2002: 49-50), Galtung and Ruge (1965), or Shoemaker and Reese (1996). 
24 Media Bias Research, for instance, deals with the question, to what extent media reality does or does not match 
with an assumed primary reality and analyzes bias and levels of objectivity that might guide the production process. 
A similar approach in this context is the framing theory that assumes that the news coverage about topics is shaped 
by certain frames that can also be understood as structures of argumentation. For more details on those approaches, 
see also Bonfadelli (2002: 50-51), Kepplinger (1989), or Scheufele (1999). 
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comparable with a “primary reality,” since the media system as an observer of society is, at the 
same time, always also an integral part of the same. Mass media can both reflect observed societal 
processes or events and shape them via their own construction criteria, views and perspectives.25 
Thus, the following analysis focuses on the product of mass media – the constructed media 
reality that is communicated to the public. It is hypothesized that this reality brings to and keeps 
certain issues, topics, and also actors in the focus of public attention. What is analyzed in the 
following is this reality, this extract of the world that is transmitted on a mass scale for the public 
perception and that provides a collective pool of knowledge for the German or U.S. society. 
 
Mass Media Discourses 
The last term that has to be defined shortly is the term “discourse.” In the course of this book, it 
will be used once in a while to refer to the various mass medial topical settings in which Arabs 
and Muslims appear. Following the perspective of Gerhards (2004), a public or social discourse is 
regarded as social communications of societal actors about topics, events, or also other actors. 
These communications (or communication processes) consist, for instance, of the different 
positions and arguments that actors hold with regard to the discussed topics, events, or actors, as 
well as of different interpretations that actors provide for those issues. Furthermore, I assume 
that discourses take place in different forums and are negotiated on different communication 
platforms. As Gerhards (2004) argues, the mass media can be regarded as the most important 
platform for the presentation and negotiation of discourses, since they allow a large number of 
actors to (indirectly) take part in their communication processes (Gerhards 2004: 300-301). A 
social discourse, for example about Arabs and Muslims, thereby, is not reduced to the level of 
mass media of course. However, since mass media also reflect and summarize communication 
processes and the different positions of other societal systems with regard to societal phenomena 
or topics they can have an influence on the foci that discourses may take. 
With those assumptions in mind, the following media analysis could also be labeled as a 
systematic content analysis of discursive negotiations about Arabs and Muslims as they can be 
found in mass media contents. Nevertheless, we do not mainly aim at tracing and summarizing 
the discourses, i.e. the topics and contexts in which Arabs and Muslims are focused on, or the 
strategies of argumentation that are used to locate the actors with regard to the contextual events 
and topics. Instead, the analysis will focus on the way in which Arab and Muslim actors are 
constructed IN those different topical contexts and discourses. Consequently, such a research 
perspective does not take into account the individual articles as separate independent units but 
regards them as part of overall communication processes about Arabs and Muslims, and about 
                                                 
25 Constructivist theories have influenced a number of theoretical as well methodological approaches towards the 
analysis of mass media in recent years. Those developments will not be further outlined and discussed here. For an 
overview of the most relevant constructivist approaches and their applications to media research see for example 
Weber (2003: 184-201). For more detailed elaborations of the relation between mass media and reality see for 
instance Schmidt (1994: 4-6). 
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the perceptions of a German or American national collectivity that may also become explicit in 
these communication processes. 
Therefore, we can sum up this section by saying that mass media are focused on as a platform for 
the presentation and discussion of Western principles. At the same time, mass media also serve as 
a platform for the negotiation and diffusion of the same. It is expected that these Western 
principles become relevant in discourses about Arab and Muslim countries and actors as well, as 
they also form the central standards and principles according to which the society’s own national 
collectivity is described and defined. Western principles are thereby assumed to be 
institutionalized expectations and a common sense or “taken-for-granted” knowledge that shapes 
the structure of the actor images in mass media, not only in the context of one topic but 
ACROSS different topics. 
 
2. A Taken-for-Granted Myth: The Distinction of Occident and Orient 
Continuing with the considerations of the first subchapter, which introduced the societal 
background for the definition of the constructed collectivities of Western countries and Arab and 
Muslim Otherness, and emphasized the Western rational principles that are relevant in this 
context, the analysis has also to take into account one special aspect of distinction: the taken-for-
granted myth of a distinction between Occident and Orient. 
In general, from a sociological perspective, a myth can be regarded as a basic form of human 
conception of reality, an unchallenged narration about basic questions of human life, about 
cultural aspects, conflicts, and norms and values. It can be an essential part of a certain worldview 
that is used, for instance, to legitimate value and action patterns that may not be substantiated on 
a rational basis.26 Möller and Sander (1997: 160) also refer to myths as legends, popular 
narrations, or metaphorical, emblematical, and ritualized concretions. They argue that these 
metaphors are needed in the construction of collectivity to provide the rather abstract collective 
concepts – and here especially national identity concepts – with illustrative, visual language, and 
“concrete imageries” since ethnic and national “images” serve as a transformation of an 
intellectual-formal into a visual-concrete semantic of nationality (Möller and Sander 1997: 160). 
This would mean, for instance, that abstract terms like “nation” are visualized. On the level of 
(Christian) religion, Möller and Sander (1997) here mention the transformation of rather abstract 
terms like “justice” or “divineness” into more popular and “naturalistic” allegories like ritualized 
holidays (e.g. Easter), or the personification of salvation and redemption by concrete figures or 
martyrs (Möller and Sander 1997: 160). Adding the assumptions of the world polity approach 
here and reconsidering the set of Western principles that are regarded to form the Western 
cultural account, we can thus assume that those rather abstract principles are also transformed 
into more concrete, more figurative, and therefore more manifest allegories. This transformation 
                                                 
26 This definition was derived from Krech (1994) given in the German LEXIKON ZUR SOZIOLOGIE, edited by Fuchs-
Heinritz et al. 
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can make the abstract principles applicable and comprehensible for the actors who use them and 
for the contexts in which they are used. 
Following this assumption, I would like to highlight the Oriental myth as one central taken-for-
granted idea that shapes the Western worldview: The assumption that Occidental and Oriental 
collectivities confront each other can be seen as a visualization of an external Otherness for 
Western societies that shapes a certain set of criteria according to which Western collectivity is 
constructed. The Oriental myth in our context is especially relevant for the analysis of German 
and U.S. mass media because a number of the analyses that have been introduced in I.2 have 
already outlined that it forms a basic way of communicating Arab and Muslim topics and 
constructing Arab and Muslim actors. As Karim (1997) argues, this myth is preserved in 
collective cultural memory. Therefore, this second subchapter will briefly summarize some of the 
origins of the Oriental myth, list the most relevant studies that have been made with regard to the 
Oriental Other, and illustrate its explicit relevance in the context of mass media constructions of 
Arabs and Muslims. 
 
2.1. Geographical and Cultural Dimensions of the Terms “Orient” and “Occident” 
Let us first of all define what is referred to in the following when we speak about “the Orient.” 
As several authors like Sardar (1999), Said (1978), or Kabbani (1993) have pointed out, “Orient” 
is a term that is traditionally used from a Eurocentric perspective to refer to a cultural space that 
is geographically somewhat vaguely defined. Also when Western media refer to the “Orient” this 
may include the region of the Middle East, but also of South Asia, or East Asia. As the authors 
above argue, since the Middle Ages “Orient” was also increasingly understood as the dominion 
of Islam. Because of its biblical association as the Holy Land described in the Bible, from the 
European perspective the Orient was first and foremost the Middle East. In general it can be said 
that the term “Orient” (or also “East”) forms the oppositional label to the terms “Occident” or 
“West” that were traditionally used to refer to the countries in Europe, and today also 
conceptually include the North American continent or even Australia. 
Thus, a solely geographical location of the concepts of Occident and Orient is not the crucial 
point for the categorization of countries – as the example of Australia illustrates. The distinction 
between the two terms is not predominantly negotiated through political or geographical aspects 
but more via religious and cultural ones. The modern cultural geography approach introduced by 
Kolb (1962) – in contrast to the physical geography approach that defines continents – 
distinguishes different cultural areas that are defined by human societies with a certain lifestyle 
and economy, and therefore have similar cultural developments.27 
Derived mainly from the way in which the terms are used in mass media contexts, for the 
following analysis the term Occident is regarded as a partner of the term “West,” which is used to 
                                                 
27 This idea of “cultural continents” was taken up later for instance by Huntington in his thesis of a “Clash of 
Civilizations” (1996). 
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summarize not only the cultural continent of Europe but also North America or Australia.28 In 
contrast to that, the term “Orient” in its present day usage in mass media mainly refers to Arab 
countries in the Middle East but can also include Muslim countries like Turkey, Iran, Pakistan, or 
the North African region (with Egypt and Morocco). However, other countries that are also 
taken into account for our analysis because of their large Muslim population like Indonesia and 
the Philippines, or Sudan are on the other hand not included in this narrow concept of Orient. 
Said (1978) has summarized this contrasting of Occident and Orient as a European system of 
imaginations that forms a dual image of the world that confronts an Oriental and an Occidental 
sphere and argues that… 
Yet none of this Orient is merely imaginative. The Orient is an integral part of European material 
civilization and culture. Orientalism expresses and represents that part culturally and even ideologically as 
a mode of discourse with supporting institutions, vocabulary, scholarship, imagery, doctrines, even 
colonial bureaucracies and colonial styles. (Said 1978: 2)29 
According to Said (1978), this distinction can be traced back to the Middle Ages and has to this 
day a decisive impact on Western thought and perceptions about Eastern societies (Middle as 
well Far Eastern) – and here especially about Muslim societies. 
Said’s thesis that he first outlined in his book ORIENTALISM in 1978 can be regarded as the 
starting point for a research field that has critically analyzed and discussed the perceptions and 
images of the Orient, of Islam, and of Arab countries in Western culture. As Said (1978) argues, 
the term “Orientalism” thereby mainly refers to the Western attitudes towards Islam, Arabs and 
the Orient.30 The Western perspective on the Orient is shaped by a network of easily 
comprehensible categories, concepts, and norms that are taken from a Western context and that 
are used for the observation of a complex variety of Arab and Muslim cultures (Said 1978: 55-58) 
and has become an integral part of Western culture, a commonly shared myth that was especially 
shaped by the geographical distance between the observer (the West) and the observed object 
(the Orient) (Said 1978: 222-223). 
 
                                                 
28 Even though in the classical definition the term Occident only referred to a Western European cultural area. 
29 With the term “discourse,” Said mainly refers to the vocabulary that is employed when the Orient is spoken or 
written about (see Said 1978: 71). 
30 His definition of the term covers three different levels: an academic, an imaginative, and a historical level. On an 
academic level, any person who studies, researches, teaches, or writes about the Orient can be labeled an Orientalist. 
On an imaginative level, according to Said (1978), Orientalism covers the very notion of a distinction between East 
and West, of “us” and “them” that people have been taught and thus are aware of and use as a taken-for-granted 
belief or myth in theories and literature. And finally, on a historical level, Orientalism is regarded as a discursive way 
or a “corporate institution” for dealing with the Orient, to describe it, to authorize certain views about it, or, as Said 
phrases it “as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, and having authority over the Orient” (Said 1978: 2-3). 
In the following analysis, only the imaginative level will be of central interest. 
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2.2. Research on the Western Perception of the Orient 
A number of scholars have picked up this thesis and have analyzed the roots, the history, and the 
composition of the Western perception and images of the Orient since Said’s book. Looking at 
only a few of those scholars, the following section will outline the most essential aspects of the 
Western perception of the Orient that have an influence on the perception of Arab and Muslim 
countries to this day, as they shape the perspective on Arabs and Muslims and are also reflected 
in the images that can be found of them in Western mass media. The overview that will be given 
in the following does not claim to be complete, but presents only the most central facets that are 
regarded as relevant for the Western perception of the Orient until today. I will thereby not go 
into too much detail about they way in which the Oriental image has changed and developed 
from the Middle Ages until today.31 
Encounters with the Orient are documented throughout the history of Western literature – in 
fictional writings and travel reports but also in scientific works. Sardar (1999), for example, argues 
that especially the Crusades dominated European imagination and fiction about the Orient, and 
the crusading ethos became a central motif of Western thought and literature and endured even 
centuries after the actual campaigns into the Orient had ceased (Sardar 1999: 20). Historical 
markers like the Siege of Vienna in 1529 (when the Turkish army expanded into Europe) are 
consulted to this day as relevant cases to describe the historical relationship between Occident 
and Orient. 
A number of authors outline in their studies that in European portrayals and narrations about the 
Orient the mentioned attributes largely emphasize a basic difference between Orient and 
Occident. As Kabbani (1993) puts it, two central motifs can be highlighted here that shape the 
traditional Western perception of the Orient. On the one hand, the Orient is described as a place 
of lascivious sensuality; on the other hand, the Orient is regarded as violent and barbaric by 
nature (Kabbani 1993: 19-20). Sardar (1999) emphasizes that in addition to the exclusion of the 
Oriental Other we also find a certain attractiveness expressed towards it, since “the pathology of 
the Orientalist vision is based on two simultaneous desires: the personal quest of the Western 
male for Oriental mystery and sexuality and the collective goal to educate and control the Orient 
in political and economic terms” (Sardar 1999: 1-2). 
Historically, Rotter (1993) outlines that during the Middle Ages – with the culmination of Arab 
sciences and arts and the expansion of Arab cultural and material goods and scientific knowledge 
to Western Europe – the European perception of the Oriental region is not exclusively negative. 
During the sixteenth century, the perception of the Orient is also increasingly shaped by the 
                                                 
31 For a more detailed retrospective I suggest the comprehensive studies and books by Heine (1996), Hentsch (1992), 
Kabbani (1993), Sardar (1999), or Suleiman (1989). Kabbani (1993), for instance, presents a comprehensive and very 
descriptive overview of the clichés, myths, and stereotypes that for centuries have stimulated the Western 
imagination about the Orient. She thereby for example discusses the Western Crusades, the European travel 
narrations, but also European painting and poetry that has adopted those myths and has thereby created a European 
perception of the Orient that is not only a place of fantasy but has remained influential until today – and not only in 
fictional literature of movies but also for political relations between Europe and Middle Eastern and Islamic 
countries. 
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positive images of travelers, traders, and diplomats. The created image of the Orient is rather 
complex and differentiated but also reflects a fascinated and romanticizing view of the Orient 
and the Islamic world (Rotter 1993: 54-55). Furthermore, the translation of the ARABIAN 
NIGHTS, a Medieval Middle Eastern compilation of historical tales, love stories, tragedies, and 
poems into European languages and its wide reception in Western countries had a large influence 
on the way in which the Orient is perceived. As Suleiman (1989) reports, countries and actors 
were identified with the book to a great extent, and the characteristics and lifestyles that are 
described in the tales were transferred to the “real” Arab and Muslim figures that the Western 
observer came into contact with. Those “fictional” images were in addition supported by the 
stories of merchants and travelers who wrote about their adventures in the Orient and with its 
people during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (Suleiman 1989: 257). 
However, parallel to the romantic enthusiasm, we can also find a continuous negative side of the 
perception. As already mentioned, violent political conflicts and events like the conquest of 
Constantinople by the Ottoman Turks in 1453 or the expansion of the Ottoman Empire also to 
Europe also strengthened the Western perception of the Orient as a potential threat (Rotter 
1993: 52-55). A number of the authors that have also been introduced in chapter I.2.3 have 
argued that the religion can be regarded as the crucial element here for the perception of 
difference between Occident and Orient. Sardar (1999) argues, for example, that it was the 
encounter with Islam that can be seen as one of the central influences for the Western vision of 
the Orient as an “unfathomable erotic and exotic place where mysteries dwell and cruel and 
barbaric scenes are staged” (Sardar 1999: 2). As the author writes, 
The Crusades, for example, both initiated and perpetuated the representation of Muslims as evil and 
depraved, licentious and barbaric, ignorant and stupid, unclean and inferior, monstrous and ugly, fanatical 
and violent. (Sardar 1999: 2) 
Sardar (1999) sees a close connection between those images and the religious confrontation of a 
Christian Europe with a predominantly Islamic Orient that is mainly traced to the geographical 
expansion of the Ottoman Empire: 
For Christendom, Islam was the darker side of Europe. The Protestant Reformation and the rise of the 
Ottoman Empire led to the transformation of Christendom to “the West” […] Western civilization […] 
became the yardstick, as Christendom had been earlier, by which Oriental cultures and civilizations were 
measured. (Sardar 1999: 2-3)  
Similarly, Suleiman (1989) mentions a study by James Waltz (1963) who analyzed the attitudes of 
the West towards Muslims before the Crusades and argued that those attitudes often reflected 
indifference and (political, military, academic, or religious) hostility, but occasionally also interest 
in coexistence.32 However, as Suleiman (1989) argues: 
[…] although there was much ignorance, indifference, and some prejudice, the major change in Western 
attitudes toward Arabs/Muslims came when the church hierarchy – the popes – took over political 
leadership and power from inept secular authorities, called for peace among warring Christian nations, and 
sought to direct that antagonism and war against the Muslim outsiders […] an anti-Muslim ideology was 
developed which painted a dark and evil picture of Islam, the Prophet, and Muslims in general, including, 
of course, the Arabs (Saracens, Ishmaelites, and so forth). (Suleiman 1989: 257) 
                                                 
32 For more details on the different historical steps of these attitudes see also Suleiman (1989: 257-258). 
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Arabs and Muslims were perceived as pagans, who worshipped Muhammad as well as other gods, 
or were described as extremely cruel and savage. According to Suleiman (1989), this picture then 
came to dominate the Western European attitudes for a number of centuries and can even be 
identified in present day perspectives as well. The author claims that these images were first and 
foremost maintained and reproduced by Western literature, giving the example of Elizabethan 
literature about the Orient, where the main themes concerning Arabs and Muslims were 
identified as war, conquest, fratricide, treachery, and lust (Suleiman 1989: 257). 
Most of the authors who have been quoted so far mainly refer to the European context and the 
Oriental image that has developed there. However, similar findings have also been presented by 
U.S. scholars for the perception of the Orient and the constructed Oriental image in the United 
States. Suleiman (1989), for example, emphasizes that the Medieval Western picture of the Orient 
were later also inherited by the inhabitants of the American colonies. At the same time, however, 
he claims that “Americans added other specifically American ingredients – influenced by 
distinctly American factors” (Suleiman 1989: 258). The author here summarizes four central 
differences of the U.S. image of the Orient: 
First of all, the Oriental image of the American colonies and the early American republic included 
a greater emphasis on the Bible as a literal representation of the events and processes in the 
Middle East. Arabs were, for example, presented as “God’s agents of retribution and temptation” 
(Suleiman 1989: 258). Similarly, also McAlister (2005) emphasizes that for most of the nineteenth 
century, American’s primary interest in the Middle East was the “Holy Land” and most American 
visitors to the region (Protestant Christians) went, for example, to Palestine for religious reasons. 
As McAlister (2005) notes, those travelogues from Holy Land trips were extremely popular in the 
U.S. in the nineteenth century (McAlister 2005: 13-20). Second, Americans tended to identify 
themselves with the ancient Hebrews, and the early settlers and here especially the Puritans in 
New England regarded themselves as ancient Israelites. In the twentieth century this perception 
led to a comparison of the modern Israelis with the American pioneers. In both cases, Arabs 
were – on the contrary – perceived as a continual threat to the Hebrews, i.e. not only to the 
modern Israelis but also to the Israelites in the United States (Suleiman 1989: 258). 
Suleiman (1989) sees a third difference between Europe and the United States that results from 
the American experiences of the settlement era. As Suleiman (1989) argues, the early American 
settlers developed an ideology of Savagism that was regarded to protect them, as civilized people, 
from the “uncivilized” Indians (Native Americans) who had to be either Christianized or 
eliminated to protect the settlers from becoming uncivilized savages as well. According to the 
author, in the twentieth century this ideology of Savagism and the original orientation toward 
Indians was broadened to the Arabs as well, and here especially to Palestinian Arabs in their 
conflict with Israel (Suleiman 1989: 258). Last but not least, in the nineteenth century the 
establishment of Christian missionaries in Arab and Muslim countries and the attempt to convert 
Muslims to Christianity further shaped the negative perception of the region. According to 
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Suleiman (1989), the reports and books that the Christian missionaries wrote about the different 
countries that they lived in were mainly negative (Suleiman 1989: 259). 
The historical development and relevance of the Oriental myth may be summarized with Sardar’s 
argument that… 
[...] underlying the complexity of the history of the West there is a continuity of stance to a necessary 
construct that is called the Orient. The overriding opinions were set when information was most limited 
and as information expanded its meaning and effect for the internal purposes of the West changed, but 
continuity was the essential feature of the Orient. (Sardar 1999: 52) 
As Sardar (1999) indicates here, the origins for the developed oriental image can be traced back 
to the times of the Christian Crusades and have since then formed the elementary features 
according to which the Otherness of the Orient was constructed, not only but also in literary and 
artistic genres. 
 
2.3. The Oriental Image Today: A Taken-for-Granted Myth  
Thus, when we look at present day perceptions of Arab and Muslim countries and actors, we 
have to be aware of this taken-for-granted myth that assumes a general difference between Orient 
and Occident. Present day references towards the idea of an Oriental Otherness as they might be 
found in German or U.S. mass media thereby are regarded as a continuation of this tradition of 
summarizing a geographical and cultural region under the concept of Orient. The confrontation 
of two cultural and geographical areas like the Orient and the Occident is not a new idea, even 
though some political and cultural analysts have argued that this confrontation line was replaced 
to some extent for a few decades by the East-West confrontation during the Cold War era.33 
Concerning the present day perceptions of the Orient, a number of the studies that have been 
introduced in I.2 have also referred to this historical dimension of present day images.34 In the 
already mentioned study by Artz and Pollock (1995) the authors note, for example, that reporters 
for non-fictional newspapers and television news also use existing cultural beliefs about an 
Oriental distinction, for example to frame the Persian Gulf crisis. As both authors argue here, 
this is first and foremost due to the fact that news professionals and entertainment professionals 
in the U.S. share the same cultural heritage, and thus also “factual” non-entertainment images of 
the Oriental Other “reinforce their fictional counterparts” (Artz and Pollock 1995: 124). 
In the same book, Wiegand and Malek (1995) argue that modern mass media have continuously 
used stereotypical and ethnocentric thought in their perception and portrayal of the Oriental 
Other. The authors emphasize that the violent aspect has come to dominate the Western 
                                                 
33 See for example Huntington (1996), or Rotter (1993) who argues, for example, that the collapse of the Communist 
regimes and the end of the East-West conflict has also led to the dissolving of the hostile stereotypes that were 
associated with this confrontation. At the same time, a new hostile stereotype stepped into the vacant spot that was 
an old and well known one though: the Orient, and more precisely, Islam and especially the Arab Muslims. 
According to the author, this new hostile stereotype was especially reinforced by Saddam Hussein’s annexing of 
Kuwait which resulted in the Second Gulf War in 1990-91 (Rotter, 1993: 44-45). 
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perception of the Orient especially since the 1970s due to numerous crises and conflicts in the 
region (Wiegand and Malek 1995: 204).35 One of the examples that the authors mention here is 
the foreign news coverage of U.S. mass media has increasingly focused on the phenomenon of 
Islamic revivalism and the establishment of a militant streak of Islamic fundamentalism, especially 
in the context of countries like Egypt, Lebanon, or Israel and Palestine (Wiegand and Malek 
1995: 205). 
Thus the present day perceptions of the Orient are mainly shaped by a strong focus on Islamic 
militants, fundamentalists, terrorism, and violence, still ignoring largely the possible diversities 
among Arab and Muslim cultures, religious sections, or historical circumstances of political and 
violent conflicts. As Hafez (2002) argues, this Oriental concept occurs as a well-established, 
timeless and largely unchallenged myth that is not bound to specific topics but can appear in 
nearly every context that refers to Islam or the Middle East. Despite the changing topics over the 
last decades, the Oriental construction is a continuous element of the news coverage on this 
cultural and geographical region. The only thing that changes in the different contexts of its usage 
– according to Hafez (2002) – is the focused-on dimension and the emphasized facet of the 
Oriental image (Hafez 2002: 293-311).36 For the following analysis we may therefore assumed 
that the Oriental myth is also of central relevance in the context of the coping with the 9/11 
attacks when Arab and Muslim countries and actors are focused on. The comparative analysis of 
German and U.S. mass media may also reveal some of the current Oriental facets and the 
relevance of the Oriental myth in German and U.S. mass media when Arab and Muslim countries 
and actors are constructed. 
 
Media Usage of the Terms “Arab” and “Muslim” 
At this point, some final comments have to be made about the usage of the terms “Arab” and 
“Muslim” in the context of my analysis. Following the considerations of the last few pages, it can 
be said that the concept of Orient is used synonymously with the concepts of Islam and Arabs. 
Therefore, when in the following we use the term “Oriental Other” this is equated with referring 
to Arab or Muslim countries and actors. This decision can be supported by the simple fact that 
the same synonymous use of the terms can be found in the analyzed set of mass media.37 In the 
analyzed data, the terms “Orient,” “Arab,” or “Muslim” are very often used interchangeably in 
                                                                                                                                                        
34 See, for instance, Campbell (1995), Fuller (1995), Kamalipour (1995), McAlister (2005), Said (1981), Shaheen 
(1984, 2001), or Wöhlert (2004). 
35 Here, examples are, for instance, the continuing conflict between Israel and Palestine, the oil crisis in 1973, the 
Iranian Revolution in 1978-79, or the Lebanese civil war that started in the mid-1970s. 
36 For instance, for the German print media context Hafez has shown that up to the 1960s the Oriental focus was 
dominated by rather positive depictions of Oriental royal dynasties. This changed however with the Iranian 
Revolution, when the former positive image was replaced by an increasing Islamization and a growing politicization. 
In the course of this change, new topical foci were established that included issues like fundamentalism, terrorism, or 
the oppression of women (Hafez 2002: 293-311). This shift can be assumed to have become even more manifest in 
the media after the terrorist attacks of 2001. 
37 The media selection will be introduced in chapter III.2.3. 
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the various contexts in which they are applied, or they at least remain rather undefined according 
to their distinctiveness.38 
Furthermore, a combined usage of these terms includes two central connotations that are closely 
connected with the considerations that have been made so far. First of all, the combined usage of 
both labels indicates the broadness of the Oriental concept. Second, the usage of both terms 
indicates the two central aspects that shape the Oriental myth which has an influence on the 
Western perception of the observed countries and actors and which is also assumed to be 
reflected in the mass media images of the same: the Orient is regarded as different on a 
geographical dimension (i.e. Arab countries) and on a cultural or religious dimension (i.e. Islam 
and Muslim countries). 
As scholars like Suleiman (1989) have noted, also historically often no distinction was made for 
example between Arabs and other residents of the area under Ottoman rule. Even though they 
might have been given different names (depending on the region they were living in) or slightly 
different attributes, they were nevertheless all perceived as wild, cruel or savage.39 As the author 
argues, also in the present day context most Americans do not distinguish between Arabs and 
Muslims and think that both terms are synonymous. To some extent, this might be due to the 
fact, that the vast majority of Arab people are Muslims.40 The indefinite character of the term 
“Arab” is furthermore increased by the fact that – according to Suleiman (1989) – Americans also 
do not distinguish between Arabs, Turks, or Iranians, which can lead to the result that a potential 
conflict with one of those countries is perceived as a conflict with “Arabs” in general (Suleiman 
1989: 257-258). In the context of the 9/11 attacks, this became quite obvious when the religious 
and political aggression of a few terrorists caused the assumption that “a network of Islamic 
fundamentalist terrorists has spread out over Europe and the whole world.”41 
Therefore, in the following analysis, both terms are used in combination. Not all of the occurring 
actors are Muslims, just as not all of them are of Arab origin. Nevertheless, the analyzed mass 
media predominantly do not distinguish between the concepts when they identify actors from the 
observed regions. In the particular contexts in which certain actors appear, we may find a 
differentiation according to national origin, just as some of the occurring actors may or may not 
be (additionally or solely) referred to as being Muslims. And comparing the German and 
American mass media, German news more often use the label “Muslims” than “Arabs” to refer 
                                                 
38 Other authors like Ghareeb (1983) or Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) have also argued that American media 
generalize both categories and tend to report on Muslims and Arabs within the United States but also abroad in the 
same stories and use the terms as if they were interchangeable (see Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 137). 
 
39 For example, the name “Arabs” was given to those people who were living in the desert, whereas people from 
North Africa were referred to as “Moors,” and those from Egypt as “Mamelukes” (see also Suleiman 1989: 257). 
40 Even though, as for example Shaheen (2001) has emphasized, we can also count more than fifteen million Arab 
Christians (Shaheen 2001: 2-3). 
41 This statement was given by the then German Federal Minister of the Interior, Otto Schily in an interview with the 
German news magazine DER SPIEGEL (Sp-01-i39: 32-34). The quotation was taken from the analyzed print media 
set. From now on, the newspaper references will be abbreviated according to the following structure: abbreviated 
name of the medium-year-volume-issue: page (for the news magazines) and abbreviated name of the medium-year-
month-day: page (for the newspapers). 
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to those actors who live within Germany, whereas in the U.S. we can at least find a distinction 
being made between Muslim Americans and Arab Americans. 
Nevertheless, in the analyzed data set for this book the labels “Muslim” or “Arab” are 
predominantly used synonymously and interchangeably, for instance when several countries 
come under one label. U.S. media refer, for example, to “the vast majority of Muslims, Arab and 
non-Arab alike,” and talk of “Arab regimes,” “Muslim countries in the Middle East” or “the 
Arab world” when referring to countries ranging from Algeria and Egypt to Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen. German mass media construct the “Arab world” as part of an overall “Islamic world” 
and thereby also refer to countries like Saudi Arabia as well as Turkey, or label the Middle East as 
the “central area of Islam.” Although both concepts are somehow differentiated, it is not clear at 
what point the difference becomes relevant or not. An editorial commentary in the American 
NEWSWEEK claims that, as a reaction to the 9/11 attacks “Learning Arabic would be an especially 
patriotic act. Or international economic development to bolster moderate Muslims,”42 indicating 
that both actions refer to the same group of people. 
And the following quotation from the NEW YORK TIMES illustrates how broad the geographical 
radius is when the Arab-Muslim world is focused on: 
Many of these super-empowered angry people hail from failing states in the Muslim and 
third world. They do not share our values, they resent America’s influence over their lives, 
politics and children, not to mention our support for Israel, and they often blame America 
for the failure of their societies to master modernity.[…] So what is required to fight a war 
against such people in such a world? To start with, we as Americans will never be able to 
penetrate such small groups, often based on family ties, who live in places such as 
Afghanistan, Pakistan or Lebanon’s wild Bekaa Valley.[…] We need to have a serious and 
respectful dialogue with the Muslim world and its political leaders about why many of its 
people are falling behind. The fact is, no region in the world, including sub-Saharan Africa, 
has fewer freely elected governments than the Arab-Muslim world, which has none. (NYT-
01-09-13: 27) 
To come to a conclusion, we can say that one central assumption for the following analysis is that 
the Western perspective on Arab and Muslim countries and thus the German and American 
worldview is shaped by the taken-for-granted myth of a contrast between two geographical and 
cultural entities that confront each other: Occident and Orient. As I have outlined throughout 
the last subchapter, one crucial element of this myth is the idea that both geographical and 
cultural entities are assumed to be DISTANT from each other, and here not only with regard to 
the geographical dimension but also on the political, economic, and especially on the cultural 
dimension. This distance is furthermore taken as an indicator for DIFFERENCE as well. 
Thus, when we look at the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims we have to take into 
account that this perception and the images of Arabs and Muslims that are communicated for 
instance in mass media are shaped by a well established myth of a contrast between two 
geographically distant and culturally distinct entities: the West (Occident) and the East (Orient). 
As was outlined, this myth has developed and institutionalized as a form of taken-for-granted 
knowledge that is consulted by the West to observe and explain the actions and behavior of the 
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Oriental counterpart, and to compare and evaluate this counterpart according to the Western 
rules and principles that are taken as a yardstick and structuring pattern for the classification and 
estimation of social events and action. 
For both the German as well as the American context, I assume that the comparison between the 
German and U.S. national self-concept and Arab and Muslim countries and actors in mass media 
is guided by this myth to a significant extent. It is expected that this also has an influence on the 
evaluation of the occurring Arabs and Muslims with regard to the Western standard principles. 
As might be expected from the outlined facets of the Oriental myth, those effects may be 
predominantly negative. 
 
3. The Construction of a Collective Self and Otherness 
After having outlined the relevant societal criteria, principles, and myths that are regarded to 
shape the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims, the last subchapter will discuss a third 
aspect that I assume to be central for the media imaging of Arabs and Muslims. We may 
approach this theoretical level with two questions: First of all, we could ask, why is it important 
for actors in the world society to not only negotiate their societal principles but actually – in 
doing so – also to permanently negotiate their own collective identity or self-image? And second, 
why does this process of self-definition work via the observation and construction of a 
distinguished group with which the society’s own principles, rules, and structures are compared 
and through which they are communicated? 
To answer those questions, the last section of this chapter will introduce some theoretical 
assumptions for the relevance of the concept of the Other in the construction of social 
structures, norms, and collectivities. It will be shown that on the one hand, the construction of 
difference is regarded as central for the reduction of global and social complexity of the observed 
environment. At the same time, however, the construction of difference is also directed towards 
the inside, as it communicates and evaluates central rules and guidelines for the members of a (in 
our case national) group. 
When we look at the way in which difference between groups and societies but also between 
members within a group or society is constructed, theoretical approaches of the social disciplines 
that become relevant here have focused on the field of intergroup relations as well as on the role 
of boundary drawing and collective identity construction. What can be looked at for instance is 
the different ways in which ethnic or other social groups deal with each other and out of what 
motivation they form groups. A large spectrum of sociological and social-psychological research 
in this area has concentrated on the study of ethnic groups and has looked for example at ethnic 
minority groups and their status in society. Other studies have analyzed the topic of collective or 
social identity construction in this context and have analyzed and compared ethnic or national 
identities in Western countries. Or, studies in the political sciences have concentrated, for 
                                                                                                                                                        
42 NW-01-v138-i14: 63 
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example, on national citizenship rights and have discussed the structural and formal definition of 
minority or immigrant groups and the interrelation of citizenship and national identity definition. 
The following analysis aims at describing the perceptions that can be found of Arabs and 
Muslims in German and U.S. media and the images that result from those perceptions. One 
central idea in this context is that these perceptions and images are strongly influenced by the 
national self-perceptions of Germany and the United States. Thus, we will also look for ascribed 
images and communicated collective self-descriptions. The construction of Arabs and Muslims in 
mass media is regarded as an example of how national self-images are defined and 
communicated, and how boundaries are drawn between the society’s own collective concept of 
belonging and the outside of this concept. The analyzed images are assumed to reflect and 
summarize the societal communication processes about national group concepts and the 
characteristics and features that are regarded as relevant for these concepts by the respective 
(German or U.S.) societies. And, by identifying and summarizing the central dimensions of 
difference that are referred to in the context of Arab and Muslim actors in Western mass media, 
the analysis will redraw the demarcation line between the constructed concept of a German or 
U.S. self-image and one representative of the outside of this concept: the Oriental (Arab and 
Muslim) Other. The actual process of identity construction is therefore less central here; the 
analyzed images and communicated group concepts in mass media are rather considered to form 
sets of knowledge and ideas that may then have an influence on the actual process of identity 
construction and active identity definition as it is analyzed by other studies. 
Based on those assumptions, I will first of all outline some general assumptions for the question, 
why a collective self-image or a concept of belonging is relevant for individuals and groups. Here, 
some social-psychological considerations will be consulted that deal with the construction and 
definition of collective identities in the world society. Subsequently, and also resulting from those 
assumptions, some considerations will be introduced for the question why an Other is needed for 
the concept of self, and how the different possible roles of this Other can be summarized. Here, 
some social-anthropological considerations about ethnic group relations and the construction of 
boundaries constructions within or between groups and societies will be consulted. The role of 
the geographical distance and the construction of (geographically, but also political, cultural, 
symbolic, etc.) difference are regarded as two key elements. Last but not least, some basic 
assumptions will be introduced for example from the sociological field of deviance theories that 
offer an explanation for the evaluation and portrayal of largely negative features in the media 
constructions of Arabs and Muslims. 
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3.1. Why do We Need a Collective Self Image? 
But first of all, let us start with a rather general question: Why does difference matter? This 
question can actually be divided up into two sub-questions that open up two central theoretical 
assumptions about concepts of belonging or collectivity. First of all, we may ask why the 
definition of a collective self-image is relevant for actors (individuals as well as groups). Second, 
we could ask why this definition mainly works via the differentiation and demarcation of an 
outgroup. 
To answer those questions, we may start from a rather general sociological definition according 
to which the self-concept or self-image summarizes the beliefs, attitudes, expectations, 
evaluations, and opinions that an individual holds in terms of their own physical, psychological, 
social, and behavioral characteristics, skills, values, or interests etc.43 Those beliefs and evaluations 
of the individual about their own image mainly refer to the individual level of the 
conceptualization of self, but they may also be applied to the level of collective concepts of group 
affiliations, for example in the form of a national collectivity. On a national or cultural level – two 
aspects that are basically focused on in the context of this analysis – collective concepts of 
“nation” or Western “culture” can form comprehensive reference systems for actors. These 
reference systems may help the members of a society to locate themselves and other actors in a 
(world) society and may offer certain patterns according to which social phenomena and actions 
can be classified and evaluated. 
One approach that can give an answer to the question why the Self needs a concept of collective 
belonging can be found in the considerations of Weller (2000) who also brings us back to the 
theoretical assumptions about the world society that were discussed in II.1.1. Weller (2000) looks 
at collective identities and identity construction in the world society and in this context 
emphasizes the distinction between society formation and community formation.44 The author, 
thereby, follows Weber’s distinction of “community” and “society” as two dimensions of the 
world society. As Weller (2000) argues: 
For Weber […] the ideal-typical distinction between society and community formation is based on a 
difference of attitude that lies at the root of these two forms of social relationship. Community formation 
is not motivated by interests, but comes about on the basis of a feeling of belonging (Weller 2000: 46). 
According to this perception, specific expressions of community formation are forms of social 
fragmentation like nationalism, ethnicity, or separatism. Weller (2000) argues that a significant 
proportion of social action can be defined as community formation rather than as rationally 
motivated formation of society, though both forms of formation are regarded as modes of social 
relation that “exist in a constant interrelationship with one another, neither of which can replace 
the other because each of them performs a specific function within human society as a whole” 
(Weller 2000: 45). 
                                                 
43 This definition was derived from Klima (1994) given in the German LEXIKON ZUR SOZIOLOGIE, edited by Fuchs-
Heinritz et al. 
44 One example of society formation here would be the development of a world society or a German society as a 
global or national society formation. 
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The author thus provides an answer to the question of what motivations lay behind community 
formation and why we need a collective self-image or concept. Weller (2000) argues that the 
individual’s need for a positive social identity can be regarded as the basic motivation for the 
construction of a self-image or self-collectivity. According to this assumption, the striving for a 
positive identity is therefore also central for community formation in social relations. Weller 
(2000) thereby adopts the social-psychological approach of the social identity theory that was 
originally formulated by Tajfel and Turner.45 He derives a definition for collective identity 
according to which a collective group concept can be identified “when a number of individuals 
accept a social categorization that enables them to differentiate themselves as a group from the 
rest of the world” (Weller 2000: 46). Social identity concepts, therefore, are cognitive 
representations that reflect elements of the self-concept. In this process, it is assumed that groups 
rank themselves higher than a potential outgroup from which they demarcate themselves, and 
thereby strengthen their self-esteem. Weller (2000) describes this as follows: 
[…] the desire and striving for a positive self-image is the driving force behind the evaluation of social 
categories and groups, because there is an individual advantage to be derived from a positive evaluation of 
categories and groups of which one is oneself a member. (Weller 2000: 46) 
Following this approach, we can say that national and other community concepts can be regarded 
as constructions of belonging and exclusion that demarcate an outgroup on the basis of certain 
categories that allow the members of a collective group to structure the perceptions of their 
environment. As I already said before, according to Anderson (2005) these constructions of 
community are regarded as existing mainly in a mental sense, i.e. in the imagination of the actors 
who define them and who identify with this imagined community even though they do not know 
every member of this collective group (Anderson 2005: 14-16). 
And Weller (2000) offers another answer to the question of why concepts of belonging are so 
crucial for the individual when he argues that “the categories used to draw boundaries between 
groups and to attach a lower value to the out-group are not given from the start, but are based on 
the respective perceptions of reality of those involved” (Weller 2000: 61). When we define 
ourselves according to social categories we are able to orient ourselves within our social 
environment. Categorization is decisive because categories segment the world. Again, Weller 
(2000) here adopts this aspect from social identity theory when he argues that the grouping and 
                                                 
45 In short, Tajfel and Turner have combined concepts of social categorization, social identity, social comparison, 
and social distinction and have derived a concept that will here only be shortly outlined. The following summary is 
adopted from Mummendey and Otten (1992: 98-101). Via the process of social categorization, individuals classify 
and structure the social world on the basis of characteristics and value-dimensions into social categories and groups. 
They thereby differentiate between categories that they themselves belong to and categories that they do not belong 
themselves, and so distinguish between ingroup and outgroup. The process of categorization helps the individual to 
orientate him- or herself in the social world and define their own position in this world. This constructed belonging 
to a certain (in)group and the relationships of an ingroup to other groups shapes the social identity of individuals. 
Individual receive their information about the characteristics of their social identity via social comparison with other 
groups. One crucial point for the following analysis is that – according to this approach – every individual strives to 
have, to maintain, and to increase a positive social identity. This can be established when the social comparison 
between ingroup and outgroup produces positive results in favor of the ingroup. For further details on social identity 
theory see – amongst others – Abrams (1990), Mummendey and Simon (1997), Tajfel (1982), or Turner (1987). 
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classification of other individuals or groups on the basis of perceived similarities and differences 
is due to cognitive economy: 
Without such a categorization we would be unable to deal with the enormous variety of stimulations 
reaching our consciousness. The order we create in this way, however, contributes not only to self-
orientation but also to the structuring of the world in terms of categories and of the social world in terms 
of groups, and this enables each individual to find an answer to the question, “‘Who am I?” (Weller 2000: 
62). 
Thus, we can say that the perception of Self and Other is mainly influenced by the structures of 
the social world that shape the different categories with which an individual (or in our case a 
national group) observes its environment. Arguing with the world polity approach, these 
categories are expected to be shaped mainly by the commonly shared Western principles, norms, 
and normative patterns that provide the central objectives and orientations for the individual and 
collective actors in a society. As has been emphasized before, these Western principles are not 
only nationally institutionalized but are also used to structure the perception of the environment 
of the members of the German or American national community and are thus consulted as well 
to structure and evaluate the complexity beyond the national borders, for example when Arab 
and Muslim countries are focused on. 
It can be concluded therefore, that a conception of self (on whatever level) is crucial for 
individual as well as collective actors to define themselves in their inner structure of views, 
opinions and behavior, and to position themselves in their external environment. On the one 
hand, the self-concept is therefore part of the individual’s personality that has an impact on the 
individual’s actions. On the other hand, the concept itself can be the object of observation and 
negotiation. The self-concept does not only develop out of the self-observation of the 
individual’s (or group’s) own behavior or the own inner (cognitive and physical/emotional) 
processes, but that it is also shaped by examination of the social environment. 
 
3.2. Why do We Need the Other? 
At this point, the Other comes into play. When I assume that the construction of the self-
concept is shaped by interaction with the social environment, the imagining of a self-community 
involves at the same time the imagining of an Other from whom the Self is distinct. 
 
Who is the Other? 
In sociological research, the Other as a social concept can be seen as one of the central themes 
for the analysis of societies and intergroup relations. However, in the context of different 
research foci, different forms of Others can be distinguished: 
On the one hand, the Other can be a PART of a society. This form of otherness within a society 
can either refer to individuals who are demarcated from certain branches of society, for example 
because of their deviant behavior (e.g. delinquents, or ill people). A number of studies on social 
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deviance have focused on the group of delinquent Others in society and have tried to analyze the 
images and functions those outsiders have for a society.46 Furthermore, according to the 
analytical tradition that looks at the sociology of the stranger,47 the Other can also be a foreigner 
or stranger in our own culture or society, who crosses the collective (national) borders and who – 
as Simmel (1968) argues – comes but also leaves again. Shimada (2006) refers to those temporary 
visitors as “intra-Western” Others, a particular population group of modern Western societies 
who stand outside the context of their own society. These Others are regarded however as 
“nearby” Others that are not consequently very different from the host society’s own self-
concept (Shimada 2006: 85-86, see also Schütz 1971). Examples of this Other are the group of 
Jews in Western societies48 or the economic traveler.49 And as for the internal immigrant Other, 
the broad research field of ethnic and minority studies but also a large number of media studies 
has focused on this group of Others, the way they are perceived by their host society and the 
problems that may result from those perceptions. The group of Arab and Muslim immigrants 
that will also be focused on in the following analysis can be seen as one representative of this 
internal immigrant Other. 
On the other hand, the Other can also stand OUTSIDE of society, as an external figure who is 
placed outside of the geographical borders of a society, and who – according to Shimada (2006) 
can for example be labeled as those “who are not part of modern Western civilization” (Shimada 
2006: 86). In the context of our analysis, the observed Arab and Muslim countries and actors in 
German and U.S. mass media could be classified as those external Others that are observed by 
the German and U.S. Self from the outside. 
For all these conceptions, I assume that the social comparison with those different forms of 
otherness is important for the structuring and evaluation of a nation’s collective self-perception. 
As Mummendey and Simon (1997) assume,50 this distinction and comparison between self-
concept and an outgroup predominantly aims at positively enhancing the Self, mainly by 
devaluating the Other.51 Inevitably, it seems, the construction of a collective Self mainly works via 
the identification or construction of DIFFERENCE. This consequently means that the 
construction of a Self has to be based on an idea of what is regarded as non-Self and therefore 
presents a difference or a constructed outside.52 
 
                                                 
46 See here, for instance, Becker (1973), Sibley (1995), or Young (2006). 
47 According to Stichweh (1997), this tradition “documents the near universal tendency of societies to classify some 
social entities as strangers, and to build social structures on the basis of these classifications” (Stichweh 1997: 45-64). 
48 An example that was introduced by Simmel (1968) one of the classical representatives that can be mentioned here. 
49 For more current research and theoretical elaborations on the stranger see, for instance, Bielefeld (1991), Münkler 
et al. (1997), or Stichweh (1997, 2002). 
50 But see also Abrams (1990), Tajfel (1982), or Turner (1987). 
51 Billig (1995) points out that the Other in this context is not a homogenous one, but can be subdivided into various 
groups of Others, that are distinguished on the basis of different focused characteristics and criteria. The author lists 
for example the different stereotypes that are ascribed to different nationalities and points out that some of those 
outgroups are presumed to be more admirable and appreciated than others, or even more like “us” (Billig 1995: 80). 
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Borders and Boundaries 
One object of investigation to approach this construction of difference is the analysis of borders 
as social and symbolic boundaries. Diez (2006) ascribes borders and boundaries the defining role 
in the construction of political system or, in more general terms, political order. According to the 
author, borders establish a certain structure by defining constitutive units (Diez 2006: 180-181). 
Similarly, Weller (2000) argues that community formation is associated to a large extent with the 
drawing of boundaries. He supports this thesis with the fact that identity formation requires a 
demarcation of one’s own group from those individuals who do not belong to the group (Weller 
2000: 47). 
In the anthropological field, this idea can – among others – be traced back to the theoretical 
works of Barth (1969) and Cohen (1982, 1986). Adopting the assumptions of these authors, 
communities or collectivities exist only by virtue of their opposition to another community or 
collective group, and are therefore a construction that is based on a relational perception that 
implies both similarity and difference. Boundaries are therefore constructed by actors in their 
interaction with others from whom they wish to distinguish themselves (Donnan and Wilson 
2001: 24). Ethnic groups – and this is assumed for the national collectivity as well in our context 
– are thus socially constructed. As Barth (1969) notes, ethnic groups – or more generally speaking 
– collectivities “are categories of ascription and identification by the actors themselves, and thus 
have the characteristics of organizing interaction between people” (Barth 1969: 10). What has to 
be noted in this context is that cultural definitions, symbols, or depicted differences are thus 
significant only insofar as they are socially effective. “The members are marked off or mark 
themselves off from other collectivities in a process of inclusion and exclusion which 
differentiates and categorizes ‘us’ from ‘them’” (Donnan and Wilson 2001: 21-22), and they do so 
to create a boundary that helps to demarcate and thereby structure their environment. 
Therefore, what are centrally focused on are not only the group constructions but the boundaries 
between the groups. For Cohen (1982), the construction of boundaries has been the key focus of 
his series of books that has been mentioned earlier. Referring to Barth’s idea, Cohen (1982) 
argues, for instance, that a community’s awareness of its own distinct criteria is crucial for the 
way in which the members of this group will express their attachment to it. For the author, the 
boundaries of a group are the places at which the group’s definition becomes relevant and 
meaningful when a group engages with others (Cohen 1982: 3). Cohen (1982) furthermore notes 
“that people become aware of their culture when they stand at its boundaries. […] But we do not 
simply become aware of our culture: we also attribute value to it, positively or negatively, and 
accordingly attribute values to the culture which confronts our own. We are not, therefore, 
merely aware of our distinctness, but we tend to value it as well” (Cohen 1982: 3, 5). 
                                                                                                                                                        
52 An interesting book that not only deals with different theoretical approaches to the relevance of difference but 
also discusses the construction of difference in the context of different contemporary issues like the integration of 
Muslims in Norway or identity formation in “Creole” societies was published by Rottenburg et al. (2006). 
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Even though the author mainly outlines those assumptions in the context of an ethnographic 
analysis of group membership and belonging in the context of the anthropology of Great Britain, 
his ideas can also be applied to the following analysis that looks at mass media constructions of 
belonging and boundaries between Western societies and an Oriental Other, when we assume 
that in order to construct a Self, the Other is a crucial element. The categories of self and 
otherness can be regarded as basic categories for cognitive and social differentiation. This 
differentiation not only helps to reduce the complexity of the environment, but is also needed to 
demarcate the environment by defining, what is part of the self-concept and what is not. We can 
say therefore that the drawing of a boundary or demarcation line between Self and Other is the 
first and central step toward a concept of belonging. At the same time, it is a cognitive 
delimitation that is based on the assumption of dissimilarity between both sides. 
 
Evaluation of the Other 
In addition to the aspect of an assumed difference between the concept of Self and the Other, 
Cohen’s (1982) approach also implies a second assumption: the Self not only observes the Other 
but will consequently also evaluate it as a distinct entity. For the following analysis we may 
assume that this evaluation takes place on the basis of the valuation pattern of the Western values 
and principles, because those principles have developed over time and have proved their 
appropriateness to the members of the ingroup over time (Cohen 1982: 5). 
Similarly, Fuchs et al. (1995) point out the aspect of evaluation in their analysis on nationalism 
and ethnocentrism in Western Europe, where they argue that the drawing of a boundary between 
Self and Other has a double significance as it not only presents a cognitive delimitation but can 
also help to evaluate Self and Other. Referring to a potential national outgroup, they note that: 
They are not only dissimilar from the in-group (cognitive) but also inferior to the in-group (evaluative). 
[…] Through a cognitive and evaluative construction (imagination) of “us” and “them”, through internal 
attraction and external rejection, the identity of a collectivity is constituted. (Fuchs et al. 1995: 165-166) 
[emphasis by the authors] 
This assumption brings us back to the social identity approach which suggests that – due to the 
striving for a positive self-image – different strategies are used by the Self to achieve a positive 
distinction from the Other. According to Mummendey and Otten (1992), the Self may for 
example leave a certain group with a lower status to advance to a group with a higher status. 
Another possibility that seems relevant in the context of our analysis is that the level of 
comparison is changed, for example, by choosing a different dimension of comparison between 
Self and Other according to which the Self comes off better than the Other, or by choosing a 
different outgroup for comparison with the Self (Mummendey and Otten 1992: 101-102). 
Regardless of which strategy is used for the comparison between Self and Other, this comparison 
is shaped by an evaluation of the two sides that aims at a positive result for the self-image. 
Besides a positive self-affirmation, the evaluation of the Other is also assumed to strengthen 
ingroup cohesion and the norms that are decisive for the self-concept. Billig (1995), for instance, 
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mentions a study by Quattrone (1986) who found that people ascribe more stereotypic traits to 
outgroups than to ingroups. The author concludes that the Self more often assumes itself and its 
own collectively shared principles and values as the standard, or an unmarked normality, against 
which the deviations of the Other are noted and emphasized (Billig 1995: 81). We may say, 
therefore, that the features and characteristics of the Other are identified and evaluated on the 
basis of a set of standard criteria like Western principles which form a normative pattern by 
Western countries like Germany or the United States. 
At the same time, this construction of deviance can serve as a contribution to social order, to the 
definition and accomplishment of societal rules and principles, and to the manifestation and 
strengthening of the collective conscience. Here, we can also consult Durkheim’s (1976, 1992) 
considerations about the differentiation between normal and pathological phenomena.53 If we 
adopt this perspective and alter it for our broader perspective of the construction of difference, 
the following assumptions are possible. One of Durkheim’s (1976, 1992) theses is that deviance 
can help to define the moral boundaries which distinguish between right and wrong. Those 
boundaries can symbolize the established normative conventions of a society and communicate 
to its members what is expected of them (see also Pfohl 1985: 179-180). If we alter this thesis, we 
could derive the assumption that difference between Self and Other defines the collective 
boundaries between the two concepts of belonging, and that the communication of this 
difference can be understood as a communication of societal rules. 
In addition to that, Durkheim (1976, 1992) also assumes that deviance strengthens the collective 
conscience or, in other words, the internal solidarity of a group (see also Pfohl 1985: 180). 
Following this argument, the ingroup solidarity of national collectives may also be strengthened 
by the construction and demarcation of Arab and Muslim actors that are portrayed as lacking the 
favored or postulated Western principles, structures, and norms. In the context of devastating 
events like the 9/11 terrorist attacks that are directed against a national group like the United 
States, an increasing emphasis on the deviance of Arab and Muslim actors (for example in the 
construction of the 9/11 terrorists) can not only re-emphasize the moral boundaries of the 
Western Self but also may help to strengthen the social bonds of the non-deviant Western 
insiders against the terrorist enemy. 
We may conclude that the evaluation of an Other or outgroup and its construction as negative or 
deviant from standard norms and rules not only has negative, but also positive effects. It can help 
a society to maintain und stabilize the social system and the societal organization. The 
construction of deviance and the demarcation of actors not only as geographical outsiders 
(outgroup) but also as normative outsiders (deviating from norms and rules) may also help to 
strengthen ingroup cohesion as it signals to the members of the ingroup where the borders of the 
                                                 
53 Here, Durkheim (1976, 1992) distinguishes between those features that are functional (“healthy”) for a society and 
those that are dysfunctional (“unhealthy, pathological”). In this context, he chooses the phenomenon of criminality 
to illustrate this distinction, and argues that the pathological features (here criminality) are nevertheless crucial and 
useful. For more details see Durkheim (1976, 1992). 
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group are located and what features or criteria are relevant and expected from the members of 
the group.54 
 
3.3. The Self/Other Nexus as a Boundary-Formation Process 
We can summarize, therefore, that to explain and understand the images of Arabs and Muslims 
in German and U.S. mass media the focus of the following analysis also has to include the 
concepts of German and American belonging and collectivity that form the basis for processes of 
identity formation. We will thus also look at the self-images or group concepts that occur in mass 
media of both countries to identify the relevant categories that are formed or already exist in the 
Western perception of the social world and that create the boundaries between ingroup and 
outgroup, i.e. the German and U.S. Self and the Arab and Muslim Other. The major reason that 
was elaborated for the question of why concepts of self and otherness are negotiated in mass 
media (and in the societies they are embedded in), is the construction of a collective identity 
concept or, in more general terms, the formation of community. The focus of this analysis 
thereby does not lie in the exploration of the process of identity formation but of the concepts of 
belonging and collectivity that form the knowledge frame for those processes. 
Based on the theoretical assumptions that have been outlined, the construction of collectivities 
can take place on different societal and geographical levels, which reflects the variety of contexts 
in which self-imaging can be relevant. Geographically, differentiations between Self and Other 
take place on a national level, distinguishing a German or U.S. nationality and the national 
affiliation of the Arab and Muslim Other. Furthermore, when we also take into account the 
Oriental myth, differentiation between Self and Other may also take place on the broader 
geographical level of cultural areas, here the West and the Orient. Socially, difference could be 
constructed between the Christian and the Islamic religion, whereas on a political dimension, a 
distinction could be established between democratic and undemocratic political systems. In all 
these contexts, the construction of Self and Other is marked by the perception and assumption 
of DIFFERENCE. 
                                                 
54 One specific form of devaluation that summarizes some of those aspects mentioned here is the construction of 
hostile stereotypes of Arabs, Muslims, or Islam that has been frequently analyzed in sociological and especially in 
social-psychological studies. A number of the media studies that have been introduced in chapter I.2 argue that the 
images of Arabs and Muslims in Western Media depict them as enemies – creating a negative and counterpart hostile 
stereotype. See here especially Ateş (2006), Brüggen and Jäger (2003), Klemm and Hörner (1993), Kliche et al. (1998, 
1999), Palmbach and Kempf (1994), or Wagener (1999), but also Poerksen (2000). Wagener (1999), for instance, has 
given an introduction to and a historical overview of the concept of hostile stereotypes and here integrates the role 
of hostile stereotypes into the larger context of constructions of otherness. And Poerksen (2000) argues that hostile 
stereotypes are constructions of an Other that the Self does not communicate with and are therefore especially rigid 
agglomerations of negative conceptions of an Other. This also makes hostile stereotypes especially stable and hardly 
modifiable (Poerksen 2000: 38-39). To some extent, hostile stereotype constructions of Arabs and Muslims or Islam 
overlap with the negative facets of the Oriental myth that have been introduced before. However, for the following 
analysis a one-sided focus on hostile stereotypes seems to be insufficient when we aim at grasping the overall 
complexity of the media depictions of Arabs and Muslims. 
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In order to define this difference – the constructing Self has to know what it is not, if it is to 
define what it is. The observing Self not only defines what is part of the own concept but also 
observes, defines, and evaluates the concept of those who are not regarded as part of the Self. 
Therefore, the Self constructs an image or concept of the Other that distances the same from its 
own group concept. With regard to the following object of investigation, the German as well as 
the U.S. perception of the Arab and Muslim Other is shaped by a number of central aspects. 
(1) The Oriental Other is regarded as distinct and distinguishable as an object – this is necessary 
to identify it as different. It is measured by the Self according to the valuation patterns of 
Western principles since we can assume that the Self regards itself as the “standard.” (2) Those 
principles, structures and values are, at the same time, regarded as absolute and uncontested from 
the viewpoint of the Western observer. (3) The Other is constituted as largely lacking the 
Western principles, structures, and values. To what extent the Other lacks those features will be 
elaborated in the following analysis. (4) The observation of Arab and Muslim actors and their 
comparison with the Western Self is regarded as being not only done to be communicated to the 
Other but also to members of the Self. By realizing the precariousness of those who lack the 
Self’s standards (here: Western principles) the certainty of those standards is confirmed and the 
Self is strengthened in its own values and principles.55 
Thus, besides difference, the assumption of DISTANCE and the construction of 
BOUNDARIES are regarded as relevant criteria for the conceptions of Self and Other. By 
assuming an essential difference and geographic, cultural, economic, or other distances the Other 
can be distanced as a whole – not only geographically but also with regard to its cultural, 
personal, or other features, as will be elaborated in more detail in the next chapters. The 
construction of difference enables the Self to safely distance the Other, for instance, when it may 
present a threat to social, economic, or other resources and structures. Furthermore, the 
distancing of the Other helps to ignore or symbolically exclude negative features in one’s own 
society. In the context of the following analysis, it will thus be interesting to see what forms of 
distancing or demarcation can be identified in the mass media images of Arabs and Muslims that 
may not only work via a geographical differentiation but are also constructed via cultural, 
political, and other features. 
Arabs and Muslims – in the following – serve as an object of investigation with which we can not 
only show what Western principles are regarded as relevant, but also demonstrated what 
consequences a lack of those principles has. The German and U.S. Self – according to this scale – 
is thereby expected to be predominantly regarded as higher developed than the observed Arab 
and Muslim Other. However, one ambition of this book is to find out whether the image of the 
Arab and Muslim Other is really solely negative as most of the other studies have argued that 
                                                 
55 Kliche et al. (1999) very similarly argue that the Self constructs an image of the Other that denounces most of the 
Other’s features to establish and communicate the social norms to the members of the own group. Those social 
norms like civilized behavior, rationality, efficiency, technological progress, democracy that the authors refer to as 
“ethos of a machiavellistically reduced modernity” can be seen as what we refer to as the Western principles (Kliche 
et al. 1999: 316-319). 
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have been introduced in chapter I.2. The evaluation of other countries and actors can also turn 
out positive, or the Self may also discover similarities and a certain degree of proximity with the 
Other. The study will analyze whether and how German and U.S. mass media integrate those 
similarities and proximity, how the differentiation and evaluation of Arabs and Muslims is carried 
out and what influence the Western principles have in this context. 
  
4. Conclusion: Basic Theoretical Assumptions and Guiding Research Questions 
Basic Theoretical Assumptions 
Altogether, we can summarize the following assumptions that form the basis for the analysis at 
hand. First of all, the neo-institutional world polity approach serves as a basic frame for the 
definition of society and culture in the context of this work. It provides a useful concept to 
explain why Arabs and Muslims are predominantly focused on in German and American mass 
media and may also offer some explanation for the composition of the images that we find of 
Arabs and Muslims in both countries’ mass media discourses. I assume that the classification and 
evaluation of Arab and Muslim countries and actors is guided by a certain set of rules, norms, 
and myths that form the Western cultural account (“Zurechnungssystem”). Following Meyer et 
al. (2005), this cultural account forms the basis for the national identity concepts of both 
Germany and the United States is centrally shaped by so-called “Occidental rational principles.” 
We furthermore assume that when Western countries like Germany or the U.S. observe and 
evaluate Arab and Muslim countries or actors, this classification and evaluation of the Other is 
centrally guided by the taken-for-granted myth of a distinction between two cultural hemispheres: 
the West and the Orient. It is expected that those two aspects not only have an impact on what 
Arab and Muslim actors and countries are paid attention to by the Western observer but also on 
the way in which those actors are perceived and constructed. 
Second, mass media are regarded as an overall observer of societal communications, events, or 
issues, and are seen as a medium of self-observation of modern societies that constructs a reality 
that is collectively available. Another central assumption for the following analysis is thus that 
mass media are also a central platform for the negotiation and communication and thus also the 
diffusion of the basic principles, rules, norms, and myths, etc. of the world society. They 
summarize the overall societal perceptions of Arab and Muslim actors and countries and the 
principles, norms, and other criteria that are relevant for the observation and evaluation of those 
actors. 
Third, by defining and communicating images of national collectivity, Western mass media not 
only focus on the Self (i.e. on events, issues, and processes within their own national or Western 
boundaries) but also need a conceptual Other or counterpart image that can be demarcated and 
against which the own collective image is constructed. I therefore also assumed that the portrayal 
of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. mass media necessarily reflects German or U.S. self-
perceptions as well, since the constructing Self has to know what it is not, if it is to define what it 
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is. The German and U.S. perception of self and of Arab and Muslim otherness is thereby guided 
by the assumption of an overall difference and distance of the Other. 
However, according to the world polity approach, Western rational principles have diffused and 
institutionalized globally. This would mean that they can be found in Arab and Muslim countries 
as well.56 Furthermore, we can also find a significant group of Muslim and Arab minorities within 
the West today. Thus, what is expected is that the evaluation of the Arab and Muslim Other in 
the mass media contexts may lead to different levels of similarity, difference, and thus distance 
towards the Self. Whether or not this assumption is confirmed and how similarities between Self 
and Other are integrated in the Western worldview will be elaborated in the following study. 
 
The Selected Event and the Comparison of Two Countries 
A comparative analysis of two Western countries – Germany and the United States – allows 
filtering out whether both countries reveal the same perceptions of a non-Western Other and 
whether they use the same patterns and criteria to evaluate the Other and thus also define the 
self-image. Most of the previous studies on the construction of Arabs and Muslims (see I.2) have 
only focused on the mass media of one country and the used data sets, timeframes or methods 
have been rather manifold, and a direct comparison between the different results is only possible 
to a certain extent. Furthermore, most of those studies did not take into account the German or 
U.S. self-perception in the analysis of the Arab or Muslim media images. The following 
comparative analysis will integrate both aspects and will concentrate on the interrelation between 
the media constructions of both German and U.S. Self and Arabs and Muslims. 
We can also find out whether the rather abstract Western principles that I assume to be central 
for the German and U.S. self-image are defined and interpreted differently in the contexts in 
which they are communicated, and what impact those principles have on the portrayal of Arabs 
and Muslims in the mass media. The analysis may therefore also be able to offer new ideas on 
how similarly or differently Western countries define themselves and Arab and Muslim countries 
or actors. Moreover, a country comparison offers a higher internal comparability since it allows 
us to see whether or not the structures of actor construction that are observed for one country 
can also be identified in another media context. It may help us to reveal whether the images of 
Arabs and Muslims are not only guided by certain worldviews that may be similar or different in 
two Western countries but whether they are also influenced by certain “universal” techniques of 
identity construction and the demarcation of certain people from the constructed self-concept. 
The concepts of self and otherness are not regarded as a fixed and stable construction, even 
though the distinction of both may be guided by a more or less commonly shared and stable set 
of myths, scripts and rules. Instead, it is expected that the Western principles as well as the 
concepts of self and otherness are permanently negotiated in Western societies to apply them to 
                                                 
56 For instance, as they are institutionalized in political, legal, or educational structures. 
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every new societal situation, development, and change – for instance when the security or 
coherence of a certain group is threatened like on September 11, 2001. 
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 – as far as media coverage and public attention is 
concerned – were not a national but an international event. Although the attacks took place on 
American soil only, they received media attention all around the globe. Furthermore, six years 
after the attacks, we can also note that the geopolitical consequences of the event had effects on a 
number of countries – in Europe as well as in the Middle East, since the attacks were politically 
interpreted by the West as an act of aggression towards the Western world as a cultural and 
political unity – as the introductory remarks have already illustrated. And last but not least, to this 
day the attacks are frequently cited as a measure of comparison to evaluate other violent clashes 
with Islamic terrorists or incidents like, for example, the terror attacks in Madrid in 2004, the 
London bombing in 2005, or the controversy about the Mohammad cartoons in 2006. 
Thus, it seems as if events like the 9/11 attacks serve as a trigger event with regard to the 
attention that is paid to Arabs and Muslims in Western countries, since the attacks were regarded 
as religiously motivated and the attackers and the masterminds behind the attacks were identified 
as Islamic fundamentalists who came from a number of different Middle Eastern countries. At 
the same time, the attacks also serve as a trigger event with regard to the national attempt not 
only of the United States as a direct victim of the violence but also of other Western countries 
like Germany to re-emphasize its own group identity and strengthen the national (or Western) 
boundaries and coherence. These two aspects make the 9/11 attacks an attractive object for the 
research questions that have been outlined in the beginning of the book. 
 
Guiding Research Questions 
In continuation of the raised questions in chapter I and based on the theoretical assumptions that 
have been outlined in this chapter, three central research aims and the following research 
questions will guide the analysis: 
First of all, the analysis wants to reveal the worldview and German and U.S. self-perception. 
Here, the analysis is guided by the questions: 
(1) How do Germany and the United States reflect upon themselves in the mass media? We will 
look at the implicit or explicit references to the national or Western self-image that can be traced 
in both countries’ mass media when Arabs and Muslims are discussed. 
(2) What Western principles can be identified in those national self-concepts? We will specifically 
look at the principles, ideals and standards that are communicated in the different contexts in 
which the Self refers to its own collectivity and will also see how relevant those principles are for 
the Self when the Other is observed. 
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(3) Does the German self-perception differ from the American one? Here, we will look at how 
both countries may also differ in their application and definition of Western principles, and 
whether we find different relevancies of the principles, myths or scripts that shape the self-image. 
Second, the analysis aims at summarizing the perception and images of Arabs and Muslims to 
filter out the definition of otherness in both countries’ mass media. Here, the analysis is guided 
by the following questions: 
(4) Who is the Arab and Muslim Other in German and U.S. mass media? We will find out what 
Arab and Muslim actors and countries appear in German and U.S. mass media, which countries 
they come from and what societal group or branch they belong to? 
(5) What images of Arabs and Muslims can be found in German and U.S. media around 9/11? 
We will summarize and analyze the features and characteristics that are used to construct those 
actors and countries, and will see whether the images of those actors and countries differ in the 
German and U.S. mass media, whether they either change with the attacks or instead remain 
invariable and stable over a certain timeframe. 
Finally, the analysis aims at illustrating how difference is constructed between Self and Other. 
Here, we specifically look at the evaluation of Arabs and Muslims. This can also lead us to an 
explanation for the perception of Arabs and Muslims in Western countries and their images in 
Western media. With regard to this aim, the following questions guide the analysis: 
(6) How different is the Arab and Muslim Other? To answer this question we will analyze what 
levels of difference between Other and observing Self can be identified in the images of the 
different Arab and Muslim actors in both countries’ mass media. We will also look at what 
happens when the geographical distance between Self and Other is diminished, i.e. when Arabs 
and Muslims cross the geographical boundaries and enter the Western space. 
(7) Did 9/11 change the Western perception of Arabs and Muslims? Here, we want to find out 
what relevance the event has on the perception of Arabs and Muslims, and whether or not the 
event has changed this perception of the Other in the West. 
(8) How central is the Oriental myth for the Western worldview? We will analyze whether the 
Arab and Muslim Other is as homogeneous and different from the West as some of the studies 
on the reciprocal perception of Occident and Orient that have been introduced before have 
argued, or whether the Western view integrates similarities between both sides as well, for 
instance, because of the world polity assumption that Western structures and institutions have 
already established and can thus be identified in the respective Arab and Muslim countries, and 
that the Other is thus not as different as one would expect. 
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III. DATA SAMPLE AND RESEARCH METHODS 
To answer the research question that have been raised in the last chapter, a media analysis of 
German and U.S. press was conducted. Before the questions will be answered and the results of 
this press study will be presented, the methodological realization of this analysis will be outlined 
in the following chapter. First of all, the data sample of the study will be introduced. In 
subchapters III.2 and III.3 the two methods that were used to analyze the selected data sample 
will be described in more detail. 
 
1. Data Sample of the Media Analysis 
As already indicated in the last chapter, in the following analysis, comparison takes place on two 
levels. On the one hand, the data are compared on a chronological level. This allows a trend 
analysis of the news coverage in the face of the focused event. On the other hand, a comparison 
is possible with regard to the media portrayals of Arabs and Muslims and the national self-
perceptions that are reflected in those portrayals in two different Western countries. This 
comparison may show us whether there are possible similarities or differences in the construction 
of otherness and the national self-perception. 
 
1.1. Media Selection and Survey Period 
The media analysis concentrated on the German and U.S. print media sector only. Following the 
argument of Schiffer (2005) here, national newspapers and news magazine may be less consumed 
than television these days, but they are considered as a serious news medium and are furthermore 
assumed to present and comment on information in much more detail than television formats 
(Schiffer 2005: 26-27). 
To be able to derive representative statements about the image of Arabs and Muslims in the 
German and U.S. press coverage, different print media formats were included in the analysis. 
Daily newspapers of the high and the low end and weekly news magazines are analyzed. 
According to Hafez (2002), this composition of different publication formats is one basic 
premise for a content analysis as the formats are also connected with different content profiles. 
As Hafez (2002) argues, daily newspapers exercise a political and social “recording function” 
because they can treat events and developments in a much broader and wider ranging news 
stream by using different text formats that weekly magazines are not able to present and use. In 
contrast to that, weekly newspapers are able to have stronger thematic foci and can extend and 
reinforce these by integrating them in a broader analytical and opinion-oriented frame (Hafez 
2002: 31). Furthermore, different print media formats may also be addressed to different 
readerships. 
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Altogether, six print media have been selected for the analysis. The German SÜDDEUTSCHE 
ZEITUNG1 and the American NEW YORK TIMES2 have been chosen as representatives for serious 
daily newspapers. The analyzed more popular dailies are BILDZEITUNG3 and USA TODAY, and 
from the news magazine section, the weekly magazines DER SPIEGEL and NEWSWEEK have been 
selected. 
For both countries, the selected print media can be regarded as some of the main representatives 
of the three genres. Another criterion for the selection is their national availability, and apart 
from that the news media are among the newspapers with the highest circulation in the respective 
country. Furthermore, the selected media embrace different angles of the spectrum of political 
opinions. As newspapers can be regarded as a medium for orientation not only for the reader but 
also for other journalists (Hafez 2002: 32), it is assumed here that the news coverage of the 
chosen print media has an influence on other news media as well and that the topics and views 
which are focused on and communicated here are more or less representative for the German 
and U.S. press coverage of Arab and Muslim countries or actors. By including different print 
media formats in the analysis we are thus able to cover different possible ways of news coverage 
and frame a broader spectrum of the print media sector of both countries. 
As for the comparability of the chosen newspapers of both countries, a few remarks have to be 
added: The NY TIMES is one of the traditional daily newspapers of the U.S. print media market 
and – in addition to that – is nearly one hundred years older than the German representative of 
the serious daily newspaper section, SZ. The German SZ is only published from Monday to 
Saturday, whereas the NY TIMES is published on Sunday as well – even though only with a 
smaller up-to-date news section. Both newspapers approximately cover the same news sections 
like a daily news block, the culture and society (“feuilleton”) section, a business and economy 
section, a sports section and an editorial.4 In addition to that, both the NY TIMES and the SZ 
have a local and regional news section that is however not included in the analysis due to its lack 
of comparability on a national scale. 
USA TODAY and the German BILD can both be seen as comparable representatives of the 
national tabloids. For BILD it has to be noted however, that it is a street sale newspaper. Apart 
from that, both newspapers offer the subject groups daily news, sports, entertainment, and a 
service section. Especially the national sports section is a central subject group for both tabloids. 
Furthermore, both print media place a strong emphasis on pictures and eye-catching colors, and 
attract attention with sensational headlines. One difference between the BILD and USA TODAY is 
that the BILD articles are generally very short and only include one or two basic and reduced 
messages that are communicated in a very emotional and colloquial tone. In addition to that, the 
BILD predominantly focuses on specific individual actors, famous and unknown. Compared to 
that, USA TODAY articles are longer and more complex, even though they are also less complex 
                                                 
1 As from now, the title will be abbreviated to “SZ.” 
2 As from now, the title will be abbreviated to “NY TIMES.” 
3 As from now, the title will be abbreviated to “BILD.” 
4 For additional information about the respective newspapers see also www.sueddeutsche.de and www.nytimes.com. 
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and substantiated than those of the chosen serious newspapers.5 A second difference is that the 
BILD is published six days a week (Monday to Saturday) whereas USA TODAY is only published 
from Monday to Friday. 
The chosen weekly news magazines DER SPIEGEL and NEWSWEEK both combine daily political 
topics with more substantiated analyses and background stories, and they offer more complex 
background information and explanations for the depicted political, cultural, social, or economic 
issues and topics than daily newspapers. A significant difference that has to be noted is the 
publication output of both news magazines: Whereas the American NEWSWEEK normally has an 
average size of about one hundred pages, DER SPIEGEL normally exceeds two hundred pages.6 
The data sample includes most of the different used text formats like articles, brief news, 
interviews, editorials, etc. The only two formats that have not been included in the analysis are 
articles etc. in the regional or local sections and letters to the editor.7 In the following, the 
different text formats will be summarized under the label “articles.” 
The study covers a period of eight weeks before and four weeks after the 9/11 attacks. It starts 
with the publication day “July 17, 2001” and ends with “October 9, 2001.” The longer time 
period of eight weeks before the attacks has been chosen to gain a contrastable volume of 
newspaper articles that deal with Arab and Muslim issues and actors compared to the data sample 
after the event. This is especially important to find out whether the overall focus on the Middle 
East or other Muslim countries and Arab and Muslim actors is similar before as well as after the 
attacks – despite the fact that maybe the frequency with which these countries and actors are 
focused on is lower before 9/11. 
In contrast to that, the publication output of articles that focus on Arab and Muslim topics and 
actors increased significantly after the attacks. Therefore, the analyzed period only covers four 
weeks. It also seems reasonable to stop the analysis after four weeks as the U.S. military offensive 
in Afghanistan starts in the first week of October 2001, which leads to yet another shift of the 
focal point of the news coverage. This would have unilaterally distorted the thematic and 
geographical focus that was much broader in the direct aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. 
 
                                                 
5 For additional information about the respective tabloids see also Pick (2004: 25-26), www.usatoday.com or 
www.bild.t-online.de. 
6 For additional information about the respective news magazines see also Pick (2004: 25-26), www.spiegel.de or 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/3032542/site/newsweek/. 
7 As already noted, those sections are ignored since they are not comparable on a national scale. With regard to 
letters to the editor, it is assumed furthermore that they present a reaction to earlier news coverage that cannot be 
fully retraced in the analysis of the defined time period. Therefore, letters to the editor are not regarded as part of the 
mass media discourse here, but are rather seen as part of the public discourse reflected by the readers that is again in 
itself part of the observed reality and societal discourse that mass media reflect. 
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1.2. Definition of the Research Sample 
The newspaper articles were basically downloaded from the full-text internet database 
LexisNexis,8 except from the articles from BILD, which were directly downloaded from the 
Springer publishing company’s database program MediaPILOT.9 It has to be noted that the 
online versions of the newspaper articles may not be 100 % identical with the printed versions 
due to subsequent editing on behalf of the operators of the database programs – this cannot be 
controlled for all analyzed media, but has only been randomly checked. 
The total number of relevant articles was determined via conscious selection of thematically 
relevant contents that were identified by scanning the index of contents and individual article 
abstracts. What guided the selection was the theoretical assumption of a differentiability of a 
Western Self and an Arab or Muslim Other as two opposing hypothetical concepts (see II.3). In 
the case of our data sample, the viewpoint of the Self can be defined as the viewpoint of the 
researcher as well as of the reader and the publishing print medium. Thus, the Self therefore can 
be equated with the German or American print medium that publishes articles in which 
perceptions of the national self and concepts of otherness are communicated. 
The Other in our analysis is assumed to be presented by Arab and Muslim countries and actors 
that occur in the different newspaper articles, and this Other is assumed to be constructed 
geographically, culturally, as well as nationally. Thus, for the data sample every article was selected 
that has a geographical focus on countries of the Near and Middle East or on other countries 
where Islam is one occurring if not the main religion like, for example, in Indonesia, Sudan, or 
Turkey. In addition to that, also those articles are taken into account that discuss Arab and 
Muslim immigrants or ethnic groups within the West, i.e. in Europe, North America, or Australia 
(see II.2). Last but not least, articles are taken into account when they focus on Islam or terrorism 
as a general topic and in this context also include Arab or Muslim actors or country 
descriptions.10 
On the basis of those criteria, the articles of the chosen newspapers were scanned and selected. 
In a second step, and because of the large number of articles that fulfill these criteria,11 a 
systematic random sample was drawn from the material of the daily print media over the 
analyzed timeframe. Starting with the first day that was set for the timeframe of analysis, only 
every second weekday was included in the analysis. For the German BILD and SZ, this sampling 
results in a two-week-rhythm of the publication days Monday-Wednesday-Friday and Tuesday-
Thursday-Saturday. As USA TODAY is not published on the weekend, the two-week-rhythm 
consists of a Monday-Wednesday-Friday week and of a Tuesday-Thursday week. The NY TIMES 
is published Monday to Sunday; therefore, the analysis includes a change of a Monday-
                                                 
8 For additional information on LexisNexis see also www.lexisnexis.com/de/business/home/home.do. 
9 For additional information on MediaPILOT see also www.mediapilot.de. 
10 At this point, I would like to thank Tülay Zengingül for her assistance with the scanning and selection of relevant 
newspaper articles from BILD in the database program MediaPilot. 
11 Altogether more than 2100 articles. 
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Wednesday-Friday-Sunday week and a Tuesday-Thursday-Saturday week. As for the weekly news 
magazines, all identified relevant articles are included in the data sample. 
This reduced sample presents a smaller but still structurally equivalent composition of the original 
sample. As Brosius and Koschel (2001) have argued, the method of systematic random sampling 
thereby provides the highest probability to reflect the real or actual distribution of the 
characteristics and features of the universe data set in one sample (Brosius and Koschel 2001: 82-
83). Despite the reduction of the material, the results for this sample are regarded to be 
representative for all publication days of the analyzed timeframe. A reduction to every second day 
still makes it possible to take into account all relevant events and topics that occur in the 
timeframe of analysis. In addition to that, the changing rhythm also makes it possible to take into 
account different publication categories like the travel section, etc. that may only appear on 
specific week days. 
Altogether, the systematic random sampling has led to the following text corpus that forms the 
data sample for the analysis: 
Table III.1: Overview of the Research Sample 
 Total number of 
Articles 
Before 9/11 After 9/11 
Weekly News Magazines 
       DER SPIEGEL 102 27 75 
       NEWSWEEK 51 9 42 
Serious Daily Newspapers 
       SZ 294 140 154 
       NY TIMES 350 145 205 
Tabloid Newspapers 
       BILD 129 39 90 
       USA TODAY 143 14 129 
Total Number of Articles 1069 374 695 
 
 
2. The Quantifying Qualitative Content Analysis 
The analysis of this sample was carried out in two steps: In a first step, the newspaper articles 
were analyzed with the method of a content analysis.12 Based on the definition of Früh (2001), 
this content analysis, as an empirical method, aims at systematically describing the ways in which 
German and U.S. newspaper articles portray Arabs and Muslims, and in this context also reveal 
perceptions of their own national concepts of belonging. The descriptive aim of this form of 
analysis is to reduce the complexity and variety of the information that can be found in the large 
                                                 
12 As defined by Mayring (2003) or Früh (2001). 
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data sample. Only selected aspects of the content are focused on, and the perspective on the data 
sample is shaped by the research questions and research aims that have been outlined earlier. The 
two main questions in this step of the analysis are, how Arab and Muslim actors and countries are 
described in the newspaper articles, and whether the respective newspaper articles explicitly refer 
to national self-conceptions in those contexts as well. 
In addition to that, and here mainly following Merten (1995), I assume that the content analysis 
offers a method to analyze social reality: The term “content” – according to Merten (1995) – is 
limited to the communicated content, and here only to that content that can be made manifest 
with certain notation techniques and with certain text forms like newspaper articles. At the same 
time, we may assume that the content of the articles summarizes and reflects the communication 
processes of the German and U.S. society about Arabs and Muslims as well (Merten 1995: 15).13 
On the basis of the theoretical assumptions about media reality (see II.1.2), the content of a 
newspaper article is therefore regarded as part of a constructed media reality that is not 
predominantly supposed to be revealed as true or false, but is taken as one construction of reality 
that reflects societal communication about Arabs and Muslims. The shared as well as differing 
framework of the articles of the two countries before and after 9/11, i.e. the overall societal 
values, set of beliefs and knowledge, or attitudes, but also political, social or economic aspects, is 
expected to shape the images of those Arab and Muslim countries and actors in the analyzed 
print media. What is not considered here, however, is the motivations or needs of the producers 
of news media or the possible influences of the produced images and views on the attitudes of 
the readers etc. 
 
2.1. Quantitative Analysis of Formal Characteristics and Occurring Actors 
Altogether, the content analysis has systematically captured and described several different 
aspects. First of all, on a quantifying level, the formal features of the different newspaper articles 
were analyzed and all occurring Arab and Muslim actors and country portrayals that appear in the 
different articles were identified. This analytical step can be labeled as a quantifying content 
analysis since I quantitatively captured what topics and country references dominate the news 
coverage on Arab and Muslim countries and actors, how many actors occur in the different 
articles, and how frequently those actors are referred to. 
With regard to the formal characteristics of the articles, it was basically analyzed what countries 
the articles’ contents refer to and what topics and issues are covered. To identify the relevance of 
certain topics and countries, frequency analyses were carried out to describe the overall thematic 
contexts in which Arabs and Muslims become relevant or are focused on. Besides that, the 
analysis of the most frequent country references of the different articles makes it possible to 
develop a map of the geographical origin of the Arab and Muslim Other that is focused on by the 
German and U.S. press. The formal description also makes it possible to compare the differences 
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and similarities in German and U.S. print media with regard to the different topics in which 
contexts Arabs and Muslims occur. In addition to that, we can show whether or not the 9/11 
attacks have changed the topical or geographical focus on the Arab and Muslim Other. 
Furthermore, all occurring Arab and Muslim actors and countries in the different articles were 
identified and labeled with an identification code. I have concentrated on actors mainly due to the 
theoretical assumption that the definition of collective group concepts works via the 
communication of a set of criteria and principles, characteristics, and features that are regarded as 
crucial for this group concept (see II.3). Since one central way of constructing collectivity is via 
the construction of distance and difference, and the drawing of a boundary between the ingroup 
and an outside Other, the images of Arab and Muslim actors and countries are assumed to reflect 
these forms of collectivity construction by being the outside Other against which the national 
concept of collectivity is demarcated. Actors thereby are regarded as more interesting for this 
construction of difference and distance than, for example, societal structures because they can be 
described not only on a political or cultural dimension but also with regard to their personal 
features and behaviors. 
Altogether, the quantitative descriptions give an overview over the general relevance of the Arab 
and Muslim Other in German and U.S. American print media. We are able to compare the 
different entities, and can retrieve the quantitative relevance of actors that are focused on in both 
countries’ newspaper articles for the analyzed timeframe. The quantitative analysis of all 
occurring actors also allows to illustrate the composition of the object of investigation – Muslim 
and Arab actors as representatives of the Other – and allows to describe the total complexity of 
this Other. We are able to reveal possible differences and similarities in both countries’ press 
focus, for example, if different actors or actor groups appear more frequently in one country or if 
only certain topics are discussed. 
However, a solely quantitative analysis disregards that indicators that convey a certain meaning 
may change their meaning and relevance under the influence of different cultural or situational 
contexts and circumstances (Merten 1995: 50). For example, the construction of the actor Osama 
bin Laden may take place with similar attributes before and after the 9/11 attacks. However, 
these attributes may form a different overall image of the actor simply because he now receives a 
completely different importance for the articles in which he appears. Before the attacks, bin 
Laden was merely mentioned in combination with brief news messages, whereas after the attacks, 
he becomes a central actor or even the topic of the newspaper article, and now can be the 
linchpin for the line of argument of the respective news medium. This spectrum of different 
relevancies cannot be retrieved via a quantitative analysis; it has to be developed via a qualitative 
analysis of an actor’s construction as well as the setting in which he or she occurs. 
Furthermore, on the basis of the quantitative description, actors who appear less often might be 
classified as less significant as well. However, if we look at their relevance and ascribed images in 
the articles and at the contexts in which they occur they may be more significant for the discussed 
                                                                                                                                                        
13 Merten (1995) calls this a “reference to non-manifest contexts” (Merten 1995: 14). 
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topic than actors that simply appear more frequently. For example, it can be observed that after 
9/11 Palestinian freedom fighters in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – as a group – occur more 
frequently in German and U.S. articles than the 9/11 terrorists. However, on a qualitative level 
they are far less relevant for the different articles in which they appear than the 9/11 terrorists are 
in articles about the attacks etc. In addition to that, the way they are portrayed in the text creates 
a much more complex image of the actors than the one that can be drawn from the Palestinian 
suicide bombers and gunmen. Altogether, it can therefore be said that the 9/11 terrorists are 
qualitatively more central for the news coverage after 9/11 than the Palestinian gunmen and 
suicide bombers. 
 
2.2. Qualitative Content Analysis of Actor Images 
Therefore, the quantitative description is combined with a qualitative content analysis that looks 
at the way in which the identified Arab and Muslim actors and countries are constructed in the 
content of the different newspaper articles. Following Mayring (2003) here, qualitative content 
analysis aims at collecting and describing the semantic characteristics of the occurring Arab and 
Muslim actors and countries in the German and U.S. print media (see for instance Mayring 2003: 
59). 
Thus, in a second step I have concentrated on the semantic level of the written text and have 
retrieved the terms, i.e. the attributes, characteristics, and features that are used in the articles to 
construct and describe the different occurring Muslim and Arab actors and countries. Each 
identified actor or country portrayal was not only labeled with an identification code, but in 
addition to that, all features were coded that are used to describe the respective country or actor. 
The resulting personal description that summarizes the image of the identified actors or countries 
is not derived from one article but from the media portrayal of the same in one of the analyzed 
countries before or after the 9/11 attacks. This basically means that repeatedly occurring actors 
receive an overall image that consists of all the different features that the actor received in the 
particular discourse – before or after the event and in the U.S. or the German media. Altogether, 
each actor therefore may have up to four different images in the overall data sample. 
This cross-textual collection of Arab and Muslim actors and images aims at drawing a cross-
section through the print media set to reproduce the overall complexity of the focused Other and 
its central traits and features in German and U.S. mass media. One basic assumption is that with 
this method we are able to grasp the media reality, as it is offered to the reader, more realistically. 
This assumption also includes that actor images may be contradictory in articles of DER SPIEGEL 
and SZ, or they might change from one day to another. It is assumed here that for the reader the 
constructed image of an actor14 is not only shaped by one article but by the combination of 
different articles and content that he or she occurs in over a longer timeframe, and by the overall 
set of features that are ascribed to him or her. 
                                                 
14 That might be recalled when you ask the reader maybe after one week of newspaper consumption. 
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A pre-test with about one hundred articles from DER SPIEGEL produced a basic pattern 
according to which the data sample was analyzed and the actors and country features were 
categorized. The pretest also produced a number of crucial dimensions of actor construction that 
were used as an overall pattern for the coding process. The basic categories that were established 
from the pre-test are the actor’s country of origin, his or her societal context group, the ascribed 
religious affiliation, as well the basic subdivision of features into a political, social-economic, 
cultural, personal dimension as well as the dimension of delinquency. The actual features that are 
used in the different articles to describe the different actors were categorized according to this 
pattern. Following Mayring (2003) here, one central aim of this qualitative step of analysis is to 
develop the respective aspects of evaluation out of the concrete text, i.e. on a concrete descriptive 
level that sticks close to the material. Inductive coding offers the possibility to derive categories 
from the actual material and the information it has to offer. Therefore the articles are taken as the 
source and the starting point of the analysis, and the categories are established close to the 
analyzed text (Mayring 2003: 4-5). Nevertheless, the research questions and theoretical 
assumptions still play an influential role in the analysis as well. As Mayring (2003) suggests, the 
used technique of inductive coding is regarded as a “structuring process” that is largely guided by 
the theoretical assumptions and by the research questions that were outlined in chapter II 
(Mayring 2003: 82-83). 
Altogether, and as Mayring (2003) or Kuckartz (1999) also point out, the inductive coding 
process and the formation of relevant categories from the data material presents a central method 
to structure and restrict the complexity of information that a text may offer (Mayring 2005: 12; 
Kuckartz 1999: 204). This restriction is guided by the selection criteria that are defined in the 
beginning of the coding process. The inductive coding process stuck very closely to the written 
text and, as a summarizing and paraphrasing process, was finished when the main and decisive 
criteria had been captured. This abstraction presents the basic difference to a simple 
summarization of the articles’ contents. The structuring inductive coding process only 
concentrated on the Muslim and Arab actor and country portrayals in the analyzed articles. The 
different contexts of the article as well as the interplay of actor and content are not taken into 
account in this first step of the analysis. 
Last but not least, all text passages were identified and coded that explicitly reflect upon the 
German or American self-perception and refer to the self-images of both countries. Based on the 
theoretical assumptions of the Self/Other nexus as a boundary-formation process (see II.3) the 
overall coding process was guided by the idea that the construction of Arab and Muslim actors 
and countries also implicitly reflects how the Self sees itself. This basically means that not only 
are certain terms used to describe the Arab and Muslim Other but that those features and 
characteristics to a large extent form the binary opposite to the features and characteristics that 
are regarded as central for the Self’s own collective group concept. Thus, this implicit national 
self-references cannot be directly traced in the respective news articles, but can only be derived 
from the images of the Arab and Muslim actors and countries. However, the pre-test analysis 
III. Data Sample and Research Methods 
 - 82 -
revealed that national self-perceptions are also explicitly communicated in the articles. These 
explicit self-references were therefore coded as well. 
 
Computer-Assisted Data Analysis with the Software Program Atlas.ti 
The quantifying qualitative content analysis was assisted by the software program Atlas.ti and all 
relevant articles were edited and analyzed with this program. One advantage of using software 
programs like Atlas.ti is that large data sets can be managed and structured more easily, and a 
computer-based analysis makes it easier to transfer the data to different work settings as well as 
between different coders, since parts of the data sample were analyzed by a second coder.15 In 
addition to that, Atlas.ti offers greater transparency of the coding process as interpretations of the 
data and coding processes can be retrieved and re-checked quickly and easily at any time. 
A second advantage is that the program offers higher flexibility because it is possible to go back 
into the qualitative data at any time to control the ascribed codes and categories and test them 
with regard to possible inconsistency that may have occurred during the coding process.16 
Existing codes and categories can be later changed (in name etc.), new codes can be created out 
of old ones or already existing codes can be merged to form a new – more abstract – one. It is 
furthermore possible to connect the written data with numeric data, as the use of the program 
offered the possibility to export numeric data into statistical programs like SPSS, to carry out the 
mentioned frequency analyses. Finally, the program allows selective text retrievals that can put 
together every text passage (quote) that refers to a certain actor. This quotation list has been 
especially useful for the second methodological step of our analysis, formation of the actor 
typology that will be further outlined in the next subchapter. 
 
                                                 
15 At this point, I would like to thank Florian Spengler for his assistance with the coding of the German newspaper 
articles. Furthermore, I want to thank my “Atlas.ti working group” (i.e. Anna Kosmützky, Marion Müller and Frank 
Berner) for their assistance, their ideas and critical remarks on the coding process, and their ideas and suggestions in 
the process of the establishment of the actor typology. 
16 For instance, all codes are directly connected with the relevant text passages; this makes it possible to list all 
relevant text passages at any time. 
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3. The Formation of an Actor Typology 
In the previous subchapter, I have outlined the first step of the methodical analysis – the 
quantifying qualitative content analysis. The results of this first step will be introduced in the 
chapters IV and V. In a second analytical step, the gathered images of Arab and Muslim actors 
and countries have been further classified and described on the basis of a typological analysis that 
will be shortly sketched in the last subchapter.S 
 
3.1. General Remarks on the Typological Analysis 
Following Kuckartz (1988, 1995, 199917), the typological analysis was carried out to get from a 
“quantified” description of the images of the identified Arab and Muslim actors and countries in 
German and U.S. print media to a systematic and traceable identification and illustration of 
possible structures and patterns of actor portrayal (Kluge 1999: 178). This aim was reached via 
the formation of an empirically based actor typology as, for instance, Kuckartz (1988, 1999) has 
introduced it. Kuckartz (1988) defines “types” as a way to grasp phenomena and rules of social 
processes in adequate terms – theoretically as well as with regard to their meaning (Kuckartz 
1988: 62-63). Following this definition, a typology can be understood as the result of a grouping 
process that subsumes objects of research to types which are similar with respect to one or 
several features. An actor type is characterized by a high internal homogeneity that allows to 
clearly emphasis the commonly shared, characteristic features of the including actors. The 
different types are also marked by a high external heterogeneity between each other. A type is not 
only used to structure a field of research and – as in the research project at hand – to group the 
analyzed elements, i.e. the occurring actors. Rather, the established types are also regarded as 
sharing a certain meaning – in our case by reflecting different levels of perceived otherness. 
Thus, the aim of the typological analysis is not only to uncover structural regularities between the 
different actor and country images but also to understand those regularities. The actor types that 
have been established and that will be introduced in chapter VI, are not only constructed in a 
similar way, i.e. with the same features or on similar dimensions. In addition to that, those actor 
types also reflect different levels of otherness, or in other words, of demarcation between a 
German or American national Self and Arab and Muslim Others. 
 
3.2. The Analysis of Empirical Regularities 
The first step towards the formation of this actor typology was the analysis of empirical 
regularities. In this step, the coded text passages that describe the identified actors are 
decontextualized, and we thus step out of the content of the text. One problem that occurred in 
this first step was the high complexity of the material, i.e. of the identified actors and country 
                                                 
17 But see also Kluge (1999). 
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images and the large variety of characteristics and features with which they are described. As 
Kuckartz (1999) points out qualitative data – even more than quantitative data – are highly 
complex, and in view of the richness of the data it can be very difficult to identify the relevant 
patterns that embrace the whole material. 
Therefore, the actor typology was systematically developed, starting with very simple distinctions 
that were subclassified and differentiated in different steps. First of all, rough scanning 
frameworks were defined that were then further differentiated hierarchically. Actors were divided 
into four basic groups. The first group included all those actors and countries that only possess 
features that are disapproved of by the (hypothetical) German and U.S. Self in the articles. The 
disapproval of those features is expressed either implicitly, for example when these features form 
the (negative) opposite to those features that are highlighted in the texts as crucial features of the 
national or Western self-image, or explicitly when they are criticized by the respective article.18 
Examples of disapproved features are being politically undemocratic, culturally uncivilized, a terror 
supporter, fanatical, cruel, arrogant, or economically lavish. The second group included actors and 
countries that only possess features that are implicitly or even explicitly favored by the 
(hypothetical) German and U.S. Self in the articles or that are even labeled as features of the 
national self-concept of both countries.19 Examples of favored features are being politically pro-
western or reform-oriented, culturally modern or tolerant, against violence and terrorism. A third group was 
formed of actors and countries that are described as rather neutral with regard to the distinction 
of positive and negative facets. Those actors only possess features like being personally shy or 
reserved, or being politically influential. But most of all, this group includes actors that are described 
as victims. Finally, a group was formed of actors and countries that appear to be contradictory 
with regard to the distinction between favored and disapproved features, since they carry both 
kinds of features. 
In a second step, those groups were further subdivided according to the different dimensions 
that the features can be ascribed to. For instance, some actors of group one, i.e. who only possess 
disapproved features, are only described on a political dimension, whereas others possess 
disapproved features also in a cultural, social-economic, and/or personal dimension. 
In a third step, the resulting subgroups were compared with each other again across the different 
dimensions to see whether the actor images reveal similar or only slightly differing structures and 
patterns according to which the features on the different dimensions are combined – to derive 
types of actor construction. It has to be noted that not all actors that were summarized to those 
actor types may possess all of those features, and not all actors are identically portrayed. 
Nevertheless, the features that are central for the distinctive features of the actor type are 
inherent in all actors that are ascribed to this type. 
 
                                                 
18 And that usually have negative connotations. 
19 And that usually have positive connotations. 
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3.3. Characterization of the Actor Types 
After those patterns of actor construction had been identified and classified to different types of 
actors, in a final step it was then necessary to “go back into the data” to finally also capture the 
contexts in which the actors occur that have revealed the same structure of portrayal, to re-
examine the concrete usage of the different actor types in the context of the different articles. In 
this final step of the typological analysis, the derived structures were re-embedded into the 
content of the different articles to be fully comprehensible. 
For the description and characterization of the established actor types different prototype actors 
were selected on the basis of the significant aspects of each actor type. According to Kuckartz 
(1988), those prototypes can be seen as representative cases of the different actor types that were 
derived from the material. They summarize and outline the typical aspects and central 
characteristics of each actor type (Kuckartz 1988: 223). The selection of a prototype therefore 
can also be seen as the most important step to create an analytical frame of orientation that 
makes social reality readable by highlighting the essential and omitting the unessential facts 
(Kuckartz 1988: 224). 
The different prototype actors were then re-embedded in the articles’ contents, to derive the 
relevance of the different actor types for the media discourses and to see how those actor types 
interact with each other. 
The results of this second step of analysis, i.e. the formed actor typology, the quantitative 
relevance of the different actor types and the prototype examples of each type will be introduced 
and discussed in chapter VI. 
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IV. OCCURRING ARABS AND MUSLIMS AND THEIR MEDIAL CONTEXT 
Let us first have a look at the general composition of what we are dealing with when talking 
about Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media. The following chapter will 
sketch the most relevant contexts in which those actors occur. Due to the selection criteria that 
have been outlined in the last chapter (III.1.3), this analysis is not able to make generally valid 
statements about overall publication output with regard to discourses on topics like “terrorism,” 
“Islam,” or the overall news coverage of the Near and Middle East or of Muslim countries, nor 
does it aim to. For instance, if articles that refer to those discourses did not include any reference 
to Muslim or Arab actors or described certain country criteria they were not included in the 
further analysis. Therefore, when in the following chapters we look at the publication output of 
articles that refer to Arab and Muslim countries and actors (IV.1) and at the range of focused 
topics and countries (IV.2) the quantitative results only refer to those articles. According to this 
limitation, the following chapter introduces the print media frame and contexts in which Arab 
and Muslim actors and countries appear or are referred to and in which the construction of a 
collective (national or transnational) identity is done via the othering of Arabs and Muslims. 
Furthermore, we will look at the basic composition of this constructed otherness and the 
complexity of different actors and actor groups that occur in the analyzed print media samples of 
both German and U.S. newspapers (IV.3). 
Before the different results will be outlined, a few words have to be added on how the data will 
be quoted and presented in the following. Referring to the level of abstraction that presents the 
results from the content analysis, in the following all features that are introduced to illustrate the 
facets of the different actor images will be written in italics. The terms that are given present the 
codes that have been formed in the inductive coding process. Those terms are not necessarily the 
linguistic terms that are used in the respective articles, since two countries with two different 
languages have been analyzed. Thus, those terms summarize possible linguistic differences under 
one label when those different linguistic terms refer to the same feature, or summarize more 
complex descriptions under one feature.1 
In addition to those codes, quotes from the data sample will be given throughout the following 
chapters to further illustrate the way in which the abstract codes that describe the features of 
Arab and Muslim actors and countries are used in the different articles. The different actor types 
that are introduced in chapter VI will also be illustrated with quotes from the German and 
American print media sample. In this context, the quotes from the German newspapers will be 
given in German, in order to convey the original wording and tone of the different newspapers, 
and to reflect the individual differences that may be used in the German language to talk about 
Arab and Muslim actors and countries. Additionally, it has to be noted here that the newspaper 
articles that have been downloaded from the databases have not been changed according to their 
                                                 
1 For example, when an article refers to an actor being poor, describing at length the different facets of this poverty 
or simply writing that an actor does not have the money to buy food, those different aspects are summarized under 
the label economically poor. 
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content, thus also no grammatical or spelling mistakes have been corrected, etc., but the quotes 
have been adjusted to the English form of punctuation that is used in this book. As for the 
German spelling, one systematic difference between the articles from the German SZ and those 
from DER SPIEGEL and BILD has to be mentioned: The database versions of DER SPIEGEL and 
BILD were downloaded with their original spelling. SZ articles have only been available in the 
database LexisNexis with a spelling that includes [ue], [oe] or [ae] instead of an umlaut, and [ss] 
instead of [ß], which presents a modified version of the original articles as they were published in 
the print version of the newspaper. This spelling has been maintained for the analysis. 
 
1. Relevance of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media 
As a number of studies have already discussed and outlined empirically, the focus on Arab and 
Muslim countries in Western media has had a permanent space in the everyday news coverage, 
also and already before the 9/11 attacks.2 Those results have already indicated that Arab and 
Muslim actors and the geographical focus on Arab and Muslim countries is an integral and 
central part of the Western observation of the non-Western environment, and that a certain 
number of topics and issues are more or less permanently negotiated in the news in both 
countries. 
 
Before 9/11 
The review of the newspaper articles and the collection of relevant articles have revealed that 
topics on Arab and Muslim actors and countries had a regular space in the daily news coverage 
even before the events of September 11, 2001. As Hafez (2002) has already stated for the 
German newspaper coverage of the Middle East and Islam, we can also summarize for the 
analyzed print media that Arab and Muslim actors and countries have a constant and stable 
position in everyday newspapers and weekly magazines. This conclusion can also be drawn from 
the analysis of the American print media. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2 As the different studies of Bieber-Roberts (1995), Hafez (2002), Hashem (1995), Thofern (1997), or others that 
have been introduced in I.2.3 also noted. 
IV. Occurring Arabs and Muslims and Their Medial Context 
 - 89 -
Table IV.1: Media Coverage of Arab and Muslim Actors before 9/11 
 Total Number of Analyzed 
Articles 
Average Media Coverage3 
   German Print Media 206 8 
              SZ 140 6 
              DER SPIEGEL 27 3 
              BILD 39 2 
   U.S. Print Media 168 6 
              NY TIMES 145 5 
              NEWSWEEK 9 1 
              USA TODAY 14 1 
 
Altogether, 206 German and 168 American articles were analyzed for the eight weeks before 
9/11. As Table IV.1 illustrates, in the German data set, this makes an average of eight articles per 
analyzed publication day in the eight weeks before the attacks, whereas in the U.S. print media, an 
average number of six articles per analyzed publication day include references to or depictions of 
Arab and Muslim actors. In both countries, the serious daily newspapers NY TIMES and SZ cover 
Arab and Muslim actors most frequently with an average of five (NY TIMES) and six (SZ) articles. 
Compared to that, in the news magazines we find an average of only one article per analyzed day 
in NEWSWEEK and of about three articles in DER SPIEGEL. Similarly, the news coverage in the 
tabloids USA TODAY and BILD lies at an average of one (USA TODAY) and two (BILD) articles 
per analyzed publication day. We can say therefore that the news coverage of Arab and Muslim 
actors was existent before the attacks and quite similar with regard to the quantitative amount in 
both countries’ analyzed print media, even though German print media report slightly more 
frequently about Arabs and Muslims. 
 
After 9/11 
With the event of September 11, and as expected, the number of articles which include Arab and 
Muslim Islamic actors increased significantly in the four weeks after the attacks. Altogether, 319 
German and 376 American articles were identified in the four analyzed weeks after the attacks 
that include Arab and Muslim actors. Thus, in the U.S – where the attacks took place – the 
average number of articles per analyzed publication day multiplied by almost five from six to 
twenty-seven articles.4 But also in Germany – a country that was not directly targeted by the 
attacks – the newspaper focus on Arab and Muslim actors and countries increased tremendously: 
                                                 
3 Average number of articles per analyzed publication day in the timeframe before 9/11 that focus on Arab and 
Muslim countries and actors. 
4 Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) presented similar quantitative results for their analyzed U.S. media set around 
9/11, which included the NY TIMES, NEW YORK POST, DAILY NEWS, and USA TODAY, reporting that in the six 
analyzed months after the attacks the four newspapers published nearly eleven times as much news that included 
Arab and Muslim actors as in the six months before the attacks (see Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 139). 
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The number of articles grew to an average of twenty-nine per analyzed publication day, which 
means that it nearly quadrupled (see Table IV.2). 
Table IV.2: Media Coverage of Arab and Muslim Actors after 9/11 
 Total Number of Analyzed 
Articles 
Average Media Coverage5 
   German Print media 319 29 
           SZ 154 14 
           DER SPIEGEL 75 19 
           BILD 90 8 
   U.S. Print Media 376 27 
           NY TIMES 205 15 
           NEWSWEEK 42 11 
           USA TODAY 129 13 
As we can see in Table IV.2, the U.S. print media USA TODAY and NEWSWEEK increased their 
media coverage of Arab and Muslim actors and countries most tremendously – by more than 
1000.0 % – after the attacks, an average of now thirteen (USA TODAY) and eleven (NEWSWEEK) 
articles deal with the hypothetical Other. But the NY TIMES also tripled its coverage to an 
average of nearly fifteen articles per analyzed day. In Germany, the results are quite similar: The 
SZ increased its coverage to an average of fourteen articles per analyzed day, whereas with BILD 
and DER SPIEGEL we can register a steep rise in the number of relevant articles to eight (BILD) 
and even nineteen with regard to DER SPIEGEL. 
Thus, it can be noted that in both countries, compared to the serious newspapers, especially the 
tabloids and the news magazines tremendously intensified their focus on Arab and Muslim actors 
and countries and the topics they occur with. In addition to that, the event has increased the 
newspaper coverage of Arab and Muslim actors and countries not only in the United States as the 
direct victim of the attacks but also in Germany. Three different reasons may be given for this. 
First of all, the culprits of the terrorist attack were quite immediately identified as Muslim 
extremists of Arab origin, which increased the focus of public and medial attention on Arab and 
Islamic countries almost overnight. Osama bin Laden, a Saudi Arabian citizen who is hosted by 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, claimed to be responsible for the attacks in Washington and 
New York. This combination of proclaimed anti-western activity in combination with the religious 
values of the Taliban regime seems to have classified the attacks in the context of Islamic 
fundamentalism. 
Secondly, the attacks were violent and brutal, and have caused a tremendous amount of 
disturbance because of the high number of victims that resulted from the plane crashes and 
                                                 
5 Average number of articles per analyzed publication day in the timeframe after 9/11 that focus on Arab and 
Muslim countries and actors. 
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especially from the collapse of the World Trade Center in New York. That the events took place 
on U.S. American soil not only shattered the feeling of national security of the U.S. American 
Self. It also called into question the internal (national) security in Germany, because, on the one 
hand, some of the terrorists were assumed to have planned the attacks in Germany and had thus 
infiltrated a Western country that – so far – had regarded itself as secure due to strict immigration 
rules and regulations. Thus, the event not only pushed the public discourse about national 
security in the U.S. but also in European countries like Germany. The discussions also addressed 
security threats that might emanate from the country’s large Muslim minority, Muslim 
fundamentalism, and a potential terrorist threat in Europe. As a consequence of this perceived 
threat, discussions were also conducted about new immigration restrictions and the effectiveness 
of previous integration policies, since it was assumed that the potential radicalization of Muslim 
immigrants might be due to a possible lack of integration in Western societies. 
Thirdly, in public discourse and as could also be traced in the course of the print media analysis, 
the event was perceived as a threat to Western culture, not only to the United States. The 
German perception that was reflected in political speeches as well as in the different societal 
discourses that the mass media have taken up and summarized, constructed Germany and the 
overall construct of a “West” as a symbolic victim. How the German or Western Self is perceived 
in this construction in German media will be taken up again and considered in more detail in 
chapter V and VI when the textual construction of Arab and Muslim actors in contrast to the 
communicated self-perception of the country will be discussed. 
 
2. Focused Topics and Countries 
If we look at the formal level of the news articles we can describe the medial context for the 
construction of Arab and Muslim Others on the basis of focused topics and countries that 
articles in which those actors appear deal with. This level of analysis summarizes the different 
discourses in which Arab and Muslim actors become relevant. In the following subchapter I will 
elaborate the content of the German and U.S. news articles which focuses on Muslim and Arab 
actors. An overview will be given over the range of topics that Muslim and Arab actor and 
country depictions occur in connection with, and I will also circumscribe the geographical radius 
of the Arab and Muslim Other as it is drawn in both countries’ print news coverage. 
First of all, we have to distinguish between an internal versus an external focus of news coverage. 
The overall image of Arab and Muslim actors is predominantly shaped by an external focus on 
foreign news, and on Arab and Muslim countries. Arabs and Muslims within the German or U.S. 
national context are only marginally referred to before the attacks. In German print media, these 
internal Arabs and Muslims are noticed in the context of criminality, immigration policies, 
debates about Islam lessons at public schools, or the wearing of headscarves in public 
institutions. Especially the German BILD portrays Muslim immigrants mainly in the context of 
criminality or cultural differences. In U.S. print media, Arab actors are only brought up in the 
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context of the election campaign for the New York mayor.6 It is only after 9/11 that the internal 
Other becomes significantly relevant, and here especially in the context of terrorism. 
With the external focus of news coverage both countries’ print media integrate a wide range of 
different countries. The following two sections will introduce the major countries that are 
focused on in the articles that deal with Arab and Muslim actors, before and after 9/11. The 
kinds of topics and issues discussed in the articles will be described in order to summarize an 
overall setting in which Arab and Muslim actors appear in the German and American print media 
before and after the 9/11 attacks. 
 
2.1. Countries of Reference and Topics before 9/11 
Before 9/11, Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed print media of both countries appear in a 
broad setting of a number of different countries and topics. Altogether, German articles that 
include relevant actors focus on up to twenty-eight different countries. In American articles, we 
find twenty-one countries or regions that are referred to. There is also a wide-ranging diversity of 
topics discussed in both countries, with about forty-three different topics in Germany and thirty-
eight topics in the U.S. From this large variety of countries and topics that include relevant actors 
the most central ones will be introduced in the following: 
Figure IV.1: Spectrum of foreign countries focused on before 9/117 
 
 
 
                                                 
6 However, these occurrences were not included in the analysis since the articles were published in the regional 
sections of the NY TIMES. 
7 In %, given the proportion of articles with the listed country focus in relation to all articles in the indicated 
timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
First and foremost, in both countries one third (Germany: 33.5 %8, USA: 33.3 %) of the analyzed 
media articles which include Arab and Muslim actors focus on Israel and Palestine, and here 
predominantly report on the ongoing conflict between both countries.9 The discourse about the 
conflict in the Middle East therefore dominates the news coverage of the subject of research 
before 9/11.10 Both Germany and the United States perceive themselves as crucial parties in the 
peace negotiations and the process of establishing a Palestinian state solution which can be seen 
as one reason for this central and permanently high focus on events in Israel and Palestine. 
Furthermore, for the U.S. context Zaharna (1995) has argued that the focus on the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict is also due to the special political relationship between the Jewish community 
within the United States and prominent American officials and politicians which also reflects in 
the mass medial attention that is put on the conflict and political decisions and negotiations in 
this region (Zaharna 1995: 38). 
The internal as well as foreign political relevance of this conflict for the Western Self is also 
reflected in the fact that the majority of articles about the Middle Eastern conflict in both 
discourses deal with political issues. They discuss, for example, the positions of the different 
government actors that are involved in the ongoing violent conflict, like the Palestinian leader 
Yassir Arafat,11 the Israeli government, or political leaders of Palestinian organizations like Hamas 
or Islamic Jihad, etc. Furthermore, articles deal with the diverse attempts to design a road map 
for a peace plan for the region. 
Another aspect that dominates the articles about the conflict in Middle East is the daily interplay 
of violence that consists of suicide attacks by Palestinian freedom fighters or extremists and the 
military reactions of the Israeli state. Both topics are often intermingled in the different articles 
and create a circle of daily violence, counter-violence, and political peace initiatives. It can be 
suggested here that the conflict between Israel and Palestine offers continuing news relevance 
because of the (nearly) daily attacks, violent confrontations between the two parties, and the 
civilian victims that this conflict offers and causes. 
 
                                                 
8 In the following, when only the percentages are given, this always refers to the percentages of articles as measured 
by the total number of analyzed articles. The given average numbers were rounded up or off to one decimal place. 
9 The ongoing political as well as military conflict between the state of Israel and its Arab neighbor states as well as 
the Palestinian people and their political leaders, that basically developed with the withdrawal of Great Britain from 
Palestine in 1948 and the proclamation of Israel as a sovereign state. It often overlaps with other conflicts in the 
region. Since the outbreak of the Second Intifada (2000-2005) the conflict is characterized by continuous suicide 
attacks in Israel carried out by Palestinian terrorists and counter-measures of the Israeli military like repeated 
occupations of Palestinian territory or the Israeli policy of so-called preventative, systematic killings of potential 
terrorist leaders. 
10 Similar findings were published for the German context by Hafez (2002) as well as for the American context by 
Hashem (1995) who analyzed the U.S. news magazines TIME and NEWSWEEK for the time period between January 
1990 and December 1993, and found that actors from Palestine make up the second largest group behind actors 
from Iraq which are probably focused more often during this time period due to the Kuwait invasion in 1990 and 
the subsequent Second Gulf war in 1991 (see also Hashem 1995: 151-155). 
11 Yassir Arafat was Chairman of the PLO from 1969 to 2004 and President of the Palestinian National Authority 
from 1993 to 2004. 
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Afghanistan and Shelter Now 
In addition to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that can be identified as the leading topic in both 
countries’ print media in the analyzed timeframe, a relatively large number of articles in both 
countries focus on Afghanistan (Germany: 10.2 %, USA: 8.3 %), which is mainly due to the 
Shelter Now affair that began in July 2001.12 The Shelter Now issue not only attracted great 
attention in Germany where four of the arrested staff of the organization came from, but also 
U.S. newspapers took high notice of the topic. The issue also revives the focus on the political 
situation in Afghanistan. The ruling Taliban regime, which at that time was not awarded state 
recognition politically by Germany and the U.S. as well as by almost the entire international states 
community, becomes highly focused again for its strict, fundamentalist rule, domestic power 
struggles with opposition groups like the Northern Alliance, and the regime’s diplomatic behavior 
in general and in the context of the Shelter Now affair in particular. 
 
Conflict in Macedonia 
A third focus that would not automatically be considered to be of high relevance when discussing 
images of external Arabs and Muslims is Macedonia and the province of Kosovo, especially not 
as the country geographically lies in the European continent. Altogether, 9.2 % of all analyzed 
German articles and 7.7 % of the U.S. data sample before 9/11 focus on Macedonia or the 
province of Kosovo. The articles considered here predominantly deal with the Macedonian 
conflict and mainly focus on the members of the National Liberation Army (UÇK) who 
consisted of Albanian extremist rebels and who fought for the independence of the Kosovo 
region that is to a large extent settled by Muslim Albanians (Kosovo Albanians). Other articles 
discuss the group’s violent conflicts with the NATO troops in the course of the disarmament 
process.13 The high interest of both countries in this conflict could be explained with the military 
involvement of both Germany and the United States in the NATO security troops that were 
stationed in the country during the analyzed time period to secure the demilitarization of the 
UÇK. 
 
                                                 
12 In early August 2001 the Taliban regime arrested eight foreign staff of the aid organization “Shelter Now 
International” in Kabul, among them also four Germans. They were accused of Christian missionary activity, which 
was illegal in Afghanistan at that time. 
13 The violent conflict in Macedonia is mainly a conflict between the Slavic Macedonian majority and the ethnic 
Albanian minority, the second-largest population group in the country, which seeks more political independence and 
state autonomy. In 2000, the conflict between the two sides became more violent as Albanian rebel groups 
(especially the UÇK) increasingly and more and more systematically attacked the Macedonian security forces. A 
massive intervention by the United Nations in August 2001 led to a ceasefire and the formulation of a peace plan 
that also included plans for political reforms and the political betterment of the Albanian minority in Macedonia. 
Among other things, the agreement includes the demobilization of the UÇK and, in return, a guarantee for amnesty 
for its members. The demobilization process was supported and monitored by NATO, which was reduced in size 
but remained in the country after the process was finished, mainly to support the Macedonian security forces and to 
protect the EU and OSZE monitors who are also stationed in the country (Hansen 2004). The media analysis 
partially covers the timeframe of the demilitarization process. 
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General European and Western Focus 
Apart from the interest in the Macedonian conflict, we also find a small amount of articles that 
deal with Arab and Muslim actors within European countries (Germany: 1.9 %, USA: 1.8 %). 
Besides the focus on Macedonia, Arab and Muslim actors also occur in the context of German as 
well as American articles that refer to countries like Italy, Belgium, Serbia, or Bosnia, although 
only to a limited extent compared to the other countries mentioned so far. The topics of these 
articles are similar in both German and U.S. newspapers; they discuss immigrants or refugees 
with Arab or Islamic background, the ethnic Albanian minority in the Kosovo region, or a 
Tunisian hijacker in Italy. 
 
Iraq 
Apart from such “leading” topics as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict we find countries that are 
focused rather frequently but in the context of a diverse range of different topics. The media 
focus on Iraq may serve as an example here: On a quantitative scale, 2.9 % of the analyzed 
German articles and 6.0 % of the U.S. articles deal with the country. The focus on Iraq is 
dominated by the ongoing conflict between the Iraqi government and the former Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein in particular on the one hand and the U.S. military on the other hand. This 
ongoing conflict includes, for instance, the military confrontations in the no-flight zones in 
northern and southern Iraq that were established after the Persian Gulf War in 1991 to protect 
ethnic groups threatened with repression by the Iraqi government.14 The news coverage on Iraq 
also includes aspects like the sanctions that were imposed against Iraq after the Gulf War by the 
United Nations, which were especially supported by the United States. In this context, German 
media also focus on the social and economic consequences of those sanctions for the Iraqi 
population – an aspect that is not picked up in the analyzed American articles. 
In both countries’ print media articles that focus on Iraq, special attention is paid to the actor 
Saddam Hussein and his personal political but also private actions. For the surveyed time period 
before the 9/11 attacks, we can for instance find articles about his private family conflicts or his 
literary work in the German newspaper SZ, as well as a discussion about a possible legal 
prosecution of the ruler at the International Court of Justice in the news magazine NEWSWEEK. 
 
Iran 
A second country that is focused on quite often in both countries print media (Germany: 6.3 %, 
USA: 10.1 %) but with reference to different issues is Iran. With regard to the Islamic republic, 
German and U.S. newspaper articles predominantly report on political issues that concentrate on 
                                                 
14 The Persian Gulf War took place from August 1990 to March 1991. It was a conflict between Iraq and a coalition 
force of approximately 30 nations led by the United States and mandated by the United Nations in order to liberate 
Kuwait, which had been invaded by Iraq on the basis of the contention that Kuwait was illegally slant-drilling 
petroleum across Iraq’s border. 
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domestic political frictions and conflicts between the conservative powers like the religious 
leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, or the Guardian Council, and the reformers of the parliament 
and President Mohammad Khatami. The struggle over democratic practices in Iranian politics 
seems to be of central interest for both German and American news coverage, and is embedded 
in the context of several legislative and executive decisions and actions that take place in the 
country. 
Furthermore, both countries’ print media focus on events and phenomena of Iranian society that 
predominantly center on societal conditions, rights of women, or religious and legal restrictions 
that are enforced by religious conservative forces like Guardian council and that the Iranian 
population have to live with. Last but not least, the trial of a serial killer who murdered more than 
a dozen prostitutes arouses attention in both countries’ print media in the period of analysis, and 
here is especially picked up in the German tabloid BILD and the American NEWSWEEK magazine. 
As for the topics, focused on countries, and discourse that have been listed so far, the medial 
context for Arabs and Muslims can be summarized as rather similar in both German and U.S. 
print media. However, the two countries’ media samples before 9/11 also reveal some slight 
differences. 
 
The Focus on Turkey in German Print Media 
One country that is more frequently referred to in German print media with nearly 10.2 % is 
Turkey. Compared to that, only 3.0 % of the articles in U.S. newspapers before 9/11 deal with 
the country. First of all, the German interest in the Turkish politics or society seems to be due to 
the fact that Germany has a large Turkish minority. Apart from that, Germany – as a European 
country – is involved in the Turkish accession talks with the European Union. In the context of 
these negotiations, news about the Turkish foreign policy toward Cyprus, internal political 
processes towards more democratic structures, civil rights abuses like torture, or the freedom of 
the Turkish press are of great interest from a European perspective for the evaluation of whether 
or not the Turkish nation state fulfils the Western criteria and standards that are required for 
accession to the European Union. The internal political issues and decisions are therefore also 
evaluated with regard to the level of institutionalization of European or Western principles 
(human rights, freedom of the press. etc.) that become relevant in this context.15 Furthermore, 
the German interest in the country also concentrates on the growing influence and popularity of 
the Islamic fundamentalist party for Justice and Progress (AKP) and its leader and later prime 
                                                 
15 Gür (1998) comes to a similar result in a content analysis of the image of Turkey in the German press for the 
timeframe 1987-1995: In addition to the mentioned topics, the author argues that the human rights situation and the 
status of the Kurdish minority or other central topics that are focused in the context of the news coverage of Turkey. 
In another analysis that also includes television programs, Quandt (1995) comes to the result that besides the 
Kurdish minority problem, German media mainly concentrate on political issues, and largely disregard cultural and 
economic issues. In this point, Quandt’s results differ slightly from the observations that have been made around 
9/11. 
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minister of Turkey, Tayyip Erdogan, in 2001 that is closely watched by the German and 
European political public in terms of its democratic accomplishment. 
In addition to these political issues, German print media also discuss Turkish actors in the 
context of social or economic issues and topics. Here, articles predominantly deal with the 
problems of the Turkish economy and their effects on Turkish society. Again, these articles 
reflect the relevance of this issue being derived from the accession negotiations of the country to 
the European Union and indicate certain skepticism of the German Self towards those attempts. 
But also topics of the private or entertainment sector are newsworthy, and not only in the tabloid 
newspaper: among other things we also find an article about the murder of a Turkish business 
man in the SZ, or another article about a “sex strike” of Turkish women in a village in Southern 
Anatolia in BILD.16 
 
The Focus on Indonesia and Pakistan in U.S. Print Media 
Just as we find a stronger focus on Turkish issues in German media, U.S. newspapers more 
frequently focus on political and other events and topics in Indonesia. Even though, for instance, 
the political change of government in Indonesia found its way into the news coverage in both 
countries, the attention paid towards Indonesia was much more prominent in the American 
media as the number of analyzed articles reflects. It has to be noted that German newspaper 
articles pay more attention to Indonesia than to a number of other countries, with about 3.9 % of 
all analyzed articles. Nevertheless and compared to that, the proportion of analyzed articles 
referring to Indonesia in U.S. newspapers before 9/11 stands at 13.1 %. 
The majority of these articles focus on Indonesian domestic politics, and here especially on the 
political change of power from President Abdurrahman Wahid to the former Vice President 
Megawati Sukarnoputri that took place in 2001. For the United States, the personal profile of the 
new president and the degree of her commitment to democracy, as well as her willingness to 
solve the social, economic and political problems of the country, for example with religious 
extremists, are of great interest in particular. Other articles discuss the reactions of Wahid 
concerning his loss of power, and examine the political and private consequences for the ex-
president. Finally, on a social and economic dimension, U.S. articles also cover issues like the 
consumption of cigarettes in Indonesia, a natural catastrophe, or a railroad accident that took 
place during the period of analysis – events that received no attention at all in the analyzed 
German data sample before 9/11. 
A second country that is referred to more often in the American news media before 9/11 than in 
the German ones is Pakistan. About 4.8 % of all U.S. articles focus on the country, compared to 
                                                 
16 It has to be noted however that other studies have shown that U.S. media also focus on Turkey in their news 
coverage (see for instance Bieber-Roberts 1995). This is especially the case in the context of the different military 
coups that took place in Turkey since the 1950s, even though the authors here also emphasizes that the news 
coverage has decreased steadily since the last coup in 1980. According to the author, and similar to the German news 
coverage on Turkey, U.S. media here mainly focus on the inner political, but also the military issues in the country, 
democratic developments, the Cyprus Crisis, or the economic stability of the country. 
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only 1.9 % in the German news media. The majority of the American articles report on domestic 
politics, and cover such issues as recent cases of execution of the death penalty, or political 
conflicts between the Pakistani government and religious and political fundamentalist groups. 
Furthermore, the discourse about the ongoing conflict between Pakistan and India about the 
Kashmir region draws attention to Pakistani actors in U.S. media. 
 
The Discourse on Islam 
One non-geographical context in which Arab and Muslim actors become relevant as well in both 
countries’ media is the discursive examination of Islam. Since the discourse on this religion 
becomes highly relevant for both countries in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the quantitative 
relevance of this topic shall also be mentioned before the event. Here, it has to be noted that 
both countries only marginally focus on the topic of Islam before the attacks. In the NY TIMES, 
an article discusses the role of religion in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Another 
NY TIMES article reports on the growth of Islam and the rising conflicts in the former Soviet 
republics in Central Asia. In the German SZ, we find two articles about suicide bombers in 
Palestine and the question of how terror and Islam are interrelated, and how terrorism is justified 
in the religion. An article in the SZ has a national focus as it refers to the national debates about 
the wearing of headscarves in Germany.17 
 
The National Focus 
This brings us to the last relevant context in which Arab and Muslim actors can occur in German 
and U.S. print media, namely the focus on and discourse about national topics and events in 
which context Arab and Muslim actors can appear. Again, this topical context is less significant 
for the time period before the attacks but it becomes increasingly relevant after 9/11. 
Nevertheless, already before 9/11 we find articles with a national self-focus that also include 
references to Arab or Muslim actors – even though the number of articles for the analyzed 
timeframe before 9/11 is rather small. For both countries, articles that refer to national issues are 
treated as a distinct category. Of the articles referring to Arab or Muslim actors, only 3.4 % of the 
German ones and about 1.8 % of the American texts focus on national issues and topics, after all. 
In the American news media, the respective articles discuss the U.S. foreign policies in the Middle 
East and the national discussion about that. In the Germany newspapers, these articles focus on 
the discourses about integration of immigrants or, more concretely, the wearing of headscarves in 
public institutions like schools or work places, in Germany. Or they report on criminal behavior 
                                                 
17 Even though the focus on Islam is only of minor relevance in the timeframe analyzed here, Islam is a relevant 
facet of the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other also before 9/11. As Hafez (2002) has noted in his long-
time study of German newspapers, the news coverage on Islam is quantitatively only of minor relevance but 
becomes important when it is combine with political issues (political Islam). As Hafez (2002) argues, especially the 
Iranian Revolution (1978-79) increased the quantitative relevance of Islam in the German print media. At the same 
time, the circumstances especially of the political radicalization of Islam have also ascribed the image of the religion 
with a predominantly negative connotation (see for instance Hafez 2002: 47-64). 
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of Arab or Muslim actors that is carried out within the national borders, i.e. by immigrants or 
ethnic minority members, or in a more concrete case by an Iranian spy who is reported on in the 
SZ and the tabloid BILD. In yet another context, the news magazine DER SPIEGEL discusses the 
negotiation strategy of the German foreign minister in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the 
reactions of other German and European politicians to that. In this context, the articles also 
include references to actors in the Middle East. 
Altgether, the complexity of topics and countries of references is already quite broad before the 
events of September 11, in German as well as in U.S. articles. We find quite similar ranges of 
discourses on topics and focused countries in which Arab or Muslim actors are referred to in the 
analyzed print media of both countries.18 In addition, it can also be noted that the different 
newspapers in both countries do reflect the same composition of depicted countries and topics as 
we find more or less similar geographical and topical foci in all of the different analyzed 
newspapers in both countries before the attacks. The only exception might be the slightly 
stronger internal focus of the German tabloid BILD since articles with a national focus rank 
second highest rank in that newspaper. 
Nevertheless, and despite these large similarities of topical and geographical foci, we also find 
some mentionable differences between the German and U.S. media contexts in which some Arab 
and Muslim actors occur: The stronger German focus on political and social events in Turkey 
and the stronger American focus on the political developments in Indonesia as well as in Pakistan 
have been mentioned here. What has also been outlined is that both countries pay only little 
attention to issues that concern the content and practice etc. of Islam before 9/11, and only to a 
very small extent refer to Arab or Muslim actors in the respective national contexts. This changes 
however quite significantly with the attacks, as will be outlined in the next section. 
 
2.2. Countries of Reference and Topics after 9/11 
On a quantitative level, after the 9/11 attacks the number of different topics and the countries 
that are focused on in the news overage when Arab and Muslim actors appear has only partially 
increased. This is due in part to the fact that a number of articles that include Arab or Muslim 
actors or country depictions do not have a specific country reference any more (Germany: 
31.7 %, USA: 16.0 %). The majority of these articles are part of the discourse on the 9/11 
attacks. They deal, for instance, with the 9/11 investigations of the police, the identified suicide 
attackers, the presumed mastermind behind the attacks, Osama bin Laden, or other terrorist 
suspects that were identified in the course of the investigations. These articles either focus on a 
number of different countries or highlight no specific country at all as the news media 
discursively negotiate the event and its societal impact on a rather abstract level. 
                                                 
18 For the U.S. press between 1990 and 1993, Hashem (1995) has presented similar significances, just as Hafez (2002) 
has done for the German print sector since the 1950s. We can thus back up our finding that before 9/11 the Israeli-
Palestinian conflicts present one of the central topics in the context of which Arab and Muslim actors are depicted. 
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Apart from that, a number of articles can be found that deal with the international reactions to 
and political, cultural, or economic consequences of the attacks that refer not to one but to a 
wide range of different countries. Regarding the geographical focus, the number of countries that 
are looked at in the German articles declined to eighteen from formerly twenty-six, which means 
that the focus slightly narrowed. Nevertheless, and despite that reduced focus, the variety of 
topics increased to forty-six, compared to forty-two before 9/11. 
Compared to that, in the analyzed American news articles the number of countries that are 
focused on increased from twenty to twenty-four. This increase is combined with a rather 
decisive growth in the variety of discussed topics from formerly thirty-eight to now fifty. 
Altogether it can thus be said that the variety of topics in both countries’ media increased and 
additionally shifted to some extent as well since the geographical focus of the topics that are 
discussed after 9/11 in both countries changed too. 
Figure IV.2: Spectrum of foreign countries focused on after 9/1119 
 
The National Focus 
First and foremost, the focus on the Self, i.e. the focus on the national (and Western) territory 
and internal issues and actors has increased tremendously. For the context of the United States 
this development seems obvious since the attacks took place within the country. Consequently, in 
U.S. media nearly half of the articles (42.6 %) analyzed after the attacks have a predominantly 
national focus in which Arab and Muslim actors now occur. Every fourth article deals with the 
reactions to and consequences of the attacks as they are observed in American society. For 
instance, articles discuss the reactions of different societal groups like foreign students from Arab 
or Muslim countries or Muslim and Arab American citizens. Other articles report on such 
                                                 
19 In %, given the proportion of articles with the listed country focus in relation to all articles in the indicated 
timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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negative consequences as hate crimes against Arab and Muslim immigrants, traumatized children, 
and the grieving of the relatives of the 9/11 victims. 
In a political dimension, articles focus on the reactions and possible or actual foreign political or 
military consequences – for example to fight the terrorist threat – that are discussed by the U.S. 
or German government. In view of the internal impacts, the analyzed print media also look at the 
internal political decisions after the event, like the measures that are taken to improve internal 
security, or the investigations against the mastermind and possible accomplices of the attacks. In 
the American context, we also find a number of articles that explicitly discuss the self-image of 
the United States, or that look at they way in which the attacks may change international policies 
– and here especially emphasize the imminent military action against the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan. 
What is surprising, however, is that this focus on the Self and on Arab and Muslim actors within 
the national boundaries also strongly increases in the German articles after 9/11. A focus on 
national Arab and Muslim actors can be found in 18.2 % of the analyzed German articles in the 
time span after the attacks. This high significance of the internal Other already indicates that the 
attacks also had a strong impact on the self-reflection of German society. We will again come 
back to this aspect of the self-observation in chapters V and VI.6 when we look at the way in 
which those internal actors are constructed and will see why it becomes so relevant for the 
German Self as well to look at and demarcate internal actors more strongly after the attacks. 
 
General European and Western Focus 
Besides the national focus we also find an increased focus on other Western (and here mainly 
European) countries after 9/11. In both countries, the Macedonian focus nearly disappears 
completely from both countries’ print media (Germany: 0.3 %, USA: 0.8 %). However, some 
differences can also be observed here between the German and the American news coverage. 
Whereas in the American context, the focus on Europe and other Western countries (like France, 
Spain, or Germany) only increases slightly to now 5.1 %, in the German media the focus on 
Europe increases significantly, as about 18.8 % of all analyzed articles after the attacks focus on 
Arabs and Muslim in a Western or European context. Especially the German focus on the 
United States – as a Western nation – increases strongly with the event, which explains the 
increased overall Western focus in the German print media after the attacks. 
The topics that are focused on in the national and Western contexts in both American and 
German articles can mainly be explained by the event itself – as well as by the roots of the 
terrorist network and the regional provenance of the suspects and their helpers. In both print 
media samples, articles in this context especially look at terror investigations in European 
countries. The actors that appear in articles with a Western focus are predominantly the 9/11 
suicide attackers or their accomplices and supporters in the U.S. as well as in Germany. Both 
countries’ print media thereby report, for instance, on the so-called “terrorist cell of Hamburg,” a 
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group that is believed to have organized and mainly carried out the attacks. The fact that the 
majority of the culprits lived or stayed in Germany and/or the U.S. for a longer period of time 
before they carried out their attack, increased the perception of a potential threat that comes 
from the Arab and Muslim Other not only in distant places but also within the Western 
hemisphere. This realization, which is communicated very strongly in both discourses after 9/11, 
also throws back the geographical focus on the Western sphere and raises the awareness of a 
potential future threat that might come from other possible – and yet still invisible – terrorist 
cells within the national and Western boundaries. 
Apart from this shift in focus towards internal topics and actors, i.e. onto the Self, both countries’ 
newspapers also reveal a similar shift in the external perspective onto the potential Arab and 
Muslim Other. Here, the new significance of Afghanistan has to be listed: 
 
Afghanistan 
As noted before, Afghanistan was a relevant focus before the event as well. Now the attention 
that is paid to the country further increases but also shifts slightly to a new topic since the 
presumed mastermind of the attacks, Osama bin Laden, is a guest of the ruling Taliban regime, a 
fact that is now frequently emphasized in German and U.S. media discourse on the attacks. Due 
to this connection, Afghanistan very quickly becomes the central focus of the U.S. investigations 
on the background, the masterminds or supporters, and the political or military consequences of 
the attacks. This increased focus may explain the grown media focus as well: In the analyzed 
timeframe after the attacks, 14.4 % of the German and 16.0 % of the American articles look at 
Afghanistan, which makes the country the most frequently focused on country in the U.S. 
context. 
Most articles with reference to Afghanistan in German and American newspapers deal with the 
reactions of the Taliban regime towards the attacks or with their diplomatic negotiations with the 
United States regarding the handing over of Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, the great interest in 
Afghanistan is maintained by the foreign political strategy of an anti-terror coalition that the U.S. 
government strives for, and that aims at integrating not only European countries, but also Arab 
and Muslim countries in the military actions that are planned against terrorist groups as well as 
governments or countries that support and sponsor terrorist organizations and activities against 
Western countries. Afghanistan’s Taliban regime is regarded as one of those terror supporters 
and becomes the first target of a military campaign by the anti-terror coalition.20 The war in 
Afghanistan that finally started at the beginning of October 2001 therefore has constantly drawn 
the medial focus to Afghanistan in both U.S. and German articles.21 
                                                 
20 With regard to Afghanistan this anti-terror coalition very quickly worked towards a military operation against the 
country that not only aimed to arrest Osama bin Laden but also to displace the ruling Taliban regime which – was 
noted already – was not recognized politically by Western countries mainly because of its way of seizing power, but 
also because of its exclusive and religiously fundamentalist politics. 
21 This topic is also frequently discussed in German newspapers since Germany is one of the coalition partners that 
will take part in the military campaign in Afghanistan that starts in October 2001. 
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Apart from that, also the Shelter Now affair did not disappear completely after 9/11 but can be 
regarded as a minor topic that is still reported, even though now only in the larger context of the 
“war on terrorism” and Osama bin Laden. The trial of the Shelter Now staff is now seen as a 
further – supporting – argument for a military campaign against the ruling Taliban regime. 
 
Pakistan 
A second country that is quite similarly pushed into the limelight of both countries’ attention 
after the attacks is Pakistan. In German print media, compared to the timeframe before the 
attacks22, now 5.0 % of all analyzed articles now focus on Pakistan. In the U.S. data sample the 
focus on Pakistan remains stable almost stable, increasing only slightly from formerly 4.8 % to 
now 5.9 % of all articles. The focus on Pakistan after 9/11 is, one the one hand, due to the 
geographic proximity of the country to Afghanistan. On the other hand, the interest in Pakistan 
can be associated with the very fast political decision of Pakistan’s government to take sides with 
the United States in the anti-terror coalition. This strategically favorable and militarily central 
position provides the country with an increasing amount of attention. 
The main focus of both German and U.S. newspapers is put on political issues and here 
especially on the country’s President Pervez Musharraf’s internal political conflict with 
fundamentalist groups and the military over his pro-western course and the country’s role in the 
anti-terror coalition. Especially Musharraf’s support for the U.S. military in the war in 
Afghanistan are frequently discussed, because up to the 9/11 attacks, Pakistan was regarded as an 
ally of the Taliban regime. After the event, the political turn of the Pakistani government against 
the Afghan leaders as well as its political strategy to support the plans of the U.S. and the NATO 
to carry out military actions against Afghanistan in order to destroy terrorist structures etc. 
provides one explanation for the increasing focus on Pakistan in the analyzed print media. 
 
The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Whereas Afghanistan and Pakistan clearly come to the fore in the news coverage after the attacks, 
the formerly central topic and geographic focus – the Israeli-Palestinian conflict – loses its central 
position. The conflict does not disappear completely but the news coverage on the topic declines 
significantly and with it, also the actors from this region lose their quantitative relevance. 
Altogether, only 6.0 % of the analyzed German articles and 5.3 % of the U.S. articles after the 
attacks focus on Arab and Muslim actors in Palestine or Israel (compared to one third of the data 
before the event). 
Regarding the content, both countries’ media discourses on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still 
mainly deal with the everyday violent conflict between the Israeli military and Palestinian gunmen 
and groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad. Apart from that, articles also discuss the reactions of 
                                                 
22 When 1.9 % of all analyzed German articles focused on the country. 
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both Israeli and Palestinian politicians, of religious groups, and of private people towards the 
attacks in the U.S. Here, the articles put a strong emphasis on the way in which both sides do or 
do not take sides with the United States in the anti-terror coalition. Especially the demonstrated 
support of some Palestinian demonstrators for the attacks in Gaza is critically discussed and is 
embedded in the broader reflections on the ambivalence of Arab regimes but also of Arab and 
Muslim populations towards terrorism and anti-American or anti-western sentiments. 
 
Arab and Muslim Countries, Terrorism, and the Anti-Terror Coalition 
In addition to the strong focus on the two countries Afghanistan and Pakistan, another discourse 
that can be identified refers to a wide range of different countries in the Middle East. German 
and U.S. newspapers frequently refer to Arab and Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, 
Iraq, Libya, or Egypt and the reactions of those nation states, their governments, and also their 
populations to the 9/11 attacks. On a quantitative scale, most of those articles do not have an 
explicit focus on one specific country but refer to the “Arab region,” “Muslim world” or “the 
Middle East” as an overall category. In Figure IV.2, most of those articles are thus categorized 
under “unspecific” or “other” country reference. Articles discuss the degrees of involvement of 
those countries in international terrorism, their diplomatic behavior and their positions towards 
U.S. foreign policy, or their concrete positions, engagement, and possible involvement in the anti-
terror coalition. 
In the context of these topics, some countries especially stand out, and here we find slight 
differences in the German and American focus. One case in point here, for example, is Saudi 
Arabia. The country increasingly became the focus in German and U.S. print media after the 
9/11 attacks, but the amount of news coverage is somewhat larger in the U.S. articles than in the 
German press. Three American articles exclusively highlight and discuss the Saudi Arabian 
connection with international Islamic terrorism, and locate some of the roots of Islamic terrorism 
in the country’s political history and present day politics. In Germany, we find only one article on 
this issue in the news magazine DER SPIEGEL. 
In addition to that, U.S. articles also focus specifically on the terror connections of Syria and 
Egypt, whereas two German articles discuss the terror connections of Iraq and a possible 
involvement of Iraqi Islamic extremists in the 9/11 attacks instead. Nevertheless, altogether both 
countries put a strong focus on the participation of the already mentioned countries in the 
proclaimed anti-terror coalition, whereby both countries’ media largely include the same range of 
countries that have been outlined before. The only exception in German newspapers is the 
inclusion of Turkey in this discourse. German articles also discuss the Turkish position and 
reactions towards the attacks. 
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The Discourse on Terrorism 
Compared to the timeframe before the 9/11 attacks, after the event new topics enter the arena as 
well. Triggered off by the attacks and as the other introduced topics have already indicated, 
“terrorism” becomes a central topic of discussion in both countries’ articles, mostly in the 
context of the topics that have already been introduced, but in some articles also as an abstract 
issue with a specific country reference. 2.4 % of the analyzed U.S. articles and 6.0 % of the 
German ones exclusively deal with this topic23 – stimulated of course by the 9/11 attacks but also 
focused on the broader subject of terrorism in general. 
Apart from this rather abstract discourse on terrorism, a number of articles that portray actors 
from an Arab or Muslim background now strongly measure the political actions of countries 
according to the degree to which they support or refuse terrorist activities. A second issue that 
became extremely relevant in both discourses is the discussion about a general and permanent 
terror threat that is assumed to have become obvious with the attacks on New York and 
Washington. In this context, articles focus mainly on Islamic and political groups within 
Germany, the United States, and Europe, and discuss whether or not and why those groups can 
be perceived as an increasing terror threat. 
Altogether, it has to be noted here that the discourse on terrorism after 9/11 also includes a 
rather abstract discussion about the roots and the geographic origins of terrorism, and here in 
particular about the structures and the specific form of Islamic terrorism. Furthermore, the 
American perspective more intensively focuses on the weapons that terrorists use or could use in 
the future, like nuclear, biological or chemical weapons, etc. Here, it becomes obvious from the 
content of the respective articles that these discussions about terrorist weapons are embedded in 
the general overall considerations and negotiations of military strategies of both the discussed 
terrorist groups but more than that of America’s own counter-strategies to fight terrorism. 
Compared to that, German articles deal with the question of counter-terrorism in more general 
terms, e.g. by discussing the effectiveness of the “war on terrorism” in general. This more distant 
perspective on the topic might be explained by the observing status of Germany after the attacks 
– at least with regard to the military consequences of possible retaliatory measures. Instead, we 
find more articles in German print media after 9/11 that discuss the roots of and reasons for 
terrorist activities, the role that Western politics has had in the development of terrorist 
movements and groups in the Arab world, and possible social and economic causes or religious 
reasons that might motivate terrorist actors. 
Beyond that, both countries keenly deal with established and partly well-known terrorist figures, 
historically incisive terrorist attacks, and existing terrorist groups and structures in the Middle 
East, by introducing their major goals, historical development, and societal background. In other 
articles both countries’ print media also try to answer the question why people become terrorists. 
Here, especially the American media continuously pick up and discuss the involvement of Arab 
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governments of countries like Syria, Pakistan, Iran, and other “state sponsors” with diverse 
terrorist groups and networks. Particularly the latter topic indicates interchangeability between 
the discourses on terrorism in general and the specific focus on terrorism in connection with 
Arab and Muslim countries and actors after 9/11. 
 
The Discourse on Islam in German Print Media 
Finally, a discourse that also becomes more prominent after the attacks, but here more often in 
German newspapers than in American ones, is that on Islam. In the German newspaper articles 
after 9/11 examination of the Islamic religion becomes one of the central topics of discussion. 
This increased interest in Islam as an independent topic distinguishes the German focus from the 
American news media after September 11, at least when focusing on Arab and Muslim actors. 
Whereas only 0.8 % of the U.S. articles in our analysis deal with Islam and Islamic terrorism as 
abstract topics, in German articles, we find more than 6.6 % discussing the religion and its 
connection to terrorist activities.24 
It has to be admitted, however, that first of all, religion is a crucial feature for Arab and Muslim 
actors in U.S. print media as well. U.S. articles simply do not discuss the religion as an 
independent unit and in its essence as a spiritual worldview. Religious affiliation is used mainly as 
a cultural identifier and element of classification for actors (as will be further outlined in the 
chapters V and VI). 
Second, after 9/11 it becomes increasingly difficult to distinguish between articles that 
predominantly focus on either terrorism or Islam because the majority of these texts discuss the 
connection between both phenomena. The German articles focus, for instance, on Islamic 
terrorism and in this context discuss the possible roots for violence and aggressive behavior in 
the religious rules and scripture itself. In other contexts, the German media discourse on Islam 
looks at the attitudes of Muslims in the Middle East towards violence, war, and terrorism. The 
questions that guide those articles are whether or not Islam – in its basic principles – is a violent 
religion. This is done, for example, by introducing the substance and basic rules of the religion, 
outlining the “violent” history of Islam, and introducing religious and historic experts who 
emphasize, for example, that an actually peaceful religion has been taken hostage by a small 
number of radical extremists. The German tabloid BILD even publishes a series on the history of 
Islam where the well-known but also controversially discussed journalist and expert on the 
Middle Eastern region, Peter Scholl-Latour, gives an overview about the religion and its social 
and historical context in articles on questions like “Was Mohammed a benevolent prophet?”, 
                                                                                                                                                        
23 Those articles on “terrorism” are listed in the category “others” or “unspecific” (see Figure IV.2) depending on 
whether they have either no or no specific country focus. 
24 Again, those articles on “Islam” are listed in the category “others” or “unspecific” (see Figure IV.2) depending on 
whether they have either no or no specific country focus. 
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“Who are the great Islamic leaders?”, “The holy sanctuaries of Islam,” or “Will Islam rule the 
world?”25 
Altogether, we can say that the topics that have been outlined for the weeks after 9/11 in the last 
section present the most frequently depicted contexts in U.S. and German print media in which 
Arab and Muslim actors occur. There are a number of topics from the pre-9/11 time period that 
have become marginalized by the event, like for instance the discourse on the conflict in 
Macedonia or the formerly more frequently focused country Indonesia. Those discourses and 
countries and the actors that occurred in their context did not disappear completely from the 
respective media. But even though we can still find three German articles about the Macedonian 
conflict and three American articles referring to Indonesia, those countries have simply been 
pushed aside by the topics that have been mentioned throughout the last section. 
However, and despite the geographical shift, what can be noticed with respect to the images of 
those countries after 9/11 is also the changing perspective upon the Other’s features and 
characteristics. U.S. and German media turn their focus mainly on the political dimension. This is 
reflected (a), in the focus on democratic developments in diverse regions and countries like 
Indonesia, the Middle East, etc. that are discussed in a number of articles; (b), in a frequent 
integration of political quotes by U.S. politicians in the respective articles; and (c), in the frequent 
theoretical discussion about the American norm and value system and core ideas like democracy, 
freedom, and liberalism. In this context, only those countries with political or military relevance 
in the up-coming “war on terrorism” receive special focus, a relevance that Indonesia does not 
have for example because of its strategically less important geographical location. This irrelevance 
could also be assumed for the formerly important Macedonian conflict. 
Despite this political focus, especially U.S. articles after the attacks now increasingly discuss social 
and economic features of Arab and Muslim actors and countries. Here, especially the economic 
usefulness of certain countries and the advantage of political relations are frequently discussed – 
again mainly in the new geographical framework of an anti-terror coalition. This change will 
become even clearer in the chapters V and VI when we look at the way in which the identified 
Arab and Muslim countries and actors are constructed. 
 
                                                 
25 Similar to that but a couple of years before 9/11, according to Esposito (1992), the BOSTON GLOBE (a serious 
American national newspaper) has run a four-part series on Islam in 1991 with the title “The Sword of Islam” (see 
also Esposito 1992: 168). 
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3. Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media – A Cross Section through Society 
After having outlined the basic contexts in which Arab and Muslim actors appear, the next 
subchapter will take a look at the basic composition of this constructed Other and the complexity 
of the actors and actor groups that occur in the analyzed print media articles. In the comparison 
of German and U.S. print media and the actors that occur in both media contexts we could of 
course primarily compare whether or not the same actors appear in both countries. However, this 
comparative result would not be sufficient to answer the questions of how the construction of 
Arab and Muslim Other and Western Self are connected, and what overall image of the 
hypothetical Other can be found in both countries media reality. U.S. articles may focus on other 
actors and countries than German ones, and these differences in focus could be explained with 
aspects like geographical closeness of certain countries (as in the case of Germany and Turkey), 
or with a certain political, social, economic, or cultural relevance, like Saudi Arabia has for the 
United States. 
However, one finding of this analysis is that behind this ostensible focus on the appearing 
individual actors or countries we find similar if not nearly identical structures and patterns of 
perception and construction of Arab and Muslim actors as a group conceptualized as a non-
Western Other. In other words, U.S. and German print media might just have different persons 
or countries in mind when they think of an Oriental Other or of their commonly shared image of 
this Other. 
In the context of the various topics and discourses that have been outlined in the last two 
subchapters, the overall composition of Arab and Muslims actors that can be found in German 
as well as American newspaper articles can be summarized as rather complex, and the identified 
actors come from a large variety of different societal branches as well as from a large spectrum of 
different countries. Altogether, before the 9/11 attacks 257 Arab and Muslim actors have been 
identified in the analyzed articles of German print media compared to 232 actors in U.S. 
newspapers. After the attacks, the numbers increased slightly to now 269 actors in the German 
and more significantly to even 386 actors in the American data set. If we compare the occurring 
actors in both countries and before as well as after the event, we can also say that there are a 
number of actors that appear in both countries media and/or before as well as after the attacks, 
whereas other actors may only occur in one of the countries or only before or after the analyzed 
event. So, to give a total number of the variety of Arab and Muslim actors that are analyzed in the 
following, we can say that about nine hundred different actors have been identified and further 
analyzed in this study. 
Furthermore, and as has already been noted for the medial context in the last subchapter, we 
have to distinguish between an internal and an external focus of news coverage. Most of the 
identified Arab and Muslim actors occur in the context of the foreign news coverage, and are 
therefore of foreign origin. Especially before 9/11, Arab and Muslim actors within Germany and 
the United States (and other Western countries) are only marginally referred to in the analyzed 
newspapers. 
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Table IV.3: Numbers of External and Internal Actors in German and U.S. Print Media 
Before 9/11 After 9/11  
Germany USA Germany USA 
  External Actors 249 230 216 319 
  Internal Actors 8 2 53 67 
  Total Number of Actors 257 232 269 386 
 
Therefore, and as Table IV.3 illustrates, before the attacks more than 95.0 % of all occurring 
Arab and Muslim actors in both countries’ newspapers that are discussed here are external actors. 
Only two internal actors (about 0.9 %) have been identified in U.S. newspapers before the 
attacks, compared to eight actors (about 3.1 %) in the German print media sample. As already 
mentioned in IV.2, in German articles they appear only in the context of issues like immigration 
legislation, Islam lessons in public schools, the wearing of headscarves in public institutions, and 
criminal activity. In U.S. news media, Arab actors are only brought up once, in the context of the 
election campaign for the New York mayor. 
After the terrorist attacks, this ratio between internal and external actors changes significantly as 
the focus of both German and U.S. print media now also shifts towards actors and issues within 
the national borders. Due to this shift in attention, the numbers of identified internal actors rise 
noticeably (see Table IV.3): Now in both countries’ data sample nearly every fifth occurring actor 
(Germany: 19.7 %, USA: 17.4 %) is located within the national boundaries of Germany or the 
United States. This may especially be due to the fact that it became clear soon after the attacks 
that the terrorists were immigrants who had already lived in the countries for a certain time. 
Therefore, the West now also increasingly takes notice of its Arab and Muslim communities. 
Thus, the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other is shaped by an external focus and is thus 
dominated by external actors, even though after 9/11, the internal Other receives growing 
attention in the Western perception. In the following two sections the internal composition of 
these two groups of actors will be further differentiated and described in more detail. 
 
3.1. External Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media 
The large number of external Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed print media articles can be 
further differentiated according to two aspects – the actors’ geographical origin and the societal 
sphere that those actors can be assigned to. 
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Geographical Origin 
Geographically, the composition of external actors is similar to the overall geographical focus of 
the articles (see IV.2). To roughly summarize the geographical complexity, we can say that Arab 
and Muslim actors in the analyzed data set come from countries like Egypt, Morocco, Turkey, or 
Palestine, from former Russian republics like Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, or Tajikistan, from Iran, 
Iraq, Afghanistan, or Pakistan, from countries of the Gulf region and Arabian peninsula like 
Saudi Arabia, Dubai, Yemen or the United Arab Emirates, from Europe (Kosovo, Albania), or 
Sudan and Indonesia. 
In both countries’ print media before 9/11, the majority of actors are however of Palestinian 
origin.26 Besides that, in German articles most actors come from Turkey, Egypt, Pakistan, or 
Yemen, compared to a large number of Indonesian, Iranian, or Pakistani actors in U.S. articles. In 
connection with the topical shift that has already been outlined in IV.2, after 9/11 we can also 
identify a geographical shift in the national origin of the appearing actors. The number of 
Palestinian actors strongly declines. These actors are somewhat pushed aside by the large number 
of actors from Afghanistan and Pakistan, and in U.S. context also by the increased number of 
Saudi Arabian actors that now shape the image of the Other in the German or U.S. perception. 
In addition to that geographical variety, the occurring actors are also from different societal 
spheres, as not all actors are from the political sphere. The composition of external actors can be 
described on the basis of different societal contexts in which the respective actors appear, as is 
summarized in Table IV.3: 
Table IV.4: Composition of Occurring External Actors27 
Before 9/11 After 9/11  
Germany USA Germany USA 
  Government Actors/Nation States 15.7 20.4 20.8 21.9 
  Political Groups/Parties 12.4 12.2 8.8 6.9 
  Terrorist Groups 11.6 8.7 17.1 18.8 
  Private Actors/Populations 43.4 40.0 30.1 29.8 
  Military/Police 2.8 3.9 2.3 3.4 
  Religious Groups 5.2 3.0 11.1 10.0 
  Country Depictions 5.6 7.8 8.3 6.9 
  others 3.2 3.9 1.4 2.2 
  Total Number of External Actors 249 230 216 319 
 
                                                 
26 This quantitatively high visibility of Palestinian actors has also been noted for the U.S context by authors like 
Zaharna (1995) or for the German context by Hafez (2002). 
27 In %, given the proportion of all external actors that can be ascribed to the different actor groups in relation to all 
occurring external actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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According to this classification, it can be said that Arab and Muslim actors in German and 
American newspapers are members of political, religious, or terrorist groups, they can be 
members of governments or political parties, they can be members of the media, of the military, 
or of cultural institutions, or they come from the private sector. We also find descriptions of 
whole populations of Arab and Muslim countries as well as depictions of countries in general.  
On a quantitative level of occurrence, those different societal branches and the groups of actors 
that can be formed are focused to different extents. 
Table IV.5: Quantitative Occurrence of External Actor Groups28 
Before 9/11 After 9/11  
Germany USA Germany USA 
  Government Actors/Nation States 49.9 61.7 41.9 60.8 
  Political Groups/Parties 28.6 21.4 9.1 11.7 
  Terrorist Groups 28.2 19.0 48.9 57.7 
  Private Actors/Populations 51.4 46.8 27.2 27.8 
  Military/Police 8.3 10.1 3.8 5.9 
  Religious Groups 5.3 4.2 11.0 8.2 
  Country Depictions 12.1 20.8 12.9 18.4 
  others 7.3 8.3 2.8 2.1 
  Total Number of Analyzed Articles 206 168 319 376 
 
Government Actors and Nation States 
First and foremost, both countries’ print media concentrate on the portrayal of government 
actors, or construct nation states as actors. By using this label I refer not only to representative 
heads of states like prime ministers and presidents, kings or sheiks, but also to representatives of 
the legislative branch of a state – such as parliament members etc. In addition to that we often 
find references to whole nation states as acting units. Newspapers use descriptions such as 
“Afghanistan, which is harboring him [Osama bin Laden]”29, or a German article states, for 
instance, that “Iran has denied the USA any support for military operations against terrorism.”30 
These statements indicate an active role that is ascribed not to the governments of the respective 
countries but to the nation states themselves. 
As we can see in Table IV.4, before 9/11 government actors and nation states account for about 
20.4 % of all actors in U.S. articles and about 15.7 % in German articles, a proportion that 
changes only slightly after the event to a proportion of now about 21.9 % in American and 
                                                 
28 In %, given the proportion of articles in which external actors of the different groups occur in relation to all 
analyzed articles in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
29 USAT-01-09-13: 5Ac 
30 Own translation, original quote in German: “Iran hat jegliche Unterstuetzung der USA bei der militaerischen 
Bekaempfung des Terrorismus abgelehnt.” (SZ-01-09-27: 5) 
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20.8 % in German print media. Examples for government actors are numerous, the most 
frequently appearing one before 9/11 being the Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat who occurs in 
9.7 %31 of the analyzed German and 14.3 % of the American articles. Besides that, the Iraqi 
leader Saddam Hussein, the Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi, Pakistan’s president Pervez 
Musharraf, the Iranian parliament and President Mohammad Khatami, or the governments of 
Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and Brunei are described. 
German newspapers most frequently construct the government of Afghanistan, the Taliban 
regime, which occurs in 11.2 % of all analyzed articles before the attacks, compared to only 6.1 % 
in U.S. discourse. This can be mainly attributed to the Shelter Now affair that has already been 
mentioned in subchapter IV.2. In contrast to that, U.S. newspapers more frequently focus on the 
new Indonesian president Megawati, who appears in about 7.0 % of the analyzed articles 
(compared to only 1.9 % in Germany). 
After the attacks, the relevance of certain government actors changes, as now for instance the 
Taliban regime becomes the centrally focused government actor in both countries’ print media. 
The Taliban now appear in every fifth article of the U.S. as well as the German newspaper set. 
Even though the Palestinian leader Arafat is still focused on quite regularly, his quantitative 
occurrence has declined to 4.1 % of all German and 5.1 % of the U.S. articles that have been 
analyzed. Instead, and besides the Taliban regime, the focus now also shifts to those nation states 
and government actors that are either direct neighbors of Afghanistan or are regarded as decisive 
partners in the search for Osama bin Laden. As a result, for example, the Pakistani president 
Musharraf is given more attention in the articles that are published after the event. He now 
appears in 3.4 % of the German and 5.3 % of the U.S. articles. A second actor who attracts 
increasing attention after 9/11, and here especially in German print media, is the Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein, who becomes the second most frequently depicted government actor in the 
German articles, whereas U.S. print media now also frequently report on the Saudi Arabian 
rulers. 
In combination with these government actors before as well as after the attacks, we also find 
references to the respective nation states. Before the attacks this mainly includes state references 
of Iraq, Iran, Indonesia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Libya, or Uzbekistan, and after 9/11 also of 
states like Pakistan, Syria, Afghanistan, or Saudi Arabia. Altogether, the U.S. articles more often 
refer to nation states as acting units than the German newspapers. Nevertheless, the direct 
reference to government figures can be found far more often in both print media than this 
indirect reference. 
                                                 
31 For the quantitative significance of those actors that will serve as examples for the different actor groups in the 
following two subchapters, no detailed tables and figures will be given, since the overall illustration of the large 
amount of analyzed actors would have gone beyond the scope of this book and would have extended this chapter 
too much. Numbers will be given only for those actors who have appeared most frequently in the data sample. 
Whether this quantitative relevance is combined with a qualitative significance of the respective actors for the 
different articles in which they occur will be looked at more detail in chapter VI. 
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Thus altogether, government and nation state actors present one of the central and most 
significant actor groups in German and U.S. newspaper articles about the Arab and Muslim 
Other. This can also be supported by the fact that over the analyzed time period, they have the 
strongest quantitative significance before as well as after the event, as I have listed in Table IV.5. 
Government and nation state actors are focused on in about every second (49.9 %) analyzed 
German article before the attacks and even 61.7 % of all analyzed U.S. articles. This relevance 
does only decrease slightly with the attacks, and still 41.9 % of all German articles and 60.8 % of 
all American articles include government or nation state actors. 
 
Other Political Groups and Parties 
Besides government actors, we also find other political actors in both countries’ print media. On 
the one hand, we can subclassify actors that are members or representatives of the different 
political institutions and institutional levels of the respective countries, like for example political 
parties. On the other hand, some of the occurring actors and groups may work outside of the 
political system and may pursue their own political agenda and aims that can also work against 
the respective political system. Before as well as after the attacks, political groups and parties 
appear less often than government actors in both countries’ print media. Every eighth Arab and 
Muslim actor in the analyzed German and U.S. newspapers before 9/11 is a political actor 
(Germany: 12.4 %, USA: 12.2 %). After the attacks, these numbers decrease slightly to about 
8.8 % in Germany and 6.9 % in the U.S. 
Most political groups thereby appear only once in the print media before as well as after the 
attacks, i.e. in only one article, and normally are not identified by a proper name or a group name 
but remain anonymous. Two of the few exceptions before 9/11 are the UÇK32 and the militant 
Palestinian political organization Fatah, one of the largest organizations in the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO) that both appear also quite frequently. In the German 
newspapers, the UÇK is focused on in 9.7 % of all articles and in U.S. newspapers we find it in 
7.7 % of the articles. Fatah is referred to in 4.4 % of the German and in 2.4 % of the U.S. articles. 
Other examples that occur in the U.S. newspapers before 9/11 are unnamed groups and political 
actors in Iran, Uzbekistan, or Afghanistan, parties in Indonesia or the PLO in Palestine as well as 
the multinational Arab League,33 the Iraqi National Congress, or the Northern Alliance, an 
opponent of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Similarly, in German newspapers we also find 
portrayals of the Arab League, or articles that report on different Indonesian or Turkish political 
parties like the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK).  
Due to the shift in regional focus to Afghanistan and its neighboring countries after the attacks, 
the Afghan opposition Northern Alliance becomes the most frequently occurring political group 
                                                 
32 For more context information on the group see also IV.2. 
33 This organization of predominately Arab states is headquartered in Cairo, Egypt. The League’s charter states that 
the League shall coordinate economic affairs, including commercial relations, communications, cultural affairs, 
nationality, passports, and visas, social affairs, and health affairs. See: 
www.wissen.de/wde/generator/wissen/ressorts/geschichte/index,page=1050944.html, accessed March 4, 2007. 
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in both countries’ newspapers. Reference to this group can be found in nearly 6.0 % of the U.S. 
and 2.5 % of the German articles after 9/11. Compared to that, the majority of the other 
depicted political actors only appear once or twice. Those “one-time” political actors stem mainly 
from Indonesia, Afghanistan, Palestine, and Saudi Arabia, but also the UÇK appears again in the 
context of the conflict in Macedonia after 9/11. In German newspapers we find portrayals of 
political parties from Jordan, Pakistan, and first and foremost from Turkey, which indicates again 
that the Turkish political system in general seems to be of special interest for the German view 
on Turkey.  
Similar to the government actors, political groups are also quantitatively significant as those 
actors occur continuously and frequently over the analyzed time period. Before 9/11, we find 
references to political groups or parties and their members in nearly every fifth U.S. article 
(21.4 %) and in more than every fourth German article (28.6 %). After the attacks these political 
actors are replaced to a large extent by a stronger focus on terrorist and religious fundamentalist 
groups: Their overall occurrence drops slightly and now only every tenth German article (9.1 %) 
and every eighth U.S. article (11.7 %) includes political actors or parties. 
We can summarize, therefore, that compared to the group of government and nation state actors, 
political parties and groups outside of the political system are quantitatively slightly less 
significant. Even though they are the third most frequently occurring actor group before the 
attacks, this is due to the large amount and variety of different political actors that occur only 
once or twice however. In contrast, the introduced group of government and nation state actors 
can be characterized as a less diversified and more constant group of continuously recurring 
actors that serve as identification figures for the discussed regional, political, or other topics and 
issues. 
 
Terrorist Groups 
Besides the political sector, a field that is frequently focused on as well is that of criminal, and 
here more explicitly of terrorist, activity. As has been outlined in the last subchapter, terrorism in 
general and Islamic terrorism in particular has strongly moved into the center of attention after 
9/11, and with it also the actors who are involved. Under the category of terrorist groups all 
those actors and groups have been summarized that are referred to by the analyzed media 
explicitly as terrorist organizations or actors, besides the fact that political motifs and orientations 
are also ascribed to most of the actors in this category. What distinguishes these actors from 
other political groups is that even though these groups might be perceived as politically or 
religiously motivated, the newspaper articles also highlight a terrorist facet. This classification is, 
nevertheless, difficult to maintain over the entire timeframe of the analysis in a number of cases, 
since some of those groups that were simply described as political or religious before the attacks, 
are predominantly constructed as terrorist groups after the event. This means that they have also 
changed their position in the overall classification, since they now would have to be regarded as 
terrorist groups. For the analysis, these cases were still classified as political or religious groups 
IV. Occurring Arabs and Muslims and Their Medial Context 
 - 115 -
after 9/11 even though the main focus of the news coverage might now have shifted to terrorist 
features. 
Before the event, 11.6 % of all Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers are terrorist 
actors. In the American newspapers this proportion stands at 8.7 %. Despite this slightly smaller 
number of occurring terrorist actors, compared to government and other political actors, 
representatives of terror groups or individual terrorist figures are quantitatively significant insofar 
as they appear in every fifth article in the U.S. (19.0 %) and in every fourth article in the German 
print media set (28.2 %). The most frequently occurring terrorist groups can be found in the 
context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict: The Palestinian organization Hamas is, for instance, 
regarded as a terrorist group and occurs most often in the U.S. articles, namely in 8.3 % of all 
articles, but can also be found in every sixth article in the German newspaper set. Hamas is 
accompanied by other groups like Islamic Jihad, Hisbollah, and a number of unnamed actors in 
the ongoing conflict between the two countries. In addition to that, we already find articles in 
both countries that focus on Osama bin Laden. Furthermore, some German newspaper articles 
also refer to the Philippine separatist group Abu Sayyaf as a terrorist group. Apart from the 
mentioned examples, the majority of occurring terrorist actors in both print media sets only 
appears in one or two articles, and usually remain unnamed and anonymous. 
With the 9/11 attacks, terrorist actors from the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict become 
less focused in both countries, and are replaced especially by the central figure that is assumed to 
be behind the attacks, Osama bin Laden. His relevance increases markedly, as he can now be 
found on average in every third article in both countries’ print media sets. His assumed terror 
network – al Qaeda – receives similar but less dominating attention. The group is the second 
most frequently occurring terrorist group after 9/11, that is referred to in 9.4 % of all analyzed 
articles in German newspapers and in even 16.8 % of the U.S. articles. 
Nevertheless, also the formerly central terrorist groups of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict still 
frequently appear. Hamas occurs in 6.0 % of the German and 3.7 % of the U.S. articles, 
accompanied by Islamic Jihad, Abu Sayyaf, and a large variety of other terrorist groups. We can 
clearly note that in the aftermath of the attacks in New York and Washington the media focus 
has shifted towards Arab and Muslim terrorist actors in both countries. These groups are not 
only of Palestinian or Afghan origin, but are also located in a number of other countries like 
Egypt, the Philippines, Iraq, Yemen, or Lebanon, and also appear in articles with a European 
focus. 
Altogether, with the attacks the focus on terrorist actors increases tremendously. The number of 
terrorist actors nearly doubles to a proportion of 17.1 % in the German and 18.8 % in the 
American newspapers, as measured by the total number of occurring actors. But more than that, 
those actors now also appear in about every second German article (48.9 %) and even in 57.7 % 
of all analyzed U.S. articles after the event. This increasing significance makes the group of 
terrorist actors the quantitatively most relevant actor group in the articles after the attacks, and 
terrorist actors now even outnumber the government and nation state actors. 
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Private Actors and Populations 
A forth category of actors can be formed of private actors and constructions of populations. If 
we take a look at the societal level of the private sphere, we first and foremost have to say that 
private actors may in most cases not strictly be necessary for the basic information of the 
political, economic, or other topics or issues that are communicated in the analyzed articles. 
Nevertheless, and as the analysis has revealed, actors from the private sector play an important 
role in the everyday news coverage on Arabs and Muslims. Before 9/11, this classified group 
offers the largest amount in the overall set of identified Arab and Muslim actors in both 
countries’ print media. 43.3 % of all occurring actors in German articles and 40.0 % of Arab and 
Muslim actors in U.S. articles come from the private sphere. This variety decreases slightly in the 
aftermath of the attacks, but still every third Arab and Muslim actor comes from the private 
sphere (Germany: 30.1 %, USA: 29.8 %). Therefore, it can be summarized that private actors 
form the largest actor group in both countries’ analyzed media around the 9/11 attacks. 
Representatives from the private sector are, for example, private people that are interviewed on 
the streets to give their opinion or statement about certain topics or issues. Sometimes these 
actors are chosen as examples in the context of certain topics or issues to describe a certain 
lifestyle, or to illustrate certain social or economic problems. In some articles we also find more 
general descriptions of national facets, when for example the features and views of the Afghan or 
Turkish population as a whole are portrayed. Regarding their geographical background, private 
actors before the attacks come predominantly from Palestine, but also from Egypt, Iran, and 
Turkey. In German articles we also find a number of private actors with Afghan origin or from 
Yemen, whereas some U.S. articles look at private actors in Pakistan. On the more abstract level 
of populations, we find a similar focus: in both countries, references to the Palestinian population 
are most frequent, in Germany in 13.1 % and in the U.S. in 6.0 % of all analyzed articles. This 
focus, again, is largely due to the strong focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in both countries’ 
newspapers. Besides that, we find portrayals of the populations of Afghanistan and Iraq in 
Germany and of Iranians, Indonesians, or Macedonian Albanians in the U.S. newspapers. 
In articles after 9/11, private actors from Palestine are still numerous but are now increasingly 
replaced by actors from Afghanistan and Pakistan due to the shifting topical and geographical 
focus in the aftermath of the attacks. This shifting focus can also be observed with reference to 
Arab and Muslim populations: Now, the Afghan population occurs most frequently in both 
countries as we find references to it in 6.9 % of the German and 7.2 % of the U.S. articles. Apart 
from that, we also find an increased focus on the Pakistani population and on Arab and Muslim 
populations as one unified actor group. 
With regard to the overall quantitative relevance of private actors we can say that before the 
event they form the second most frequently appearing category in U.S. print media after the 
group of government and nation state actors, and the most frequently occurring actor group in 
the German data sample. In German as well as in U.S. newspapers, external private actors occur 
in nearly every second article (Germany: 51.4 %, USA: 46.8 %). After the attacks, their 
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occurrence drops significantly, but private actors still form the third most frequently occurring 
group in both countries’ print media. 27.8 % of all American and 27.2 % of all German articles 
include Arab and Muslim private actors. 
Even though the majority of private actors appear only in one or two articles at most and 
therefore only have an insignificant relevance in the overall timeframe, as a group they are 
significant. Very often a representative of the private sector of society in the newspaper articles 
gives more insight into the “informal” sectors and the everyday social reality of the respective 
countries, to create an image of the overall societies in whose context certain political or 
economic topics and issues are discussed. The same can be observed for populations of Arab and 
Muslim countries. Even though, for example, the population of Afghanistan is mentioned in 
more than one article, in most contexts this collective actor does not form the central issue of the 
respective articles. Instead they serve as a “supporting” actor who reflects the public opinions 
and societal conditions, for example for the discussion of the politics of the ruling Taliban regime 
and the consequences of those politics for the Afghan people or the country’s infrastructure. 
What other functions the portrayal of Palestinian (and other) private actors may have in the 
different articles will be examined more closely in chapter VI. 
 
Members of the Military and Police 
Another group of actors that can be classified are members of the executive branch of society, 
such as military or police forces. The variety of these actors is quite small compared to the other 
groups that have been introduced so far. Members of the military or the police make up only 
2.8 % of all occurring actors in German newspapers and only 3.9 % of actors in U.S. print media 
before the attacks, numbers that remain nearly stable in the timeframe after the event (Germany: 
2.3 %, USA: 3.4 %). The most frequent focus before the attacks is on military and police 
members in Palestine – again due to the central role of the Israeli-Palestinian focus before 9/11. 
Apart from that, in U.S. newspapers we also find military actors from Indonesia and Iran, 
whereas German articles report on military forces of Turkey more frequently. After the attacks, 
military actors in Pakistan are depicted more frequently and thereby displace the attention that 
was formerly paid to Palestinian military and police actors. 
Altogether, German and U.S. print media before the attacks quite regularly include military 
actors, as we find them in every twelfth German article (8.3 %) and in every tenth U.S. article 
(10.1 %). After 9/11 this category loses some of its relevance however and it now only appears in 
3.8 % of all German and 5.9 % of all American articles. Thus, we can sum up that the focus on 
military and police actors is not as complex and recurrent as that of the other groups that have 
been introduced. 
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Religious Groups 
The last relevant actor category that can be classified summarizes religious figures and groups. In 
contrast to political groups, these actors are defined mainly according to their religious features, 
actions, or aims that are focused on in the newspaper articles to describe the respective actors. 
Before the attacks, neither print media set included a large number of religious actors. In German 
newspapers only 5.2 % of all occurring actors can be classified as religious actors, and in U.S. 
articles the number of religious groups accounts for only 3.0 %. However, with the 9/11 attacks 
the focus on religious actors increases tremendously, which may be explained by the fact that the 
9/11 suspects were assumed to be religiously motivated, an assumption that is clearly also 
reflected in the media debates about religious (and here especially Islamic) fundamentalism in 
general. This increased significance is also reflected in the risen number of religious actors in both 
countries: we now find 11.1 % religious actors in German articles and 10.0 % in U.S. print media, 
which makes the group the fourth largest actor category in both countries’ analyzed newspapers. 
A number of these religious actors remain anonymous and unnamed. Before 9/11, these more or 
less nameless or rarely identified actors come mainly from countries like Iran or Palestine, and in 
German news media also from Egypt or Yemen. One exception in the articles of both discourses 
is the Iranian Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who occurs in four German and three American articles. 
After the 9/11 attacks, and with the increased focus on Islam, we now find a number of 
reference to “Islamic fundamentalists” as an unspecific group in German as well as American 
articles. Geographically, these “fundamentalists” are located mainly in countries like Pakistan or 
Afghanistan. In German newspapers, they appear in about 4.0 % of all analyzed articles, and in 
the U.S. context they occur in 1.6 % of the articles. Besides these “fundamentalists” the majority 
of the other religious actors are also located in Pakistan. Less often, religious groups come from 
countries like Egypt, Indonesia or Saudi Arabia. 
As was the case for most political and terrorist actors, the majority of religious actors only appear 
in one or two articles at most in the data set. On the basis of individual actors we can therefore 
say that most religious actors have a relatively small relevance for the analyzed timeframe around 
the attacks. Altogether, the quantitative relevance of religious actors is less distinctive before 9/11 
than that of most of the other mentioned groups but increases significantly in the aftermath of 
the event. They are only focused on in 5.3 % of all German articles and in only 4.2 % of the U.S. 
print media sample. However, they nearly double their relevance after the attacks, where they can 
now be found in 8.2 % of all U.S. articles and 11.0 % of the German articles. This increasing 
interest in religious actors is closely connected to the fact that the attacks in New York and 
Washington were assumed to be religiously motivated. This assumption, which was also 
communicated in the media discourses about the event, may have supported this higher interest 
for and the increased awareness of religious actors in the context of Arab and Muslim countries. 
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Country Depictions 
A last category that was formed in the course of the media analysis summarizes the depictions of 
country features that can be found in both German and U.S. print media before as well as after 
the attacks. Here, all those references are included that do not refer to specific actors but give 
descriptions of certain country characteristics and peculiarities in connection with the discussed 
topics, discourses, or issues. Besides the constructions of Arab and Muslim actors these country 
references also support and shape the overall image of the Oriental Other insofar as they form a 
background foil of the setting in which the different actors occur. In most cases, the respective 
countries carry the same features as the actors that can be found in those countries. Before the 
attacks, we find references to country features in every eighth German (12.1 %) and about every 
fifth American article (20.8 %). After the event, those numbers change only slightly as we find 
ascriptions of country features in 12.9 % of the German articles and in now 18.4 % of the 
analyzed U.S. articles. 
In view of the geographical focus of these country references we can say that the focus mainly 
corresponds with the geographical focus of the articles (see IV.2.1): In U.S. as well as in German 
articles before the attacks, we mainly find country images of Afghanistan, in the U.S. in 3.6 % and 
in Germany in 1.9 % of the articles. U.S. articles contain more country descriptions of Indonesia 
(6.0 %) and Iran (2.4 %), whereas in German articles, we find more country features of Turkey 
(1.5 %). Even though the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the central topic before 9/11, country 
features of the Palestinian territories are quite rare in both sets of analyzed print media articles. 
This may be due to the fact that with Palestine, the focus lies primarily with Palestinian actors, 
and articles concentrate more on those. We could assume here that country descriptions of the 
Palestinian territories can hardly be found because those territories are not perceived primarily as 
a nation state that carries certain commonly shared country features. What is ascribed however is 
a commonly shared identity of the Palestinian people, since we find references to and 
constructions of the Palestinian population as a unit in both countries’ print media. 
After 9/11, German and U.S. newspapers also reflect the shifting focus of the news coverage in 
terms of the country portrayals as they now include an increasing number of passages that 
mention country characteristics of Afghanistan (Germany: 5.6 %, USA: 8.0 %), of Saudi Arabia 
(Germany: 1.6 %, USA: 1.6 %), or of countries like Syria, Iraq, Egypt, or Iran. In the U.S. data 
sample, we also find a number of articles which include country characteristics of Pakistan, the 
country that is regarded as a new central partner of the West in the new anti-terror campaign (see 
IV.2.2). 
We may conclude this section by saying that occurring external actors can be mainly classified 
according to the actor groups that have been introduced so far. I have also identified a few actors 
that do not fit into one of these formed categories – which is the case for example for a few 
cultural artists, sportsmen or a few members of the media systems of the portrayed countries – 
but the majority of the external Arab and Muslim actors can be formally structured and classified 
according to the introduced categories. To a large extent, the nationality of the occurring actors 
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thereby corresponds with the geographical foci of the articles and the societal context of the 
discussed topics and issues that have been outlined in chapter IV.2. However, so far I have only 
talked about external actors that appear in the context of articles which focus on foreign news. 
Internal Arab and Muslim Others, i.e. those actors within Germany or the United States who 
become increasingly focused on after the attacks with the rising national and Western focus in the 
analyzed newspapers can also be classified according to the introduced formula. Therefore, in the 
following section the composition of Arab and Muslim actors that are referred to within the 
German or American national context will be outlined in more detail. 
 
3.2. Internal Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Print Media 
Compared to the overall classification of external Arab and Muslim actors, we find a slightly 
different focus with regard to the internal actors that have been identified in the German and 
U.S. print media around the 9/11 attacks. 
Table IV.6: Composition of Occurring Internal Actors34 
Before 9/11 After 9/11  
Germany USA Germany USA 
  Political Groups/Parties 12.5  1.9 3.0 
  Terrorist Groups  50.0 35.8 41.8 
  Private Actors/Populations 75.0  41.5 37.3 
  Military/Police 12.5 50.0  6.0 
  Religious Groups   18.9 11.9 
  others   1.9  
  Total Number of Internal Actors 8 2 53 67 
 
As can be seen in Table IV.6, and as has already been mentioned, before the attacks we find only 
a few internal Arab and Muslim actors in both countries’ newspaper articles. What distinguishes 
both countries is that in the analyzed American articles the two identified internal actors are (a), a 
terrorist actor and (b), an Iranian spy (who has been mentioned earlier), whereas six of the eight 
internal actors in German articles are from the private sector. However, in both media sets, these 
actors are quantitatively only minor significant since each of them only occurs in one article 
except from the private actors in the German context who occur in 5 articles which accounts for 
2.4 % of all analyzed German articles. 
                                                 
34 In %, given the proportion of all internal actors that can be ascribed to the different actor groups in relation to all 
occurring internal actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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Table IV.7: Quantitative Occurrence of Internal Actor Groups35 
Before 9/11 After 9/11  
Germany USA Germany USA 
  Political Groups/Parties 0.5  0.3 0.8 
  Terrorist Groups  0.6 26.3 10.4 
  Private Actors/Populations 2.4  3.1 4.8 
  Military/Police 0.5 0.6  0.5 
  Religious Groups   5.3 2.4 
  others   0.6  
  Total Number of Analyzed Articles 206 168 319 376 
 
As already noted, after the attacks the focus on Arab and Muslim actors within Germany and the 
United States increases tremendously in the newspaper articles. In the German articles most of 
these actors – 41.5 % – come from the private sector. In second place, 35.8 % of all internal Arab 
and Muslim actors in the German news coverage are terrorists, followed by about 18.9 % actors 
of religious groups. Compared to that distribution, in U.S. articles the internal terrorist actors 
dominate the news coverage on internal Arab and Muslim actors. 41.8 % of all internal actors in 
the American articles are terrorists. The second largest group of internal actors in U.S. articles 
with about 37.3 % comes from the private sector followed by a proportion of 11.9 % for 
religious actors. Regarding the quantitative occurrence of those internal actors, in both countries’ 
media terrorist actors occur most frequently now, in Germany even in every fourth article 
(26.3 %) and in the U.S. still in every tenth text (10.4 %). Compared to that, the large number of 
private actors appears less often, in Germany they can be found in only 3.1 % and in the U.S. in 
only 4.8 % of the analyzed articles. More often even, we find description of religious actors in the 
German context (5.3 %, compared to 2.4 % of the analyzed U.S. articles). 
The large focus on internal terrorist actors but also on an increasing number of internal religious 
actors is largely due to the fact that the 9/11 terrorists and their accomplices are also discussed 
within the national context, i.e. as internal actors, since they were actually living within the 
national borders for a longer period of time before they carried out the terrorist acts. This factual 
“threat from within” that is exemplified with those actors is also explicitly communicated in the 
different articles that deal with the event and the respective actors. Furthermore, it already 
indicates what will be outlined in more detail in the next two chapters: that this infiltration of 
hostile terrorists has severely shaken the feeling of national security. And finally, some of the 
terrorists declared religious motifs as one basis for their attacks against the West. 
German articles also strongly reflect upon this internal threat, which may be heightened by the 
fact that some of the 9/11 culprits stayed in Germany and planned the attacks there, even though 
                                                 
35 In %, given the proportion of articles in which internal actors of the different groups occur in relation to all 
analyzed articles in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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they were eventually carried out in another country. Therefore, a strong focus on potential or 
actual internal terrorist actors can also be traced in the German newspaper articles. 
But in addition to that focus on the internal terrorist Other, U.S. and German articles focus on 
Arab and Muslim actors from the private sector, and discuss these actors and their societal status 
as immigrants in German and U.S. society. Especially in the German context, the view on these 
internal private actors is shaped by the overall question of how integrated and ideologically 
assimilated these people are in German society, and what positions they take up with regard to 
the central values and principles of this society and with regard to issues like religious 
fundamentalism and terrorist hostility against the West. A more detailed examination of the 
actual images of those internal actors in both countries’ newspapers and the perspective of the 
German and U.S. Self that shapes those images will be carried out in more detail in the next two 
chapters. 
 
4. Conclusion: The Medial Settings for Arabs and Muslims, Their Composition and Their 
Quantitative Relevance 
With regard to the media settings for Arabs and Muslims we can thus sum up that in both 
Germany and the United States the focus is characterized by a large variety of topics and 
countries of references. Apart from minor differences, e.g. a stronger German focus on political 
and societal issues of the potential EU candidate Turkey, or a stronger U.S. focus on the political 
developments in Indonesia as well as in Pakistan, in both countries, the complexity of topics and 
countries of references is already broad before the attacks and is nearly congruent. After 9/11, 
especially the German external focus is broadened to countries like Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Syria, 
or Egypt which are now also frequently focused on in U.S. print media. Both countries now 
especially focus on the political and military positions of those countries with regard to terrorism 
and the anti-terror coalition. Apart from this increased focus on terrorism, the turn towards an 
internal Other, i.e. towards actors within national or Western borders indicates another major 
change in both countries after the 9/11 attacks. Apart from the question of how modern, secular 
Western societies can prevent terrorism in general and Islamic terrorism in particular within their 
own geographical boundaries, the national focus also lies on the 9/11 investigations in Germany 
and the United States, as well as on the search for masterminds and supporters of the attacks. 
Internal actors are often discussed in the context of future national security measures in both 
countries as well as the potential threat that emanates from the Arab and Muslim actors within 
Germany or the U.S. 
One difference between German and U.S. print media after 9/11 is the strong German focus on 
religious topics that cannot be observed in the analyzed U.S. newspapers.36 German articles 
frequently highlight the potential threat of Islamic fundamentalism. This focus indicates a higher 
significance of religious facets and affiliations in the perception of the Arab and Muslim Other 
                                                 
36 For example, attempts to explain the content and history of Islam. 
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and consequently also in the concept of the German self-image, an aspect that will become more 
apparent in the textual construction of Arab and Muslim actors and countries that will be 
discussed in the following chapters V and V.I. Compared to that, U.S. articles put more emphasis 
on the positioning of Arab countries in the anti-terror coalition. In addition, U.S. print media 
more frequently deal with the consequences of terrorism for civil liberties and democratic values 
in general and for the U.S. society in particular. 
Regarding the composition of the appearing actors, it was outlined first of all that the perspective 
on the Arabs and Muslims before as well as after 9/11 is predominantly characterized by an 
outward focus on a geographically distant Other. Second, the composition of those external 
Arabs and Muslims can be best summarized on the basis of different societal branches in which 
the respective actors appear. According to the introduced classification system, the portrayed 
Arab and Muslim actors are governmental/nation state actors or members and representatives of 
other political groups or parties. Other actors were classified as members of the military, the 
police, or other security forces, or they are (members of) religious or terrorist groups. Last but 
not least, actors can come from the private sector. Here I have further distinguished between the 
images of individual private actors or small private groups and the more general construction of 
whole populations. Apart from those concrete actor portrayals the analysis has also revealed a 
number of contexts in which Arab and Muslim countries carry certain characteristics and 
features. 
With regard to the amount and quantitative relevance of those different categories of actors I 
have noted that government and nation state actors account for one of the central and most 
significant actor groups in both German and U.S. print media. Throughout the analyzed time 
period, they have the strongest quantitative significance in U.S. print media, which basically 
means that they appear most often in the analyzed articles. In German print media, they form the 
second most frequently occurring actor group around 9/11. Political parties and other political 
groups outside of the political system are quantitatively slightly less significant since they mostly 
only appear once or twice, whereas certain government figures, e.g. Saddam Hussein or Yassir 
Arafat, appear regularly in the print news of both countries. Instead, we find a large diversity of 
different political groups occurring in both countries’ print media before and after 9/11. 
Actors from the private sector form the most (Germany) or second most (USA) frequently 
occurring actor category in the analyzed articles before the attacks and rank third with regard to 
the quantitative significance after 9/11. Furthermore, this classified group also offers the largest 
amount of different actors in both countries’ print media. 
Two actor categories that are especially pushed to the fore by the attacks are the groups of 
terrorist actors and of religious actors. Terrorists become the quantitatively most (Germany) or 
second most (USA) relevant actor group after the attacks. Similar to that, religious actors 
increasingly appear in news articles in the aftermath of the event. I have argued here, that this is 
mainly due to the fact that the attacks in New York and Washington were assumed to be 
religiously motivated which led to an increased interest in, and Western awareness of, not only 
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terrorist but also religious actors in the context of Arab and Muslim countries. Like with the 
political actors, it was noted that the majority of those actors have a relatively small quantitative 
relevance for the analyzed timeframe around the attacks, since the majority of them only occur in 
one or two articles at most in the data set. 
The overall composition of appearing external Arabs and Muslims in the analyzed German and 
U.S. print media is therefore shaped by a variety of actor groups and integrates different branches 
of Arab and Muslim societies. In addition to that, with the attacks Arab and Muslim actors in the 
national contexts, i.e. within the West, become increasingly focused on. This was explained 
mainly by the fact that the event is seen as an infiltration of (Arab and Muslim) terrorists into the 
Western space. The fact that the 9/11 terrorists came were Muslim Arabs (from Saudi Arabia or 
Egypt) who had furthermore been living in Germany and the U.S. for quite a while before they 
carried out the attacks, leads to a general critical observation of internal Arabs and Muslims in 
both countries. Most of the identified internal actors are either from the private sector or are 
ascribed to terrorist groups that form a potential threat and therefore have to be identified and 
distanced from the Self – for example in the media. 
The introduced formal classification of the appearing Arab and Muslim actors offers a first 
overview over what actors are primarily focused on and what is meant when we talk about the 
Arab and Muslim Other in the context of German and U.S. print media. With regard to one of 
the theoretical assumptions that has been outlined before – namely that collective identities are 
basically constructed via the demarcation of an outgroup – we can thus already note that one 
major aspect of differentiation between Arabs and Muslims and the West is based on 
geographical distance, since the majority of depicted actors comes from abroad. This is also the 
case after the 9/11 attacks, and despite the fact that after the event the focus of attention shifted 
strongly towards the national context of both Germany and the U.S. 
However, geographical distance is not the only criterion that forms the dividing line between the 
German, the American, or even a Western concept of belonging and Arabs and Muslims as 
representatives of the Other. Instead, actors are also regarded as different or distant from the Self 
on other dimensions; this is reflected, for instance, in they way in which they are portrayed with 
regard to the features or characteristics they receive and the way they act. Therefore, the next two 
chapters will step into the content of the newspaper articles to analyze the way in which actors 
are constructed with regard to their features, characteristics, and actions, and to outline how 
Arabs and Muslims are observed from the Western point of view. 
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V. THE MAIN DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE WEST AND ARABS AND MUSLIMS 
To learn not only whom German and U.S. print media look at in the Arab and Muslim world but 
also what image is formed of those who are observed in both countries’ print media, the next 
chapter will outline the major facets and dimensions of the images that are constructed of Arab 
and Muslim actors in the analyzed German and U.S. newspaper articles. In the following pages, I 
will summarize the central line of demarcation that is drawn between a German or American self-
concept and the concept of what characterizes Arab and Muslim actors in the different medial 
settings and contexts in which they are referred to. This overall image of the Other is largely 
derived from the quantitative screening of features that are used in the articles to describe the 
actors and their behavior, actions, or standpoints on certain issues, topics, or towards other 
actors. 
This overview may help us to understand the major dimensions that are focused on when Arab 
and Muslim actors are covered, and also enables us to identify the central Western principles that 
are negotiated when Arab and Muslim countries and actors are observed. At the same time, we 
can also derive the subliminal national or Western self-perceptions and evaluations that are 
reflected in the constructed image of the Other and that sometimes are also explicitly 
communicated in the analyzed articles. It will be shown how the portrayed external as well as 
internal actors differ from the Western Self according to the Western (media) perspective and 
why it also becomes relevant from the German and American perspective to deal more 
intensively with Arab and Muslim actors within the Western space after the 9/11 attacks. The 
most relevant features and characteristics of the discussed images will be illustrated with quotes 
from the analyzed newspapers articles. 
Let us, first of all, return to the theoretical assumptions that have been introduced in chapter II.3. 
If we – in a first and broad step – want to summarize the different features and images that can 
be found in the newspaper articles we have to note that the overall picture is rather complex. A 
first step to approach this complexity is by consulting the theoretical thoughts about the Self-
Other-dichotomy: As has been theoretically discussed before, the image of an outgroup is closely 
connected to the way in which a certain ingroup defines itself in relation to that outgroup. In this 
context, the demarcated outgroup may also serve as a portfolio or constructed counterpart that 
represents everything that the Self rejects, does not want or is not allowed to be. According to 
Wagener (1999), this counter-construction is often defined as a hostile stereotype (“Feindbild”) 
and presents an antithesis, i.e. an exclusively negative counter-version of an exclusively positive 
self-image (Wagener 1999: 35). 
If we adopt this form of relational thinking, we could expect that the Other and the Self mainly 
have to possess features that oppose each other. Otherwise, a clear distinction between both 
concepts might be rather difficult since the boundaries between them might blur or become 
permeable. This would mean that the features that are ascribed to Arab and Muslim actors should 
be largely negative. By collecting the most frequent features that are used to construct Arab and 
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Muslim actors we are able to test this assumption. We will see in the following, that actors not 
exclusively receive a negative image. 
But let us start with the most central distinction: As has already been introduced in the last 
chapter, Arab and Muslim actors first and foremost carry a geographical reference. We learn 
where the occurring actors live or what countries of origin they have. The geographical reference 
and classification is in most cases done either via an explicit mentioning of the nationality or via 
an implicit reference that can be derived from the country reference of the article in which the 
actor appears. However, this aspect is only a formal category that is used to geographically locate 
and group the respective actors. In both countries’ newspapers, the images of Arab and Muslim 
actors are far more complex than that. Before as well as after the 9/11 attacks, they not only 
consist of a number of different geographical references and topics, but also of a variety of other 
features that describe the occurring actors. 
The images of Arab and Muslim actors in both countries’ print media can be further described 
according to five dimensions: a political, a cultural, a social and economic, and a personal 
dimension (that includes aspects of gender,1 appearance, or character traits), and the ascription of 
delinquency (when actors are described, for instance, as criminal, violent, or as terrorists). The 
analysis has also revealed a number of explicit references towards German, U.S., or Western 
identity conceptions, which can be classified according to those five dimensions as well. 
Especially after the 9/11 attacks we find a permanent reflection upon the Self when Arab and 
Muslim actors are located and discussed with regard to dominating topics like terrorism, national 
security, and religious reasons for the conflict between “Occident” and “Orient.” Thus, we can 
say that difference between the concepts of self and otherness can mainly be summarized on the 
basis of those five central dimensions. 
Therefore, in the following subchapters these five dimensions for the construction of Arab and 
Muslim actors will be outlined in more detail to illustrate the major distinction lines between Self 
and Other. At the same time, a listing of the most frequently ascribed characteristics and features 
that can be found in the images of the different actors also aims at illustrating the spectrum of 
different facets that shape the image of Arabs and Muslims in present day print media. Last but 
not least, the integration of explicit references towards the self-concept in German and U.S. 
articles will demonstrate the interplay and interdependence between the portrayal of Arab and 
Muslim actors and the self-concept and self-perspective from which those images emanate. The 
adjectives or nouns that are used in the following to describe the features that are most relevant 
for the different dimensions of the images of Arab and Muslim actors have to be understood as 
abstract codes that have been derived from the qualitative content analysis. They  
summarize those terms and linguistic variances which are used in the different articles and  
 
                                                 
1 Regarding the identification of the gender of the respective actors, this aspect is only made explicit when female 
actors are depicted. In general, we can say that the Arab and Muslim Other is not exclusively but predominantly 
male. 
V. The Main Differences between the West and Arabs and Muslims 
 - 127 - 
describe the same aspect. As noted before, to indicate that those terms present an abstracted level 
of the actual media depiction, the abstractly used adjectives and nouns will be written in italics. 
 
1. The Political Dimension 
The first dimension in which actors are described is the political one. With an overall variety of 
about forty different characteristics it is a decisive dimension before as well as after the attacks. 
Political features and attitudes are not only used for the characterization of political or 
government actors but can be found with the images of all sorts of actors. 
Before the 9/11 attacks, actors are for instance frequently described as politically hostile – towards 
Western countries but especially towards Israel – as politically radical or militant, conservative, 
undemocratic, or repressive. Other actors are described as undiplomatic, politically isolated, unstable, or 
powerless. However, those rather negative facets are not the exclusive way of characterizing actors 
politically. Some actors are also referred to as diplomatic and politically committed, moderate, or reform-
oriented. In both German and U.S. newspapers before 9/11, two basic structures of distinction can 
be identified, according to which the listed features can be grouped. On the one hand actors are 
classified on the basis of their political actions which take place in or are directed towards their 
own country. Here the scale on which the actors’ behavior and characteristics are measured runs 
between the poles of democratic versus undemocratic actions or features, and actions are directed 
against or affect mainly other Arab and Muslim actors (i.e. the Other). In this context, both 
countries’ newspapers also critically observe the adherence to or violation of human rights on the 
part of the Other, for example when the new Indonesian government is assessed and the 
American NY TIMES argues that… 
President Megawati must also move forward with prosecutions for human rights violations 
in East Timor, Papua and Aceh. Nothing she has said or done indicates she has the remotest 
interest in doing so; indeed, she has publicly defended the East Timorese militia thug Eurico 
Gutteres. (NYT-01-07-27: 19) 
…or when DER SPIEGEL, in the context of the trial against the German Shelter Now workers in 
Afghanistan, critically remarks that… 
Einwände der westlichen Vertreter, die mit internationalem Recht argumentierten und von 
“Isolationshaft, einer Art Folter” (Landes) sprachen, wischten die Taliban beiseite. In 
Afghanistan, so wurde den Diplomaten bedeutet, gebe es keine Menschenrechte, wie sie der 
Westen propagiere, also könne man auch nicht gegen sie verstossen. Nur die Gebote der 
Scharia zählten – und ein Scharia-Gericht werde womöglich über die Ausländer befinden. 
(Sp-01-i34: 124-126) 
On the other hand, actors can be classified on the basis of the distinction of being either hostile or 
peaceful with regard to their actions towards the West. Here the relevance of the features derives 
from their effects for the Self, since actions are directed – or are perceived to be directed – 
against the same. 
The first scale of evaluation can be identified more often in the images of actors than the second 
one before the 9/11 attacks. The classification of (non)democratic actions and developments of 
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Arab and Muslim actors reflects certain expectations on behalf of the Self with regard to the 
political criteria that are taken as a standard for the political measurement of the Other. One 
quote from the NY TIMES that appears in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reflects 
some of the abstract principles that play a role here: 
As long as there was a peace process that was basically moving forward, it was both a cover 
and an engine for a lot of other things: It empowered the Arab and Israeli business 
communities to push for more economic liberalization and integration with the global 
economy, it provided an impetus for secular, political voices who advocated more openness, 
modernization and democratization, and it put the most obscurantist religious forces 
somewhat on the defensive. (NYT-01-07-17: 19) 
Political structures, actions, and decisions of Arab and Muslim countries and actors are measured 
on the basis of Western standards such as democratic structures, political openness, equal rights, 
or secularity. Nevertheless, what characterizes this focus is that it is directed mainly towards the 
Other. The reference towards the Self or even the comparison with the same shimmers through 
only indirectly in the different newspaper contexts in which political features are ascibed. 
After the attacks, the second scale of evaluation can now be frequently identified in the actor 
images. First and foremost, Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed print media articles are 
evaluated according to their attitudes towards the West – and in U.S. articles towards the United 
States in particular. They are either classified as being anti-western, hostile, and undiplomatic, or they 
are described as being pro-western, peaceable, and diplomatic. This central division of pro- versus anti-
western attitudes indicates skepticism on behalf of the Western observers and with regard to the 
question whether Arab and Muslim countries take sides with or against the anti-terror coalition 
after 9/11, i.e. they oppose or support terrorism. Especially in U.S. media, these two features are the 
most frequently used characteristics on the political dimension. Furthermore, it is especially with 
this second evaluation scale of attitudes towards terrorism that explicit comparisons with the 
Western standards can be found in the newspaper articles. For instance, the motivations for the 
attacks are explained with the political foundations, standards, and institutions of the Western 
world that are argued to be threatening for certain terrorist actors like, for example, Osama bin 
Laden. As the U.S. NEWSWEEK writes: 
The West has created a world in which individuals are free to choose how they would like to 
live their lives – how they work, travel, trade, worship, organize, speak and think. These 
freedoms are utterly revolutionary in the history of the world. They are also deeply 
threatening to the world view of men like Osama bin Laden. (NW-01-v138-SpIssue: 46) 
And the NY TIMES expresses certain expectations that the Self implicitly communicates towards 
the Other as follows: 
[…] the animating vision of America in the world is the promotion and protection of 
freedom – freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom of markets and freedom of 
politics. And that while America might align itself with all sorts of countries for economic or 
strategic reasons, in the end it was those who were "basically pro-freedom" whom America 
would never abandon and with whom America would always share a special bond. (NYT-01-
10-09: 25) 
At the same time, however, the attacks are also perceived as a threat for the political standards 
and principles of Western democracies. The German SZ writes: 
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“Wir alle in Deutschland sind voller Abscheu ueber die terroristischen Anschlaege in den 
Vereinigten Staaten von Amerika”, hiess es im Aufruf zur Kundgebung. Die Attentate in 
New York und Washington seien als “Angriff auf die Grundwerte des menschlichen 
Zusammenlebens” zu verstehen. “Jetzt muessen alle Demokraten zusammenstehen, um den 
Frieden und die Freiheit in der Welt zu verteidigen und gemeinsam entschlossen den Terror 
zu bekaempfen.” (SZ-01-09-15: 9.) 
In addition to that, the terror attacks are assumed to have an impact on the political identity, 
since… 
In der Stunde, da die Tuerme des World Trade Center niedersanken, hat Europa sich 
veraendert: Es unterliegt dem Zwang, Partei zu sein – die Rache kehrt in die Zivilisation 
zurueck. (SZ-01-09-13: 15) 
However, both countries’ print media also make clear that this threat for Western political values 
and principles is taken as an appeal by the Self to defend those standards against hostile Others. 
U.S. President George W. Bush, for instance is frequently quoted in both countries’ newspapers 
after the attacks with his appeal that… 
“In every generation,” the 43d president said, “the world has produced enemies of human 
freedom. They have attacked America because we are freedom’s home and defender. And 
the commitment of our fathers is now the calling of our time.”  
(NW-01-v138-i13: 50) 
And in the German context Chancellor Gerhard Schröder is quoted as saying: 
“Ich habe immer wieder deutlich gemacht, dass die terroristischen Schläge, die so unsäglich 
viel Leben gekostet haben, nicht nur Anschläge gegen die Menschen in den Vereinigten 
Staaten, gegen unsere Freunde in Amerika selbst sind, sondern auch Anschläge gegen die 
gesamte zivilisierte Welt. Also auch Anschläge gegen unsere eigene Freiheit, gegen unsere 
eigenen Werte, die wir mit dem amerikanischen Volk teilen.”  
(Bild-01-09-13: 1) 
Altogether, the increasing relevance of this second scale of evaluation after the attacks indicates 
that the relationship and the interplay of Western Self and Arab and Muslim Other becomes a 
central focus on the political dimension after the attacks. Even though the political actions within 
Arab and Muslim countries are still mentioned in the analyzed articles, the importance of internal 
political features is now to a large extent replaced by the issue of international terrorism and by 
the evaluation of the actors’ attitudes and actions towards to West. Although actors are still 
classified as moderate or conservative, undemocratic, and repressive, those features are now 
predominantly related to their foreign political actions and valued according to their political 
attitudes as well as their usefulness for the United States or Germany in international coalitions 
and military actions against terrorist activities and groups. This observation will become relevant 
again when I discuss political features of the different actor types in more detail in chapter VI. 
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2. The Cultural Dimension 
“We as Westerners”2 
We can identify another scale of evaluation that forms a central dividing line on the cultural 
dimension. Here, a central distinction can be made between Western modernity and Oriental 
backwardness and underdevelopment. This cultural dimension becomes especially but not solely 
emphasized after the 9/11 attacks. In the context of this general distinction, the religious 
affiliation to Islam is a central trait of demarcation in both countries. The mentioning of Islam 
seems to happen independently of whether the information is relevant for the content or the 
message of the article. Even though both countries’ newspapers do not explicitly classify the 
affiliation towards Islam on a developmental scale between modernity and traditionalism or conservatism, 
the context in which religious affiliation is used as a descriptive element for a number of actors is 
shaped by culturally underdeveloped aspects and features – that are compared to a Western standard 
that is also implicitly or explicitly referred to in the respective articles.3 This can be illustrated with 
the following three examples which are taken from both German and U.S. newspapers. The 
German news magazine DER SPIEGEL argues, for instance, that… 
Muslime verkünden den Dschihad, den Gotteskrieg gegen alles Böse, das sich vor allem in 
den “Ungläubigen” der westlichen Welt manifestiert, und kämpfen für die Re-Islamisierung 
jener Länder, in denen die Lehre Mohammeds über Jahrhunderte Regelwerk für alle Bereiche 
des gesellschaftlichen und staatlichen Lebens war. (Sp-01-i41: 160) 
And the American NY TIMES implicitly confronts and compares the developmental stage of 
Islamic religion with Western cultural standards of emancipation, by arguing that… 
A hybrid kind has been forged across that seam between the civilization of Islam and the 
more emancipated culture of the West. (NYT-01-10-07: 19) 
Finally, in yet another context in the NY TIMES the West is argued to present a cultural and 
political threat for a number of Muslims: 
Such historical allusions may well tap into the widespread sense of siege among many 
Muslims who see themselves threatened by a modern world dominated by the United States 
and Western secularism. (NYT-01-10-09: 6) 
A combination of Islamic belief and fundamentalist attitudes, extremist actions and a general link of 
religious beliefs with violent tendencies can be found with the images of a large number of Arab 
and Muslim actors in both countries’ newspapers, before as well as after 9/11. This combination 
of religion and violence creates a negative context in which a neutral aspect like religion becomes 
negatively tainted. This indicates a certain degree of Western skepticism with regard to Islam in 
general, which may cause the German SZ to ask, for example: 
Im Westen geht die Angst um vor dem Islam. Ist diese Angst berechtigt? (SZ-01-09-21: 6) 
                                                 
2 Own translation, original quote in German: “Wir als Abendländer” (Sp-01-i38: 168). 
3 Ateş presents a similar result for the perception of Islam in the German local boulevard newspapers KÖLNER 
EXPRESS after 9/11 (2001, 2003), arguing that the newspaper continuously refers to the religious and cultural 
differences between the German society and Muslims (see Ateş 2006: 160). 
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But also independently from religion, the cultural facets of Arab and Muslim actors can be 
categorized on the basis of an evaluation scale that puts Western modernity as a standard principle 
at the one end and Oriental backwardness at the other. The Western self-concept includes such 
Western parameters as open-mindedness, tolerance, and freedom of thought and expression, as 
can be illustrated with a quote from USA TODAY: 
Fighting such extremism requires understanding that this is a war not between Islam and the 
West, but between certitude and open-mindedness, dogma and thought, prejudice and 
tolerance. (USAT-01-10-01: 15Ab) 
Actors who do not fulfill these Western standards are frequently described as culturally 
conservative, isolated, ignorant, or even uncivilized. In contrast to that, actors who do reflect a certain 
level of Western rationalization and institutionalization are described as culturally modern, 
enlightened, or secular. Furthermore, Arab and Muslim countries are marked by cultural or societal 
intolerance, for example when the treatment of homosexuals in Egypt is discussed in an article of 
the NY TIMES: 
The sensational trial is part of a pattern of what gay Egyptians call stepped-up harassment of 
any homosexual activity in the last 8 to 10 months, much of it related to the Internet. Many 
believe that the government has acted to try to stamp out what was becoming an increasingly 
open and vocal gay community. Homosexuality is not specifically outlawed in Egypt, and 
lawyers and international human rights groups accused the government of President Hosni 
Mubarak of circumventing the regular judicial system and its appeal process to bring a 
dubious case to trial. (NYT-01-07-19: 10b) 
Here, we can also note that the aspect of intolerance is not only reduced to the cultural and social 
dimension but also extends over the dimension of political decisions. 
In some cases, when conservative views are confronted with modern ones within Arab and Muslim 
countries, the opposition of both positions results in cultural conflicts in the respective societies, an 
aspect that is frequently mentioned in the analyzed articles, as well. Nevertheless, in most 
German and U.S. articles the images of Arab and Muslim actors are dominated by the 
underdeveloped side of this confrontation, whereas the more developed actors occur far less 
frequently. One aspect that is frequently used as an indicator for cultural underdevelopment is the 
unequal status of women in Arab and Muslim societies. Male actors, but also governments or 
nation states are referred to as misogynistic, and articles frequently mention that in Muslim and 
Arab societies, women are unequal to men, discriminated against, and oppressed. 
After the 9/11 attacks, the Afghan opposition group Northern Alliance, the central opponent of 
the Taliban regime in the Northern territories of Afghanistan, becomes an ally of the American 
military in the course of the latter war against the Taliban regime that starts in October 2001. 
Despite the group’s role as a partner in this military conflict the NY TIMES, for example, points 
out the cultural deficits of this group that the “Western” observer should recognize: 
Here, in territory under the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, 8 young women were allowed to 
join 300 young men studying at the university for the first time last year. Still, to a Western 
visitor, a striking feature of alliance territory is that women are seen only occasionally on the 
street, silently carrying a child or leaving a bazaar with food. (NYT-01-10-03: 6) 
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Especially the German articles continue to emphasize the opposition of an uncivilized East to a 
civilized Western hemisphere after the attacks.4 A frequently discussed actor in this context is the 
Afghan Taliban regime who is perceived not only as culturally conservative or religiously 
fundamentalist, but as altogether uncivilized. The German DER SPIEGEL, for example, refers to them 
as “the wild and religious warriors in Afghanistan”5 or “the Afghan stone-age Islamists,”6 while 
the Western Self is described as enlightened, secularized, and civilized: 
Sie verbannten mit ihren rigiden islamistischen Alltagsregeln – keine Arbeitserlaubnis für 
Frauen, keine Schulbildung für Mädchen, keine Unterhaltungsmusik – alles, was an 
westlichen Lebensstil erinnerte. (Sp-01-i39: 14) 
But also the American NY TIMES picks up this cultural dichotomy, for example by stating that… 
If there are Americans clamoring to bomb Afghanistan back to the Stone Age, they ought to 
know that this nation does not have so far to go. This is a post-apocalyptic place of felled 
cities, parched land and downtrodden people. (NYT-01-09-13: 18) 
After 9/11, this classification of two clashing cultural areas is broadened and now also includes 
Muslim and Arab actors within the Western space. The cultural dimension becomes a central 
element of distinction and evaluation of internal actors in Germany and the United States as well. 
This is especially the case in the German newspapers. When the German SZ, for example, calls 
for a stronger dialogue with the Muslims within German society this perspective thereby 
implicitly draws a distinction line between a culturally Christian West and Muslim Others that are 
not part of this concept of belonging: 
Gerade jetzt muss der Dialog zwischen der christlich-westlich gepraegten Mehrheit in 
Deutschland und den drei Millionen Muslimen im Land weiter gehen, breiter werden.  
(SZ-01-10-9: 12) 
Altogether and measured by the quantitative scale of occurrence, we can say that the cultural 
dimension of the images of Arab and Muslim actors implicitly reflects and also explicitly 
expresses a cultural distinction line that labels and thus demarcates Arab and Muslim traditions 
and religious norms as medieval and backward and contrasts them with a concept of Christian 
modernity and traditions that distinguishes the Western Self. Especially German articles explicitly 
communicate this distinction, for example, when DER SPIEGEL refers to the Self as “we as 
Westerners”7 and the SZ notes that “Western Enlightenment meets Islam.”8 
 
 
 
                                                 
4 As Weller (2005) has for instance noted in his analysis of the television news coverage on the 9/11 attacks, it was 
not the Bush administration that – chronologically – first proclaimed that the attacks have to be understood as a 
declaration of war, but German television. As a consequence, other German journalists and also politicians picked up 
the term and it was German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder who then declared the event to be “a declaration of war 
against the whole civilized world,” (Weller 2005: 328) thus introducing the term “civilized” in this context to refer to 
the Self. 
5 Own translation, original quote in German: “wilden Gotteskriegern in Afghanistan” (Sp-01-i38: 158). 
6 Own translation, original quote in German: “die Afghanischen Steinzeit-Islamisten” (Sp-01-i39: 148). 
7 Own translation, original quote in German: “Wir als Abendländer” (Sp-01-i38: 168). 
8 Own translation, original quote in German: “Westliche Aufklaerung trifft Islam” (SZ-01-09-10: 12). 
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3. The Personal Dimension 
Compared to the other dimensions, the category that summarizes the reference to personal 
features offers the largest variety of different characteristics that shape the images of the 
occurring Arab and Muslim actors in both countries’ print media.9 However, personal features to 
a large extent only have a supporting status in the constructed images of the occurring actors. 
The analysis has revealed that actors who are described via their personal features almost always 
also possess other – major – features of one of the other dimensions. Nevertheless, the ascription 
of personal facets is an integral stylistic element in both countries’ newspapers, which makes the 
personal dimension equally mentionable. In many contexts, the personal features of the depicted 
Arab and Muslim actors are not inevitably needed for the coverage of the topic or story. 
However, these features provide the articles with some additional information that forms a more 
vivid image and background for the communicated story or situation. 
In the German as well as the U.S. articles, negative personal features outweigh the positive ones. 
Before 9/11, those features mainly focus on ways of communication – whether in the context of 
a communication with other Arab and Muslim actors, or in the communication processes with 
the Western Self. Some actors are criticized as disputatious, choleric, backstabbing, pigheaded, or 
untruthful, whereas others are described as weak in their ability to assert themselves, for example 
with regard to political plans and opinions. 
After the attacks, the personal focus shifts from features that describe the interaction of actors on 
a communication level to features that describe the interaction of actors on a more physical level 
or that refer to the mental state of actors. A large number of actors are now portrayed as being 
fanatic, hostile, and evil in character, and are thereby evaluated according to a self-standard and self-
image that includes characteristics such as being rational, calm, good, peaceful and free. Especially the 
confrontation of good versus evil can be seen as an abstract linguistic dichotomy that is used to 
demarcate and stigmatize an aggressive terrorist Other that not only carries out violent actions 
against the Self and tries to fight Western cultural values and political institutions, but that is evil 
and bad in his or her natural character. The German BILD formulates this as follows: 
Unsere Erde vereint sich gegen das Böse. Aus dem Zwielicht des Terrors wächst offensiv die 
neue Kraft unserer Werte. (Bild-01-09-15: 12) 
At the same time, the contrast between good and evil can be seen as a summary of the central 
reasons for a needed demarcation and distancing of the – in this case basically terrorist – Other, 
since it presents a threat to the ingroup cohesion and security of the Self.10 The NY TIMES, for 
instance, in one article quotes president Bush who says… 
                                                 
9 Nearly fifty different personal features and traits can be summarized in the analyzed articles, whereas the variety of 
the other dimensions ranges from about fifteen to twenty different traits for the social and economic dimension, and 
about thirty features in the cultural dimension to forty different characteristics in the political dimension, as already 
mentioned in V.1. 
10 Iversen (2004) conducted an analysis of the depiction of bin Laden in the American news magazines TIME and 
NEWSWEEK after 9/11, and in this context also emphasizes the relevance of the facet of evilness in the portrayal of 
the actors, arguing that “evil […] has throughout history been reserved for industrialization, slavery and communists 
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“This will be a monumental struggle of good versus evil, but good will prevail,” Mr. Bush 
said as he opened a meeting this morning with his national security advisers.  
(NYT-01-09-13: 16) 
…and in another context writes: 
The result: We must now fight a war against terrorists who are crazy and evil but who, it 
grieves me to say, reflect the mood in their home countries more than we might think. 
(NYT-01-09-21: 35b) 
The 9/11 terrorists are even more difficult to fight because they have inconspicuously lived among 
the Self. Therefore, the aspect of being too inconspicuous and reserved to be recognized as different 
becomes a frequently mentioned feature in the images of external but even more of internal Arab 
and Muslim actors in some articles after the attacks. The inconspicuousness and seemingly 
harmlessness of some of those actors is thereby emphasized explicitly in both countries’ 
newspapers and is evaluated as a threatening feature of the Other and the internal Other in 
particular. 
Apart from that, a different – and in itself more positive – personal focus does also occur in the 
aftermath of the attacks. In both countries’ print media – but especially in U.S. articles – we now 
also find a number of actors that are described as compassionate, friendly, and helpful. Similarly to the 
contrast of pro- and anti-western political positions, on the personal dimension actors are classified 
according to their open expression of compassion for the American victims of the 9/11 attacks 
or their help and support in coping with the event. A number of actors are positively highlighted 
if they do so, while others are strongly criticized for not doing so, as the following statement 
about Palestinian demonstrators may illustrate: 
Die Unterdrueckten und die Entrechteten der arabischen Welt – die Palaestinenser – liessen 
sich von den Fernsehbildern zu Freudendemonstrationen und Freudenschuessen aus ihren 
Maschinengewehren hinreissen. Dieser fatale politische Enthusiasmus erzeugte 
Fernsehbilder, die wiederum in Europa und Amerika zu Entsetzen fuehrten.  
(SZ-01-09-13: 21) 
Last but not least, and in addition to the introduced character facets, the appearance and the style of 
clothing are visual identifiers that make the Other recognizable. In German as well as U.S. articles, 
when Arab and Muslim actors are introduced in an article their visual appearance often seems 
worth mentioning: Articles report whether actors, for example, wear headscarves or turbans, or 
mention that they have beards and dark hair. These features are accentuated even though they 
might not be relevant for the information of the respective news article. It may be concluded 
here that this aspect of the image of the Arab and Muslim Other, namely occurring visual 
distinctions, is seen as a crucial aspect of difference by the observing German and U.S. Self. 
Altogether, it can be summarized that the personal dimension is a supporting category which 
basically means that it almost always occurs in combination with features of other dimensions in 
the different actor images. With regard to those personal features that are ascribed to actors in 
                                                                                                                                                        
– and now terrorists. When an exceptional act of terror occurs […] the victim interprets it as evil. The use of the 
word ‘evil’ […] may […] be interpreted as a central element in American identity discourse, a verbal practice aimed at 
reminding one and another of what it means to be an American. The practice serves an important cause: It preserves 
the American collective – it helps to reconstitute the identity of the country” (Iversen 2004: 79-80). 
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the media images, a demarcation line between Self and Other can be identified in three basic 
ways. First of all, actors are classified according to their communicational behavior, in the 
interaction with the Self but also with other Arab and Muslim actors. This aspect is especially 
focused on before the 9/11 attacks. Hostility and choleric or untruthful behavior are frequently 
mentioned features here in the images of the analyzed actors. Second, after 9/11 the focus shifts 
towards a more intensive evaluation of Arab and Muslim actors on a scale of good versus evil 
character. Hostile actors, who are seen as a threat for Western identity, are also described as evil, 
whereas actors who express their compassion with the terror victims can be classified under the 
label of good characters who form the opposition to the evil actors and also reflect the preferred 
Western standard of personal behavior. And finally, the visual distinction forms a third way of 
constructing difference between self and otherness with regard to Arab and Muslim actors in 
both countries’ newspapers. The appearance of Arab and Muslim actors and their style of clothing are 
frequently mentioned features and can be interpreted as a way of constructing a visual difference 
of the Other. 
 
4. The Social and Economic Dimension 
“The gap between the wealthy elite and struggling poor”11 
Compared to the other four dimensions, the social and economic dimension is quantitatively less 
relevant for the portrayal of Arab and Muslim actors. Nevertheless, there are a few features used 
in the different actor images that are worth mentioning with regard to the overall differentiation 
of German or U.S. Self and Arab and Muslim Other. On this dimension, actor images 
predominantly include features that center on economic as well as social crises and conflicts 
within Arab and Muslim countries. The roots for these conflicts and problems can basically be 
explained by the confrontation of tremendously wealthy actors on the one side and extremely poor 
actors on the other side. 
The U.S. newspapers before 9/11 especially concentrate on the social and economic crises in 
countries like Indonesia or Turkey to contrast the gap between rich and poor parts of the 
population. In doing so, some American articles also communicate political expectations towards 
the respective – mostly political – actors that demand for social or economic features which can 
be interpreted as Western social and economic standards or principles: The portrayal of the new 
Indonesian President Megawati in the NY TIMES can serve as an example here. As the newspaper 
writes: 
The first priority is her cabinet. She [Megawati] needs to be inclusive – her predecessor, 
Abdurrahman Wahid, was not – so that key political parties receive posts and some of the 
damage wrought by the power struggle between the legislative and executive branches can be 
repaired. […] She needs a justice minister who is committed to legal reform and who can 
restore respect for the courts and an attorney general willing and able to show that neither 
army officers nor politicians are above the law. She also needs economic advisers who can 
                                                 
11 NYT-01-07-21: 4 
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steer the country through its debt crisis, banking problems and decentralization of fiscal 
authority. […] Restoring economic health is essential […] (NYT-01-07-27: 19) 
Political elites are furthermore frequently described as economically wealthy but are often also 
described as extravagant, unscrupulous, or money grubbing, as can be illustrated with the following 
quotes. The German news magazine DER SPIEGEL, for instance, describes the lifestyle of Osama 
bin Laden’s family as follows: 
Die steinreichen Saudis fahren Rolls-Royce oder Mercedes S-Klasse, sie besitzen riesige 
Yachten und kleiden sich bei Armani oder Versace ein. Sie schicken ihre Kinder auf 
Eliteschulen und wohnen in sündhaft teuren Appartements und Villen in London, Paris oder 
Boston und geniessen das, was Osama Bin Laden wohl am meisten hasst: den American Way 
of Life. (Sp-01-i39: 112) 
Similar to that, the American NY TIMES remarks on the Turkish economy: 
But as Turkey ends the fifth month of the worst economic crisis in its modern history, the 
gap between the wealthy elite and struggling poor is growing wider and more visible. (NYT-
01-07-21: 4) 
Socially, a number of these wealthy actors are also said to having received a good education – in 
many cases from schools and universities in European countries or the United States. 
Furthermore, we also find facets of the Oriental myth that have been mentioned earlier. As it was 
noted by authors like Sardar (1999) or Kabbani (1993), some of the actors have an excessive lifestyle 
that ruins not only their own financial budget, but also the countries they govern. This aspect 
may be quite vividly illustrated with another quote from the NY TIMES that summarizes the 
facets of the Saudi Arabian society as follows: 
History, geography and geology have made Saudi Arabia a fault line between civilizations. It 
is torn between conservative Islamic traditions and a modern global economy fueled by oil 
and money and defended by American military power. […] But for generations, political 
power in Saudi Arabia has been monopolized by an extended royal family. Saudi kings and 
princes have been worldly in their foreign policy and business dealings, sometimes 
ostentatiously corrupt in their personal lives and unyieldingly hostile to political debate and 
representative institutions. (NYT-01-09-25: 28) 
Here, not only the cultural conservatism and the political lack of democratic structures are 
highlighted but also the economic wealth and the corruption and lavishness that results from it. 
After 9/11, we also find wealthy actors who do not spend their money on pompous palaces and 
expensive clothing, but rather finance terrorist groups or use their Western education and 
influence to logistically support attacks against Western countries. Here, Osama bin Laden or the 
9/11 terrorists may serve as examples. For instance, in DER SPIEGEL it is noted that… 
Der Saudi-Araber Bin Laden hätte sich als Erbe eines 80-Millionen-Dollar-Baugeschäfts 
ebenso ein unbeschwert unpolitisches Wohlstandsleben leisten können wie der ägyptische 
Chirurg Sawahiri. Beide hatten sich aber schon bald dem radikalen Islamismus verschrieben, 
überzeugt davon, dass Ungläubige mit dem Flammenschwert bestraft werden müssten.  
(Sp-01-i39: 14) 
In opposition to the wealthy parts of Arab and Muslim populations German and U.S. articles also 
refer to the poor and chanceless populations of Arab and Muslim countries. Those poor actors are 
additionally described as uneducated, economically disadvantaged, or socially and economically 
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powerless. They often have to live in conditions that are shaped by a bad infrastructure, poor housing, or 
insufficient healthcare, and their social or economic problems are not only seen as a negative 
consequence of missing democratic structures but also of the extravagant lifestyles on behalf of the 
political elites in the respective countries. A depiction of the healthcare situation and the 
supplying conditions for the Afghan population in an article of the NY TIMES may illustrate that. 
As the newspaper writes: 
Infected clothing, bandages and bedding are burned in a rusty barrel outside the building 
because the hospital has no proper incinerator. Rather than the full protection suits and 
headgear common in Western hospitals, doctors and nurses wear only latex gloves, surgical 
masks and cloth boots. (NYT-01-10-05: 14) 
Interestingly enough, the mentioning of these negative conditions could as well be interpreted as 
an implicit critique of the Western observers in view of the social and economic conditions in the 
respective countries. At the same time, these negative features indicate a lack of social and 
economic Western standards, which are not accomplished in these cases. 
Apart from the contrast between wealth and poverty in Arab and Muslim countries, both 
countries’ print media also implicitly as well as explicitly compare the levels of development and 
progress of the Other with that of the own country. This is largely done by depicting the already 
mentioned lack of good infrastructures in some Arab or Muslim countries, the bad education 
systems, or the lack of healthcare, etc. In those contexts, even though no explicit contrasts of the 
social and economic conditions of Germany or the U.S. can be found, the critical and sometimes 
also explicit evaluation of those conditions can be interpreted as a devaluation of those features 
and as a deviation from Western economic or social standards. 
However, especially after the attacks both countries’ newspapers become more explicit in their 
comparison. In the context of the looming military conflict that might result from the terrorist 
attacks, the technological developments of Self and Other come to the fore in some of the 
analyzed articles. Some U.S. articles name “[…] two of America's greatest strengths – openness 
and technology”12 as two Western principles that characterize the American self-image in contrast 
to the terrorist opponent. Reflecting more insecurity in this technical-developmental point, some 
German articles see the technologically developed West in a disadvantaged position in the context of 
the fight of good versus evil, however. Still, in debating this point they also – and explicitly – 
communicate their national self-perception. DER SPIEGEL, for instance, writes that… 
Die vermeintliche Stärke des reichen technologisch hoch gerüsteten Westens erweist sich als 
Schwäche. Die Industriegesellschaften – zumal die offenen Demokratien – mit ihren 
Kernreaktoren, hochgiftigen Chemiekomplexen und Riesenstädten sind nicht zu schützen. 
(Sp-01-i38: 16) 
…and in the SZ we find the statement: 
Die saekulare, bedenkenlose westliche Spass-, Entertainment- und Kultur-Gesellschaft sieht 
sich auf einmal der Weltmacht des religioesen und politischen Fundamentalismus – und 
Fanatismus – gegenueber; sieht anderseits blossliegen bei sich selbst das fein gesponnene 
Netzwerk einer nervoesen technischen Zivilisation. (SZ-01-09-13: 1) 
                                                 
12 NW-01-v138-i13: 26 
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The German reference to the own technological standards is expressed in combination with a 
feeling of insecurity with regard to the superiority of those technologies compared to the 
technological standards of the Other. Nevertheless, the German self-concept in the analyzed 
articles – or more generally speaking, the German perception and interpretation of the Western 
technological standards – coincides to a large part with that communicated in U.S. articles. In 
both countries, technological development is contrasted with an underdevelopment of the – 
especially terrorist – Arab and Muslim Other that is also, but not exclusively, seen in the social and 
economic dimension. This can be shown, for example, with the following quotation from a NY 
TIMES article that includes a comparison between the social and economic conditions in 
Afghanistan under the rule of the Taliban regime and the United States: 
And now we are battling a bunch of atavistic ascetics who hate TV, music, movies, the 
Internet (except when they’re planning atrocities), women and Jews, who live in caves in a 
country smaller than Texas with a gross domestic product smaller than Bill Gates’s.  
(NYT-01-10-03: 23) 
Altogether, the assumption that could be derived from those images is that the elimination of 
social and economic crises and the improvement of underdeveloped structures are regarded as one 
method against the terrorist threat. Another idea that is indirectly communicated in this context is 
that the improvement of the social and economic standards of Arab and Muslim countries and 
their alignment with the Western principles of prosperity, wealth, and progress, which manifest 
themselves in aspects like good education, technological progress, and well-established 
infrastructures, would also improve the relationship of the Arab and Muslim Other with the 
West, or as the USA TODAY puts it: 
How can we fight this scourge, spread around the world in tiny pockets of fury and pain? 
[…] Education and economic assistance must be part of our arsenal.  
(USAT-01-10-01: 15Ab) 
 
5. The Aspect of Delinquency 
“Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists”13 
Last but not least, Arab and Muslim actors frequently carry features of delinquency. Criminal 
behavior like the drugs trade, corruption, or torture, but especially terrorism and violence against other 
actors are features that are used to describe a significant number of the identified actors in both 
countries’ newspapers. But articles not only focus on the committers of violent, corrupt, or terrorist 
actions; they also mention their victims. Palestinian civilians in the violent conflict between Israel 
and Palestine, victims of torture practice by the Turkish military, or the population under the 
repressive Taliban regime are only some examples here. In American news media, Arab and 
Muslim actors within the United States can especially be noticed here as we find a large number 
of them being constructed as victims of hate crimes and violent assaults after the 9/11 attacks. 
                                                 
13 NYT-01-09-21: 1 
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Before the attacks, the central line of distinction is drawn between a violence-prone Other and a Self 
that does not accept and rejects violent behavior in any form, against its own ingroup members 
but also against other Muslim and Arab actors. Before the attacks, the depicted violence of actors is 
mainly directed against other Arab and Muslim actors. This distant location of violent behavior 
changes with the circumstances of the terror attacks in New York and Washington. After 9/11, 
the specific aspect of terrorism becomes the decisive criterion for the differentiation and evaluation 
of self and otherness in both German and U.S. newspapers and replaces the more general 
category of violence. Terrorist violence is now increasingly perceived and communicated as a threat 
directed against the Western Self. German articles note, for instance, that… 
Das Grauen der terroristischen Attacke hat die zivilisierte Welt bis ins Mark erschüttert.  
(Sp-01-i40: 94) 
…or argue that… 
[…] Deutschland ist wie die anderen Länder der freien Welt vom Terrorismus bedroht.  
(Sp-01-i41: 40) 
It is even explicitly claimed that the new opponent of the West is terrorism. Most clearly this new 
line of confrontation is drawn by U.S. President Bush who is cited in several articles with his 
statement that… 
“Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make […] Either you are with us, or 
you are with the terrorists.” (Here taken from NYT-01-09-21: 1) 
With this shift in focus from the more general form of violence to the more concrete form of violent 
terrorism, government actors, who were formerly measured according to their active opposition and 
battle against violence, are now classified according to their position and actions in favor of or against 
terrorism. But also Arab and Muslim populations are classified according to that pattern: 
Palestinian or Pakistani demonstrators who signaled their approval for the attacks are strongly 
criticized. 
Altogether, this fifth dimension of the images of Arab and Muslim actors – the ascription of 
delinquency – is quantitatively the most frequently focused on dimension in both countries’ print 
media. Before as well as after the 9/11 attacks, violent or terrorist features are aspects that are most 
often mentioned when Arab and Muslim actors are characterized in both countries’ articles. 
Before the attacks, the more general reference to violence, violent disposition, and support of violence 
attracts the largest attention in the context of occurring actors. After 9/11, the more specific 
form of terrorist violence and terror support comes to the fore and determines the media discourses on 
Arabs and Muslims. Besides the focus on those actors who act violently or support violence and 
terrorism, Arab and Muslim victims of violence or criminal actions like corruption, etc., are also 
taken into account. 
The scale for the evaluation of actors on this last dimension is therefore clearly dominated by the 
negative side of deviance and is dominated by features that are disapproved of by the Self 
because of their destructiveness for the ingroup members as well as – on a more abstract level – 
for the Western standards and institutions. Whereas before the attacks these destructive features 
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and actions are largely seen as being directed against the Other itself, e.g. the populations of Arab 
and Muslim countries, the attacks against the U.S. lead to a shifting focus on violence and terrorism 
against the Self. 
 
6. Conclusion: Western Principles and German and U.S. Self-Images That Shape the 
Images of Arabs and Muslims 
In the last chapter, I have given an overview over the five major dimensions that are focused on 
when Arab and Muslim actors are covered, and have thereby also derived the central Western 
principles that are negotiated when Arab and Muslim countries and actors are observed. The 
introduced features present the major characteristics according to which Arab and Muslim actors 
are described, differentiated and distanced from the German and American conception of self. 
The analysis of those five dimensions has also revealed that the demarcation between the 
German and American self-concept and the Arab and Muslim Other is established on the basis 
of a number of distinctions, that are – to a large extent – identical in both countries’ analyzed 
print media sets. 
 
The Central Dimensions of Distinction between Self and Other 
First and foremost, as already noted in chapter IV, Arab and Muslim actors are demarcated by 
geographic distance. The majority of the identified actors are external, i.e. they come from 
countries of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, or Northern Africa. Therefore, an implicit 
difference between Self and Other in the context of this analysis is created by geographic 
distance. This distance is challenged, however, after the attacks, since not only are the 9/11 
terrorists revealed to have planned and carried out the attacks from within the West but also the 
internal actors, i.e. actors within the German or U.S. national territory, increasingly become the 
focus of the public and mass medial attention. 
Politically, actors before 9/11 are classified mainly according to their political actions and views 
in the internal political contexts of the respective Arab and Muslim countries. Actors are 
politically conservative, undemocratic, and repressive, but also moderate. This rather distant view of a 
neutral observer changes with the attacks. After 9/11, the relationship and the interplay of 
Western Self and Arab and Muslim Other becomes the central focus in the political dimension. 
The importance of internal political features is now to a large extent replaced by the issue of 
international terrorism and by the evaluation of the occurring actors’ attitudes and actions 
towards to West, and in U.S. articles towards the United States in particular. Actors are either 
described as taking an anti-western position or they are on the side of the Self and support the 
Western ambitions, actions, or policies. This central distinction line is closely connected to the 
opposition of actors being either pro-terror, i.e. supporting terrorism or carrying out terrorist acts, and 
being against terrorism. Here, a large number of the identified Arab and Muslim actors are 
characterized by deviant traits that result in violent, terrorist, and criminal behavior. 
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A similar and clear cut dividing line can be found in the cultural dimension. Actors are classified 
according to the general distinction of being either civilized and modern, or uncivilized and culturally 
backward. On the personal dimension, a central distinction can be identified between good and evil 
actors, an opposition that includes personal features such as being irrational or unrestrained. In the 
social and economic dimension, we find two basic contrasts. On the one hand, Arab and Muslim 
actors are sub-classified into poor and wealthy actors, a distinction that becomes relevant to 
understand internal dynamics and conflicts within the respective societies. At the same time, both 
countries’ print media implicitly as well as explicitly compare the levels of development and 
progress of the Other with that of the German, American or more general the Western Self. Both 
countries media images reflect a distinction between a (technologically) developed West and an 
underdeveloped Arab and Muslim Other that lacks most of the Western economic or social 
standards such as a well-established infrastructure, a good educational system, or a good 
healthcare system. 
 
The Communicated Self-Concepts 
The Western standards that are reflected in the images of Arab and Muslim actors, and that after 
9/11 are also explicitly communicated in both countries’ newspaper articles – as some of the 
quotes in this chapter have illustrated – are nearly identical in the German as well as in the 
American context. The self-image of both countries is mainly characterized by such general 
principles as democracy, openness of society, freedom, equality, justice, rationality and personal 
self-discipline, tolerance, and progress. 
The political principle of democracy is reflected, for instance, in the strong focus on the political 
dimension of Arab and Muslim actors. Furthermore, the concept also carries a strong cultural 
connotation, since democratic structures are, for example, equated with cultural modernity and 
progress, and are thus located at a higher developmental level than non-democratic political 
systems. The openness of society refers to aspects like social mobility, and here especially 
hierarchical mobility with regard to economic or social status, and freedom of choice with regard 
to life planning. In the German and U.S. self-conception, this freedom is expressed in freedom of 
speech, freedom of religion, or the possibility of open criticism and freedom of choice with 
regard to political issues and decisions. On a personal dimension, the self-concept is based on an 
assumed rationality that results from cultural development and a civilized status that is expressed 
for example in personal self-discipline. Equality refers to aspects like equal participation in 
political decision-making processes, or equality of economic and educational opportunities for all 
members of society. At the same time, the self-description is characterized by tolerance towards 
other political opinions, other religious beliefs, ethnic differences, and different lifestyles. The 
principle of progress – which is also contained in most of the criteria that have been mentioned 
so far – is the last central principle that is expressed in the self-images in the analyzed articles of 
both countries. Progress refers to all dimensions and includes the permanent development and 
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improvement of political, cultural, economic, scientific, or social conditions and technological 
standards. 
Altogether, in the analyzed articles of both countries those principles are indirectly and explicitly 
reflected, for instance, when (a), newspaper articles especially emphasize the lack of those 
principles with the occurring Arab and Muslim actors, or when (b), the articles explicitly 
emphasize those principles as central facets of the German or American self-concept. The 
analysis has furthermore confirmed that both countries basically present the Self (and 
consequently also demarcate the Other) in a more or less identical kind of way. The introduced 
Western principles can be traced in both countries’ print media portrayals – even though the 
explicit reflections of the German and U.S. self-image only come to the fore largely in the 
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. 
Therefore, we may summarize that the worldview that can be derived from this German and U.S. 
observation of Arab and Muslim actors and countries could be described as a two-sided concept: 
On the one hand, we have the ingroup (in our case this basically refers to the communicated 
perception of the German or U.S. nation state as a concept of belonging) as part of a “Western” 
hemisphere that shares a set of central principles, norms, worldviews, and on the other hand, we 
have the Arab and Muslim Other as an outgroup from which the Self demarcates itself on the 
basis of those principles, norms, and concepts. Both countries describe themselves more or less 
equal with regard to their political, cultural, social, economic, and also personal development and 
institutionalization of the commonly shared Western standards and principles. It is furthermore 
important to note that this identification with a Western whole does not stem from the 9/11 
attacks, but was already verbally expressed before the event, predominantly by referring to the 
United States or European countries as “the West.” But especially after the terrorist attacks of 
9/11, both countries’ print media now include a noticeable amount of self-references and explicit 
descriptions of the American, German, and Western self-image. 
However, despite the overall similarities between German and U.S. print media, what has to be 
noted as well is that we do find quantitative differences in the way in which those different 
standards are discussed and focused in the context of the occurring actors, which may indicate 
differing relevancies of those standards for the German and the American self-concept. For 
instance, and especially in the timeframe after the analyzed event, the two countries ascribe 
themselves to different levels in the structure of Western countries. The analyzed U.S. articles 
include a number of self-references that indicate that the United States regards itself not only as 
one nation state in a union of Western countries that form the already mentioned “Western 
hemisphere” or “Western world.” Instead, American articles communicate a national self-image 
that sees the United States as the LEADING ROLE MODEL of modernity, democracy, 
progress, openness, equality, and rationality. This perception of superiority is also reflected in the 
following quote from NEWSWEEK that writes: 
The United States is the pivot that makes today’s globalization go round. If other countries 
believe in individual liberty, in free enterprise and free trade, in religious freedom, in 
democracy, then they are eating the fruits of the American order. (NW-01-v138-SpIssue: 46) 
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Concerning the analyzed media contexts, the United States not only sees itself as making the 
running for the countries of the West, but in the context of the analyzed articles also and 
especially for the Arab and Muslim Others. When Arab and Muslim actors are evaluated on the 
basis of Western principles those principles are first and foremost regarded as American 
principles. And by comparing the occurring actors with those standards, the American media also 
openly communicate this American status, as this example from the NY TIMES may illustrate: 
And this Third World War does not pit us against another superpower. It pits us – the 
world’s only superpower and quintessential symbol of liberal, free-market, Western values – 
against all the super-empowered angry men and women out there. Many of these super-
empowered angry people hail from failing states in the Muslim and third world. They do not 
share our values, they resent America’s influence over their lives, politics and children, not to 
mention our support for Israel, and they often blame America for the failure of their 
societies to master modernity. (NYT-01-09-13: 27) 
Therefore, we can argue that the U.S. print media reflect a stronger national focus, and only in a 
second position see the United States as a member of a transnational Western collectivity. At the 
same time, this self-acclaimed leading position of the United States in the world does also reflect 
a religious connotation that bases the leading role of the country on a historically given mission, 
since… 
Americans share a faith of the Founders: that democratic destiny will furnish leaders the 
times require. (NW-01-v138-i14: 24) 
Compared to that, Germany rather perceives itself as PART OF THE WESTERN WORLD and 
German print media communicate a more transnational self-concept and, therefore, more often 
define a Western concept of belonging than the German newspaper articles. 
A second aspect that is much more emphasized in the U.S. print media than in the context of the 
German articles is the stronger focus on the aspect of technological progress and the 
demarcation line between a leading technological U.S. and an underdeveloped and technologically 
weak Other. Both aspects combined form a perception of the Other that can be summarized 
with the following quote that refers to the 9/11 terrorists: 
What makes them super-empowered, though, is their genius at using the networked world, 
the Internet and the very high technology they hate, to attack us. Think about it: They turned 
our most advanced civilian planes into human-directed, precision-guided cruise missiles - a 
diabolical melding of their fanaticism and our technology. Jihad Online. And think of what 
they hit: The World Trade Center – the beacon of American-led capitalism that both tempts 
and repels them, and the Pentagon, the embodiment of American military superiority.  
(NYT-01-09-13: 27) 
Compared to that, a German peculiarity is that in the German print media images of Arab and 
Muslim actors the cultural dimension is quantitatively more emphasized and is consulted more 
often in German articles to describe difference between Self and Other. German articles thereby 
often implicitly draw a distinction line between a culturally Christian West and Muslim Others 
and frequently emphasize the religious affiliation of actors or discuss the religious content, 
history, and political level of Islam in Arab and Muslim countries than the American articles. 
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After having outlined the central lines of distinction between Western Self and Oriental Other, 
we can thus come to the preliminary conclusion that, to a large extent, one theoretical 
assumption for this analysis that was outlined in II.2 seems to be confirmed with the introduced 
results of this step of the print media analysis: The Western perspective on the Arab and Muslim 
Other is also shaped to a significant extent by the myth that those – Oriental – Others represent 
the opposite counterpart of the Self. The features and characteristics that are used in the 
newspaper articles to describe Arabs and Muslims predominantly do not meet but contradict the 
Western standards and principles that are regarded as the cultural account of countries of the 
West and that are communicated in the articles as well. 
However, in the overall image of the occurring Arabs and Muslims we also find a number of 
facets that can be regarded as favored characteristics for the Self, which indicates that the images 
of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media do not solely reflect a simple contrast of a 
self-concept with an Other that differs completely in its views, characteristics, and features. 
Rather, and as the theoretical assumptions in II.1 have suggested,14 the Self also has to face an 
Other that is never solely different to the extent that it only possesses features that are not part of 
the self-concept, i.e. which cannot be found in German or U.S. society, or which are rejected by 
the Self. The boundary-drawing does not solely seem to work via the devaluation of the Other, 
since we also find a number of actors in the analyzed articles that are, for instance, constructed as 
rather similar to the Self, as they possess features or fulfill standards that are also promoted as 
central for the self-concept. A number of actors are described as pro-western, modern, peaceful, and 
compassionate, or actively condemn or combat violence and terrorism. 
Therefore, the simple dichotomy of an Oriental Other and an Occidental Self, and the  two-sided 
opposition of a good Self and a bad Other does not fully describe the complexity of the image of 
Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. media. This, and a simple summary and description 
of the different facets and characteristics that can be found in the images of Self and Other 
would lead to the assumption that Self and Other are not that different after all, since their print 
media constructions reveal nearly the same features. Thus, to understand how difference is 
portrayed, we have to further subdivide the overall image of the Other. The next chapter will 
therefore look more closely at the levels of difference in the images of Arab and Muslim actors 
and will illustrate, for instance, how the distance between Self and Other is maintained despite 
possible similarities between both sides. This step of analysis will also show that the Other can be 
regarded as similar and different or similar and distant at the same time. 
                                                 
14 Namely that Western principles have institutionalized more and more on a global basis and therefore are 
institutionalized in Arab and Muslim societies to some extent as well. 
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VI. HOW DIFFERENT IS THE OTHER? – TYPES OF ACTORS AND LEVELS OF 
DIFFERENCE 
1. Types of Actors and Levels of Difference: An Overview 
The first part of the content analysis of the Arab and Muslim actor images has revealed that even 
though we can identify central lines of difference that demarcate the self-concept from the 
images of Arab and Muslim actors and countries in the analyzed German and U.S. newspapers, 
not all of the occurring actors are completely different from the German, American, or Western 
Self. Instead, we have learned that some actors are quite similar to the Self or, to put it in other 
words, the distance between Self and Other is rather small in some cases in both countries’ print 
media. One lack of distance can occur, for instance, in the geographic dimension, i.e. when we 
look at Arab and Muslim actors within the national boundaries. But also actors who can be 
distanced geographically may reveal a certain degree of similarity with the self-concept that is 
communicated in the newspaper articles, and may fulfill the political, cultural, or other standards 
of the Self as outlined in chapter V. 
Thus, not all of the actors fit into the dichotomy derived from the hypothesis that in order to 
construct and strengthen in-group identity, the Self needs an out-group Other that is evaluated 
and described as (a) completely different from the Self, and (b) a negative counterpart to the Self. 
It was argued in chapter II that an overall difference of the Other that is demarcated and 
distanced from the Self serves the aim of clearly marking the boundaries of the in-group, and 
that, furthermore, the negativity of the counterpart image enables the Self to positively enhance 
the in-group and at the same time set the normative frame for the in-group members. These 
assumptions have only been confirmed to some extent. Therefore, we will have to look more 
closely at the differences within the Other, i.e. at the differences and similarities in the images of 
actors in both countries’ print media around 9/11. In the following chapter we will examine how 
the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other can be subdivided, what forms of images 
dominate – positive or negative ones – and whether or not the Other is really as different from 
the Self as the quantitative scanning of the last chapter has suggested. 
What can be noted first and foremost is that across the different images outlined in the following 
chapter, the cultural pattern of Western principles serves as the central pattern according to 
which the different actors are evaluated: The Self measures the Arab and Muslim Other on the 
basis of those principles, which results in different images of the respective actors depending on 
how this evaluation turns out. Furthermore, and depending on the degree to which Western 
principles can be identified with the Other, different levels of similarity can be derived. High 
levels of difference are easy to demarcate and the Other can be distanced according to the 
features that deviate from the Self’s own societal norms and principles. In other cases, and with 
lower levels of difference, a demarcation appears to be less easy. How difference and distance is 
constructed (or is maybe not constructed) in those different cases will be outlined in the 
following chapter. 
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To discuss the different levels of constructed similarity or difference, we can first of all observe in 
what ways and according to what pattern the occurring actors are combined with the set of 
features that have been introduced. A typological analysis of all appearing actors has revealed 
certain overall patterns and structures among the different actor images across the different 
groups of actors, the diverse character dimensions, and the different analyzed print media. The 
established actor types that will be introduced in the following enable us to summarize the 
complexity that results from the large number of actors and the variety of ascribed features in the 
different images, and to illustrate those overall patterns of actor portrayal. At the same time, a 
typological analysis allows comparisons between the two countries as well as between the data 
sets before and after the attacks. 
Altogether, the typological analysis has revealed that the about nine hundred different Arab and 
Muslim actors that have been identified in the analyzed data set can first of all be divided into 
INTERNAL and EXTERNAL actors, which are distinguished on the basis of either 
geographical closeness to (internal actors) or geographical distance from (external actors) the 
observing German and American Self. 
 
Typology of External Arab and Muslim Actors 
From the set of identified external actors in both countries’ analyzed print media, about twenty-
five different forms of actor images can be derived – of which thirteen can be regarded as 
empirically significant1, and have therefore been included in the typology of external Arabs and 
Muslims that will be discussed in the following. The derived actor types are not only 
quantitatively significant but are also characterized by the same structure of construction, i.e. by a 
similar combination of features. As will be outlined in the following chapter, some of these actor 
images may look different at first sight but on looking more carefully they work with the same 
patterns.2 
The established typology of external Arab and Muslim actors can be found in both analyzed print 
media sets, and the majority of these actor types occur before as well as after the 9/11 attacks. 
Altogether, this typology reflects four levels of difference that are accompanied with four forms 
of perceived otherness: External actors can have images that devaluate them as solely negative 
with regard to their features and can therefore be distanced as completely different from the 
standards of the observing German or American Self. On this level, six empirically relevant actor 
types have been identified. Other actors are described as similar to some extent: difference 
between the Self and similar Others on this level is constructed by weakening those actors, either 
by weakening their similar features or by weakening the whole actor, for instance as a result of 
the actions of other actors. On a third level of difference, similarities between Self and Arab and 
                                                 
1 Empirically significant here means that this form of actor depiction has to occur in at least one of the two 
countries’ print media sets (i.e. either German or U.S. newspapers) in at least one of the two analyzed timeframes (i.e. 
before or after 9/11) with at least five different actors. 
2 For more methodical details on the formation of the actor typology see chapter III.4. 
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Muslim Other are neglected, either by constructing them as strategic and by exposing the 
similarities as pretence, or by revealing the Western ambivalence in dealing with actors who are 
negative but useful at the same time. The fourth level of difference summarizes types of actors 
who are portrayed as positive and who carry features that are supported by the Self. 
 
Typology of Internal Arab and Muslim Actors 
When we now add to the established typology the identified internal Arab and Muslim actors, a 
fifth level of difference comes into play when Arab and Muslim actors cross the geographic 
boundaries of the Self. Whereas the first four levels of difference are additionally marked by a 
geographic distance and thus only summarize the images of external actors, the images of internal 
actors are first and foremost marked by a geographic closeness to the observing German and 
American Self. Whether this similarity is accompanied by a political economic or other similarity 
as well, and whether these internal Arabs and Muslims can be integrated in the overall actor 
typology that has been established for the external actors will be examined, as well. Altogether, 
four different actor types will be discussed here that have been derived from the images of the 
internal Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media. 
In the following subchapters (VI.2-6), these five levels of difference will be introduced as follows: 
On the basis of the established actor types it will be shown which features are combined in what 
ways when Arab and Muslim actors are constructed in the analyzed German and U.S. 
newspapers, and how similar or different actors are with regard to the Western standards. For 
each actor type, different prototypical actor examples will be introduced and will be illustrated 
with quotations from the different German and U.S. print media. 
 
2. Level 1: The Devaluated Other 
As has been mentioned briefly in the introductory section to this chapter, the first level of 
difference that can be identified for a part of the occurring Arab and Muslim actors in both 
countries’ newspaper articles is shaped by an overall deviation from the Western standards and 
principles. On this level of difference, actor types are ascribed almost exclusively with negative 
features. The images that result from these features mostly form the complete opposite to the 
concept of belonging that is communicated for the German or American Self. These features can 
be explicitly rejected by the Self in the different articles or they are rejected implicitly by 
illustrating their negative consequences. This first level of difference therefore can be interpreted 
as a form of devaluation of the Other. 
At this point, we may return to the theoretical considerations about collective identity 
construction for a minute: In chapter II.3 it was argued that an out-group is chosen for the 
comparison with the Self and that this comparison between Self and Other is shaped by an 
evaluation between the two sides that aims at a positive result for the self-image. The boundaries 
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between Self and Other are drawn via the emphasis of difference between both sides, a difference 
that is traced, for instance, in different political, cultural, or other features that distinguish both 
sides. In most cases the Self thereby looks for features that form the opposite to the 
characteristics of its own group. Furthermore, in-group cohesion and solidarity of a collective 
group are also strengthened by the construction and demarcation of Arab and Muslim actors that 
are portrayed as lacking the favored or postulated Western principles, structures and norms. 
Following these assumptions, the ascription of negative features and the construction of actors as 
the complete opposite to the Western self-concept or even as active opponents of the West, 
therefore, seems to be the first and most logical form of imaging the Arab and Muslim Other. 
On this level of complete difference, six actor types can be distinguished that are summarized in 
Table VI.1. 
Table VI.1: The Devaluated Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance3 
Before 9/11 After 9/11  
Germany USA Germany USA 
Type 1:  Gunmen, Terrorists, and Hostile Politicians 28.4 28.9 17.8 24.1 
Type 2:  The Culturally Backward and Fundamentalist  
              Other 
12.8 11.6 12.3 8.0 
Type 3:  The Politically Devaluated Other 5.8 5.2 3.3 3.6 
Type 4:  The Poor and Underdeveloped Other 1.2 3.9 1.9 2.3 
Type 5:  The Wealthy Political Elite 5.4 3.0 0.4 0.3 
Type 6:  The Villain - - 2.2 2.3 
              Other Devaluated Actors 0.4 0.4 1.9 0.5 
 
 
2.1. Type 1: Gunmen, Terrorists, and Hostile Politicians 
The first actor type that can be introduced here focuses on features that have already been 
emphasized in chapter V as two very central aspects of the distinction between Self and Other: 
actor type 1 summarizes the images of actors that mainly focus on violent attitudes and behavior, 
as well as on political hostility and aggression. Actors of this type are mainly described as either violent 
or more concretely as terrorists. Very often features of violence are accompanied by negative 
personal features that further intensify the negativity of these actor images. Many of those Type 1 
actors only appear in the context of one single event, like for instance a terror attack or violent 
aggression against other actors or the Self, and therefore do not reach a very high level of 
complexity with regard to their overall image. In the majority of cases, these actors serve as a 
background foil that describes the setting in which context the articles discuss, for example, the 
steps of success and failure in internal as well as foreign political negotiations. Other actors of 
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this type possess political facets that can be summarized as politically hostile. For example, those 
actors are referred to as anti-western, or are said to be hostile towards Israel with regard to their 
views, rhetoric, or political actions. 
Altogether, those violent and hostile actors represent a potential threat – not only for their own 
countries but also for the Self, especially after the 9/11 attacks. These actors are regarded as 
different, and the Self has to distance itself from them geographically because they not only 
present a threat to their own countries but also to the national security of Germany and the 
United States. In some articles (as already shown in chapter V) this threat is communicated 
explicitly, in other contexts it is illustrated indirectly by outlining the possible negative 
consequences of the behavior of these actors. The real motives and personal backgrounds of the 
violence of the individual actors are not discussed, as these actors are not perceived as 
autonomous individuals, but instead reflect a certain violent potential in the respective Arab and 
Muslim countries and their populations. Some of the actors of Type 1 are even said to be 
worshipped as heroes by the populations, an aspect that is mentioned for example with reference 
to a Palestinian suicide bomber in the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL. 
Therefore, we can say that this first actor type presents an unchallenged negative image of actors 
that can be characterized by one central message: violence is a normal and every-day event and a 
central aspect of social reality for a number of the described Arab and Muslim societies. The 
construction of delinquency and hostility presents the most frequently used way of constructing 
actors in both countries’ analyzed newspapers, before as well as after the 9/11 attacks. Nearly 
one third of all occurring actors in both print media sets can be assigned to this actor type 
(Germany: 28.4 %, USA: 28.9 %). Whereas the quantitative relevance of this type decreases 
significantly to 17.8 % of the appearing actors in the German newspapers after the attacks, its 
significance drops only slightly in the U.S. newspapers to a proportion of 24.1 %. Thus, Type 1 is 
the most frequently used way of imaging Muslim and Arab actors, before as well as after the 
attacks. 
 
Type 1Actors in the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict 
Before 9/11, violent actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are the most often appearing 
examples of Type 1. In both German and U.S. articles, we find a large number of private 
gunmen, individual terrorists, and members of groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad, but also 
members of Palestinian political parties like the PLO and political groups like Fatah or Al-Aksa. 
In most cases, the unnamed actors only appear once – usually because they are killed by their 
own suicide attacks or by Israeli military forces. Listed below are just a few examples of how 
those actors are normally introduced. USA TODAY writes, for instance, that… 
A 17-year-old Israeli was killed late Thursday night, presumably by Palestinian gunmen, as he 
drove with his father along a West Bank road just north of Jerusalem. (USAT-01-07-27: 4b) 
                                                                                                                                                        
3 In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to 
all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
VI. How Different is the Other? 
 - 150 -
...and in German articles we are informed that… 
Einen Tag nach der Toetung von acht ihrer Landsleute haben militante Palaestinenser im 
Westjordanland Vergeltungsanschlaege angekuendigt. Auf einer Beerdigung in Nablus riefen 
Zehntausende zu einem “heiligen Krieg” gegen Israel und zur Toetung israelischer Politiker 
auf. (SZ-01-08-02: 1) 
…and that… 
Auch gestern gab es neue Gewalt! Im Gazastreifen feuerten Palästinenser Mörsergranaten 
auf israelische Siedlungen. (Bild-01-08-02: 2) 
This usage of Type 1 actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is also maintained after the attacks. 
In the context of an article on the conflict the German SZ writes that… 
Eine israelische Siedlerin war am Donnerstagmorgen suedlich der palaestinensischen Stadt 
Bethlehem getoetet und ihr Mann schwer verletzt worden. Die Frau war mit ihrem Auto 
nahe der juedischen Siedlung Tekoa im Westjordanland unterwegs, als Palaestinenser auf das 
Fahrzeug schossen. (SZ-01-09-21: 6c) 
…and in the context of another article on this topic reports that… 
Ein als israelischer Soldat verkleideter Palaestinenser hat am Donnerstagmittag zwei Israelis 
im zentralen Busbahnhof der israelischen Kleinstadt Afula an der noerdlichen Grenze zum 
Westjordanland mit einem Maschinengewehr getoetet. Mindestens 15 weitere Israelis wurden 
bei dem Anschlag zum Teil schwer verletzt. (SZ-01-10-05: 11) 
And in the NY TIMES we are also informed that… 
Palestinians rioted during the afternoon in southern Gaza, and a bomb exploded near an 
Israeli convoy near the town of Jenin in the West Bank, the Israeli Army reported. The 
bomb damaged a jeep but injured no one. (NYT-01-09-23: 15) 
As these examples already show, the resulting images of Type 1 actors are not very complex, and 
the actors usually remain anonymous. In the case of the following actor, this one-sidedness and 
anonymity does not change even despite the fact that he occurs repeatedly in several different 
articles in the NY TIMES. On August 12, 2001, we first learn in the NY TIMES that… 
[I]n the heart of downtown Jerusalem, a Palestinian suicide bomber blew himself up in a 
crowded pizzeria and restaurant, killing 15 people besides himself and wounding 130 others. 
(NYT-01-08-12: 8) 
This topic is picked up again two days later when the newspaper reports that… 
On Friday, hours after a Palestinian terrorist bombing had killed 15 people, plus the suicide 
attacker, in a Jerusalem pizzeria, Israeli forces took over the unofficial Palestinian 
headquarters in eastern Jerusalem. (NYT-01-08-14: 1) 
And also in the third article on this topic, the respective actor remains anonymous and we still 
only get the information that he is a suicide bomber who has killed 15 civilians: 
After a suicide bomber killed 15 Israelis and foreigners at a Jerusalem pizzeria last week, the 
prime minister, ignoring objections from the United States and other countries, ordered his 
forces to take over several Palestinian offices in and around Jerusalem. (NYT-01-08-16: 3) 
Even if actors of this type are identified by a name, this does not inevitably lead to a more 
complex and insightful image, as the example from the German tabloid BILD illustrates:  
Gaza-Stadt - Er hat das Gesicht eines Engels. Doch seine Familie hat teuflischen Hass in 
seine Seele geträufelt. Und so spricht Ahmed Masawbi auch - sagt mit seinen erst vier Jahren 
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Sätze, die die ganze Welt schockierten: “Wenn ich groß bin, will ich ein Selbstmordattentäter 
werden. Wie mein Onkel Ismail. Ich werde die Juden töten.” (Bild-01-08-24: 1) 
Besides the violent gunmen and terrorists, some private Palestinian actors can also be assigned to 
this actor type: In German as well as U.S. articles we find references to parts of the Palestinian 
population as hostile towards the West, and those images do not only appear after the attacks. The 
NY TIMES, for example, reports in July 2001 that… 
Encircled by a tight cordon of army checkpoints, Bethlehem residents seethed with anger 
after the killing of the four Palestinians. At a funeral punctuated by bursts of gunfire, 
mourners vowed to avenge the killings with bombings in Tel Aviv. Thousands gathered near 
the Church of the Nativity to hear speakers call for holy war and martyrdom in the struggle 
against Israel. (NYT-01-07-19: 5) 
…and USA TODAY writes: 
And tens of thousands of Palestinians chanting anti-Israel slogans took to the streets of 
several towns in the West Bank (of the Jordan River). (USAT-01-08-28: 6A) 
Especially after 9/11, the newspapers focus on this facet, for instance, when both countries 
report on Palestinian demonstrators who – as a reaction to the attacks – take to the streets to 
demonstrate their pleasure, or at least their support for the attacks. In Germany, DER SPIEGEL 
writes: 
Mit Maschinengewehren feuerten Milizen Salut-Schüsse in die Luft, wie sie sonst blutige 
Anschläge gegen Israel feiern. Nun drückten sie ihre Freude darüber aus, dass die mächtigen 
“imperialistischen USA” in die Knie gezwungen wurden. Frauen und Kinder schwenkten 
palästinensische Fahnen, klatschten, sangen und stießen Freudentriller aus. (Sp-01-i38: 154) 
Similarly, the SZ reports that… 
Die Unterdrueckten und die Entrechteten der arabischen Welt - die Palaestinenser - liessen 
sich von den Fernsehbildern zu Freudendemonstrationen und Freudenschuessen aus ihren 
Maschinengewehren hinreissen. Dieser fatale politische Enthusiasmus erzeugte 
Fernsehbilder, die wiederum in Europa und Amerika zu Entsetzen fuehrten.  
(SZ-01-09-13: 21) 
But the NY TIMES also reports: 
But in Nablus, Palestinians took to the streets joyfully, without cameras to egg them on. 
(NYT-01-09-13: 18) 
The examples show that, in the context of the respective articles, delinquent and hostile actors are 
more or less used as pegs on which to hang the main story the article is covering. In the course of 
the article, the real topic or issue – the political negotiations of Israeli or Palestinian politicians, or 
the visit of European politicians as negotiators in the peace process in the Middle East – is then 
discussed. The Type 1 actors in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, therefore, only 
serve as an element of recognition for the topic that they are embedded in. Type 1 actors here 
more or less form a background image for the articles and for other actors that are at the center 
of those articles and the discussed topic.4 
                                                 
4 This form of depiction is not restricted to actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In a more recent context, it can 
also be found in the mass media coverage of the ongoing conflict in Iraq since 2003. Here, we can find a nearly 
identical depiction of anti-western insurgents fueling the violent conflict with daily terrorist attacks against the U.S. 
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Only one actor group steps beyond the specific sphere of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The 
Islamic Jihad is now ascribed to a wider radius of international terrorism and therefore now also 
occurs in the context of other topics besides the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This is mainly due to 
the assumed alliance of the group with Osama bin Laden, as the quotation from USA TODAY 
describes: 
Al-Jihad: Created in Egypt in the late 1970s, the group is blamed for the assassination of 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in 1991. One faction considers Omar Abdel-Rahman, 
imprisoned in the World Trade Center bombing, as its spiritual leader. Al-Jihad is a key 
component of bin Laden’s broader-based network. (USAT-01-09-25: 3A) 
However, this broadened scope can only be found in the U.S. media set and also only after 9/11. 
Nevertheless, the group remains a one-sided hostile terrorist actor. The only difference is that now 
it is described as acting at an international level, and is therefore is perceived as a threat for 
Western countries’ security as well. 
 
‘The Notorious Agitators,’5 Moammar Gaddafi6 and Saddam Hussein 
Besides the significant relevance of actors of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Type 1 also includes 
other actors, some of which are, in addition, also not nameless and anonymous like the ones 
mentioned so far. The most well-know representatives of Type 1 before 9/11 are Iraqi President 
Saddam Hussein for the U.S. print media set, and the Libyan de facto leader, Colonel Moammar 
Gaddafi7, in German newspapers. 
In the German newspapers, Gaddafi is labeled for instance as “Washington’s Archrival”8 and 
articles focus on the anti-western rhetoric of the “Libyan Terror Dictator.”9 The SZ writes: 
Mit scharfen Vorwuerfen an die Adresse der USA hat der libysche Staatschef Muammar el 
Gaddafi den 32. Jahrestag seiner Revolution gefeiert. In einer zweieinhalbstuendigen Rede 
vor Abgeordneten des Volkskongresses in Tripolis sagte Gaddafi, das Regierungssystem der 
USA sei veraltet und gehoere auf den Muell. “Amerika ist keine Demokratie”, sagte der 59-
Jaehrige, der am 1.September 1969 in einem unblutigen Putsch Koenig Idris gestuerzt hat. 
[…] Libyen ist einer von sieben Staaten, die nach Einschaetzung Washingtons den 
Terrorismus unterstuetzen. (SZ-01-09-03: 8d) 
The image of Saddam Hussein in the American newspapers is quite similar to that of Gaddafi in 
the German context. In a NEWSWEEK article, President George W. Bush is quoted as saying: 
Between air-strikes, President George W. Bush explained that Saddam was “still a menace, 
and we need to keep him in check, and will.” (NW-01-v138-i08: 26) 
                                                                                                                                                        
army in Iraq (as the counterpart to Israeli soldiers) and against Iraqi and foreign civilians (as a counterpart to the 
Israeli population). 
5 Own translation, original quote in German: “die notorischen Scharfmacher” (Sp-01-i30: 106). 
6 German and U.S. print media use various different transcriptions for the Arabic name (“Gadhafi”, “Quadhafi” or 
“Quaddafi”). In my own text, I will use the transcription “Gaddafi” from now on, but will not change the writing in 
the original German or U.S. quotes.  
7 Gaddafi holds no public office or title. 
8 Own translation, original quote in German: “Washingtons Erzrivale” (Sp-01-i34: 118). 
9 Own translation, original quote in German: “libyscher Terror-Diktator” (Bild-01-08-10: 1). 
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Furthermore, Hussein is labeled as a war criminal, and in one article in NEWSWEEK is referred to 
as the “butcher of Baghdad” who “can still threaten, in part, because he never leaves Iraq, and so 
can avoid the lengthening reach of international law.”10 Even though Saddam Hussein here is the 
central actor of the quoted article, he remains – nevertheless – a very one-sided character who 
only carries negative political or delinquent features, and therefore can be classified as a hostile and 
violent actor. This image changes only slightly after the 9/11 attacks, when Hussein also is 
suspected of being involved in terrorist activities. USA TODAY writes, for example: 
The elder Bush was second-guessed for ending the war without ousting Saddam Hussein, 
who still is in power and accused of sponsoring terrorism. (USAT-01-09-17: 10A) 
This aspect even becomes a given fact in a later depiction of the Iraqi president, when the 
newspaper writes that… 
Some Bush advisers say they believe the scope of the retaliation should be expanded to 
include Iraq because of President Saddam Hussein’s past support for terrorism. The State 
Department issued a report in April that identified Iraq as one of the seven leading state 
sponsors of terrorism. (USAT-01-10-09: 8A) 
And the NY TIMES quotes political sources that see Hussein as one of the suspected mastermind 
of the 9/11 attacks. The newspaper writes: 
Mr. Wolfowitz is said to be wedded to the position that Mr. bin Laden and his Al Qaeda 
network could not have carried out the attack without Saddam Hussein’s help, the officials 
said. (NYT-01-09-25: 2) 
Thus, he remains a representative of Type 1 as his image is only expanded with one more 
negative element. 
Altogether, after the 9/11 attacks the composition of this actor type changes only insofar as the 
formerly dominating portrayal of actors’ hostility towards Israel is now outweighed by the 
potential aggression and threat of the terrorist front of hostile actors from Pakistan, Europe, or the 
United States. Even though we still find a significant number of Palestinian actors in both 
countries’ newspapers, Type 1 is now dominated by other terrorist groups and individual actors 
of diverse origins. In both countries, we now find a more significant number of hostile and violent 
Pakistani terrorists, religious groups, and private actors. German print media also focus on a large 
variety of internal German or European terror cells and groups, whereas U.S. articles now 
increasingly refer to Type 1 terrorist actors within America’s national borders. 
 
2.2. Type 2: The Culturally Backward and Fundamentalist Other 
The second form of negative imaging can be found with regard to cultural otherness of Muslim 
and Arab actors and countries. Like the first type, images of Type 2 actors combine violent 
behavior or attitudes with hostility and other negative political features. However, the central facet 
of the images of Type 2 actors is the dimension of cultural underdevelopment that is predominantly 
reflected in the fact that this second actor type subsumes actors who are described as culturally 
                                                 
10 NW-01-v138-i08: 26 
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conservative, or as religiously fundamentalist or fanatic. As has been indicated in chapter V, those 
cultural aspects are regarded by the observing German and U.S. Self as cultural backwardness to a 
large extent. Other features that shape this cultural underdevelopment are descriptions of actors as 
being misogynistic or uncivilized. In some contexts, actors of this type are referred to as medieval. As 
already mentioned, these cultural features are often combined with politically negative 
characteristics and violent features or delinquent activities, and in these contexts, religion is often 
regarded as the driving force for these activities. Apart from that, Type 2 actors sometimes also 
possess negative personal features, being described as superstitious, choleric, arrogant, or in the U.S. 
context, as evil. Those personal facets further emphasize their negativity as a person or 
supposedly explain the roots for delinquent action. In a number of cases, the reference to the 
actors’ appearance and their style of clothing strengthen the conservative or religiously fundamentalist 
image. 
Culturally devaluated actors form the second most commonly used form of devaluation in both 
countries’ newspapers to describe Arab and Muslim actors. However, despite the attacks and 
their religious terrorist background, the occurrence of this actor type only slightly changes in the 
analyzed data after the attacks. In German articles the proportion slightly decreased from 12.8 % 
of all occurring actors in the timeframe before the attacks to 12.3 % after the event. In U.S. 
articles the proportion of Type 2 actors dropped from 11.6 % to 8.0 %. This slightly differing 
quantitative relevance of Type 2 actors further supports the observation that has already been 
made in chapter V, namely that the German perception of Arab and Muslim actors is shaped by a 
stronger quantitative focus on the dimension of cultural difference as an element of demarcating 
Self from Other than the American perception. 
Alongside the anonymous violent and hostile actors in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which were 
examined in the last section, a number of the leading actors in this conflict are representatives of 
Type 2. In contrast to the Palestinian Type 1 actors, negative cultural features are additionally 
ascribed to these terrorist groups and they appear repeatedly over the analyzed timeframe. In 
both countries’ print media, for example, the Palestinian organization Hamas dominates news 
coverage of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict before the 9/11 attacks. In the German as well as in 
the U.S. newspapers, the Hamas occurs in nearly every article that focuses on the conflict. 
Furthermore, and compared to Type 1 actors, groups like Hamas are also provided with a 
religious facet that guides their political and violent actions: both countries’ print media regard 
them not only as hostile and violent but also as Islamic fundamentalists. 
Apart from the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, before 9/11 this actor type also includes a number of 
other actor groups. In German newspapers we find a larger number of private actors of Iranian 
or Palestinian origin. The SZ describes parts of the population of Yemen as “[…] conservative, 
strictly religious mountain clans that have been completely cut off from the world for 
centuries.”11 U.S. media also describe the country of Yemen as culturally and politically conservative 
                                                 
11 Own translation, original quote in German: “den konservativen, streng religiösen, seit Jahrhunderten von der Welt 
abgeschnitten Bergstämmen” (SZ-01-08-16: 3). 
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by giving a detailed description of the cruel and inhuman punishments under the Islamic Sharia law 
used in Yemeni courts. Furthermore, in German articles, this actor type includes religious groups 
from Afghanistan, Iran, or Palestine who are referred to as fanatic, fundamentalist, and radical. 
 
The Iranian Religious Conservatives in U.S. Newspapers 
Both countries’ print media describe the Iranian religious leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the 
Iranian Guardian Council as culturally and politically conservative. German print media, for 
instance, see Khamenei as the powerful Iranian leader, who as the clerical leader has the last word 
with regard to many religious and political issues, and who opposes the reform course of the 
moderate president Mohammed Khatami. In addition to that, in American print media, the Iranian 
religious conservatives are quantitatively depicted more frequently before 9/11 than in the 
German context. The NY TIMES, for example, openly criticizes the Ayatollah by stating that… 
Unelected clerical leaders ought not to have arbitrary power to arrest and punish their critics, 
overrule Parliament and direct intelligence agencies to organize assassinations abroad. 
Narrow interpretations of Shiite orthodoxy should not be imposed on an unwilling 
population. (NYT-01-08-10: 18) 
In addition to that, the U.S. newspapers describe the rigid rules and consequences that result 
from the conservative actions of “Iran’s conservative clerics who hold the most power and want 
to maintain it through a strict interpretation of Islamic law.”12 As the NY TIMES reports: 
Since the revolution, the government has also enforced obligatory veiling for women and a 
punishment of 74 lashes for violators. For years, bright colors were considered 
inappropriate, and women in the government were required to wear a shapeless black head-
to-toe cover known as a chador. (NYT-01-07-29: 6) 
In combination with the Ayatollah, in both countries the Iranian Guardian Council is described 
as a symbol of cultural conservatism. The image of the institution is strongly shaped by cultural 
facets and by violent and undemocratic actions, like the supporting of public beatings and the 
suppression of women, and in one article, the NY TIMES quotes: 
“The whip must cut the skin and smash the flesh, and it is all right if a bone breaks,” a 
reformist newspaper, Norouz, quoted [chief justice] Mr. [Ayatollah Mohammad 
Mohammadi] Gilani as saying. (NYT-01-09-01: 2). 
Altogether, the Iranian religious leaders can be regarded as the prototype actor for cultural 
devaluation in the analyzed U.S. print media before 9/11. 
  
Turkish Politicians in German Newspapers 
Comparable to that prototype in U.S. newspapers, German articles before 9/11 more frequently 
depict the Turkish government and a number of different political parties in Turkey as culturally 
conservative, fundamentalist, and misogynistic, as the following passage from the German SZ about the 
former ruling party in Turkey, the MHP, illustrates: 
                                                 
12 NYT-01-07-29: 6 
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Doch bemueht sich derzeit die nationalkonservative Regierungspartei MHP wieder einmal 
ganz besonders, sich als Waechter angeblich tuerkischer Traditionen zu profilieren. […] 
“Unanstaendige Bekleidung” der Schuelerinnen wird danach mit einem Ausschluss aus dem 
Unterricht von einem bis zu fuenf Tagen bestraft. Auch fuer das Aufsuchen “unanstaendiger 
Orte” drohen Sanktionen, wobei nicht definiert wird, welche Plaetze das sein koennen, was 
den Moralwaechtern viele Moeglichkeiten gibt. Die schwerste Bestrafung – der Hinauswurf 
aus der Schule – aber droht bei Verlust der Jungfraeulichkeit. Dann sollen die Schuelerinnen 
(von den Schuelern ist hier nicht die Rede) auch keine andere staatliche Schule mehr 
besuchen duerfen. (SZ-01-07-17: 12) 
The conservative forces of Turkish culture seem to be highly interesting from the German 
perspective of observation. This could be explained by Turkey’s negotiations with Europe to join 
the European Union (EU), as well as by the fact that Germany has a large number of Turkish 
immigrants. With reference to Turkey’s attempts to become a member of the EU, German print 
media especially communicate the requirement of a stronger political turn towards Western 
norms, values, and standards and a stronger process of democratization as a central condition for 
the entry of the country to the Union. Thus, political and cultural conflicts in the country are 
attentively observed, and especially cultural deviations from the Western standard principles are 
critically discussed. 
At the same time, those Western criteria that are set in the course of the Turkish accession 
negotiations to the EU are one way of marking difference between the two countries, Germany 
and Turkey. The newspaper images of Turkish politicians indicate skepticism on behalf of the 
German Self with regard to the pro-western attempts of Turkish politics and the cultural 
development of the country. One interpretation here could be that the entry of Turkey to the EU 
might not only neutralize the political and cultural distance but (symbolically) also the 
geographical distance between the West and the Muslim country. 
 
Type 2 Actors after 9/11 
After 9/11, Type 2 is mainly represented by religious groups and terrorist groups from Palestine, 
Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon, Iraq, Indonesia, and Afghanistan. Altogether, the terms of 
description become sharper, as the articles now include more devaluating portrayals when 
referring to those actors. For instance, in DER SPIEGEL Islamic fundamentalists are referred to as 
“[…] those manic fundamentalists from the Muslim world”13 or as “Islamic zealots,”14 and the 
cultural backwardness of Type 2 actors is described, for example, in an article in the NY TIMES that 
discusses the Saudi Arabian Wahhabi traditions of suppression and violent rule: 
The telephone, radio broadcasts and public education for women were at one point 
condemned as innovations wrought by the Devil. […] There are no movie theaters in Saudi 
Arabia – they would promote the unhealthy mingling of the sexes – and women are banned 
from driving. Their Islam is an ascetic one. Men should wear short robes and even avoid the 
black cords used on head clothes. Mosques should be without decoration. There should be 
no public holidays other than religious ones, and even the prophet’s birthday should not be 
                                                 
13 Own translation, original quote in German: “durchgeknallten Fundamentalisten aus der islamischen Welt” (Sp-01-
i38: 168). 
14 Own translation, original quote in German: “islamische Eiferer” (Sp-01-i39: 112). 
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celebrated. Drinking alcohol is forbidden. Punishment should be meted out as described in 
the Koran. The right hand should be amputated for theft. Adulterers should be stoned to 
death. Murder and sexual deviation merit beheading. (NYT-01-10-07: 7) 
Especially Islamic fundamentalism in Pakistan is now frequently mentioned in both countries’ 
newspapers, primarily as an example of religious fanaticism and backwardness. DER SPIEGEL refers 
to Pakistani fundamentalists as “Stone Age Islamists” or as “radical and ignorant Mullahs,”15 and 
in the NY TIMES we find the following statement: 
Like Mullah Omar [the Taliban leader], they [the Pakistani fundamentalists] share a world 
view born of devotion to the same Deobandi school of Islamic belief. Its roots are in a 
political and spiritual movement that sprang up in 19th century in the Indian city of 
Deoband, and which espoused a back-to-basic creed that is regarded as the theological font 
of contemporary Muslim fundamentalism. (NYT-01-09-29: 6) 
In another context, USA TODAY writes: 
“It is biologically, religiously and prophetically proven that men are superior to women,” said 
Maulana Adil Siddiqu, spokesman for the Dar-ul Uloom Haqqani school in the northwest 
Pakistan city of Akora Khattack. It is one of Pakistan’s largest Muslim schools.  
(USAT-01-09-21: 1Ac) 
To sum up, we can say that images of Type 2 actors include a combination of political and 
cultural elements that have been outlined as central features for the difference between Self and 
Other. Type 2 actors are culturally conservative, backward, and religiously fundamentalist. These 
indicators of cultural difference from the German and U.S. Self and Western cultural standards 
can be summarized with a quote from the NY TIMES that discusses the societal role of the Arab 
broadcasting channel Al Jazeera: 
Al Jazeera […] has focused on subjects considered subversive in most parts of the Arab 
world: the absence of democratic institutions, the persecution of political dissidents and the 
inequality of women. (NYT-01-10-09: 6) 
 
2.3. Type 3: The Politically Devaluated Other 
A third form of negative portrayal can be found with regard to the political dimension. Images of 
Type 3 actors can be seen as political anti-images to the political standards and principles like 
democracy or equality that are emphasized by the Western Self. The emphasis of negative 
political features is therefore the central line of difference that is drawn between the self-concept 
and this type of actor. Unlike the first type (see V.2.1.), Type 3 does not include actors who are 
basically violent and politically hostile but focuses on other political features that go beyond simple 
aggressive hostility. The observations with regard to these actors focus much more strongly on 
internal political actions and processes, also with regard to terrorism. Politically devaluated actors 
are often inactive in internal political or violent conflicts like the one between Israel and Palestine. 
Therefore, a number of them are described as politically weak or not interested in active engagement 
in peace process, etc. 
                                                 
15 Own translation, original quote in German: “Steinzeit-Islamisten” and “radikaler, weltfremder Mullahs” (Sp-01-
i39: 162). 
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Type 3 actors indirectly reflect the political values and standards that the Self imposes on the 
Other, for example in the way they are described as the opposite to those values. A number of 
the actors of this type are described as not democratic, not tolerant, or not peaceful, and instead are 
referred to as militant, radical, intolerant, or politically powerless and unstable. Altogether, this type 
reflects the political disadvantages of the Other and violence is seen as part of the overall political 
agenda. After 9/11, especially inactiveness against terrorism or even active terror support of some 
political groups and regimes is a frequently criticized feature in the context of political 
devaluation. Politically devaluated Arab and Muslim actors can be found in both countries’ 
newspapers, before as well as after the 9/11 attacks. In both countries, however, the number of 
Type 3 actors decreased slightly after the attacks, from 5.8 % of all occurring actors to 3.3 % in 
the German articles, and from 5.2 % of all actors in U.S. newspapers before 9/11 to 3.6 % after 
the attacks. 
Before the attacks, the main representatives of this type are political actors like governments, 
nation states, or other political groups and parties, although we also find private and military 
actors. The regional origin of these actors is quite diverse and ranges from the governments of 
Indonesia and Syria, depictions of the Turkish population or of Arab nation states in German 
articles to the government of Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Uzbekistan, or Turkmenistan in U.S. articles. 
The Syrian government, for instance, is seen as a supporter of terrorism in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict. As DER SPIEGEL writes: 
So unterstützt Damaskus nach israelischen Geheimdienstinformationen – im Schulterschluss 
mit der iranischen Mullah-Führung – die Hisbollah im Südlibanon, die Grenzposten in 
Israels Norden angreift. (Sp-01-i30: 106) 
Arab nation states as a whole are quarrelsome and face permanent internal as well as international 
political conflicts. But also the former Russian republics of Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan are 
negatively depicted since “while the governments claim they are a steadying force, their 
repression is creating instability.”16 A German article in the SZ describes the military forces of the 
Philippines as politically powerless because “the hallmark of the Philippine army is that it seems to 
be unable to defeat the terrorists,”17 whereas U.S. articles classify Moammar Gaddafi as politically 
isolated. 
 
The Political Incompetence of Abdurrahman Wahid in U.S. Newspapers 
A prototype for political as well as personal incompetence in U.S. newspapers is the former 
Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid. In the analyzed articles his constructed image can be 
regarded as the negative counterpart to the image of his successor, Megawati Sukarnoputri. By 
illustrating the deficits of Wahid and the political consequences for Indonesian democracy and 
the country, his image also demonstrates the benefits of his displacement and the change of 
government. Thus, the central element of Wahid’s image is the political dimension that is 
                                                 
16 NYT-01-08-16: 22 
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additionally accompanied by a number of negative personal features that have an influence on his 
political decisions and actions, as can be illustrated with the following quote from the NY TIMES: 
Mr. Wahid is a proud and stubborn man, certain of his correctness and ready for a fight. He 
insists that the Legislature has no right to challenge him or to remove him from office. […] 
It is this insouciant style, as much as any substance, that has driven an exasperated nation to 
seek Mr. Wahid’s removal. Over the past 21 months, his unbuttoned lip has succeeded in 
alienating most of his allies and infuriating his rivals. (NYT-01-07-21: 3) 
In another context, his political actions are equated with those of an undemocratic dictator who 
needs to be disempowered to secure the democratic development of the country: 
“These are the actions of a dictator,” said Andi Mallarangeng, a leading political analyst. “It is 
time for the people to say goodbye to Wahid. As a citizen of Indonesia, I urge people not to 
obey this decree. It is treason.” (NYT-01-07-23: 1) 
Furthermore, his desperate clinging to power is regarded as power-obsessed – an aspect that is 
further emphasized by the fact that Wahid would even use violence to stay in power. However, 
beyond the political and personal dimension U.S. print media also include other dimensions in 
the image of the president, as can be illustrated with a quote from the NY TIMES that 
summarizes his major failures as a political leader: 
Beginning with a charge of corruption, the process evolved into a general condemnation of 
Mr. Wahid’s term, which has been criticized for its eccentricity, incompetence and drift. As 
the showdown approached, he found himself increasingly isolated and fell back on what 
seemed his only option, to declare an emergency and silence his tormentors by shutting 
down Parliament. The political standoff has all but paralyzed his already disorganized 
administration. (NYT-01-07-23: 1) 
Apart from his political incompetence, a quote from another article illustrates that the political image 
of Wahid is not only a negative one but that the actor can also not be taken seriously as a person 
– even in his personal views and practices: 
Mr. Wahid, who was the most overtly mystical of Indonesia’s presidents, is a Muslim cleric 
who frequently communes with saints and had, as president, parallel groups of political and 
spiritual advisers. […] There is the time he went to an all-night shadow-puppet show for 
spiritual inspiration but fell asleep before the good part. Or the time he prayed tearfully at a 
tomb, only to discover later that it was the wrong one. (NYT-01-08-20: 3) 
The image of Wahid is contrasted in the articles with that of his successor, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri. This change of power in the Indonesian government and the contrasting 
construction of both political figures also illustrate the consequences of political incompetence. With 
Wahid, those political failures are closely connected to a personal incompetence of the respective 
actor. The former president is seen as an extreme example of political and personal failure not 
only to explain the political processes in Indonesia, but also as a counter-image to the Western 
definition of political leadership. Wahid’s successor Megawati Sukarnoputri, on the other hand, is 
constructed as an “improved” version of political leadership and is described somewhat 
differently. She thus also receives a different image that will be introduced later in the context of 
another form of difference construction. 
                                                                                                                                                        
17 Own translation, original quote in German: “Das Markenzeichen der philippinischen Armee ist es, dass es ihr 
nicht gelingen will, die Terroristen zu bezwingen.” (SZ-01-08-06: 4b). 
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After 9/11, the representatives of political devaluation become more diverse in U.S. articles, 
whereas their composition becomes more homogeneous in German articles. In U.S. print media, 
nearly one third of the Type 3 actors are connected to the attacks in the United States, for 
example as financiers or intellectual supporters. Apart from that, countries like Nigeria, the 
Russian republic of Chechnya, Lebanon, or political groups like the Moro Islamic Liberation 
Front (MILF, a Muslim separatist rebel group) in the Philippines, and the government of Algeria 
are politically devaluated as instable and struggling with inner political conflicts. In contrast to that, 
actors that are solely politically devaluated in German articles are almost exclusively governments, 
for example, in Libya, Syria, and Iraq, or the Iranian parliament. These government actors are 
mainly described as supporting forces behind the increasing threat caused by international 
terrorist groups, as this quote from the German SZ shows: 
Um die Mitte der Neunzigerjahre (des vorigen Jahrhunderts) lenkte eine Reihe von 
selbstmoerderischen Bombenanschlaegen […] die Aufmerksamkeit auf die wachsende 
Bedrohung durch den von anderen Staaten gefoerderten Terrorismus. In der Folgezeit 
ersetzte dieses Phaenomen die Theorien von der kommunistischen Verschwoerung als dem 
wichtigsten Zusammenhang, in dem der Terrorismus zu sehen sei. Danach waren an der 
Finanzierung terroristischer Handlungen verschiedene abtruennige, auslaendische 
Regierungen wie die Regime im Iran, Irak, Libyen und Syrien aktiv beteiligt oder erteilten 
den Auftrag zu deren Durchfuehrung. (SZ-01-09-15: I) 
Therefore, it can be summarized that the qualitative construction of Type 3 actors after the 
attacks is largely reduced to the question whether those actors are supporting terrorism or actively 
oppose and fight terrorist activities and terror groups within their national borders. Furthermore, 
before as well as after the attacks, political devaluation takes place mainly in the image of political 
actors, and here, mostly with the portrayal of governments or nation states that do not fulfill the 
Western political standards. 
 
2.4. Type 4: The Poor and Underdeveloped Other 
With regard to social and economic features a fourth form of devaluation can be identified in 
both countries’ newspapers that is illustrated by the fourth actor type I would like to introduce 
here. This actor type is shaped by a main focus on social and economic features that are, 
however, often complemented by political features. The images that are constructed here reflect 
the social and economic conflicts and instabilities that may be caused for example by political 
incompetence or corruption in the Arab and Muslim countries that are covered. In another context the 
negative social and economic features and conditions are seen as the consequences of undemocratic 
structures for the economy of the Arab and Muslim countries in focus. Predominantly, this type 
summarizes the images of several Arab and Muslim countries. 
Before the 9/11 attacks, this type is represented mainly by country portrayals of Indonesia, 
Turkey, and Iran. Drug addiction and poverty are features that are used, for instance, to portray 
private actors in Iran who are referred to as living in a country that “for years […] tried to hide 
drug abuse,” a strategy that is regarded as “the standard reactions to social problems in a country 
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that promotes Islamic government as the key to an earthly Eden.”18 In the German SZ, referring 
to parts of the population of the Yemeni city of Aden, people are described as “beggars, tattered 
children who offer you tissues, bottles of water, cigarettes […] Half of these people cannot find a 
regular job.”19 And BILD reports on a small village in southern Anatolia where the poor 
infrastructure and, more specifically, the lack of an adequate water supply system have led to a sex 
boycott by the women of the village.20 
Before 9/11, in U.S. articles 3.9 % of all occurring actors can be labeled as Type 4 actors, 
whereas in German articles this actor type is barely significant: only 1.2 % of all occurring actors 
here can be classified as solely devaluated with regard to social or economic features. After the 
attacks, this form of actor portrayal changes only slightly with regard to its quantitative 
significance in both print media sets: 1.9 % of all actors in the German articles and 2.3 % of 
those in the U.S. articles can be identified as Type 4 actors. Despite this small quantitative 
significance compared to the other actors types that have been introduced so far, the images of 
Type 4 actors reflect a number of aspects that can be regarded as crucial social and economic 
differences between Self and Other. 
 
The Social and Economic Problems of Indonesia in U.S. Newspapers 
As already mentioned, in U.S. newspapers before 9/11, the national and economic situation of 
Indonesia is frequently discussed. The resulting image of the country can be seen as one crucial 
example for social and economic devaluation. In U.S. articles, Indonesia is described as facing 
“enormous problems – economic collapse, political turmoil, social instability, debilitating 
corruption and, yes, widespread violence and local wars.”21 The social and economic crisis in 
Indonesia is the major aspect that is discussed in this context. The NY TIMES, for instance, 
mentions the badly developed infrastructure of the country that leads to negative consequences such 
as train accidents:  
Indonesia has had a string of fatal train crashes recently. Officials blamed signal failures for 
most of the accidents. Last month, a passenger train plowed into a crowded bus, killing at 
least 13 people on Java. That accident happened because the bus failed to stop at a railway 
crossing. […] With the nation in its worst economic crisis in a generation, budgets to 
maintain railway lines and other equipment have been severely cut. (NYT-01-09-03: 4b) 
In another context, the newspaper reports on the environmental destruction that causes natural 
disasters: 
After days of torrential rains, floods and landslides poured down mountainsides early this 
morning on Nias, an Indonesian island 60 miles off the coast of Sumatra, sweeping away 
entire villages and causing at least 60 deaths, local officials said. […] “So it’s really a sign of 
the environmental destruction of Indonesia,” said Longgena Ginting, the campaign director 
of Walhi. “Deforestation has become a serious problem, along with bad forest 
                                                 
18 NYT-01-08-18: 1 
19 Own translation, original quote in German: “Bettler, zerlumpte Kinder, die Taschentuecher, Wasserflaschen, 
Zigaretten anbieten, sind allgegenwaertig. Die Haelfte der Leute findet keine geregelte Arbeit.” (SZ-01-08-16: 3). 
20 Bild-01-08-16: 7 
21 NYT-01-07-29: 6 
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management.” […] Much of the problem is caused by illegal logging, one symptom of 
economic hardship, Mr. Ginting said. (NYT-01-08-02: 10b) 
The social and economic problems of Indonesia are thereby also linked to the political situation – 
an issue that has already been touched in the context of the media image of former Indonesian 
president Wahid (see VI.2.3), and this mainly refers to the change of political power during the 
timeframe of the analysis. The references to the economic crisis of the country implicitly see one 
of the reasons for the crisis in the past political failures, as can be exemplified with the following 
quotation from the NY TIMES: 
Foreign companies have shunned Indonesia since Mr. Suharto resigned in 1998 during a 
tumult of demonstrations, political defections and military feuds. Those who have stayed, 
like Exxon Mobil, have ridden a roller coaster as Mr. Wahid presided over mounting strife in 
separatist provinces like Aceh. Other companies have been mired in the corrupt legal system. 
(NYT-01-07-25: 1) 
Moreover, we also find implicit Western expectations that ask for an intervention of the political 
leaders, i.e. the future Indonesian president. The NY TIMES writes for example that… 
Megawati Sukarnoputri, Indonesia’s new president, has a mess on her hands. The economy is 
in tatters, regions are in revolt and the government has almost broken down.  
(NYT-01-07-27: 19) 
…and in another article it is argued that… 
In her announcement today, the president asked for a wide base of support in her attempts 
to address Indonesia's economic and social crises. Mrs. Megawati inherits from Mr. Wahid a 
country torn by violence, political infighting and continuing instability. (NYT-01-08-10: 4) 
Therefore, the change in power is also commented on by the observing U.S. Self with implicit 
expectations that are directed towards the new head of the government. Those expectations – in 
turn – can be regarded as implicit social and economic, but also political standards that the 
American Self expresses. To get this assumption across more precisely we can look at the last 
quotation I would like to mention and that refers to Indonesia. The NY TIMES writes that… 
The Bush administration plans to renew some American ties to the Indonesian military, the 
most powerful institution in the sprawling Southeast Asian country but one fraught with 
human rights abuses. The decision is part of an effort to cement stronger ties with Indonesia, 
one of the most important but unstable countries in the region, after the relatively smooth 
coming to power of the new president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, whose ascent was supported 
by the military. […] In re-establishing military ties, the Bush administration says it would like 
to help ensure the stability of the country, a vast archipelago that has been riven by separatist 
movements. (NYT-01-08-12: 11) 
In this quote we find pretty explicit expectations of the U.S. Self with regard to the political and 
economic actions of the new Indonesian government and, at the same time, criticism of the 
negative political and economic features of the country like human rights violations, and political as 
well as economic instability. 
 
The Socially and Economically Dilapidated Afghanistan 
After the 9/11 attacks, the geographical focus shifts slightly and representatives of Type 4 now 
predominantly come from Pakistan or Afghanistan. In the German articles, we now find a larger 
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number of Pakistani or Afghan private actors whose poverty is especially emphasized. 
Afghanistan is described as a starving and “poor, Islamic country,”22 and is described as “politically 
and economically oppressed.”23 Pakistan is also regarded as a nation state that is economically run-
down, this being mainly traced back to the economic sanctions that the United States imposed on 
India and Pakistan after their nuclear tests of 1998. In another context, U.S. media refer to 
Afghanistan as a country that is “suffering its worst drought in decades, famine is imminent and 
U.N. sanctions imposed earlier this year,”24 and that is dramatically described as “a post-
apocalyptic place of felled cities, parched land and downtrodden people.”25 This social and 
economic underdevelopment is also regarded as one consequence of the political conflicts in the 
region, as can be illustrated with the following quote from DER SPIEGEL: 
Herrscher in Afghanistan werden in der Regel gestürzt, und oft werden sie dabei auch gleich 
umgebracht. So ist es Sitte in Asiens Herzland, dessen Geschichte eine breite Blutspur 
gewaltsamer Umbrüche durchzieht. Allein im Bürgerkriegschaos der vergangenen 23 Jahre 
verloren am Hindukusch gut eine Million Afghanen ihr Leben, wurden vier der Präsidenten 
erschossen oder abgeschlachtet. (Sp-01-i39: 166) 
As was the case before the attacks, those social and economic conflicts and the general underdevelopment 
are regarded as a potential threat to the national political stability and peace. As the NY TIMES 
writes: 
The countries most concerned are Indonesia, a nation with 210 million people; the 
Philippines, with an intractable separatist insurgency in its partly Muslim southern islands, 
and Malaysia, where radical Muslim groups are taking advantage of a time of political flux. 
[…] Most worrisome to diplomats and security experts is Indonesia, where poverty has 
spawned widespread discontent, new political openness has given latitude to extremist 
groups and disarray in the security forces has weakened law enforcement. (NYT-01-09-21: 7) 
What becomes obvious with the images of Type 4 actors is that the social and economic 
deficiencies are predominantly connected to the political and social consequences that result from 
those deficiencies. Predominantly, these negative features lead to national or even international 
political conflicts and instability as the following quote about the future developments in Indonesia 
shows: 
Indonesia is seen as pivotal for the stability of Southeast Asia and, administration officials 
say, has assumed new significance as the broader region stumbles through an unexpected 
period of economic downturn and political uncertainty. (NYT-01-08-12: 11) 
In another context, a similar statement is made about the future of Turkey in the context of its 
current economic problems: 
Though Turkey is not prone to mass demonstrations, concerns have increased among 
political leaders about the potential for a social explosion as the poor watch the rich glide 
along seemingly unscathed, particularly in the country's showcase city. (NYT-01-07-21: 4) 
Again, the construction of socially and economically devaluated actors can be interpreted as also 
implicitly reflecting the economic and social standards that the observing U.S. or German Self 
                                                 
22 Own translation, original quote in German: “das arme islamische Land” (Sp-01-i39: 148). 
23 Own translation, original quote in German: “dem politisch und wirtschaftlich zerschundenen Afghanistan”  
(SZ-09-19: 28). 
24 NW-01-v138-i14: 30 
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applies when it observes the Other. Especially in the U.S. newspapers we find very explicit 
suggestions for the Other as well. Thus, in the NY TIMES we find the following one – directed 
towards the Iranian government: 
[Iranian president] Khatami needs to press ahead with limited but attainable changes. These 
should include revitalizing Iran’s sluggish economy, professionalizing public institutions and 
further loosening the grip of the morals police on daily life. […] Corruption and bureaucratic 
inertia have put a drag on employment and incomes. Even some of the more farsighted 
clerical conservatives recognize that to survive, the Islamic Republic needs to produce better 
economic results. (NYT-01-08-10: 18) 
This statement not only lists the major deficiencies of the Iranian economy like corruption or low 
income and employment rates, but also implicitly calls upon the political leaders to act, and to tackle 
those problems and improve the economic situation. 
 
2.5. Type 5: The Wealthy Political Elite 
In addition to the actor type described above, the analysis has revealed a second form of actor 
devaluation that focuses on the economic dimension. At first glance, this portrayal does not 
concentrate on negative economic or social aspects but rather focuses on those actors who own 
the money but spend it incorrectly: Actors of this type are described, for example, as wealthy or 
money-grubbing persons, who lead an extravagant, lavish lifestyle. In a way, their image forms the 
opposite to the image of Type 4 actors. This two-sided classification of Arab and Muslim actors 
in the dimension of social and economic features distinguishes between actors who are either 
tremendously wealthy, extravagant, unscrupulous, and money grubbing, or extremely poor, uneducated, and 
economically powerless has already been noted in chapter V as one of the major lines of distinction 
between Self and Other.26 
In a way, actors of Type 5 thereby represent one of the causes for the negative situation of Type 
4 actors, i.e. especially of the respective countries in which those Type 5 actors are situated. Some 
government actors, for example, are illustrated as lavish, money grubbing actors who, at the same 
time, enforce undemocratic structures and are held responsible for social and economic crises in their 
countries. Other wealthy actors even have to face bankruptcy because of their lavishness. Here, we 
may say that the constructed images implicitly contrast the lavishness and recklessness of the 
Other with a Western view that asks for thrift, generosity, and responsibility, and a certain 
discipline that the Other does not fulfill. Even though those actors are rich, this financial wealth is 
devaluated by their corruptive, lavish, or arrogant behavior. Some of these Type 5 actors are 
additionally devaluated in another dimension, for example, as being violent, politically hostile 
towards internal political opponents or Western countries, or as being undemocratic political 
leaders. 
                                                                                                                                                        
25 NYT-01-09-13: 18 
26 Karim (1997) refers to those kinds of actors as “cruel, barbaric, and lascivious but fabulously wealthy sheiks” 
(Karim 1997: 158), which summarizes the major facets of this actor type rather well, even though the author is not 
exclusively referring to print media. 
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In the German print media before the 9/11 attacks, Type 5 actors appears with a proportion of 
5.4 % of all occurring actors. Compared to that, these images are less relevant in U.S articles, 
where only 3.0 % of all appearing actors in Arab and Muslim countries can be assigned to this 
type. Geographically, these actors mainly come from countries like Egypt, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, 
Brunei, or Iran. In both German and U.S. newspapers, the type is mainly represented by private 
and government actors. After 9/11, this actor type nearly disappears completely from both 
countries’ constructed print media reality (Germany: 0.4 %, USA: 0.3 %). The dimension of 
social and economic features, in general, becomes less relevant and is more or less ruled out by 
the issues of terrorism and cultural fundamentalism that become the center of focus after the 
event. 
Representatives of Type 5 in U.S. articles are, for example, the former Iranian Shah who is 
portrayed as lavish, extravagant, and culturally unworldly. An article from the NY TIMES mentions 
that “the ordinary Iranians see the shah as a despot.”27 In German articles, a similar image is 
ascribed, for instance, to the Palestinian government who is described as corrupt and politically 
unstable. In this context, the German SZ writes about the Palestinian National Authority: 
Dort ist er [Jassir Arafat] den Leiden seines Volkes so fern wie seine ganze korrupte 
Autonomiebehoerde, deren Minister in schmucken Villen in Gaza und Ramallah logieren, 
wo sie den Laerm der Kaempfe eher als Feuerwerk wahrnehmen. (SZ-01-08-24: 4) 
And both countries’ print media communicate a devaluated image of a member of the Brunei 
royal family, Prince Jefri Bolkiah, “who has squandered billions of dollars of government money 
in the oil-rich sultanate,”28 and who “snatched up everything just as long as it was expensive 
enough – from luxurious real estate to jewelry of dubious taste.”29 As the article outlines, the 
lifestyle of the prince is said to have completely ruined the financial budget of his country. 
But also non-political actors from the private sector can be classified as Type 5 actors. The 
German tabloid BILD, for example, states that “Saudi Arabian women are addicted to clothes,”30 
in an article that solely concentrates on this shopping addiction of Saudi Arabian women. This 
facet could be contrasted with a statement from the German news magazine DER SPIEGEL which 
reports about the “ultra-conservative kingdom” claims that… 
Reformen aber sind mehr als überfällig. In Saudi-Arabien sind weder Parteien erlaubt, noch 
gibt es freie Wahlen. Frauen dürfen bei Ihnen noch nicht einmal Auto fahren.  
(Sp-01-i30: 108) 
And in the NY TIMES, Saudi Arabian men are constructed as vain, extravagant and lazy, especially 
in terms of their work ethic. The newspaper writes here that… 
Hiring Saudis is one thing; getting them to show up is another. […] One Saudi man objected 
to wearing overalls, embarrassed when acquaintances rolled down their car windows and 
joked that he should avoid police patrols looking for illegal immigrants. Another disliked the 
job title of laborer assigned to the roughly $6,000 per year entry job, wanting to tell his new 
                                                 
27 NYT-01-09-07: 4 
28 NYT-01-08-18: 6 
29 Own translation, original quote in German: “Der hatte alles zusammengerafft, was nur teuer genug war – von 
Luxusimmobilien bis zu Edelstein besetzten Schmuckstücken von zweifelhaftem Geschmack.” (Sp-01-i34: 128). 
30 Own translation, original quote in German: “Saudi-arabische Frauen sind kleidersüchtig” (Bild-01-07-17: 12). 
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bride he was a technician. A third insisted that he belonged in management, not production. 
(NYT-01-08-26: 1) 
Finally, in an article in the German SZ we are given the example of an Egyptian father who is not 
only described as culturally conservative but also as lavish and money-grubbing: He gambles and loses 
all his money and, as a consequence, tries to marry his daughter to a rich Saudi in order to receive 
new money and assets like jewelry and other presents that would help him to compensate for the 
financial loss.31 
To sum, we can say that even though Type 5 actors, on the one hand, carry somewhat positive 
features since they are described as wealthy and sometimes also as educated, their image is, on the 
other hand, devaluated by other political, cultural, or personal features. The type reflects a 
Western perception of the respective actors as being unable to manage their economic wealth. 
This indicates that the Western observer implicitly criticizes the observed actors with regard to 
the way in which they spend their money. This critical perception is further emphasized in some 
articles by illustrating the negative consequences of this behavior, for example, by contrasting 
these actors with the poverty and deficiencies of their surrounding environment, i.e. the countries 
that they rule or live in. 
 
2.6. Type 6: The Villain  
The last actor type that reflects a form of devaluation of Arab and Muslim actors can be labeled 
as “villains” since it presents the prototype of the devaluated Other, and actors of this type may 
be seen as the most different and thus the most distant actors with regard to the Western 
principles and self-concept. Compared to the other negative actor types, images of Villain actors 
are usually very complex and carry negative features on all of the five central dimensions that 
were introduced in chapter V. In most cases actors of this type are regarded as the key sources, 
the roots, and the driving forces for the conflicts, violent incidents, or other negative events that 
are discussed in the analyzed articles. Even though these Villain actors may also possess positive 
features such as being moderate or being culturally modern in some articles they appear in, those 
aspects are simply outweighed in their overall image by the strong dominance of negative 
features. 
These Villain type actors mostly form the leading actors for certain topics and articles, therefore, 
this actor type does not gain its relevance from its quantitative occurrence in the different 
analyzed timeframes, compared to the other negative actor types whose representatives do not 
necessarily have to be central for an article and can also appear only once or as one example 
among many others in the respective articles. But they can also be quantitatively significant, for 
example if they dominate the different timeframes of analysis because they appear in nearly every 
article on certain topics or events. In the timeframe before the 9/11 attacks, we do not find 
actors in both countries’ newspapers that this definition would apply to. This is mainly due to the 
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fact that the villain is primarily used to openly construct the negative counterpart in a conflict or 
situation that seems to threaten the in-group identity. Such conflicts or events did not appear in 
the phase before the event. This can be taken as an explanation for the fact that even such 
(verbally) hostile and anti-western actors like the Taliban regime or Saddam Hussein are not regarded 
as a crucial threat by the observing Self and are therefore not described as evil and as negative as 
they might have been in the context of conflicts like the Gulf War in 1990/91. This changes after 
9/11, an event that clearly shocked and unsettled the German and U.S. feeling of security. In the 
aftermath of 9/11, 2.2 % of all Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers and 2.3 % of 
those identified in the U.S. newspapers can be labeled as Villain type actors. As mentioned earlier, 
this might seem quantitatively insignificant but the majority of those actors occur in more than 
one article and presents central figures in the news coverage over the analyzed time period. 
 
The Taliban Regime 
One prototype example for a Villain type actor in both countries’ print media sets after 9/11 is 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. Before 9/11, the image of this actor is mainly culturally 
devaluated (Type 2) and the Taliban are mainly said to be culturally backward, misogynistic, 
conservative, and uncivilized, religiously fundamentalist, politically hostile towards the West, or politically 
repressive and undemocratic. Both countries’ images of the Taliban distance the regime by describing 
it as politically and culturally isolated. The SZ writes for instance, that… 
Seit 1996 regiert in Afghanistan die international geaechtete radikal-islamische Taliban-Miliz. 
Sie kontrolliert inzwischen etwa 90 Prozent des Landes. (SZ-01-08-08: 8) 
…and the NY TIMES mentions that… 
The three countries [USA, Australia, Germany] do not maintain embassies in Afghanistan 
because they do not recognize the Taliban government, which seized Kabul in 1996 and 
imposed a puritanical brand of Islamic law. (NYT-01-08-12: 15) 
This isolation is not only seen with regard to the West but also with regard to other Arab and 
Muslim countries, as the quote from the German SZ mentions: 
Mit ihrer Auslegung des Islam, die in der muslimischen Welt weithin abgelehnt wird, wollen 
die Taliban Afghanistan zu einem Gottesstaat machen. (SZ-01-08-08: 8) 
Another SZ article talks about the Taliban as “a regime that is seen as reprehensible from a 
Western perspective but also from a moderate Islamic perspective.”32 Especially in German 
newspapers, these negative cultural facets have to be embedded in the context of the Shelter 
Now affair. The seriousness of this issue is demonstrated mainly by the cultural otherness of the 
Taliban and the threat that this otherness causes for the imprisoned German citizens. This 
perceived threat is expressed for example in a quote from BILD which asks: 
Tun sie es wirklich? Steinigen die fanatischen Taliban-Krieger in Afghanistan die vier 
inhaftierten Deutschen (drei Frauen aus Niedersachsen, ein Mann aus Bayern)?  
(Bild-01-08-08: 7) 
                                                 
32 Own translation, original quote in German: “ein aus westlicher und auch aus gemaessigt islamischer Sicht 
verwerfliches Regime.” (SZ-01-08-08: 4). 
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But especially after 9/11, the Taliban regime becomes one of THE central actors that both 
countries’ newspapers focus on. This is largely due to the fact that in the context of the 
prosecution of Osama bin Laden the Taliban regime also becomes the focus of attention as a 
host of bin Laden.33 In both German and U.S. newspapers this connection leads to an image of 
the Taliban that portrays them as a key supporter of terrorism even though the regime might try to 
distance itself from terror attacks and bin Laden after 9/11, as USA TODAY indicates in the 
following quote: 
Taliban officials have condemned the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon 
and insist bin Laden could not have been involved. […] In fact, the Taliban has tried to 
separate itself from bin Laden, saying it does not support terrorism. But analysts say the 
militia’s basic views mirror those of bin Laden and his terrorist cell: that Western democracy, 
and the United States in particular, is a threat to the purity of Islam. (USAT-01-09-13: 8Ac) 
Besides this new facet, the image of the Taliban in both countries is still shaped by the cultural 
criteria listed above. In Germany, DER SPIEGEL continues to talk of the “medieval rule of the 
Taliban,”34 and refers to them as the “fundamentalist devil.”35 Similar to that, the U.S. 
NEWSWEEK continues to point out that besides their support for terror, the cultural backwardness of 
these “bad guys”36 is still one of the central features of the regime. And USA TODAY argues: 
But it is not just the Taliban’s decision to harbor bin Laden that has isolated it from the 
world. A series of edicts to the Afghan people, based on what Taliban officials see as a strict 
reading of Islamic law, has drawn international ire. […] Women have been forbidden from 
working, even for United Nations relief agencies, and must be covered from head to toe 
when outside their homes. Women also face health care restrictions. (USAT-01-09-13: 8Ac) 
In addition to that, we now also find a stronger focus on personal features and devaluation on 
the personal dimension. In the German SZ, for instance, we find references to the emotional 
state of the regime… 
Die afghanischen Taliban, denen man einen unmittelbaren Bezug zur archaischen 
Gefuehlswelt unterstellen darf […]. (SZ-01-09-13: 15)  
…or, in another context, a cultural reference to the Taliban as “Islamic barefoot warriors.”37 And 
the NY TIMES devaluates the regime’s educational level by writing: 
The average talib, educated in a religious school, can quote passages from the Koran, but it is 
a good bet that he will not know which countries fought in World War II, that man has 
landed on the moon, that not all Jews live in Israel. (NYT-01-09-19: 6) 
But especially the violent dimension of the actor is now explicitly highlighted and put to the fore. 
The SZ, for example, points out… 
Jene fuer den Westen so schockierenden Praktiken der Taliban-Regierung wie die Blutrache 
gegen andere Muslime oder die Behandlung von Frauen […] (SZ-01-09-17: 16c).  
                                                 
33 In fact, we already find this information in a NY TIMES article before the attacks where it says: “[T]he United 
Nations has imposed economic sanctions, insisting that Afghanistan no longer play host to the accused terrorist 
Osama bin Laden” (NYT-01-09-07: 1). 
34 Own translation, original quote in German: “Die mittelalterliche Herrschaft der Taliban” (Sp-01-i41: 128(. 
35 Own translation, original quote in German: “dem fundamentalistischen Teufel” (Sp-01-i39: 14). 
36 NW-01-v138-i15: 30 
37 Own translation, original quote in German: “islamischen Barfusskrieger” (SZ-01-10-1: 5b). 
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Furthermore, and especially in the U.S. newspapers, we also learn about the drugs trade as one 
central economic source for the regime, or are frequently informed about the dilapidated 
infrastructure and poverty that is caused by the political rule of the Taliban (see Type 4). It can be 
said that altogether, both countries’ media images of the Taliban after 9/11 draw a demarcation 
line between a developed and progressive self-concept and the cultural, political, social, 
economic, and personal underdevelopment and backwardness of the Taliban regime. This difference is 
not only regarded as negative for the population of Afghanistan but also as one of the central 
roots for the growth of Islamic terrorism and the threat for the Western world that results from 
this development. The 9/11 attacks are thereby taken as the prefect proof for this perception. 
Before the attacks, the living conditions of the Afghan people under the Taliban were only of 
minor importance, and were only perceived as relevant for German or Western contexts insofar 
as German or Western aid workers were threatened in Afghanistan. Now, and due to the 
perceived threat that the attacks created, the scope and the influence of the regime are regarded 
as much wider and seem to reach to the boundaries of the Western Self. As BILD writes: 
Nie zuvor sah Afghanistan ein derart brutales Regime von Stammeskriegern, die Frauen die 
Ausbildung untersagen, Kunst, Musik und Tanz als Teufelswerk verbieten, Ehebrecherinnen 
im Fussball-Stadion erschießen oder steinigen. (Bild-01-09-15: 5c) 
Similar to that, an article in USA TODAY evaluates the regime as follows: 
Their edicts – forbidding women to attend school, banning everything from makeup to kite 
flying – are infamous. So are their punishments, ranging from amputation to public stoning. 
In five years, Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban militia has become one of the best-known and 
most-hated regimes in the world. (USAT-01-09-21: 1Ac) 
Therefore the image of the Taliban reaches a new and much more negative level than before 
9/11. On all dimensions of actor characterization, negative features are emphasized that form an 
image that can be regarded as the anti-image to everything that the Self regards as central and 
achievable in the own concept of belonging. 
 
Osama bin Laden – The “Wealthy Saudi”38 and Terror Symbol 
The second prototype for a villain construction of Arab and Muslim actors is the portrayal of 
Osama bin Laden in German and U.S. newspapers after 9/11. Even though bin Laden is almost 
non-existent in the news coverage before the attacks, he becomes one of the central actors after 
9/11. Before the attacks, his image can basically be summarized as that of a one-dimensional 
terrorist actor of Type 1 that the NY TIMES refers to as “Osama bin Laden, the militant who the 
United States says plotted the bombings of the American Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 
1998.”39 After the attacks, this rather simple image becomes more complex, but it maintains its 
overall negativity. This negativity is mainly outlined on the political dimension, where his role as 
the leader of a global terror network and his fight against political actors like the Russian military 
in Afghanistan or the Saudi Arabian government is mentioned. In the German and U.S. 
                                                 
38 NW-01-v138-i13: 44 
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newspapers the Villain type status of bin Laden can be especially exemplified with articles that 
refer to him as the “most dangerous international terrorist,”40 and label him as “Public Enemy 
No. 1”41 or as “America's most-wanted man.”42 This title almost seems to stylize the actor as a 
“symbolic” leading villain figure and the phrase “Public Enemy No. 1” thereby picks up the 
already mentioned verbal construction of “a monumental struggle between good and evil,”43 
which would place bin Laden as one central representative of this evil. 
Besides this focus on political and terrorist facets, bin Laden is also devaluated culturally, 
personally, and with regard to economic features. In the cultural dimension, articles mention, for 
instance, that he has more than one wife, an aspect that is legally forbidden in Germany and the 
United States and that, moreover, reveals facets of the classical Oriental image of the harem and 
the idea that polygamy is a traditional institution in Arab and Muslim countries. Personally, bin 
Laden’s charismatic appearance is explicitly contrasted with his hostile terrorist activities to indicate 
how his charisma and his positive appearance have helped him to convince others of his political 
ideas. In an article about the actors, NEWSWEEK writes for instance that… 
Osama bin Laden likes to pose with an AK-47, yet he seems a bit awkward with a gun. He’s 
a thin reed of a man – roughly 6 feet 5 and just 160 pounds, according to FBI Wanted 
posters – soft-spoken, languid in his movements, almost effeminate. His eyes twinkle. His 
immense charisma, in fact, derives not simply from his capacity for violence, but for the 
gentle manner in which he comports himself. (NW-01-v138-i13: 44) 
And finally, on the economic dimension both countries’ articles emphasize the financial wealth of 
bin Laden, for instance in the following quote from NEWSWEEK: 
Osama bin Laden, their spiritual leader and financier, comes from a privileged background 
himself. One of more than 50 children of Yemeni billionaire parents who got rich off 
construction contracts in Saudi Arabia, Osama, for a time, made money on those most 
Western of beverages, Coke and Pepsi. (NW-01-v138-i13: 26)  
However, and as is indicated in this quote, especially the American newspapers emphasize that 
even though he is a “the Saudi multimillionaire,”44 this positive aspect has to be evaluated as 
negative since with this money he finances terrorist activities. But even though both countries’ media 
draw such negative villain images of bin Laden or the Taliban, it is also emphasized continually 
that even this evil actor cannot or must not destroy the Western principles and identity. Thus, 
DER SPIEGEL also explicitly says that: 
Wir werden unsere Art zu leben nicht ändern. Und erst recht nicht, wenn uns ein paar 
mittelalterliche Fundamentalisten, die ihre Frauen verschleiern und zu Hause einsperren und 
die auf ihren Videorecordern zu viele Schwarzenegger-Filme gesehen haben, dazu zwingen 
wollen. (Sp-01-i38: 146) 
In some articles these suggestions also include solutions for the Self on how to disarm those 
villain actors and it is explicitly emphasized that the Self will not surrender but regards the own 
                                                                                                                                                        
39 NYT-01-07-31: 11 
40 NYT-01-09-13: 26 
41 NW-01-v138-i14: 38 
42 NW-01-v138-i13: 36 
43 NYT-01-09-13: 1c 
44 NYT-01-09-13: 18b 
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Western life style, standards and group as stronger and more desirable. USA TODAY summarizes 
this perspective as follows: 
Islamic fundamentalists don’t want America to change; they want America to die. That’s why 
they strike out with no goals in mind, with no lists of demands, with no suggestions of how 
and when they and their colleagues might be placated. In responding to such unfocused but 
ferocious hatred, we must provide a demonstration of moral combat, pursued with clearly 
articulated purposes and with levels of force commensurate to achieving them.  
(USAT-01-10-03: 13A) 
Therefore we can say that it is these leading villains that enable the Self to most effectively draw 
the dividing line between the self-concept and those principles, characteristics, and views that are 
rejected in this concept. The images of Villain type actors thereby integrate (nearly) all 
dimensions on which actor features have been grouped, and can thus be seen as the most 
complex and most distant portrayal of the Other in the context of the analyzed print media. 
Following the findings of Artz and Pollock (1995) for the uncivilized and irrational barbarian image 
of Saddam Hussein in the context of the Gulf War in 1991, the actions and motives of these 
villain actors could be interpreted as being completely outside of the realm of normal behavior, 
and they do not understand or accept the basic rules of normal behavior. As Artz and Pollock 
(1995) noted for the timeframe before 9/11, Villain type actors usually present no threat to the 
West, which changes, however, when they come to power or should use their power to act 
against the Self, because then they become dangerous for the West. The Taliban regime present a 
good example here. Being mainly devaluated before 9/11 for their cultural backwardness, the 
regime after 9/11 becomes one of the central Villain type actors in both German and U.S. articles 
because it supports and harbors Osama bin Laden who, for his part, has attacked the West. 
 
Summary: The Devaluated Other 
To sum up the first level of difference, it can be said that the largest distance between Self and 
Other is created by devaluating the features of Arab and Muslim actors. The images of those 
devaluated actors possess features that are mainly rejected by the Self or that are not up to the 
Western standards that the German or American Self regards as crucial for its own national or 
even transnational concept of belonging. The devaluated Other therefore can be seen as the 
negative counterpart to the self-image, i.e. as everything that the Self defines as deviant from its 
own standard. 
As the preceding subchapter has outlined, actors in both countries’ analyzed newspapers are 
thereby devaluated in six different ways that can be summarized in six different types of 
devaluated actors. On a quantitative level, the devaluation of political, violent, delinquent, and 
cultural features is most significant in U.S. and German print media articles around 9/11. 
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Quantitatively, thereby the most relevant actors are the gunmen, terrorists, and hostile politicians 
who make up one third of all devaluated actors45. 
On a qualitative level, Villain type actors present the most significant form of actor devaluation. 
Villains receive negatively features in (nearly) all the dimensions of character and the images of 
these actors can be seen as the most complex and also the clearest construction of distance 
between a good Self and an evil Other in the context of the analyzed print media. Compared to the 
other negative actor types whose representatives are often not necessarily central for an article 
and can also appear only once or as one example among many others in the respective articles, 
Villain type actors are mostly central for an article or dominate the discourses on certain topics or 
events. However, in both countries this actor type cannot not be found in the timeframe before 
the 9/11 attacks. The main explanation that was given here was that the villain is mainly used to 
openly construct the negative counterpart in a conflict or situation that seems to threaten in-
group identity and it is argued here that such conflicts or events did not appear in the phase 
before the event. 
One observed difference between German and U.S. newspapers is the quantitatively more 
frequently occurring portrayal of culturally devaluated actors (Type 2). This differing quantitative 
relevance of Type 2 actors further supports the observation of previous chapters that the 
German perception of Arab and Muslim actors is shaped by a stronger (quantitative) focus on 
the dimension of cultural difference as an element of demarcating Self from Other than the 
American perception. 
However, besides the negative imaging of Arab and Muslim actors, both countries’ newspapers 
also reveal other forms of images of Arab and Muslim actors that, for instance, include features 
and facets that cannot simply be classified as non-Western. The images of those actors cannot as 
easily be classified as completely different from the German or American self-concept that is 
communicated in the different articles. Whereas the devaluation of the Other fathoms the 
negative dimensions and facets of the Other, other forms of difference construction also 
integrate similarities and the interplay between the Arab and Muslim Other and the Western Self, 
as will be outlined, for instance, in the next subchapter. 
 
                                                 
45 Again, Hashem (1995) comes to similar results in his study. His analysis of the two American news magazines 
TIME and NEWSWEEK reveals that the news coverage of Arabs between 1990 and 1993 is mostly negative. In most 
cases, he reports, the magazines focus on attacks, crises, invasions, kidnappings, killings, or wars – which could be 
compared with our finding that the largest group of actors in German and U.S. news media before 9/11 is 
devaluated as violent and hostile, and occurs in the same contexts as have been listed by Hashem (1995: 154-161). 
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3. Level 2: The Weak Other 
The second level of difference that has been identified in the images of Arab and Muslim actors 
in German and U.S. print media can be derived from images that show a certain degree of 
similarity to the Self. On this second level, the difference between the self-concept and similar 
Arabs and Muslims is constructed by weakening these actors, either by weakening their similar 
features or by weakening the whole actor. Each way is represented by one actor type; those two 
actor types are summarized in Table VI.2 and will be described in the following two sections. 
Table VI.2: The Weak Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance46 
Before 9/11 After 9/11 
 
Germany USA Germany USA 
Type 7:  The Victim 20.2 24.1 10.8 9.6 
Type 8: The Weakened Similar Other 6.6 10.8 9.3 10.6 
 
3.1. Type 7: The Victim 
The first actor type that can be formed here comprises portrayals of external Arab and Muslim 
actors as victims. Portraying these actors as victims could as well be seen as another form of 
actor portrayal that devaluates features and certain aspects of the Other. However, in the case of 
the Victim type, this devaluation takes place without the devaluation of the respective actors. 
Victim type actors are mostly combined with negative features, they appear in the context of 
negative circumstances and situations, or they occur with other actors who inherit those negative 
features or are responsible for the depicted situations and who are therefore, directly or indirectly, 
also responsible for the victim status of Type 7 actors. Thus, in a way, Victim type actors can be 
seen as supporting actors for the images of those actors who are actually devaluated. 
Furthermore, and with regard to the evaluation pattern of Western principles that the Self is 
assumed to apply to the Other, we can also say that the Victim type can be interpreted as the 
living illustration of the consequences that result from a lack of Western standards and principles 
in Arab and Muslim societies. The situations or problems of Type 7 actors reflect the deficiencies 
that are caused by a lack of democratic structures, freedom, or economic progress, and by 
political misgovernment. 
Therefore, on the one hand, the images of those Type 7 actors are not solely negative since those 
actors are only the victims of negative features and actions. On the other hand, the images are 
not very similar to the Self either. Overlap with the German or American Self could – when 
viewed from outside – merely be seen with regard to one aspect: both the observing Self and the 
victim disapprove of the lack of Western standards, the latter mainly because they have to face 
and bear the political, social, or other consequences that result from this lack of progress, 
                                                 
46 In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to 
all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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democracy etc. Some Victim type actors “flee” from this negativity. Especially after the attacks, 
this group of refugees comes to the fore, in particular in the context of the communicated 
argument of humanitarian relevance that is put forward in support of a political-military 
intervention in Afghanistan. 
To illustrate the actor type more clearly we will take a closer look at the different ways in which 
actors become victims in the context of the analyzed newspaper articles. In German and U.S. 
print media the negative conditions that victim actors have to face are manifold and pick up again 
some of the major facets of the Other that have been outlined before. 
  
Victims of Violence and Terror 
The largest number of actors of Type 7 is portrayed as victims of violence, violent assaults, or 
terrorist attacks, or has to live in contexts of ongoing military or other violent conflicts. 
Especially in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict we find a number of Palestinian actors 
who suffer from the everyday violence that is covered in the German and U.S. news, before as 
well as after 9/11. In a large number of these articles in both countries, victim actors appear 
together with violent and hostile Type 1 actors (see VI.2.1). In these contexts, Victim type actors 
present the object against which the violence of Type 1 actors is directed, as can be illustrated by 
a quote from the NY TIMES: 
On both sides, victims have been ample, including a 3-month-old Palestinian boy, who may 
be the youngest victim in a 10-month siege of despair in which other infants have been 
killed. (NYT-01-07-21: 1) 
A similar situation is reported on in the SZ… 
In der Nacht zum Montag drangen israelische Panzer voruebergehend in palaestinensische 
Abschnitte der geteilten Stadt Hebron im Westjordanland ein. Nach Krankenhausangaben 
wurden dabei fuenf Palaestinenser verletzt. (SZ-01-07-17: 8b) 
…as well as in BILD which reports on another Palestinian child killed in the conflict: 
Dort ein totes Palästinenser-Mädchen (8). Es wurde am Sonntag in einem Gefecht zwischen 
palästinensischen Heckenschützen und israelischen Soldaten versehentlich getroffen.  
(Bild-01-08-14: 2) 
As the examples show, these Victim type actors remain as anonymous and one-dimensional as 
the Type 1 actors, apart from a few exceptions (like in the quoted BILD article). This form of 
occurrence remains largely the same after 9/11. The SZ summarizes the Palestinian victims of the 
violence in Palestine by simply saying that… 
Seit Beginn der israelischen Offensive im Westjordanland vor einer Woche wurden 
mindestens 17 Palaestinenser getoetet. (SZ-01-09-15: 11) 
…without going into much detail about the personal details of the mentioned victims. Compared 
to that, slightly more information is provided in the NY TIMES which writes… 
But war and the need to live a normal life still mixed. Even amid gunfire, Emmad Najar, 28, 
went shopping this morning with his three young sons in Rafah. The boys were talking about 
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lunch, then a bullet struck their father in the forehead, several hundred yards from the 
fighting. (NYT-01-09-29: 5) 
But victims of violence and terrorist attacks are not only found among Palestinian private actors; 
they appear in the context of other conflicts and violent assaults as well. The NY TIMES, for 
example, reports on the civilian victims of a terrorist attack in Pakistan, where… 
A powerful bomb ripped through a school van in the eastern province of Punjab today, killing at least 
seven people, including a husband and wife and their three sons, the police said. Seven others, mostly 
children, were wounded. (NYT-01-08-12: 15) 
And DER SPIEGEL publishes an article that deals with torture in Turkey where we learn that: 
Für die moderne junge Frau aus der Mittelschicht, die Missbrauch und Folter bis dahin nur 
aus Büchern und Filmen kannte, wurden es zehn Tage wie aus dem Türkei-Schocker 
“Midnight Express” des Regisseurs Alan Parker. (Sp-01-i32: 127) 
After 9/11, and the geographical shift of focus to countries like Afghanistan that accompanies it, 
we find a more frequent portrayal of victims of violence of Afghan origin. USA TODAY, for 
example, reports on the living conditions of the Afghan population, and here especially the 
women, under the rule of the Taliban regime. In an article it is said that… 
With school and work forbidden, women are unable to leave home unless accompanied by a 
man, and are beaten, even killed, for infractions of Taliban law. (USAT-01-09-27: 2d) 
 
Political Victims in U.S. Newspapers 
Besides those victims of violence, torture, or terrorist attacks we also find other victims in both 
countries’ analyzed print media, even though these other forms of Victim type actors occur less 
often. For instance, actors can also appear as victims of political structures or decisions, or they 
suffer from political conflicts either within Arab and Muslim countries or with the West. U.S. 
newspapers also frequently focus on these political victims. In the NY TIMES, for example, the 
populations of several former Russian republics are described as victims of their political regimes, 
since… 
The people of Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have 
always lived under despots. Their history is so dismal that Communism for them was a time 
of relative prosperity. Now, 10 years after they became independent nations, they have once 
again become sultanates, ruled by tyrants who maintain tight control of political and 
economic activity. (NYT-01-08-16: 22) 
In another article in the newspaper, the politically instable and conflict-laden situation in Iran is 
discussed, and in this context the Iranian people are regarded as victims of this situation: 
In 1971, Iran was just beginning to grow rich off oil and the population was less than half 
the current 70 million. Since the revolution, per capita income has sunk to $150 from $600, 
and Iranians suffered through a nearly decade-long war with Iraq and two decades of almost 
constant political upheaval. (NYT-01-09-07: 4) 
But political victims are not mentioned only before 9/11. A NY TIMES article picks up the story 
again about the fate of over six hundred Kuwaiti civilians who were arrested and sent to prison in 
Iraq during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and have disappeared. As the NY TIMES writes, 
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these civilians, and the Kuwaiti population in general, can be regarded as a victim of hostile Iraqi 
politics in this conflict: 
Most of them were civilians who refused to cooperate with the occupying Iraqi forces. More 
than 120 were students, 50 were teenagers and three were nurses whose crime was to have 
treated wounded Kuwaitis. […] Kuwait has succeeded in rebuilding its torched and looted 
capital city since the seven-month Iraqi occupation, which ended in February, 1991. It has 
restored its oilfields that were set on fire by the departing Iraqis and rid the Persian Gulf of 
the enormous oil slick that Mr. Hussein turned loose to try to kill fish and plant life and 
poison the desalinated water that gulf states depend upon. (NYT-01-10-03: 10) 
In all of these examples the political victims are, to a large extent, from the private sector. But 
especially after the 9/11 attacks, the U.S. print media also explicitly reflect upon the connections 
and interplay between Western foreign policies and the deficits of the political situation that 
those policies might have led to in Arab or Muslim countries. This perspective comes especially 
to the fore in articles that focus on the roots of the increased terrorist threat (that the attacks are 
argued to have revealed). In the United States as a direct victim of the attacks, politicians, experts, 
and also the mass media expressed their shock about the fact that there are people who reject the 
Western values and institutions in such a way that they even enter the country to destroy them. 
The attack on the national territory is thereby seen as a new form of threat for a country that so 
far has not been the object of any larger form of external aggression and military conflict,47 at 
least not within its own national borders.48 
In the course of this examination of the causes of the hostile motivations of the Other, U.S. 
articles also look at mistakes that America itself might have made when dealing with Arab and 
Muslim countries. One cause that is identified here is the idea that Arab and Muslim actors may 
feel threatened by the first steps of an institutionalization of Western values and standards in 
their societies. In the NY TIMES we find the following statement: 
Such historical allusions may well tap into the widespread sense of siege among many 
Muslims who see themselves threatened by a modern world dominated by the United States 
and Western secularism. (NYT-01-10-09: 6c) 
Overall however, political victims are mainly seen as being weakened by the political situations 
within their own national contexts. And even when the Self reflects upon its own mistakes and 
political misgovernment to explain the terrorist aggression of Arab and Muslim Others that 
comes to the fore in the 9/11 attacks, the principles and values of the Self are thereby not called 
                                                 
47 Apart from single incidents like the Japanese military attack on the U.S. naval base at Pearl Harbor in 1941 that 
brought the United States into the Second World War. In the aftermath of the 9/11 this incident was frequently 
referred to as a comparison for the national trauma and the shock to the national feeling of security. 
48 American citizens, and especially the military, have, of course, been the victims of violent attacks before, but 
mainly abroad. As Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003) argue, the connection of Muslims and Arabs with violence and 
especially terrorism were magnified by a long series of anti-American terrorist acts. Apart from the internal incident 
of the World Trade Center Bombing in 1993, examples for terrorist attacks against the U.S. include, for instance, the 
Iranian hostage crisis (1979-81), the suicide attack on the USS Cole in 2000, or the attacks against the U.S. diplomatic 
missions in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998 (see also Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 137-138). After the 9/11 
attacks, those attacks are frequently mentioned in U.S. articles as examples for the increased terrorist threat for the 
U.S. Self but also to illustrate the huge impact of the attacks in New York and Washington compared to earlier 
attacks. 
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into question. The only thing that might be questioned is the way in which those principles have 
been conveyed to the Other. 
 
Victims of Social and Economic Conditions 
Closely connected to the political sphere are social and economic conditions and situations which 
affect the populations of Arab or Muslim countries. In the U.S. newspapers, for example, the 
Palestinian population is – among other aspects – seen also as being socially and economically 
affected by on-going political and violent conflict with Israel. USA TODAY writes for instance: 
The closures also have devastated the Palestinian economy in the West Bank and Gaza. 
More than 100,000 people have been blocked from getting to their jobs in Israel. And local 
farmers and merchants such as Abu Aysheh have been prevented from using tractors and 
cars to harvest and distribute their produce. (USAT-01-09-07: 6A) 
Other actors suffer from conditions they have to face in the context of under-developed economic 
systems and poor infrastructure: From the German SZ we learn about the fate of an Egyptian family 
that suffers from the bad medical situation in the country: 
Ihre Mutter gebar acht Kinder, Fauseia war das juengste. Als die Mutter starb, lautete die 
offizielle Ursache Kindbettfieber. Doch letztlich waren die unhygienischen Verhaeltnisse 
schuld, die mangelhafte Ernaehrung – und der Zwang, staendig Kinder gebaeren zu 
muessen. (SZ-01-07-17: 3) 
And in yet another case, the NY TIMES discusses the social and economic problems in Turkish 
society and here specifically highlights the problem of poverty among the Turkish population that 
the newspaper attributes to a mixture of cultural traditions and structural changes in Turkish 
society: 
“Turks live more intimately than people in the United States,” said Faruk Birtek, chairman of 
the sociology department at Bosporus University. “The poor are much more visible because 
they live around the corner.” […] Ostentatious displays of wealth were once taboo in 
Turkey, so the differences were less obvious. Close-knit families also served as a safety net 
and psychological buffer against poverty. But many people left extended families behind 
when they moved to Istanbul, and the grinding poverty has brought new strains. […] 
Distrust of the government is high. If elections were held today, no established party, 
including the three that make up the current government, would get enough votes to sit in 
Parliament, according to a recent nationwide poll. “You have extreme lack of trust in the 
state about anything getting better, and the economic insecurity for an overwhelming 
majority of society,” said Hale Boratav, chairman of the psychology department at Istanbul’s 
Bilgi University. “It’s hard for people to be optimistic.” (NYT-01-07-21: 4) 
Especially after 9/11 we also find contexts in both countries’ newspapers in which actors are 
seen as indirect victims of Western behavior. An article in USA TODAY, for instance, mentions 
that the economic problems that the Iraqi people currently have to face are also a consequence of 
American foreign policy:49 
The long-distance missile strikes on Iraq, in particular, have caused resentment. “President 
Bush calls [the] attacks on the United States cowardly, but from the Mid-East viewpoint 
                                                 
49 Currently refers here to the timeframe of the analysis of course, but as we know, this self-criticism will become 
even more relevant two years later with the American invasion of Iraq in 2003 that – is also carried out by the U.S. 
administration under the mission to bring democracy and progress to the country. 
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surgical long distance bombing is cowardly,” says Mary Kaldor of the London School of 
Economics. To many Iraqis, the death of civilians and the destruction of the country’s 
infrastructure, from bombing during the 1991 Gulf War and attacks since then – as well as 
from economic sanctions by Western countries – constitute terrorism. “It’s not just that 
Muslims are offended. They are humiliated by American policy,” Falk [professor of 
international law at Princeton University] says. (USAT-01-09-19: 1A) 
The consequence is that “nourishing these grievances are extremist, fundamentalist groups such 
as bin Laden’s.”50 This critical observation about U.S. behavior can also be found in some 
German articles after 9/11. DER SPIEGEL, for instance, writes that: 
Die USA dehnen ihre Macht bis in den letzten Winkel der Erde aus und zwingen entlegenen 
Völkern ihr Wirtschaftssystem auf. Ohne Rücksicht auf Schäden, die sie damit anrichten. 
Selbst unsere Bündnisstaaten aus den Zeiten des Kalten Kriegs behandeln wir noch immer 
wie Protektorate. (Sp-01-i38: 164) 
And the SZ also broadens this criticism to the European Self: 
Die Todesflieger von New York und Washington waren auch das Produkt von Jahrzehnten 
einaeugiger Nahostpolitik der USA, von europaeischer Resignation, von beispielloser 
Nachsicht der Weltmeinung fuer die dauernde Verletzung der Wuerde und des 
Lebensrechtes vieler Millionen. Es gibt eine Milliarde Muslime auf Erden. Die Mehrzahl ist 
arm und ohne Perspektiven. (SZ-01-09-27: 24) 
 
Victims of Cultural Conditions 
Finally, Victim type actors also face cultural discrimination or are confronted with cultural rules 
and conservative values that suppress peoples’ life styles or choices. In the NY TIMES, for example, 
an article looks at homosexuals in Egypt who face a legal trial because of their sexuality: 
In a high-profile crackdown on suspected homosexual activity that has been condemned by 
some legal activists and human rights groups, 52 men were charged today in a state security 
court with engaging in immoral acts or religious offenses. (NYT-01-07-19: 10b) 
But not only is their sexuality regarded as deviant and therefore criminal in Egypt, they are also 
reported to have been humiliated psychologically as well as physically since… 
Lawyers and human rights groups said the accused had undergone humiliating medical 
examinations in prison to determine whether they had recently engaged in anal intercourse. 
In addition, they said, the men were apparently beaten until they confessed to having a 
preference for homosexual acts. (NYT-01-07-19: 10b) 
And in yet another article, the Iranian youth is said to suffer under the rigid and strict 
conservative rule of the country’s conservative religious leaders. The newspaper writes: 
Iran’s young people and women, who have been among the reform movement’s strongest 
and most loyal supporters, have keenly felt the pressure of the Islamic morals police 
intruding on their daily lives. (NYT-01-08-10: 18) 
In Germany, BILD reports on a woman in Nigeria who faces a strict enforcement of Islamic 
Sharia law: 
Ein islamischer Gerichtshof in der Provinz Zamfara (Nigeria) hat eine Frau (20) zu 100 
Peitschenhieben verurteilt. Grund: Sie soll eine sexuelle Affäre mit einem verheirateten Mann 
                                                 
50 USAT-01-09-19: 1A 
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gehabt haben. Das Opfer soll in der Öffentlichkeit mit dem Rohrstock geschlagen werden 
(Bild-01-08-14: 12) 
In this quote we not only learn about the physical consequences of this form of jurisdiction but 
are also informed about the cultural rules that this woman has violated. In another article in 
BILD, we are informed about the fate of a Saudi Arabian girl who tried to commit suicide after 
being forced into a marriage. Here, the tabloid writes: 
Ein Mädchen (16) hat im Süden von Saudi-Arabien versucht, sich in einem Brunnen zu 
ertränken, weil sein Vater es gegen seinen Willen mit einem impotenten Greis verheiratet 
hatte. Dem Mädchen war es zwar einige Monate nach der Hochzeit gelungen, den 90 Jahre 
alten Ehemann zur Scheidung zu bewegen. Bei ihrer Rückkehr ins Elternhaus wurde die 
Geschiedene jedoch vom Vater mit wütenden Beschimpfungen empfangen. Verzweifelt lief 
sie zu dem nahe gelegenen Brunnen, doch ihre Mutter verhinderte den Selbstmord in letzter 
Minute. (Bild-01-08-20: 14b) 
So altogether, actors of Type 7 in both German and U.S. newspapers face a large variety of 
cultural, political, or other deficits or even oppression in their countries or under their political 
regimes. Some actors thereby only face negativity on one of those dimensions, whereas others are 
confronted with it on several dimensions. Before the 9/11 attacks, Type 7 actors form the 
second largest group after Type 1 actors in both countries’ analyzed articles. More than every 
fifth actor (20.2 %) in Germany and nearly every fourth actor (24.1 %) in the U.S. before 9/11 
can be classified as a Victim type actor. After 9/11, this quantitative relevance of victims drops 
significantly. Compared to the large number of Victim type actors before 9/11, now only 10.8 % 
of all Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers and only 9.6 % of all actors in U.S. articles 
can be labeled as victims. Furthermore, the actor type does not have a central role for the 
different topics and issues discussed either. Most Victim type actors only appear in the context of 
one or two articles, and can therefore be regarded as supporting actors as well. There are, 
however, a few victims in the newspapers that occur more than once or twice and are, instead, 
quite regularly depicted in the context of certain topics. One country where we find all kinds of 
victims is Afghanistan: 
 
The Afghan Population 
Before as well as after the attacks, the Afghan population is one of the actors portrayed regularly 
in the analyzed newspapers of both countries. The image of the Afghan population combines a 
number of different negative effects from the deficits that have already been introduced, and 
thereby exemplifies the lack of Western principles and standards in Afghanistan. The political 
leadership of the Taliban was never recognized by the West, not only because they took over 
power without any democratic election, but also because their fundamentalist rules isolated the 
country and its population more and more from the international arena. The consequences of the 
strict Islamic laws for the population of the country are an aspect to which Western observers 
pay a lot of attention, but the social and economic conditions in Afghanistan are also frequently 
highlighted in German and U.S. newspapers. Before the attacks, DER SPIEGEL writes, for 
instance: 
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Dabei braucht Afghanistan dringend Hilfe von außen. Dürreperioden, Hunger und die wohl 
rigidesten Gesetze der Welt peinigen das 26-Millionen-Volk. (Sp-01-i33: 122) 
And the NY TIMES writes in an article on the Shelter Now affair: 
Shelter Now is among dozens of aid groups in Afghanistan, a woebegone nation that has 
suffered 22 straight years of war and four of cataclysmic drought. Nearly one million people 
have fled their homes during the last year in search of food and water. (NYT-01-08-28: 3b) 
The social and economic aspects remain relevant after 9/11 as well and are now communicated 
in more forthright terms, as can be illustrated with another quote from the NY TIMES: 
At the same time, the Afghan people are imprisoned in their own country with no possibility 
for assistance for many who are starving. (NYT-01-09-23: 7) 
The most central reason for the suffering of the Afghan population is thereby seen in the politics 
of the Taliban regime. As BILD summarizes: 
Kein Volk der Welt lebt in schrecklicheren Verhältnissen. Jahrzehntelanger Krieg, Dürre und 
Hungersnot haben das Land verwüstet, Millionen von Afghanen sind auf der Flucht.  
(Bild-01-09-17: 4f) 
Consequently, in the context of the American plans to invade Afghanistan after 9/11 (see IV.2.2) 
DER SPIEGEL reports that: 
Vorrangiges Ziel soll es dabei sein, die leidende afghanische Bevölkerung von der Taliban-
Diktatur zu erlösen. (Sp-01-i39: 148) 
Also with reference to those Afghans who fled the region and the ruling regime, both countries’ 
newspapers attribute the motivations of those refugees to the cultural, social and economic 
conditions and the violence in the country. According to DER SPIEGEL… 
Wo sie herkommen, sagen sie, sind die Menschen krank vom Mangel, krank an der 
Tuberkulose. Kinder sterben, kaum geboren. Sie leiden an Würmern, und die Not schlägt 
ihnen aufs Augenlicht. Es gibt nicht viel trinkbares Wasser. Keine Arznei. Keine Schulen für 
Mädchen, keine Arbeit für Frauen. Fernsehgeräte werden öffentlich zerschlagen. Männer bei 
Freudenfesten gehenkt. (Sp-01-i40: 112) 
And USA TODAY introduces the fate of an Afghan doctor who fled to Pakistan due to the 
upcoming U.S. military operation: 
The Afghan doctor and his family now live with his brother, who also is a doctor. […] 
Nasim is convinced he would have paid a price if he had been caught leaving. “The Taliban 
have forbidden me to leave because I’m a doctor. But I have money problems and a large 
family,” he says. But he feels it’s his duty to take care of Afghans if they are injured in any 
conflict. “So I will leave my family and go back soon,” he says. (USAT-01-09-25: 6Ab) 
But cultural oppression is also frequently mentioned in both countries, as already been described 
in chapter V.2. In the NY TIMES it is said, for example, that… 
In Taliban-ruled areas, girls older than 8 are barred from attending school, women cannot 
leave home unless accompanied by a male relative and then must be veiled from head to toe, 
and they are barred from most jobs, among other restrictions. (NYT-01-10-03: 6) 
…and that… 
With school and work forbidden, women are unable to leave home unless accompanied by a 
man, and are beaten, even killed, for infractions of Taliban law. (USAT-01-09-27: 2D) 
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Therefore, the image of the Afghan population has to be seen in combination with the images of 
the Taliban regime in the analyzed data. Together with those negative images, what can be 
derived is an implicitly communicated criticism of the situation in Afghanistan and of the lack of 
Western standards and principles. Even more than that, the focus on the country is also shaped 
by the idea that the military operation will bring an improvement of the situation in all 
dimensions. With regard to this improvement, the last quote here is taken from DER SPIEGEL. 
The article compares the current situation in Afghanistan with an era before the Taliban regime 
took over power, and thereby may also indicate the future expectations that should result from a 
possible overthrow of the regime by the Western alliance: 
Vor den Straßencafés flanierten junge Frauen in Jeans und Miniröcken, die Restaurants 
schenkten Bier und Hochprozentiges aus, die Kinos zeigten Actionfilme aus Hollywood 
oder zuckersüße Erotik-Epen aus Bombay: Kabul, die Hauptstadt Afghanistans, war nicht 
nur die Traum-Destination Haschisch kiffender Hippies, sondern galt einst unter jungen 
Muslimen im benachbarten Pakistan wegen der freien Sitten als geschätzte Hochburg des 
Liberalismus. (Sp-01-i40: 166) 
We can sum up this section by saying that the images of victims are manifold, and that Victim 
type actors not only have to face violent behavior or violent conflicts like in Israel and Palestine, but 
they also suffer from repressive regimes like the Taliban, from cultural conservatism like in Iran, or 
from social and economic problems like not education, bad infrastructure, poverty and drug addiction as 
in Afghanistan and Iran. In U.S. articles we find a stronger focus on political victims than in the 
German ones, but in both countries, actors of the Victim type are predominantly private actors 
of Palestinian origin. Apart from that, other private Victim type actors come from a diversity of 
national backgrounds like Albania, Bosnia, Iran, Egypt, Pakistan, or Turkey – to name only a few. 
U.S. articles thereby also see whole populations of diverse other countries like Iran or former 
Russian republics like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan or Uzbekistan as victims, either of their 
undemocratic regimes or of the social and economic situations and cultural norms (or the lack of 
Western cultural and economic standards) in the respective countries. 
After the attacks, the Victim type remains the third most frequently occurring form of actor 
portrayal even though its quantitative proportion decreases significantly compared to some of the 
types of devaluation (see VI.2). It is still represented predominantly by private actors, but those 
actors now come from a different geographical background. Besides the Palestinian victims that 
are still quantitatively relevant, both countries’ print media now also frequently report on private 
actors from Afghanistan as political, cultural, social or economic victims. Afghan victims are 
accompanied by actors like the Macedonian Albanians, the Algerian Berbers, or actors from 
countries like Iran, Iraq, Libya, or Pakistan who are portrayed as victims of cruel, undemocratic, and 
terror-supporting regimes. 
Actors of Type 7 could be mainly regarded as a constructed victim background for the different 
articles against which the negativity of the respective governments and political elite can be 
displayed. In a way, those actors form a warning image. They illustrate the reasons why the Other 
should become more like the Self, i.e. why it should institutionalize Western principles and adopt 
Western values because the situation of those victims shows what happens without those 
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standards. At the same time, the difference between the Self and the weak Other is also 
constructed at this point by implicitly communicating that due to the lack of Western standards 
and achievements in Arab and Muslim countries, the Self is better off than the Other. The 
concept of the Victim type Other therefore can still be regarded as solely different from the 
German or U.S. self-concept. 
This is slightly different with the second form of weak images of Arabs and Muslims that can be 
identified in both countries’ newspapers for the analyzed timeframe: 
 
3.2. Type 8: The Weakened Western-Oriented Other 
What distinguishes the Victim type actors from the second type in this category of the actor 
typology is that with the former Type 7, the whole actor as one entity is described as weak 
because he or she is made a victim by other (negative) Arab and Muslim actors or, as has also 
been indicated, by the Self. Compared to that, in the images of Type 8 actors, only individual 
features are weakened, either by other features or by the circumstances in which those actors 
appear. 
First and foremost, it has to be noted that the images of Type 8 actors – compared to the Victim 
type actors – show a certain degree of similarity with the Self, as these portrayals include features 
that are also central for the self-concept of belonging. In both countries’ newspapers, actors of 
this type are described, for example, as pro-western, reform-oriented, moderate, peaceful, or compassionate, 
which means that they possess features that are judged positively by the Self as they reflect the 
Western principles that the Self promotes. Some of these actors could be labeled as “dissidents,” 
as they take oppositional positions with regard to a wide range of issues. These actors can, for 
instance, oppose undemocratic structures, conservative and fundamentalist traditions, or terrorism and 
violent conflicts. Others speak out against or actively combat corruption, violence, or terrorism. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that Type 8 actors become indistinguishable from the 
Self. What also characterizes their images is that, for example, an actor who is described as 
politically pro-western and moderate can at the same time be described as politically weak or powerless. 
One example of this kind can be found in the NY TIMES where an Iranian filmmaker is described 
as follows: 
The filmmaker, Tahmineh Milani, 41, was the first prominent liberal intellectual detained this 
year. Her arrest and the charges against her were widely seen as another attack on President 
Mohammad Khatami and his efforts to use his second term to expand personal freedom and 
democracy in Iran. […] In her film, a love story, Ms. Milani throws a sympathetic light on 
leftist students who contributed to the victory of the 1979 revolution but were later jailed or 
executed by the Islamic authorities. (NYT-01-09-01: 2) 
As the quote shows, the politically moderate views of the filmmaker are of little help to her as it 
leads to political suppression by the conservative forces of the country. What results from this 
suppression is that the actor is not able to fully realize her attempts to communicate her liberal 
views. 
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In another article, the SZ looks at emancipated female journalists in Arab and Muslim countries. 
The newspaper describes the example of the Palestinian journalist who is described as 
emancipated and independent in her job but is on the other hand also weakened in those features 
by the fact that her visual appearance is described as traditional. In this context, the article 
indirectly compares the actor with the Western concept of emancipation: 
Mit der Stimme am Telefon assoziierte die Pressesprecherin, die heute diese Rezension 
schreibt, sofort den Typ der modernen Palaestinenserin: im Westen ausgebildet, Jeans und 
offen getragene Haare. Welche Ueberraschung, als diese Journalistin eines Tages vor ihr 
stand: in traditionellem Gewand, Haupt und Haar von einem Schal bedeckt, gehuellt in einen 
knoechellangen Mantel. Von wegen, professionelle und emanzipierte Frauen in islamisch 
gepraegten Laendern koennen nur saekular sein! (SZ-01-08-20: 11) 
Despite her Western education and emancipated views, she still has to be differentiated from the 
“Western” concept of an emancipated woman. Furthermore, we learn that emancipated Arab and 
Muslim journalists distance themselves from Western feminist positions: 
Emanzipierte Journalistinnen, wie etwa die parlamentarische Vizepraesidentin Massoumeh 
Ebtekar, grenzen sich vom westlichen Feminismus deutlich ab: Sie halten ihn weder fuer 
erstrebenswert, noch fuer uebertragbar auf die iranische Gesellschaft. Stattdessen fordern sie 
einen reformierten Islam, der Demokratie, soziale Gerechtigkeit, freie Meinungsaeusserung, 
individuelle und buergerliche Rechte bietet. (SZ-01-08-20: 11) 
Therefore, even though those actors also support and demand Western principles for their 
societies, they are, at the same time, implicitly weakened in their positions by having culturally 
conservative non-secular views and a visual appearance that indicates a persisting otherness despite the 
increasing similarity with the Western self-conception. These actors explicitly distance themselves 
from the West and Western standards. 
Due to the fact that this actor type to a large extent concentrates on political features as well as 
on attitudes of actors towards violence and terror, in both German and U.S. articles the major 
representatives of Type 8 are political actors. Before 9/11, in the U.S. newspapers the images of 
the nation states and governments of Saudi Arabia and Turkey, but also of private actors from 
Israel and Saudi Arabia, or of the military of Indonesia are weakened in the political dimension. 
 
Yassir Arafat in German Newspapers 
In the analyzed German print media before the attacks, the Palestinian president Yassir Arafat 
can serve as a prototype example for Type 8. In DER SPIEGEL, Arafat is described, for instance, 
as follows: 
Arafat hingegen könnte noch so guten Willens sein, es gibt genug Selbstmordattentäter, die 
das Land unsicher machen. […] Arafat, auch er nicht mehr der Jüngste und Gesündeste, hat 
so gut wie keinen Einfluß auf radikale Gruppen, in deren Mitte sich immer ein Kamikaze- 
Attentäter finden wird. (Sp-01-i35: 35) 
Similarly, the SZ also argues that even though Arafat might have positive ambitions to fight 
terrorist groups in the Palestinian territories and stop the violent conflict with Israel, he is actually 
too weak to enforce his political aims: 
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Dem Palaestinenserpraesidenten schwinden zunehmend die Mittel, die Intifada im Zaum zu 
halten und seine Machtbasis zu sichern. […] Seine mehrmaligen Appelle zum Stopp der 
Angriffe auf juedische Siedlungen mit Moersergranaten sind ungehoert verhallt.  
(SZ-01-08-06: 6b) 
Even though the Palestinian leader continuously speaks up against violent rioting and terror 
attacks in the ongoing conflict between the Palestinian territories and Israel, he is weakened by 
the fact that he no longer seems to have the political will and power, or the physical ability to do 
so. 
 
The Reform-Oriented but Powerless Iranian President 
In both German and U.S. newspapers before 9/11, the images of the Iranian parliament under 
the rule of the Iranian president Mohammed Khatami can be regarded as a second prototype 
example for the weakening of positive political features. On the one hand, both countries’ 
newspapers construct the Iranian parliament and the president as moderate, reform-oriented, and 
therefore oriented towards Western political standards. The German SZ writes, for example, 
that… 
Der als moderat geltende Chatami wurde im Juni mit 77 Prozent der Stimmen 
wiedergewaehlt. (SZ-01-08-06: 1b) 
Similarly, NEWSWEEK reports: 
But the government of reformist President Mohammed Khatami, first elected in 1997, was 
supposed to end all that. Khatami promised more freedoms and an end to the regime’s own 
lawlessness. (NW-01-v138-i08: 28) 
On the other hand, those positive features are weakened by the observation that the president 
and the Iranian parliament lack the political influence and power to carry out most of their reform 
attempts under the powerful rule of the conservative Guardian Council and the Supreme Leader of 
Iran, Ayatollah Khamenei. The SZ notes, for instance: 
Doch der Praesident bleibt vorsichtig, wie immer. Chatami will nicht die Orthodoxie 
herausfordern, die ihm erst vor wenigen Tagen die Zaehne gezeigt hatte. (SZ-01-08-14: 4) 
…and NEWSWEEK mentions: 
But Khatami, despite his landslide re-election in June, has looked ever weaker in battles with 
hard-liners. (NW-01-v138-i08: 28) 
Thus, the positive ambitions of the Iranian parliament and president, who are also regarded as 
western-oriented, are weakened and are said to cause internal political conflicts with a political 
opponent – the religious conservative forces – that is more powerful.51 On the one hand, this 
image implicitly reflects a certain degree of approval and support from the observing German 
and U.S. Self for the ambitions of parliament and the president to institutionalize Western 
                                                 
51 Again, Hashem’s study (1995) emphasizes that in TIME and NEWSWEEK between 1990 and 1993, we find moderate, 
pro-western, and reform-oriented Arab politicians who are weakened by the fact that they are without political influence, 
and not able to fight corruption, and are confronted with radical forces in the respective countries that weaken them 
(Hashem 1995: 157). 
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political standards and carry out reforms. On the other hand, the conflict with the conservative 
political forces in Iran also allows the Self to criticize their conservative agenda. 
 
The Political Supporters in the “War on Terrorism” 
After the 9/11 attacks, Type 8 is predominantly represented by some of those political and other 
actors who offer their help in the “war on terrorism.” In German newspapers after the 9/11 
attacks, actors such as representatives of the Arab League, or the Iranian president and Ayatollah 
Khamenei are predominantly weakened with regard to their pro-western rhetoric, their expressed 
condemnation of the attacks and their condolences for the American victims. The SZ for 
example, reports in one article that… 
Ueberraschend positive Signale kamen dabei aus Teheran. Dort verurteilten sowohl die 
konservativen Geistlichen um Religionsfuehrer Ali Chamenei als auch der gemaessigte 
Praesident Mohammed Chatami die Anschlaege. Erstmals seit dem Abbruch der 
diplomatischen Beziehungen vor mehr als 20 Jahren schlossen die Freitagspredigten auf 
Anweisung Chameneis nicht mehr mit dem Ruf “Tod Amerika”. Es gibt Anzeichen dafuer, 
dass sich Iran bei einem Angriff der USA auf die Taliban und bin Laden in Afghanistan 
zumindest neutral verhalten wird. (SZ-01-09-19: 1) 
However, just one week later the newspaper has quite a different message, namely that… 
Iran hat jegliche Unterstuetzung der USA bei der militaerischen Bekaempfung des 
Terrorismus abgelehnt. Iran werde den Vereinigten Staaten und ihren Verbuendeten bei 
Militaerangriffen gegen Afghanistan “keinerlei Hilfe” leisten, sagte der Geistliche Fuehrer, 
Ayatollah Ali Chamenei, in einer Rundfunkansprache. (SZ-01-09-27: 5) 
Similarly, in U.S. newspapers actors like the late King Hussein of Jordan and Iranian politicians 
are also weakened despite their politically supportive statements, especially because of their 
criticism for the West: The NY TIMES, for instance, quotes the Iranian diplomat Mohammad-
Javad Zarif who, on the one hand, says… 
“The magnitude of this attack has been unprecedented,” he said. “It is difficult for the world 
to comprehend that in a few seconds so many people have been lost. Certainly in Iran we 
understand the trauma that the American people are suffering and will continue to suffer for 
many years to come.” (NYT-01-10-01: 3) 
…but who, on the other hand, also criticizes the United States: 
While expressing sympathy for the victims of the attacks, Mr. Zarif criticized statements by 
Secretary of State Colin L. Powell about Iran’s possible inclusion in an American-led 
coalition. “For Secretary Powell to state that we may be considering whether Iran can be part 
of the coalition but that Iran has to behave and clean up its act is considered an insult, not a 
favour,” he said. (NYT-01-10-01: 3) 
Additionally, and just like in the German SZ, the Iranian Ayatollah Khamenei is quoted in the 
USA TODAY with his statement of refusal with respect to an Iranian participation in the anti-
terror coalition that is said to be due to the country’s dislike for Israel: 
Khamenei said his country does not support terrorism but cannot be part of any effort led 
by the United States because of its friendship with Israel. (USAT-01-09-27: 1A) 
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Weakened Cultural, Social and Economic Similarities with the Self 
Despite those political facets, in both countries we can also find Type 8 actors who are weakened 
with regard to their cultural, social or economic similarities. Those actors are, for example, 
described as culturally developed, secular, and modern, and modernity and secularism are principles 
that are seen as central for the German and U.S. self-concept as well. At the same time, those 
similarities with the Self are however weakened, by other information, for example, as these 
actors may be culturally modern but personally negative and politically conservative. Other Type 8 
actors may have enjoyed a Western education and are culturally modern. Before 9/11, the image of 
the Moroccan King Mohammed VI in the German SZ can serve as an example here. At first 
sight, the actors could be regarded as positive and by all means “Western-like”: 
Mohammed VI. gibt sich modern […] Wer sich im Einklang fuehlt mit den Vorlieben des 
Koenigs fuer modische Kleidung und Pop-Kultur, wer in Marokko weiter auf Reformen 
hofft, nennt Mohammed VI. wohlwollend “M6”. (SZ-01-08-08: 10b) 
He is described a culturally modern and leads a Western-influenced lifestyle. Yet, on closer 
inspection the actor is also described as politically greedy for power, religiously immoderate and 
ineffectual in his political action: 
Andere sehen, entweder mit Erleichterung oder mit wachsender Enttaeuschung, dass sich an 
den gewohnten Machtstrukturen nichts geaendert hat. Mohammed selber will beides sein: 
M6 und Koenig von Gottes Gnaden. Durch seinen Titel Befehlshaber der Glaeubigen (Amir 
al-Muminin) erhebt er den Anspruch, eine Art sakraler Figur zu sein. (SZ-01-08-08: 10b) 
In U.S. print media before 9/11, the same pattern can be found in the image of Saudi Arabia: 
The government’s engagement in diplomatic policies to improve the peace negotiations between 
Israel and Palestine as well as the economic wealth of the country are weakened by the mentioning 
of unequal living conditions for the population and by the strict cultural rules in the country. The 
NY TIMES contrasts: 
It is an affliction that permeates Saudi society, rooted in the impression that a country with 
seemingly bottomless oil reserves would always be rich. […] But the relaxed life is slowly 
vanishing. Saudi Arabia faces problems more typical of any other developing country, and 
young Saudis are confronting the fact that they will have to work at real jobs – if they can 
find them. (NYT-01-08-26: 1) 
Furthermore, the wealth of the country is contrasted with the internal deficits such as the lack of 
democratic structures, economic extravagancies of the ruling elite, and a certain skepticism about 
Western standards: 
Saudi Arabia has managed to lift virtually everyone out of poverty. But today, even with lofty 
oil prices, the petrodollars do not stretch as far, not least because they are being spread 
among more Saudi citizens. […] As a result, the kingdom is an anxious country unsure how 
to open itself to the world at large, especially the West. Suddenly, it must find ways to relax 
its rigid traditions in order to make the economy grow. It needs jobs for a new generation 
whose parents napped contentedly beside the public trough. […] The kingdom is rapidly 
outstripping the fabled infrastructure it bought with oil largess. (NYT-01-08-26: 1) 
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The People in Northern Afghanistan in U.S. Newspapers 
A slightly different prototypical image of a Type 8 actor can be identified in the U.S. newspapers 
after 9/11. Here, the image of the Afghan population in the north of Afghanistan that was not 
under Taliban rule reflects some facets of a weakened actor of Type 8. The northern regions of 
Afghanistan – in 2001 – are under the political and military control of the Northern Alliance 
(NA) who also positions itself as a pro-western alliance in the anti-terror coalition after 9/11.52 
Thus, the population of Northern Afghanistan not only lived under the rule of a political actor 
that fights against the restrictive Taliban regime, but was also assumed to be politically and 
especially culturally more open and free. The NY TIMES positively highlights that… 
Here, at least, they [women] can ride in the back of trucks if a man deigns to let them. They 
can shop in the market, although they are allowed to speak to male shopkeepers only if it is 
absolutely necessary. And they can go to school, even if the list of professions they can 
choose from is small – teacher, for instance, or midwife. (NYT-01-10-03: 6) 
In addition, an Afghan woman is quoted, saying: 
“I am very happy if the Americans come to Afghanistan,” she said, displaying the optimism 
that is running rampant here, “especially if they eliminate the Taliban.” (NYT-01-10-03: 6) 
Compared to the Afghan population in the rest of the country, actors in the north enjoyed much 
better living conditions. However, the image of those people is weakened, at the same time, by 
the fact that despite these improvements for an open and liberal cultural and political situation 
these structures and views were limited and hah not yet fully achieved a Western level because… 
Life for women here in rebel-held northern Afghanistan is not without its constraints. Some 
of the strict Muslim dictates rigidly enforced by the Taliban government that controls most 
of the country also apply here. But generally the Islam practiced here is far more permissive. 
[…] The women are almost always covered by a light blue cotton burkah, a veil that extends 
from head to ankle. They rarely speak to men in public and almost never interact with 
foreigners. […] Family pressure still plays a major role in marriage, but women in larger 
towns generally choose their own husbands. (NYT-01-10-03: 6) 
And the woman been quoted above is also described as dreaming of “becoming a doctor one 
day, though that seems unlikely. Like 85 % of Afghan women, she is illiterate. And by local 
custom, she is barred from remarrying.”53 
On a quantitative scale, we finally have to note that altogether, Type 8 actors already appear quite 
frequently before 9/11. In the timeframe before the attacks, about 6.6 % of all occurring Arab 
and Muslim actors in the selected German print media articles can be classified as Type 8 actors, 
compared to a slightly higher proportion of 10.8 % in the U.S. newspapers. This quantitative 
significance increases in German articles after the attacks to a proportion of now 9.3 % of all 
occurring actors, whereas the number of Type 8 actors remains nearly stable in U.S. articles, with 
a proportion of 10.6 %. 
 
                                                 
52 The Northern Alliance was a military and political union of different Afghan groups that opposed and fought the 
Taliban regime until 2001. The Alliance was recognized by most foreign nations as the legal government, even 
though it only controlled about 30% of Afghanistan. 
53 NYT-01-10-03: 6 
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Summary: The Weak Other 
The second level of difference outlined in the last subchapter refers to images of Arab and 
Muslim actors that show a certain degree of similarity with the Self. The difference between the 
self-concept and the similar Other is constructed by weakening those actors, either by weakening 
their similar features or by weakening the whole actor. 
Portraying Arab and Muslim actors as victims is a form of weakening that classifies certain actors 
as victims of negative conditions in Arab and Muslim countries or of negative behavior by other 
Arab and Muslim actors who may also be responsible for the negative societal conditions. Type 7 
summarizes this form of portrayal. Thereby, to some extent the victim status of Victim type 
actors can be seen as another form of actor portrayal that devaluates features and certain aspects 
of the Other. However, not the Type 7 actors are devaluated, but the negative actors or 
conditions that they suffer from and that are, directly or indirectly, seen to be responsible for the 
victim status of Type 7 actors. So, in a way, victim actors can be seen as supporting actors for the 
images of those actors who are actually devaluated. 
With regard to the point of view of the observing Self, the Victim type is interpreted as an 
exemplification of the consequences that result from a lack of Western standards and principles 
like democratic structures, freedom, and economic progress in Arab and Muslim societies. 
Therefore, those Type 7 actors are not completely different from the Self. The overlap with the 
German or American Self could merely be seen with regard to one aspect: both the observing 
Self and the victim implicitly criticize the lack of Western standards in Arab and Muslim 
countries, the latter mainly because they have to face and bear the political, social, or other 
consequences that result from this lack of progress, democracy, etc. 
Especially after the 9/11 attacks, the Self thereby also explicitly reflects upon the connections and 
the interplay between Western foreign policies and the negative consequences of those policies 
for the Arab and Muslim Other. Specifically in the context of the increased focus on the roots of 
terrorism in Arab and Muslim countries, both German and U.S. newspapers search for the 
motivations of the aggressions against the West and thereby also critically observe and reflect 
upon their own actions and behavior. However, even when the Self reflects upon its own 
mistakes and political misdeeds to explain the terrorist aggression of Arab and Muslim Others 
that comes to the fore in the 9/11 attacks, the principles and values of the Self are thereby not 
called into question. The only thing that might be questioned is the way in which those principles 
have been conveyed to the Other. 
Before the attacks, Type 7 actors form the second largest actor type group in both countries’ 
analyzed articles and every fifth actor can be labeled as a Victim type actor. After 9/11, this 
quantitative relevance of victims drops significantly to about one in ten occurring actors. For the 
discussed topics most Type 7 actors only appear in the context of one or two articles, and can 
therefore be regarded as supporting actors as well. There are, however, a few victims in the 
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newspapers that occur more than once or twice and are quite regularly depicted in the context of 
certain topics, like for instance the Afghan population. 
Other actor images on level 2 are weakened insofar as the similarities of the respective actors 
with the German or U.S. self-concept are devaluated by other features that are regarded as non-
western. Type 8 summarizes those actors. As was outlined in section VI.3.2, Type 8 actors 
possess features that can also be regarded as part of the U.S. or German self-concept of 
belonging, or they support Western principles or even try to institutionalize them – or have 
already done so – in their own Arab or Muslim countries. Some of those actors could be labeled 
as “dissidents,” as they hold oppositional positions with regard to a wide range of issues and 
oppose, for example, undemocratic structures, conservative and fundamentalist traditions, or terrorism 
and violent conflicts, and speak out against or actively combat corruption, violence, or terrorism in 
their own countries of origin. 
However, this does not necessarily mean that Type 8 actors become indistinguishable from the 
Self, because those positive aspects are contrasted with negative aspects that weaken the positive 
image of those actors. Type 8 actors are also described as politically undemocratic, culturally 
conservative, or economically extravagant. Other representatives of this type lack the political power to 
institutionalize Western principles and standards, or the level of institutionalization is regarded by 
the Self as only half-hearted or not good enough. Thus the overall similarity to the Self is 
diminished and the respective actors receive an image that still reflects a large degree of 
difference and distance from the German and U.S. self-concept. Type 8 actors are therefore 
different from the Self DESPITE their similar features and they can be distanced without (a) 
having to deny that they also carry positive features or (b) devaluating those features. 
 
4. Level 3: The Strategic Other 
The third level of difference that can be identified with regard to the images of Arab and Muslim 
actors in the analyzed German and U.S. print media refers to actors who can be labeled as strategic 
Others. In this context, two central actor types can be derived from the material: 
Table VI.3: The Strategic Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance54 
Before 9/11 After 9/11  
Germany USA Germany USA 
Type 9:    The Strategic Other 2.7 3.4 6.3 6.2 
Type 10:  The Strategically Used Other - 1.3 4.8 3.6 
 
The actor images that are summarized in those two types appear at first sight to be rather 
contradictory. Similar to level 2, the images of these actors show a certain degree of similarity 
                                                 
54 In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to 
all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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with the Self. However, at level 3 the difference between the self-concept and the similar Arab 
and Muslim Other is constructed by neglecting this similarity. Type 9 comprises the images of 
actors whose similarity is neglected by constructing them as strategic and by exposing the 
similarities as pretence. The second actor type (Type 10) summarizes the images of those actors 
who are described as negative but useful for the Western Self at the same time. In the following 
two sections both actor types are introduced in more detail. 
 
4.1. Type 9: The Strategic Other 
As already mentioned before, images of Type 9 actors, on the one hand, reveal a certain degree of 
similarity with the Self insofar as actors of this type carry positive features that are also 
communicated as part of the U.S. or German self-concept of belonging, or as these actors 
support Western principles or standards. On the other hand, these similarities are contrasted by 
other features that are rejected by the Self and often contradict the positive features. Implicitly 
and explicitly, these actors are thus referred to as strategic, and their similarities with the Self are, 
for instance, unmasked as pretence. Compared to Type 8, the similarities between Self and Other 
are therefore not evaluated as positive but are challenged. 
The most frequently dimensions on which these similar features of Type 9 actors are challenged 
are the political dimension and the dimension of delinquent and violent features. Actors of this 
type are generally described as inconsistent or even contradictory with regard to their political 
positions, views, or actions on certain topics and issues, for example, when discussing terrorism. 
Especially in the portrayal of some government actors we find references to an ambivalent self-
representation of these actors, for example, in their political statements in the context of 
international debates and negotiations. In some articles, these statements are contrasted with the 
“outside” perspective of the observing German or American Self. This combination of two 
perspectives can lead to a contradictory image of the respective actors.55 In other cases, the 
contradiction between the actor’s rhetoric and his or her (political) actions is even explicitly 
ascribed to a strategic motivation, as for example, an anti-western view may be concealed to avoid 
political or military conflict with the West. 
Before 9/11, this form of actor portrayal is of only minor relevance in both countries’ analyzed 
print media. About 2.7 % of all occurring Arab and Muslim actors in German articles and 3.4 % 
of actors in U.S. articles can be ascribed to this actor type. As the character dimensions focused 
upon have already shown, the majority of Type 9 representatives before the attacks are 
government and political actors. To exemplify the construction of Type 9 actors more vividly, 
some prototype examples are described in the following. For the analyzed timeframe before the 
attacks, two actors in the analyzed U.S. newspapers stand out as politically contradictory: the 
                                                 
55 These contradictory images of Type 9 actors thereby do not have to result from only one article, but can be 
formed by the contradictory depictions in different articles of the newspapers in one of the analyzed countries during 
the different time periods around 9/11. 
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Albanian rebels of the UÇK and the successor of the Indonesian President Wahid, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri. 
 
The Albanian UÇK in U.S. Newspapers 
The UÇK is measured predominantly according to its political rhetoric and cooperation with 
NATO in the ongoing peace negotiations in Kosovo. On the one hand, the NY TIMES for 
example highlights the political cooperation and the peaceful talk of the group and quotes NATO 
representatives who describe the leader of the group as a reliable partner: 
NATO representatives and diplomats who have had contacts with Mr. Ahmeti and his 
commanders appear confident that the rebels will accept a political deal negotiated by Mr. 
Xhaferi and give up their arms. “From what we have seen so far Ali Ahmeti is a reliable 
partner who honors his word,” said Hans-Jorg Eiff, the NATO representative in Skopje. 
(NYT-01-07-23: 6) 
Yet, on the other hand, this rhetoric is contrasted with their breaking political agreements and 
their continuous violent actions: 
Yet on the ground the rebels appear to be positioning themselves to grab more territory and 
to raise the stakes should the peace talks break down and fighting resume. […] International 
monitors say the rebels are the source of the disquiet here, and list incidents from cease-fire 
violations and improvised checkpoints, to the detention and beating of local Macedonian 
Slavs. (NYT-01-07-23: 6) 
The UÇK is said to strategically take advantage of the negotiated cease-fire to seize new 
territories in the northern parts of Macedonia which borders the Kosovo region: 
Ethnic Albanian rebels have taken advantage of a NATO-brokered cease-fire in Macedonia 
to move into this town [Tetovo] and a few villages in this mainly Albanian-populated area of 
western Macedonia, right under the noses of government forces. Dozens of heavily armed 
Macedonian Albanian fighters, in camouflage fatigues and T-shirts emblazoned with the 
badge of the rebel National Liberation Army, have occupied the outer districts of Tetovo, 
and stand just 300 yards from the nearest police checkpoint. (NYT-01-07-23: 6) 
A few days later, the violent attacks of the group have not stopped, and the NY TIMES again 
reports violent incidents: 
A human rights group released detailed interviews today it conducted with road workers 
kidnapped by Albanian guerrillas this week in which the workers say they were tortured, 
forced to perform sexual acts on each other and had initials carved into their backs. [...] Peter 
Bouckaert, a senior researcher with the New York-based Human Rights Watch, said that the 
kidnapping of the five road workers represented “an increasing pattern of illegal detentions 
and kidnappings” by the rebels. (NYT-01-08-12: 8b) 
Thus, the group is especially regarded as an unreliable partner because it breaks the arrangement to 
disarm its troops, as the NY TIMES reports a couple of days later: 
Only two of the six brigades that make up the rebel movement, which calls itself the 
National Liberation Army, carried out their disarmament today. […] The ethnic Albanians – 
rebels and civilians – have so far voiced widespread support for the disarmament and 
NATO’s involvement. (NYT-01-08-28: 3) 
Thus, the UÇK receives an overall image that unmasks it as seemingly cooperative and peaceful on 
the one hand but violent, unreliable, and backstabbing with regard to its political actions and 
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agreements with Western actors like NATO on the other, because the UÇK did not uphold the 
negotiated ceasefire and the promised disarmament. 
 
Indonesian President Megawati in U.S. Newspapers 
With the portrayal of the second prototype example for U.S. newspapers before 9/11, Megawati 
Sukarnoputri, the major contradiction occurs with regard to her political orientation. What is 
mainly challenged is whether or not the new president is able and willing to implement more 
democratic structures in the political system and to improve the internal political instabilities and the 
social and economic situation of the country. On the one hand, U.S. newspapers regard the new 
president as an improvement compared to her predecessor Wahid (see VI.2.3), and describe her 
as politically competent and committed. The NY TIMES argues that… 
Among the I.M.F.’s biggest concerns has been Jakarta’s deficit, which has ballooned to $8 
billion, or about 6 percent of gross domestic product. Analysts note that as vice president, 
Mrs. Megawati led efforts to reduce the gap – supporting painful steps like reducing fuel 
subsidies. (NYT-01-07-25: 1) 
…and in another article positively notes that… 
In her first step to define her new presidency, Megawati Sukarnoputri chose a cabinet today 
in Jakarta, winning immediate praise for her selection of an economic team and for the 
overall professionalism of her choices. […] Economic analysts generally praised Mrs. 
Megawati's key appointments, led by an economist who has been the ambassador to the 
United States, Dorodjatun Kuntoro-Jakti, as the overall economic coordinator. The new 
finance minister is Boediono, the former chief of national economic planning. […] Mrs. 
Megawati indicated that stability and consistency were a priority by selecting Bambang Susilo 
Yudhoyono as her chief political and security minister. (NYT-01-08-10: 4) 
Regarding the settlement of political conflicts we furthermore learn that… 
Indonesia’s new president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, visited the troubled province of Aceh 
today and said she was sorry for mistakes by past governments in the region's separatist war 
that has left thousands dead. “The central government in the past has made many mistakes 
and there have been shortcomings,” Mrs. Megawati said. “For that, on behalf of myself and 
the government, I, as the president of the Republic of Indonesia, offer my greatest apologies 
to the people of Aceh.” (NYT-01-09-09: 8) 
On the other hand, these positive aspects of her image are, at the same time, contrasted with 
statements that construct her as politically incompetent, conservative, and inactive against human rights 
violations. With reference to her political views, the NY TIMES argues, for instance, that… 
Some experts noted that Mrs. Megawati is an ardent nationalist. That could chill any 
willingness to sell assets to foreigners – a necessity in reviving the country’s banks. It could 
also affect trade relations. (NYT-01-07-25: 1) 
And concerning the guarantee of human rights, the newspaper also skeptically notes in another 
article that… 
President Megawati must also move forward with prosecutions for human rights violations 
in East Timor, Papua and Aceh. Nothing she has said or done indicates she has the remotest 
interest in doing so; indeed, she has publicly defended the East Timorese militia thug Eurico 
Gutteres. (NYT-01-07-27: 19) 
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Megawati is even expected to support repressive actions: 
The new president is not seen as a stickler for civil liberties and she is expected to welcome 
the military’s eagerness to use aggressive tactics to quell separatist movements and other 
disturbances. (NYT-01-07-29: 3) 
Her moderate political attempts are thus seen as an attempt to secure her own political status and 
power, a perspective that may be illustrated with this last quote concerning Megawati: 
Andi Mallarangeng, a political scientist, said the inclusiveness of Mrs. Megawati’s cabinet 
could invite problems. “First, everyone is in the cabinet and almost no one is in the 
opposition, which is not good for democracy,” he said. “Second, the more parties there are 
in the coalition, the more fragile the coalition is.” Budiarto Shambazy, a journalist and 
political scientist, noted, however, that for the most part the political appointees were not 
given influential posts. In addition, he said, they mostly excluded the prominent names that 
many analysts had expected to be named. “This is an indication of her independence,” he 
said. “She showed her good will to party leaders while refusing to be pushed around by 
them.” (NYT-01-08-10: 4) 
 
The Turkish AKP Leader Erdogan in German Newspapers 
For the German newspapers before 9/11, the leader of the Turkish AKP can serve as a 
prototype example for a Type 9 actor.56 The party of the former mayor of Istanbul and later 
Prime Minister, Tayyip Erdogan, receives skeptical attention in German newspapers before the 
9/11 attacks because of the Islamic fundamentalist views of its leading figure. Thus the party is 
regarded as religiously fundamentalist and is mainly described with reference to the conservative and 
anti-western political rhetoric of Erdogan who is, for example, quoted in DER SPIEGEL saying: 
Die islamische Welt, so Erdogan, erwarte, “dass die türkische Nation sich erhebt.” Er selbst 
werde sich bemühen, die Türkei von der Europäischen Union, “diesem Bund katholischer 
Staaten,” fern zu halten. (Sp-01-i35: 132) 
In the article, Erdogan is said to have supported this view openly until he was convicted of 
sedition in 1998 and was given a life-long ban from political office. This ban was annulled, 
however, and Erdogan was rehabilitated in the course of a political amnesty. Since then is said to 
have changed his rhetoric and now presents himself as more moderate now, but implicitly his 
political “turn” is regarded as a strategy to re-enter the political arena. The following quotes show 
this particularly well. DER SPIEGEL, for instance, notes that… 
Seither distanzierte sich Erdogan von seiner alten Rhetorik und bemühte sich um die 
Bildung einer angeblich nur noch religiös inspirierten Partei nach dem Muster der 
europäischen Christdemokraten. (Sp-01-i35: 132) 
The SZ says about his new political ambitions: 
Erdogan, so heisst es, habe sich juengst bemueht, die Militaers davon zu ueberzeugen, dass 
er kein religioeses Regime wolle und ein ueberzeugter Demokrat geworden sei.  
(SZ-01-07-21: 6) 
And another article in the same newspaper mentions that… 
                                                 
56 For more information on the AKP see also chapter IV.2.1. 
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Die “Erneuerer” unter der Fuehrung des frueheren Istanbuler Buergermeisters Recep Tayyip 
Erdogan betonen seit Wochen, ihre Partei solle keine religioes orientierte Organisation sein, 
sondern eine demokratische Partei im westlichen Sinne. (SZ-01-08-08: 7d) 
Those quotes, on the one hand, take notice of the political rhetoric and the new moderate agenda 
of the politician but, on the other hand, they also reflect skepticism on behalf of the German Self 
with respect to the seriousness of this agenda. Indefinite phrases like “he has tried to convince 
the military” or “he tried to form an allegedly religiously inspired party” indicate that the 
moderate political course of Erdogan is not seen as seriously intended. After the attacks, German 
newspapers stick to this image of the “Islamist Erdogan”57 and his political image remains 
opaque. 
The main difference between the Turkish politician, the Indonesian president, and the UCK is 
that the latter behaves in a contradictory way in its interactions with the West, whereas Megawati 
and Erdogan are described as acting in a contradictory way with reference to their own countries. 
This is important to mention because after 9/11 Type 9 is now predominantly represented by 
actors who are focused on with regard to their interaction with the West and who mainly come 
from countries like Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Iran. As a result, for example the 
contradictory image of the Indonesian president in U.S. newspapers is replaced after 9/11 by an 
image that sees Megawati as increasingly politically powerless, and weakens her positive political 
features by confronting them with the growing radical religious and conservative forces in the 
Indonesian government. In addition, Indonesia loses most of its political relevance as now the 
focus of U.S. newspapers shifts from internal political, social or economic issues to the topic of 
“terrorism” and the international political relations of Arab and Muslim countries, as has already 
been mentioned before. Therefore, the internal political issues of Indonesia (just like those of 
Turkey in the German media context) become less relevant for the U.S. Self and are replaced by 
observation of the growing power of Indonesian religious extremist groups. 
After 9/11, the number of challenged Type 9 actors more than doubles in both German and U.S. 
print media. Now, 6.3 % of all occurring actors in German articles and 6.2 % of all actors in U.S. 
newspapers can be ascribed to this type. One reason for this increased significance may be that in 
the aftermath of the attacks and in the course of the formation of the anti-terror coalition, a 
number of Arab and Muslim countries took sides with the United States and the West. They 
therefore have to be rearranged along the dividing line between Self and Other, since these Arab 
and Muslim countries and actors not only expressed their condolences and guaranteed their 
support for the “war on terrorism.” In addition, they also explicitly supported Western principles 
and values such as more tolerance, democracy, and a free and open society without religious restrictions, 
to demonstrate their pro-western stance in the new terrorist conflict that the attacks had created. 
 
                                                 
57 Own translation, original quote in German: “der Islamist Erdogan” (SZ-01-10-5: 8d). 
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Yassir Arafat 
One example of this changing perception is the imaging of the Palestinian leader, Yassir Arafat: 
Before 9/11, German newspapers do not explicitly allege that Arafat acts strategically with regard 
to his political attempts or unmask him as a negative actor, but simply construct an image that 
weakens his positive features by undermining his overall political status (see also VI.3.2). 
Compared to that, before 9/11 the political actions of Arafat in the context of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict are already regarded as contradictory in U.S. newspapers and are even seen as 
strategic. The NY TIMES, for example, argues that… 
Many Israelis are understandably frustrated with Yassir Arafat. After spurning a politically 
courageous Israeli peace offer last summer, the Palestinian leader has broken his pledge of 
nonviolence and for the past 10 months has repeatedly endorsed an armed Palestinian 
uprising. Wary of trusting him again as a “peace partner,” some prominent Israelis, including 
former Prime Minister Ehud Barak, are calling on the world to turn “a cold shoulder” […] 
Mr. Arafat's miscalculations are manifest. […] His renewed embrace of violence has been 
inexcusable and has damaged prospects for future diplomatic advances. Mr. Arafat has been 
happier to see these groups fight Israel than challenge his own power. Thus he has done little 
to discourage their anti-Israel violence. (NYT-01-08-08: 16) 
Arafat is assumed to use foul play to please not only the radical forces of the Palestinian 
resistance against Israeli occupation (basically groups like Hamas or Islamic Jihad) but also the 
Western negotiating partners in the peace process with Israel. His strategic action is further 
revealed when we look at the next passage from an article published only a few days later, where 
the newspaper argues that… 
Apparently fearing a strong Israeli reprisal, Mr. Arafat, condemned the attack on Thursday 
and urged Israel to join him in a “joint declaration for a cease-fire” leading to a cooling-off 
period “under international supervision.” His appeals was swiftly dismissed as a ploy by a 
spokesman for the Israeli prime minister, Ariel Sharon, who noted that Mr. Arafat had called 
for a cease-fire after the disco bombing in Tel Aviv. A truce was then arranged. But it never 
took hold. (NYT-01-08-10: 1) 
And similarly, USA TODAY also sees this ambivalence. Referring to Arafat’s strategic and two-
sided behavior in the peace process, Barak is quoted as follows: 
Barak believes Arafat “deliberately returned to violence to regain the moral high ground” 
after rejecting the Camp David agreement. (USAT-01-08-24: 9A) 
After the 9/11 attacks, this contradictory image can be found in both countries’ newspapers. Now 
German articles no longer weaken Arafat on the political level but challenge his positive political 
positions – just like the U.S. newspapers did before 9/11 and continue to do so after the attacks. 
In a number of articles in both German and U.S. newspapers, Arafat is, on the one hand, said to 
position himself against terrorism and on the side of the West and is described to express his 
condolences and compassion with the terror victims. NEWSWEEK reports, for instance, that… 
In Palestine, Yassir Arafat insisted that he was “shocked” by the attack.  
(NW-01-v138-Sonder: 22) 
And the NY TIMES writes: 
Mr. Arafat, who spoke from Gaza City, emphasized that Palestinians had reason to feel 
compassion for Americans. “As Palestinians, we too have experienced the tragic loss of 
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innocent civilians, who suffer from violence on a daily basis,” he said. “Our hearts go out to 
the people of the United States during this tragedy, our prayers are with them.” He paused, 
then, spacing the words out for emphasis, repeated three times, “God bless them.”  
(NYT-01-09-13: 18) 
This kind of portrayal can also be found in the German articles even though the German 
newspapers do not focus as much on Arafat as the U.S. newspapers after 9/11. The SZ reports 
that “today, Yassir Arafat is with the Americans,”58 and DER SPIEGEL quotes Arafat saying: 
“Wir sind völlig geschockt. Es ist unglaublich.” Um seinen Worten Nachdruck zu verleihen, 
begab sich der Palästinenserchef am Mittwochabend in Gaza-Stadt ins Schifa-Krankenhaus 
und meldete sich zum Blutspenden. (Sp-01-i38: 154) 
On the other hand, Arafat’s image is challenged by contrasting his compassionate and pro-western 
agitation and behavior with the note that he is also regarded as a potential terror supporter. As USA 
TODAY writes: 
Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat, blamed for complicity in suicide bombings against Israelis, 
donated blood for U.S. victims. (USAT-01-09-13: 5Ac) 
And also an article in the NY TIMES writes that… 
Mr. Sharon warned that such a meeting now would “legitimize Arafat as a good guy” while 
the Palestinian leader is “using terrorism at its fullest possible strength.” (NYT-01-09-17: 1b) 
And a few days later, USA TODAY picks up this issue again: 
And there is an opportunity for Palestinian leader Yassir Arafat to try to ingratiate himself 
with the Bush administration by rethinking his tacit support for terrorism, Kemp says. 
(USAT-01-09-17: 1Ab) 
Arafat’s hidden motivations are also explicitly emphasized, for example, when the SZ writes 
that… 
Arafat jedenfalls ist anzusehen, unter welchem Druck er nun steht. Er weiss, dass er fast 
nirgends auf der Welt noch einen Funken Toleranz findet bei Terrorakten gegen Israel. Es 
wird nun von ihm erwartet, diesen Terror endlich zu stoppen. (SZ-01-09-13: 4b) 
Especially in the U.S. articles we find rather explicit ascriptions of strategic behavior. The NY 
TIMES argues, for instance that… 
Mr. Arafat, who condemned the attacks on Washington and New York, has been working 
overtime to repair the damage done by images broadcast internationally of some Palestinians 
celebrating the violence. But even as those images set back his cause, he found new influence 
with the Americans intent on rallying Arab support. (NYT-01-09-19: 1) 
Similar to that, USA TODAY mentions that… 
Arafat sided with Iraq’s Saddam Hussein during the Gulf War. But this time, experts say, he 
recognized quickly that tacit support for suicide bomb attacks on Israelis would no longer be 
acceptable after the carnage in New York and Washington. (USAT-01-09-19: 8A) 
And very clearly referring to the Western perspective, the NY TIMES, a few days later, again 
mentions that… 
                                                 
58 Own translation, original quote in German: “Jassir Arafat steht heute auf der amerikanischen Seite.” (SZ-01-09-21: 
4). 
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Mr. Arafat has his own worries. In the diplomatic community here, he is widely seen as 
fearing a return to pariah status if he is lumped together with the terrorists whom Mr. Bush 
wants to eradicate. “The hypothesis we’re working on,” the Western diplomat said, “is that 
he understood this has got to change or he’s going to be seen as part of the problem.” 
(NYT-01-09-21: 10) 
 
Other Contradictory Alliances in the “War on Terrorism” 
Besides the contradictory image of Arafat, there are also other actors who can be seen as 
representatives of Type 9 and who only become prominent in the course of the 9/11 attacks – 
attracting attention with reference to their possible roles as friends or enemies in the anti-terror 
coalition. In both countries’ print media, the geostrategic relevance of countries like Syria, Iran, 
or Libya and the positions of their governments becomes an important issue after the terror 
attacks. At the same time, the Western perception of those countries and actors reflects a certain 
skepticism: 
On the one hand, a number of those nation states and their governments take up a pro-western and 
anti-terrorist position with regard to international terrorism. DER SPIEGEL argues, for example, 
that… 
Syrien reagierte schon mal mit vorauseilender Unterwerfung und setzte bei einem 
nächtlichen Handstreich alle palästinensischen Extremisten fest, die in dem Verdacht 
standen, Terroraktionen gegen die USA auszuhecken. (Sp-01-i38: 154) 
Similarly, the NY TIMES reports: 
In public statements in recent days, the Syrian government has said it regrets the attacks on 
American civilians. It has said it is willing to join others in the anti-terror fight.  
(NYT-01-10-09: 8) 
Furthermore, the government of Sudan is mentioned as taking sides with the West after the 
attacks. Here, NEWSWEEK writes that… 
Even Sudan, attacked by U.S. cruise missiles in 1998 for allegedly backing bin Laden, has 
made terrorist arrests in recent days. (NW-01-v138-i14: 26) 
…and DER SPIEGEL notes that… 
Der einst so radikale Sudan hat eine amerikanische Vermittlung im Bürgerkrieg akzeptiert 
und sich der Anti-Terror-Koalition Washingtons angenähert. (Sp-01-i40: 174) 
In an article in the NY TIMES, the pro-western reaction of Jordan, “the most supportive Arab 
country,”59 is also emphasized: 
Jordan – which has provided important intelligence to Washington about terrorists in the 
past several years but has been quietly critical of the administration’s approach to the Middle 
East crisis – was ready to “lend support in any way,” said the Jordanian ambassador to the 
United States, Marwan Muasher. (NYT-01-09-13: 17) 
And last but not least, in both countries the newspapers mention the moderate and supportive 
reactions of former “antagonists” like Libya or Iran. In Germany, DER SPIEGEL writes: 
                                                 
59 NYT-01-09-27: 3 
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Doch selbst manche der schlimmsten Feinde der USA, die Führer der von Washington so 
genannten Schurkenstaaten, zeigten sich fassungslos: Die Angriffe auf New York und 
Washington seien “erschütternd,” so Libyens Revolutionsführer Muammar al-Gaddafi.  
(Sp-01-i38: 154) 
And the SZ reports that… 
Ueberraschend positive Signale kamen dabei aus Teheran. Dort verurteilten sowohl die 
konservativen Geistlichen um Religionsfuehrer Ali Chamenei als auch der gemaessigte 
Praesident Mohammed Chatami die Anschlaege. […] Es gibt Anzeichen dafuer, dass sich 
Iran bei einem Angriff der USA auf die Taliban und bin Laden in Afghanistan zumindest 
neutral verhalten wird. (SZ-01-09-19: 1) 
In the United States, the NY TIMES mentions that: 
Iran is not normally given to sympathizing with the United States, but last week’s terror 
attacks have drawn rare public condolences and a pledge to join an international effort to 
root out terrorism. (NYT-01-09-21: 2) 
And USA TODAY also reports that… 
Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi condemned the attacks and urged Muslim aid agencies to 
assist the victims. (USAT-01-09-19: 8Ab) 
On the other hand, however, this pro-western agitation of the listed nation states and their 
governments is not only seen as a positive development. The NY TIMES, for instance, contrasts 
the anti-terrorist rhetoric of the mentioned countries with their terrorist history and argues: 
Around the world, America’s allies and even many nominal foes voiced revulsion at the 
attack, and condolences for families of the casualties. North Korea, Libya, Syria, Sudan and 
Iran, which have been accused by the United States of abetting terrorism, joined the 
condemnations. (NYT-01-09-13: 1c) 
This point is also picked up again in another article of the same edition: 
A different kind of problem is posed by the handful of governments that sponsor or aid 
international terrorist groups. These include Iran, Iraq, Syria, Libya and North Korea. Several 
of those nations now seek to rebuild ties with the international community.  
(NYT-01-09-13: 26) 
This skepticism of the observing German and U.S. Self can be further elaborated by looking at 
the arguments that are listed to challenge the pro-western agitation of the potential anti-terror allies: 
To unmask them as strategic actors, both German and U.S. articles dwell especially on the terrorist 
history of those countries and their governments, and emphasize the potential terror threat that is 
assumed to come from them. NEWSWEEK here especially refers to a “list of terror sponsors” that 
is published by the U.S. government: 
The administration is seeking to target other “state sponsors,” including Pakistan, Yemen, 
Sudan and, more tangentially, Iraq and Iran. […] A good example is Iran. “Iran is the single 
largest source of finance and material for terrorism,” says one intelligence source in 
Washington. “Their legislature actually appropriates money for this thing.”  
(NW-01-v138-i13: 36) 
This list is also referred to in DER SPIEGEL: 
Die in Washington kursierende Liste jener Länder, die Terrororganisationen wie der Bin 
Ladens Zuflucht, finanzielle oder logistische Unterstützung gewähren, ist aber ziemlich lang: 
Iran und Irak, Syrien, Libyen und Sudan, Kuba und Nordkorea. (Sp-01-i39: 148) 
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The countries on this list are perceived as a general terrorist threat despite the fact that they have 
actually spoken out against terrorism before, as can be illustrated with a quotation from the SZ: 
Um die Mitte der Neunzigerjahre (des vorigen Jahrhunderts) lenkte eine Reihe von 
selbstmoerderischen Bombenanschlaegen, die hauptsaechlich gegen amerikanische Ziele im 
Nahen und Mittleren Osten gerichtet waren, die Aufmerksamkeit auf die wachsende 
Bedrohung durch den von anderen Staaten gefoerderten Terrorismus. In der Folgezeit 
ersetzte dieses Phaenomen die Theorien von der kommunistischen Verschwoerung als dem 
wichtigsten Zusammenhang, in dem der Terrorismus zu sehen sei. Danach waren an der 
Finanzierung terroristischer Handlungen verschiedene abtruennige, auslaendische 
Regierungen wie die Regime im Iran, Irak, Libyen und Syrien aktiv beteiligt oder erteilten 
den Auftrag zu deren Durchfuehrung. (SZ-01-09-15: I) 
Thus, both countries’ newspapers construct an image of these actors that is shaped by their 
ambivalent behavior and a strategic ambition. In the SZ, we learn about the potential Western “ally” 
Jordan… 
Koenig Abdullah von Jordanien beispielsweise wand sich fuerchterlich, als er von 
amerikanischen Fernsehsendern gefragt wurde, welchen Beitrag sein Land zum gemeinsamen 
Kampf gegen den Terror leisten koennte. Jordanien, so meinte er gequaelt, sei ein kleines 
und schwaches Land. Aber sein Geheimdienst sei stets dazu bereit, die Kollegen der CIA mit 
Informationen zu versorgen (SZ-01-09-15: 2) 
USA TODAY offers a possible reason for the political behavior of some of the countries and 
government: 
Whether out of fear or opportunism, Libya, Syria, Iran and the Palestinian Authority have all 
denounced the atrocities of Sept. 11. Pakistan has joined the coalition. Sudan is cooperating. 
(USAT-01-09-27: 15A) 
The NY TIMES argues that some of those regimes try to secure their own political power and 
status and therefore not only support the West but, at the same time, are working against it 
because… 
Some Arab regimes, most of which are corrupt dictatorships afraid of their own people, 
made a devil’s pact with the fundamentalists. They allowed the Islamists’ domestic 
supporters to continue raising money, ostensibly for Muslim welfare groups, and to funnel it 
to the Osama bin Ladens – on the condition that the Islamic extremists not attack these 
regimes. […] These Arab regimes, feeling defensive about their Islamic crackdowns, allowed 
their own press and intellectuals total freedom to attack America and Israel, as a way of 
deflecting criticism from themselves. (NYT-01-09-21: 35b) 
The motivations of the respective actors do not only have to be of a political nature but can also 
result from economic demands. Concerning Iran, for example, the NY TIMES writes: 
Iran is listed by the State Department as the world’s most active state sponsor of terrorism, 
largely because of its support for anti-Israeli groups, particularly the Lebanese Hezbollah. 
[…] He [Mohammad-Javad Zarif, diplomat and deputy foreign minister] said the Bush 
administration had neither asked Iran for any specific help in its war against terrorism nor 
offered any inducements. Among Iran’s longstanding demands are a lifting of economic 
sanctions and the resolution of financial claims dating from the 1979 revolution.  
(NYT-01-10-01: 3) 
Both countries’ newspapers frequently quote American President Bush’ statement that “from this 
day forward, any nation that continues to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the 
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United States as a hostile regime,”60 which especially addresses those countries and actors listed 
above. When these actors position themselves against terrorism and take sides with the West and 
the United States in particular, the skepticism against them dominates the Western perception. 
The images that result from this skepticism indicate that despite the fact that these actors support 
the West against a terrorist threat, they are not LIKE the West. So in a way, and also quite similar 
to the next actor type that will be introduced, these Type 9 actors not only act strategically but are 
also perceived as a strategic partner by the Self, as the following quote from the NY TIMES quite 
vividly illustrates: 
The Saudis, Egyptians and Syrians are not, and will not be, members of this coalition in any 
equal sense – not because they don’t have military power to contribute, but because deep 
down these Arab regimes do not share the values that we're trying to defend. […] they 
cannot openly tell their people they are on our side. Because our side is out for the defense 
of freedom, and their goal is not the preservation of freedom – for their own societies or for 
others. Their goal is self-preservation. […] “Regimes such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia or the 
Palestinian Authority have a legitimate fear of democracy – they fear that free elections 
would be exploited by Islamist extremists who are basically undemocratic,” said the Mideast 
specialist Stephen P. Cohen. […] “But these Arab leaders have to understand that if we root 
out these extremists – who’ve been produced by their own bad governance – we are not 
doing it so these regimes can keep their countries free of democracy for everyone else. We 
want to make the world safe for democracy, and they want to make the Arab world safe 
from democracy.” (NYT-01-10-09: 25) 
To sum up, we can say that the images of Type 9 actors also emphasize that they actually do not 
share the majority of Western principles and that they actually behave in an anti-western way and 
have a terrorist history themselves. The overall images of those actors challenge their positive 
features by indicating that those features or the behavior of those actors may have to be regarded 
as a strategic method to secure a certain political, economic or social status, or to reach certain 
aims. Thus, these actors are distanced by emphasizing their contradictions. As the last quote 
indicates, Type 9 actors are not seen as equal partners or as equal to the self-concept of belonging 
but remain different as long as they do not really and honestly strive for the institutionalization and 
internalization of Western principles like democracy or freedom. Compared to the politically 
weakened actors of Type 8 (see VI.3.2) who are not challenged and whose similar (Western) 
features are not neglected, the similar facets of Type 9 actors are either neglected or questioned. 
 
4.2. Type 10: The Strategically Used Other and the Western Ambivalence 
The second actor type that can be positioned on the level of a strategic Other comprises the 
images of those actors who are described as negative but useful for the Western Self at the same 
time. When these actors are referred to in the articles, they are explicitly perceived as a strategic 
partner by the observing German or American Self. Actors of Type 10 are described as negative 
with respect to their main features but at the same time, it is remarked that they are politically or 
economically profitable or useful for the West. Therefore, Type 10 actors are not regarded as similar 
to the Self. They deviate quite significantly from the demanded German or American standards, 
                                                 
60 NYT-01-09-21: 1 
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and their features are, to a large extent, not accepted or favored by the Self. However, the 
negativity of those actors is somewhat downgraded because they are politically, economically, or 
otherwise helpful and useful for certain aims of the Western Self. This ambivalence on the part of 
the Self – to reject the negative characteristics of the respective Other and at the same time to 
need the Other – are expressed in the different articles. 
Before the 9/11 attacks, this form of portrayal of Arab and Muslim actors is rather insignificant. 
In German articles it does not appear, and in the analyzed U.S. newspapers only 1.3 % of all 
occurring actors can be ascribed to this category. One image that can be introduced as an 
example for Type 10 is that of Uzbekistan. In the American NY TIMES, Uzbekistan is, on the one 
hand, regarded as a state that carries out political repression against certain independent religious 
branches of Islam to put them under state control: 
Uzbekistan is leading a regionwide crackdown on all forms of Islam that are not state-
controlled – repression that is driving entire villages into opposition and forcing religion 
underground. (NYT-01-08-16: 22) 
On the other hand, the article also notes the ambivalence of the U.S. government in the political 
dialogue with this state that is basically attributed to the American economic interest in the 
deposits of gas and oil in Uzbekistan. As the newspaper writes: 
While American officials talk about human rights when they meet with their Central Asian 
counterparts, Washington’s interest in the region’s oil and gas reserves and fear of another 
Afghanistan limit American criticism. Washington has never counted Uzbekistan among the 
nations that violate religious freedom. (NYT-01-08-16: 22) 
A similar view can be identified in the image of Sudan before the attacks. In an article about the 
U.S. engagement in peace negotiations with the war-torn country published in the NY TIMES, 
President Bush is quoted right in the beginning: 
President Bush today denounced the Sudanese government’s “brutal and shameful war 
against its own people” and appointed former Senator John C. Danforth as a special envoy 
to seek peace in the African nation. (NYT-01-09-07: 9) 
Thus, the country is seen as repressive against its own population. However, the next sentence 
immediately reveals the interests of the U.S. economy, since… 
Mr. Bush, who is under pressure from American oil interests and religious groups to become 
more active on Sudan, said he was under “no illusions” that Mr. Danforth, a Missouri 
Republican, would be able to ease a political and religious conflict that has killed two million 
people in 18 years. (NYT-01-09-07: 9) 
At the end of the article, this contradictory U.S. position is picked up again when the newspaper 
notes that American ambivalence leads to a different form of treatment of an obviously terrorist 
actor: 
American companies are barred from doing business with Sudan, which is on the State 
Department’s list of terrorist nations, but oil companies are pressing the administration to 
ease the embargo, saying they are losing out to competition. (NYT-01-09-07: 9) 
Especially with Sudan, this American perception changes with the attacks and the increased 
relevance of the terror aspect. Due to the attacks, the terrorist activities of the country can no 
longer be put aside for economic interests and it is now solely seen as strategic and as a terrorist 
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threat (see VI.4.1). Both outlined Type 10 images express a strategy – not on the part of the 
actors but pursued by the observing Self, and here the United States in particular. The negativity 
of the actors, their political oppression and violence, are mentioned but are said to be put aside to 
some extent for the economic interests of the American Self. 
After the attacks, the reflections upon the ambivalence of the Western Self in the interplay with 
the Arab and Muslim Other become a more relevant issue. Now, 4.8 % of all occurring actors in 
the German articles and 3.6 % of those in the American articles are seen as Type 10 actors. In 
both countries’ analyzed newspapers, three major representatives of Western ambivalence can be 
highlighted: the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, the Pakistani President Musharraf, and the 
Saudi Arabian government. 
 
The Northern Alliance Against the Taliban 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks, the Northern Alliance (NA) becomes a strategic Western 
partner in the context of a possible overthrow of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and the 
search for Osama bin Laden (see also V.2), and both German and U.S. newspapers pick up the 
political debates about military and financial support for the NA. In the context of those articles, 
the NA is described as a strategic partner with crucial insight and knowledge of Afghanistan and 
its political system that the West cannot call upon itself. DER SPIEGEL writes for instance: 
Im Kampf gegen Bin Laden, hat er [Mohammed Fahim Khan61] über Uno-Botschafter 
Ravan Farhadi in New York erklären lassen, stünde die Nordallianz an der Seite der 
Amerikaner, 15 000 Soldaten könne sie dafür bereitstellen […]. (Sp-01-i39: 166) 
And USA TODAY quotes U.S. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld: 
[…] Rumsfeld, on NBC’s Meet the Press, reached out to rebel forces in Afghanistan, including 
the Northern Alliance. “We need to recognize the value they bring to this anti-terrorist, anti-
Taliban effort and, where appropriate, find ways to assist them,” he said.  
(USAT-01-10-01: 2A) 
However, the perception of the NA is not free of doubt. At the same time as this group is 
praised for its military and political knowledge in the region, both countries’ print media also 
frequently mention the group’s negative sides. The NY TIMES, for example, emphasizes its 
military weakness and that the NA lacks the support of large parts of the Afghan population: 
The United States could use the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance as a proxy ground force, but 
the group is not widely supported throughout Afghanistan, and has no more than 12,000 
fighters under a command that is in flux. (NYT-01-09-19: 1b) 
This aspect is also mentioned in USA TODAY, that writes: 
But the insurgents always had one serious political strike against them: They lacked the 
support of the Pashtuns, the largest ethnic group in the country. (USAT-01-09-25: 6A) 
And another NY TIMES article reports that… 
                                                 
61 According to the news magazine, Khan is the new leader of the NA, and thus successor of Massoud who had been 
killed in September 2001.  
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While alliance officials here put on a brave face, doubts exist about its military abilities. The 
group claims to field 15,000 soldiers, but Russian officials say the number is closer to 5,000. 
They claim to control 15 percent of northwest Afghanistan; Russian officials put the figure at 
5 percent. (NYT-01-09-25: 1b) 
The assassination of the military leader of the group, Ahmed Shah Massoud, shortly before the 
9/11 attacks is regarded as a further crucial weakening factor, since… 
It’s not even clear how helpful the Northern Alliance will be, since its charismatic leader, 
Ahmed Shah Massoud, was assassinated, allegedly by bin Laden operatives, two days before 
the attacks on America. (NW-01-v138-i14: 26) 
Similarly, DER SPIEGEL argues that… 
Die Nordallianz gilt allerdings als militärisch und politisch enthauptet. Die Ermordung ihres 
Kommandanten Massud durch arabische Attentäter kurz vor den Anschlägen in New York 
und Washington sei ein weiterer Hinweis auf die strategischen Fähigkeiten der Hintermänner 
des Terrors. (Sp-01-i39: 148) 
But especially the technological and military underdevelopment of the NA – compared to the Taliban 
– is viewed with skepticism: DER SPIEGEL argues here that… 
Auch die Ausrüstung der Fußtruppen war bisher marode: Die 15000 Soldaten tragen oft 
sowjetische Uralt-Maschinenpistolen, Koppelschlösser mit Hammer und Sichel und dazu 
Turnschuhe. Nur die wenigen Berufssoldaten werden bezahlt – mit 250000 Afghani pro 
Monat, gut zwei Dollar. Der Rest sind Bauernburschen. Sie werden von den Familien aus 
den Heimatdörfern versorgt. (Sp-01-i40: 152) 
…and the NY TIMES writes: 
Even if the troops are supplied, they are outnumbered. Across Afghanistan, the alliance says 
it has 15,000 fighters squared off against Taliban forces, including foreign volunteers. The 
Taliban, who govern the country, boast of having 300,000 troops, but more reliable estimates 
range from 45,000 to 60,000. […] The general and his frozen front line represent the reality 
of the Northern Alliance. It would take months as well as money and equipment for the 
alliance to transform itself into an effective offensive threat, according to military analysts.  
(NYT-01-09-29: 1c) 
But despite this skepticism with regard to the military skills and economic resources of the NA, 
what really makes the coalition of Western countries with it critical from the perspective of the 
observing Self is the group’s violent and criminal history and its personal attitudes. Both German 
and U.S. articles reflect upon those negative features. The NY TIMES, for instance, writes: 
But in past years the alliance itself has been accused of shelling civilians, carrying out 
summary executions, and engaging in opium and weapons trafficking, according to human 
rights groups. The groups say the alliance has also burned and looted the houses of 
suspected Taliban sympathizers. […] A report released by Human Rights Watch this spring 
found that all of the factions “engaged in rape, summary executions, arbitrary arrests, torture 
and ‘disappearances’.” (NYT-01-10-07: 1e) 
Especially in U.S. articles the actor is also described as criminal because the NA earned some of its 
revenue in the past by cultivating and trafficking drugs. As the NY TIMES emphasizes: 
The alliance has also been accused of drug and gun-running and human rights violations, 
including summary executions, the burning of houses and looting. (NYT-01-09-25: 1b) 
New data collected by the United Nations indicates that most opium grown in Afghanistan 
this year was in areas controlled by the Northern Alliance […]. (NYT-01-10-05: 5) 
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And in DER SPIEGEL, the NA is described as arrogant and presumptuous when it comes to the 
realistic estimation of their military power in the region: 
Bei solcher Unterstützung sieht die Nordallianz ihre große Stunde gekommen: Sie stellt die 
Fußsoldaten, die großen USA die Luftwaffe, die Russen liefern mindestens neue Waffen, das 
wär’s doch. “Wir kontrollieren bereits mehr als ein Viertel Afghanistans,” feierte Dr. 
Abdullah, Außenminister der Nordallianz, vorige Woche vollmundig die ersten Erfolge.  
(Sp-01-i40: 152) 
Nevertheless, as the NY TIMES concludes, the alliance is regarded as a crucial Western partner in 
the war against the Afghan Taliban regime: 
In any case the alliance stands to play a powerful role in any future government, a position 
strengthened by its warming relationship with Washington. Another reason for its influence 
is sheer power: it can threaten to keep doing what it has been doing for two decades – using 
its soldiers, now 15,000, to keep up the fight. (NYT-01-10-07: 1e) 
…even though it might not form a future government because, as BILD argues: 
Die Nordallianz könnte sich in Afghanistan auf Dauer nicht halten. Aus Sicht der 
afghanischen Paschtunen sind die Nordallianz-Kämpfer feindselige Fremdvölker – Perser, 
Türken, Mongolen. (Bild-01-10-09: 2b) 
What can be said in summary, therefore, is that even though the NA is seen as a strategic military 
partner for the West it is not regarded as an equal partner, because it is regarded as underdeveloped 
and deviant from the Western standards that the Self regards as relevant. This may be illustrated 
once more with a last example, taken from USA TODAY which writes: 
Charles Dunbar, who was in charge of our embassy in Afghanistan during the Soviet 
invasion in the early 1980s, points out that the Northern Alliance “has some pretty nasty 
characters involved with them, even by the standards of that part of the world.”  
(USAT-01-10-05: 9A) 
Altogether, we can say that the NA is constructed as helpful for the Self DESPITE its deficiencies. 
Both countries’ newspapers after 9/11 emphasize the group’s lack of power, technological 
underdevelopment, and personal shortcomings, but on the other hand also point out the NA’s 
strategic relevance in the military operation against the Taliban regime. Especially the U.S. articles 
in this context also emphasize the criminal negativity of the ambivalent partner and frequently point 
out the violent character and the drug trade of the group. 
 
Pakistan and President Musharraf: The Inscrutable Partner in the “War on Terrorism” 
The second prototype example for a Type 10 actor after 9/11 in the analyzed German and U.S. 
newspapers is the state of Pakistan and its President Musharraf. 
Before 9/11, we already find portrayals of the president that indicate certain contradictions. His 
reformist, anti-fundamentalist, and democratic initiatives are challenged by the fact that he reached 
political power via a military coup in October 1999. Furthermore, the president is also described 
as lacking the political power to realize his proclaimed democratic initiatives and actions in opposition 
to the religious and political fundamentalist forces in Pakistan. In the German SZ his political 
decisions and his moderate actions are also indicated to be forced by court rulings of the highest 
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court of Pakistan. Thus, both German and U.S. print media already communicate a two-sided 
image of the actor who is, to some extent, also described as strategic and contradictory, when the 
events of 9/11 take place and Musharraf becomes a focus of Western foreign political attention. 
After the attacks, in both German and U.S. newspapers, the contradictions of the president 
continue to be relevant for the image of the actor, and also the nation state in general is seen as 
rather ambivalent. However, this contradictory image becomes increasingly relevant insofar as 
Pakistan now becomes a crucial military and political partner in the “war on terrorism,” especially 
because the country is a geographical neighbor of Afghanistan. What is added to this image is an 
increased implicit skepticism on behalf of the observing Western Self with reference to the nation 
state and its president due to this increased military and political relevance. 
But to start with the first aspect, we can say that since Pakistan is now seen as a strategic military 
partner because of its geographical position on the frontline of the “war on terrorism,” the West 
has to approach a country and a government that – so far – have not been in the closer radius of 
political relations but now has to be involved in the coalition.62 Thus, on the one hand, the 
newspapers mention the relevance and the strategic usefulness of Pakistan for the planned military 
operations. The SZ, for example, argues that… 
Eine Schluesselrolle scheint Pakistan zuzufallen, das einerseits grossen Einfluss auf das 
Taliban-Regime in Kabul besitzt und andererseits geografisch guenstig nahe den vermuteten 
Stuetzpunkten Osama bin Ladens liegt. Das ist insofern wichtig, als das Pentagon erstmals 
den Einsatz von Bodentruppen gegen die Terrorlager erwaegt. (SZ-01-09-15: 2b) 
In another article the same day, this military relevance of the Pakistanis is again picked up… 
Die Pakistaner sollen der US Air Force den Luftraum oeffnen und Basen zur Verfuegung 
stellen. Sie sollen die Grenze nach Afghanistan abriegeln. Sie sollen den Waffennachschub an 
die Taliban unterbrechen – es ist ein offenes Geheimnis, dass diese ihre beherrschende 
Stellung im afghanischen Buergerkrieg nur mit Waffen und Logistik aus dem Nachbarland 
sowie dank mitkaempfender pakistanischer Offiziere halten koennen. Vor allem aber wird 
Washington auf Geheimdienstinformationen aus Pakistan bestehen: Wie sind bin Ladens 
Trainingslager und Stuetzpunkte gesichert? Wo kann der Araber noch untertauchen? Ueber 
welche Waffen verfuegen die Taliban? (SZ-01-09-15: 6) 
In the American newspapers we find a similar image: Musharraf and his government are 
described as taking sides with the West, and the relevance of the country for the military 
operations against the Taliban regime is specifically highlighted. NEWSWEEK writes: 
In Islamabad, Foreign Minister Abdul Sattar said Pakistan would comply with all U.N. 
Security Council resolutions to combat terrorism and “discharge its responsibilities under 
international law.” (NW-01-v138-i13: 36) 
And the NY TIMES reports that… 
Mr. Bush emphasized his discussions with three nations: Pakistan, India and Saudi Arabia. 
He noted that the general who took over in Pakistan not long ago, Pervez Musharraf, has 
                                                 
62 As already mentioned this is mainly due to the fact that Pakistan has more inside and knowledge about 
Afghanistan and the Taliban regime, the Pakistani secret service is said to have direct links to the regime, just as the 
Pakistani government is said to have good relations with the Taliban. In addition to that, Pakistan is regarded as a 
useful partner for the coalition, for example, because airspace was needed as well for the planed military operation 
against the Taliban etc. 
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been particularly helpful, and administration officials say that a delegation is being sent to 
Pakistan with a list of specific requests. (NYT-01-09-17: 2b) 
…and in another article points out that… 
With his [Musharraf’s] permission, American and British bombers and cruise missiles have 
flown through Pakistan’s airspace in the last two days on their way to targets in Afghanistan. 
(NYT-01-10-09: 24) 
The strategic usefulness of Pakistan is accompanied by the emphasis of positive actions that have 
been carried out by the state and the Pakistani president in the aftermath of the attacks. The 
newspapers, for example, highlight the government’s active attempts to combat radical 
fundamentalist groups as one assumed source for terrorist activity, and NEWSWEEK emphasizes the 
image of Musharraf as a modern and moderate actor. As the magazine writes: 
Musharraf, 58, stands squarely on the side of secularism. […] In Pakistan’s long battle 
between religious extremism and modern secularism, Musharraf had staked out his ground, 
and it wasn’t in the middle – he was a modern man. But now, with war looming, he may face 
a backlash in his own land. (NW-01-v138-i14: 33) 
DER SPIEGEL reports that Musharraf has taken serious and also courageous steps to control or even 
bar radical Pakistani fundamentalist groups: 
In Pakistan, wo nach Meinung von Landeskennern immerhin jeder dritte Geheimdienstler 
und etwa jeder fünfte Militär mit islamistischen Strömungen sympathisiert, hat sich der 
Präsident und Militärherrscher Pervez Musharraf in den vergangen Wochen weit vorgewagt. 
Er hat mehrere gewaltbereite Muslim-Gruppierungen wie etwa die Bin Laden nahe stehende 
Lashkar-i-Jangvi verboten. (Sp-01-i38: 132) 
On the other hand, both countries’ newspapers also notice a number of negative aspects and 
features with regard to the crucial alliance in the “war on terrorism.” As USA TODAY notes: 
Pakistan and Iran, which border Afghanistan and could help capture bin Laden and defeat 
his Afghan allies, are themselves supporters of terrorist groups. (USAT-01-09-25: 10Ad) 
In addition to that, the positive political attempts of the country and the moderate image of the 
president are contrasted with the fact that Musharraf is not regarded as a democratically elected 
leader. DER SPIEGEL writes for instance: 
Dabei betreibt Musharraf ein durchaus diktatorisches Regime, das mit den Menschenrechten 
betont unzimperlich verfährt und asketisch auf den Luxus einer Volksvertretung verzichtet. 
(Sp-01-i40: 166) 
Also the SZ emphasizes that… 
1999 schliesslich putschte sich Pakistans derzeitiger Staatschef General Parvez Musharraf an 
die Macht. Es folgten neue US/G-8 Sanktionen – wegen der “undemokratischen 
Entwicklung” des Landes, wie es zur Begruendung hiess. (SZ-01-09-25: 25) 
Thus, the president’s approaches to the West in his foreign political course are diminished by his 
internal political deficits, and this leads to a skeptical view on the actor. Furthermore, Musharraf 
is also regarded to be politically weak because of his pro-western initiatives and in an unstable 
position because of the fundamentalist forces in the country. USA TODAY critically notes here: 
But siding with the United States is risky for the government of Pervez Musharraf. Pakistani 
hardliners who support the Taliban’s fundamentalist interpretation of Islam demonstrated 
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against Musharraf on Sunday, burning U.S. flags and shouting support for bin Laden. 
(USAT-01-09-17: 10Ac) 
And the NY TIMES argues that… 
Although Pakistan’s army and police are almost certainly powerful enough to suppress street 
protests, influential Pakistanis say, General Musharraf, who took power in a coup nearly two 
years ago, cannot be sure that some of his fellow army commanders might not topple him if 
he fails to carry them with him. (NYT-01-09-17: 1d) 
At this point, strategic motivation is ascribed to the Pakistani government and state when it is 
argued that Musharraf takes sides with the West mainly for economic reasons. The NY TIMES 
argues, for instance, that… 
An influential Pakistani who attended some of the Sunday briefings said General Musharraf 
had already assured President Bush in a telephone call on Saturday that Pakistan would allow 
the use of its airspace and airfields, if needed, as well as full access to Pakistani intelligence 
on Mr. bin Laden. […] But those who took part in the meetings said General Musharraf had 
given the impression that he had driven a hard bargain. Among other things, the general was 
said to have demanded an end to economic sanctions imposed by Washington after Pakistan 
tested nuclear weapons in 1998, and the lifting of an American ban on weapons sales. […] 
Also on the list, participants said, was a pledge that Washington would assist Pakistan’s 
battered economy by encouraging generous treatment by the International Monetary Fund 
and the World Bank […]. (NYT-01-09-17: 1d) 
This economic dimension of Pakistan’s alliance in the anti-terror coalition is also picked up by 
the USA TODAY, which argues that… 
Pakistan symbolizes the complicated crosscurrents in the Muslim world. President Pervez 
Musharraf, a Western-educated general who wants foreign investment for his poor nation, 
has condemned the terrorist attacks and vowed to support the United States.  
(USAT-01-09-19: 1A) 
… and in another article reports that… 
Debt is Pakistan’s curse. The country is a ward of international lenders, drowning in $ 35 
billion in foreign obligations. Interest payments eat up 57% of the annual budget. Military 
spending consumes 34%. That leaves just 9% for education, health care, law enforcement, 
infrastructure and other needs. […] Pakistan, with a population of 144 million, generates 
annual economic output of about $ 64 billion, about the same as Mississippi, which has 2.8 
million people. Adult unemployment is at least five times higher than the 5.9% official rate, 
economists say. (USAT-01-10-05: 1B) 
What distinguishes Pakistan and its president from the other contradictory alliances that have 
been outlined before (see VI.4.1) is that with reference to the Pakistani Type 10 actors, both 
countries’ newspaper images not only highlight the strategic motivations of the Pakistani 
government to co-operate with the West. We also find implicit as well as explicit references to 
the ambivalence of the Self. From the analysis of the articles that focus on Pakistan and its leader 
it seems that the U.S. and German Self not only know about those strategic actions of the Other 
but also accepts them because of their own strategic intentions. Thus, the images of those actors 
are also shaped by the strategic scale of measurement of the Western Self. Therefore, USA 
TODAY also quotes U.S. government officials… 
But they also say President Pervez Musharraf must be rewarded for his gamble or risk losing 
public support to the angry mullahs. (USAT-01-10-05: 1B) 
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Even more than in the U.S. newspapers, this aspect of the Western strategy is especially pointed 
out in the German newspapers, where articles reflect explicitly upon a certain Western 
ambivalence in the context of cooperation with Pakistan. German newspapers – in this context – 
emphasize the strategic usefulness but they do so largely with a focus on the United States. The 
strategic relevance is observed from a somewhat neutral position when the SZ writes, for 
instance, that… 
Offenbar bahnt sich zwischen Pakistan und den USA eine Allianz auf Gegenseitigkeit an: 
Waehrend Pakistan den USA Ueberflugrechte und geheimdienstliche Unterstuetzung 
zusagte, will Amerika dem Land oekonomisch und bei der Bewaeltigung der 
Fluechtlingsstroeme helfen. (SZ-01-09-17: 2b) 
…and in another article argues that… 
Das von US-Sanktionen und einer jahrelangen Schuldenkrise geplagte Pakistan findet sich 
ploetzlich in einer wirtschaftlich ueberaus Erfolg versprechenden Situation wieder: Die 
Vereinigten Staaten brauchen das suedasiatische Land als unabdingbaren Partner im Kampf 
gegen Osama bin Ladens Terrorbasen in Afghanistan. (SZ-01-09-25: 25) 
What results from this perspective is not only a contradictory image of the Other but also an 
implicit indication of the Self’s own ambivalence. Like the perception of the strategic roles of the 
Northern Alliance, the role of Musharraf and the Pakistani state are critically judged from both 
countries’ perspectives. We may assume that the (German and U.S.) Self is aware of the deficits 
as well as the positive facets of the Other, and also knows about the contradictions that occur 
with the political actions of Musharraf and the Pakistani nation state in reference to terrorist and 
pro-western activities. At the same time, the quotes have revealed that the Self also knows about the 
usefulness of the actor. The image that results from these two sides not only reflects the 
contradictions of the Other but also gives reasons for the cooperation with it despite those 
contradictions. 
 
Contradictory Alliance and Economic Partner: Saudi Arabia 
The last example I would like to introduce in the section on Type 10 actors is the nation state and 
government image of Saudi Arabia. The images of these actors are constructed in a pretty similar 
way. However, one basic difference to the last two examples is that the usefulness of those actors is 
predominantly seen on the economic dimension. We may start this section with a quotation from 
DER SPIEGEL that describes Saudi Arabia as “home of the most sacred sanctuaries of Islam, place 
of the oil: Saudi Arabia is said to be the partner of the West”63 and with another one from the 
American NEWSWEEK that calls the country one of “the allies who made our foes.”64 
As the first quotation indicates, Saudi Arabia is seen as a Western partner on a different level 
compared to the previous two Type 10 actors discussed. With Saudi Arabia, economic relations 
are of central relevance and shape the perception of the Other. In the case of Saudi Arabia, the 
                                                 
63 Own translation, original quote in German: “Heimat der heiligsten Stätten des Islam, Reich des Erdöls:  
Saudi-Arabien gilt als Partner des Westens” (Sp-01-i40: 174). 
64 NW-01-v138-i14: 34 
VI. How Different is the Other? 
 - 209 -
cooperation of the Self with this actor attracts particular attention after the 9/11 attacks, and the 
most critical aspect of the relationship between Western Self and Saudi Arabian Other becomes 
the issue of “terrorism.” As has been noted for the Western perception of the majority of 
occurring Arab and Muslim actors in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks so far, this point is a 
central criterion for differentiation and evaluation. And like many other Arab and Muslim actors 
that have been introduced for Type 9 and Type 10, Saudi Arabia is also reported to proclaim its 
pro-western alliance and to express its compassion for the terror victims after the attacks. Both 
German and U.S. newspapers mentioned that the political leaders of Saudi Arabia condemn the 
attacks and assure political and military help and support in the search for the mastermind of the 
attacks. 
Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia and its government are regarded as contradictory because the military 
support for U.S. interventions is contrasted with the Western belief that the government, at the 
same time, ignores or even actively supports and finances terrorist activities and maintains ties to 
diverse terrorist groups. This was already indicated in the NEWSWEEK quote in the first paragraph 
of this section but can also be illustrated with other quotes. The German SZ, for example, 
describes a certain inconsistency in the political actions of the country: 
In Saudi-Arabien spricht man dafuer das heikle Kapitel “Finanzierung des Terrorismus” an. 
Westliche Beobachter werfen Saudi-Arabien ein Doppelspiel vor: Einerseits, so heisst es in 
einem Papier der Europaeischen Union, gelte die Regierung als Verbuendeter der USA und 
verurteile offiziell den Terrorismus. Andererseits gebe es Anzeichen dafuer, dass Mitglieder 
der koeniglichen Familie und wichtige Regierungsbeamte das Netzwerk des mutmasslichen 
Terroristenchefs Osama bin Laden finanziell unterstuetzen. (SZ-01-09-27: 6) 
Similar to that, DER SPIEGEL also points to the assumed terrorist potential that emanates from the 
country: 
Es stellt sich heraus, dass dort, wo der Glauben sein Zentrum hat, auch der Terrorismus zu 
Hause ist. Man weiß um dessen Schlüsselrolle, wird aber nicht mehr lange um die Erkenntnis 
herumkommen, dass Riad Teil des islamistischen Terrorproblems ist.  
(Sp-01-i40: 174) 
Furthermore, the country and its government are still regarded as politically undemocratic, repressive, 
and culturally backward – despite their pro-western policies. DER SPIEGEL reports that… 
Saudi-Arabien, das bislang nicht der Hauch einer Demokratisierung gestreift und das massiv 
die Entwicklung extremistischer Terrorbewegungen wie zum Beispiel die Taliban unterstützt 
hat […] (Sp-01-i39: 176) 
…and the NY TIMES argues that… 
The American concerns also highlight the tortuous and ambivalent relationship that law 
enforcement officials have long had with Saudi Arabia, which has failed to be as cooperative 
as promised in other high-profile terrorism cases. […] They said that law enforcement 
officials believed that the Saudi government knew far more about Al Qaeda, Mr. bin Laden’s 
terrorist network, and its presence in the kingdom than they had been willing to share with 
the United States. (NYT-01-09-19: 4) 
This quote also reflects a first reference to the assumed ambivalence with regard to the 
relationship of the U.S. Self with this actor. On the one hand, the country and its leaders position 
themselves on the side of the Western anti-terror coalition, but on the other hand, they are part 
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of the terrorist problem. As the quotes from the observing German and American newspapers 
illustrate, the Self knows that but to some extent ignores this aspect or at least downgrades this 
terrorist involvement in the political interaction because the country is a needed oil supplier and 
important economic partner. Both countries’ print media discuss this ambivalence in the context 
of the Saudi Arabian regime and observe the own strategic behavior rather self-critically. For 
example, DER SPIEGEL, on the one hand, criticizes the cultural conservatism, a lack of democratic 
structures and secularism, the discrimination of women in Saudi Arabia, and other features of the 
country, as the following quote illustrates: 
Saudi-Arabien kennt keine politischen Parteien, keine Gewerkschaften, keine freie Presse – 
das Zugeständnis an westliche Demokratievorstellungen erschöpft sich in einer “Beratenden 
Versammlung” […] deren 90 Mitglieder der König ernennt und deren Beschlüsse von ihm 
abgesegnet werden müssen. […] Frauen haben weit weniger Rechte als etwa in Iran und 
dürfen nicht einmal ein Auto steuern. […] Das Praktizieren anderer Religionen neben dem 
Islam wird nicht geduldet, selbst nicht der verwandten monotheistischen wie Christentum 
und Judaismus. […] Die Strafen für Verbrechen sind mittelalterlich-fundamentalistisch, nach 
der rigidesten Auslegung der Scharia-Gesetzgebung: Hand-Amputation bei Dieben, 
öffentliches Köpfen, Peitschenschläge und für Ehebruch auch Steinigen. (Sp-01-i40: 174) 
On the other hand, in the same article we find a critical reflection on the West’s economic 
relationship with the country: 
Wäre Saudi-Arabien nicht das Land mit den größten Erdölreserven (rund 25 Prozent), würde 
es wohl vom Westen wegen seiner Menschenrechtsverletzungen geächtet. Und wären diese 
Ressourcen für den Westen nicht so wichtig, müsste Saudi-Arabien im Licht der neuesten 
Ermittler-Erkenntnisse fürchten, in die Liste der geächteten “Schurkenstaaten” 
aufgenommen zu werden: als Brutstätte des Terrors. […] Nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg 
begann das Schwarze Gold zu sprudeln und Milliarden in die Staatskasse zu spülen. Die 
“besondere Beziehung” zu den USA war geboren, 1945 durften die Amerikaner in Dhahran 
einen ersten Militärstützpunkt auf saudischem Boden errichten. (Sp-01-i40: 174) 
This example not only refers to a contradiction in the Western interaction with Saudi Arabia but 
especially points out the special relationship between this country and the United States. This 
special relationship is also observed in the U.S. newspapers after the attacks. The American 
NEWSWEEK, for example, skeptically asks: 
But what are we going to do about countries that are the real source of modern Islamic 
terrorism – our faithful allies Saudi Arabia and Egypt? […] These countries have been the 
fertile ground on which radical Islamic terrorism has grown. […] Saudi Arabia’s connection 
to these terrorists is particularly illuminating. Embracing Wahhabism, a rigid, puritanical 
version of Islam, the Saudi regime has tried to bolster its faltering legitimacy in the past two 
decades by fueling a religious revival in the Arab world. […] It is clear that Saudi Arabia now 
exports two products around the globe – oil and religious fanaticism. […] We think of our 
allies in the Middle East as “moderates.” And certainly compared with the barbarians of Al 
Qaeda, they are cautious, conservative rulers. But for decades now the governments in 
Riyadh and Cairo have resisted economic and political modernization with disastrous results.  
(NW-01-v138-i14: 34) 
The same critical reflection we find in a NY TIMES article that discusses the new “fragile” status 
of the relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia after the 9/11 attacks. In this 
article it is said that… 
Saudi Arabia’s track record in previous terrorism investigations has been one of keeping its 
distance from the United States. […] It is a distance that illustrates a challenge: how does 
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Washington square Saudi Arabia, the loyal ally and vital oil supplier, with Saudi Arabia, the 
guardian of Islam, a power of the Arab world and birthplace of suspected terrorists? […] In 
past cases when it has been called upon to investigate terrorism, Saudi Arabia seemed less 
concerned with finding the killers than with making sure it did not stir up radical opponents 
at home who might paint members of the royal dynasty as American lackeys.  
(NYT-01-09-15: 17c) 
And USA TODAY most explicitly points out the strategic motivation of the Self by arguing that… 
For fear of alienating strategic allies, the United States often ignores human rights abuses in 
countries such as Saudi Arabia, some say. (USAT-01-09-19: 1A) 
…and in another article openly lists the most central reasons for this ambivalence (as already 
cited from the German media). First of all, the ambivalence results from the economic usefulness 
of the country, because… 
What largely binds the United States and Saudi Arabia is oil. Saudi Arabia has one quarter of 
the world’s known oil reserves and provides 17% of U.S. crude oil imports. Protecting the 
kingdom is a top U.S. priority. (USAT-01-09-21: 8A) 
Second, the country is needed as a military and political partner in the campaign against 
terrorism: 
This time, collaboration is more sensitive. The birthplace of the Muslim religion, Saudi 
Arabia is a necessary anchor for any global coalition that targets Muslim extremists. The 
United States also needs Saudi permission to fly over the country to attack Afghanistan from 
the west without entering Iranian airspace. (USAT-01-09-21: 8A) 
The newspaper article thus concludes that… 
Despite official displays of sympathy – including full-page ads by the Saudi government in 
U.S. newspapers – sentiment back home is ambivalent. […] “It’s an ambivalent relationship 
[…] inexorably bound by many interests,” says David Long, a Saudi expert.  
(USAT-01-09-21: 8A) 
We can, therefore, say that more than with the other Type 10 examples introduced in this 
subchapter, the image of Saudi Arabia and its government is clearly marked by the ambivalence 
of the observing Self: The economic and military usefulness of the country clash with Saudi 
Arabia’s own terrorist involvements and the inner political and cultural repressions and deficits, 
which clearly deviate from the standards and principles the West demands and supports. 
Nevertheless, and especially for the U.S., Saudi Arabia is a crucial partner and the economic 
relations are of central relevance. Especially after 9/11, this leads to a conflict situation for the 
Self when “terrorism” becomes the central criterion for differentiation and evaluation. Thus, the 
contradictory role of Saudi Arabia is frequently discussed in both German and U.S. newspapers 
after the attacks. In this context we can also find attempts by the Self to justify the Western 
relationship with a contradictory Other like Saudi Arabia. As the NY TIMES argues: 
By its actions, it [Saudi Arabia] can demonstrate to other Muslim nations that Washington is 
leading an international campaign against terrorism, not, as some wrongly claim, a Western 
battle against the Islamic world. Saudi Arabia feels especially vulnerable to the strains of this 
crisis. But it is also particularly well placed to help build the broadest possible coalition 
against terror. (NYT-01-09-25: 28) 
Altogether, Type 10 actors illustrate that the observation of Arab and Muslim actors in Western 
print media is also accompanied by a self-observation: German and U.S media not only evaluate 
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the Other on the basis of its own set of principles and standards but also critically focus on the 
own ambivalences in the interaction with the Other. As the examples have illustrated, the Self can 
be aware of the negative or contradictory features of the Other but still grant this Other a 
different position and status than other negative actors, as the articles also provide relevant 
reasons for cooperation. This strategy allows the Western Self to demarcate the Other and still 
cooperate with it for its own – strategic – reasons. 
 
Summary: The Strategic Other 
As outline in this subchapter, the third level of difference comprises images of Arab and Muslim 
actors in the analyzed German and U.S. print media who can be labeled as strategic others. The 
images of the two actor types that were introduced on this level appear to be rather 
contradictory. Like level 2, the images of these actors show a certain degree of similarity with the 
Self. However, on level 3, difference between the self-concept and the similar Arab and Muslim 
Other is constructed by neglecting those similarities. 
Actor images of Type 9 actors, on the one hand, reveal a certain degree of similarity with the Self 
insofar as actors of this type possess positive features that can also be regarded as part of the U.S. 
or German self-concept of belonging, or these actors support Western principles or standards. 
On the other hand, those similarities are contrasted by other features that are rejected by the Self 
and often contradict the positive features. The respective actors appear to be strategic and their 
similarities with the Self are, for instance, unmasked as pretence. Thus, the overall images of Type 9 
actors show that they actually do not share the majority of Western principles and that these 
actors are distanced by emphasizing their contradictions. They are not seen as equal partners of 
the Self or as equal to the (German or U.S.) self-concept of belonging but remain different as 
long as they do not really and honestly strive for the institutionalization and internalization of 
Western principles like democracy or freedom. The similar features of Type 9 actors are therefore 
mostly neglected or at least questioned. Type 9 becomes frequently relevant after the 9/11 
attacks; most of these actors are questioned with regard to their pro-western and anti-terrorist 
positions and rhetoric in the course of the formation of the anti-terror coalition, since they are, at 
the same time, described as politically or culturally conservative, terror supporters, and not trustworthy. 
The second introduced actor type (Type 10) comprises the images of actors who are described as 
negative but useful for the Western Self. Type 10 actors are rather insignificant before the 9/11 
attacks but become a relevant issue after the attacks. When these actors are referred to in the 
different articles, they are explicitly perceived as strategic partners by the observing German or 
American Self. The ambivalence arises from the contradictory images of those Type 10 actors. 
On the one hand, actors of Type 10 possess negative features and deviate quite significantly from 
the expected German or American standards, since their features are, to a large extent, not 
accepted or favored by the Self. Furthermore, they are sometimes even unmasked as strategic or 
false as they proclaim themselves to be pro-western, democratic, or against terrorism, when they actually 
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support terror groups themselves or carry out undemocratic policies, like the Type 9 actors do. On the 
other hand, the negativity of these actors is somewhat downgraded because they are politically, 
economically, or otherwise helpful and useful for certain aims of the Western Self. This 
ambivalence on the part of the Self – rejecting the negative characteristics of the respective Other 
but at the same time needing the Other – is expressed in the different articles. The (German and 
American) Self is aware of the deficits and contradictions of the Other but suppresses them due 
to the strategic usefulness of the respective actors. 
Especially Type 10 has illustrated that the observation of Arab and Muslim actors in Western 
print media is also accompanied by a self-observation: German and U.S media not only evaluate 
the Other on the basis of their own set of principles and standards but also critically focus on the 
their own ambivalences in interaction with the Other. In this context, the Self is aware of the 
negative or contradictory features of the Other but still grants this Other a different position and 
status than other negative actors. This strategy allows the Western Self to demarcate the Other 
and still cooperate with it for its own – strategic – reasons. 
Thus, what unifies the two actor types on level 3 is that strategic behavior is a central facet of their 
images; but whereas with Type 9 actors the strategic facet is ascribed to and critically observed in 
the Other, in the context of Type 10, strategy and ambivalence are critically observed in the Self. 
The strategic Other reflects the Western assumption that especially Arab and Muslim governments 
permanently oscillate between two sides. They lack Western standards in their internal political 
actions and they adopt these standards when interacting with the West. The newspaper articles 
reflect the assumption that this strategy is pursued by the respective actors to avoid, for instance, 
political conflict (internal as well as with the West) or economic sanctions by the West. At the 
same time, the strategic Other also reflects the strategic behavior of the Self, which again has an 
influence on the evaluation of the Other. 
 
5. Level 4: The Self Within the Other 
The first three levels of difference between Western Self and Arab and Muslim Other that have 
been outlined so far, summarize actor images that are predominantly characterized by the 
ascription of characteristics and features that can be classified as non-Self characteristics. Those 
features are, for example, deviations from those principles and standards that the observing print 
media regard as central for the own (German, American or Western) concept of belonging. The 
images of Arab and Muslims on two of those three levels (level 2 and level 3) did also bear 
different degrees of similarity with the communicated self-concepts, but, at the same time, 
differed from this concept since they also included a number of non-western features. In addition 
to those more or less different actors, the analysis also identified a small but in no way 
unimportant number of actors in German and U.S. print media before as well as after 9/11 that 
solely possess features that the Self regards as preferable and desirable. Thus, we can distinguish a 
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fourth level with regard to the portrayal of Arabs and Muslims, that can be summarized as “the 
Self within the Other.” 
On a quantitative scale, images of solely positive actors from Arab and Muslim countries are not 
found very often in the analyzed print media sets around 9/11 compared to the other ways of 
portrayal that have been outlined so far. After 9/11, the number of positive images of external 
actors nearly doubles in both countries’ print media, but still, positive images form the least 
frequently used portrayal of external Arab and Muslim actors. Nevertheless, for the analysis of 
the (German, American, or Western) self-perception and the construction of Arab and Muslim 
otherness as well as for the construction of difference and a demarcation line between those two 
concepts of belonging, these positive portrayals of the Other present a particular relevance. 
Literally, these positive actors CROSS the demarcation line between both concepts of belonging, 
because they seem to merge with the Self insofar as they are implicitly evaluated by the Self as 
equal, as “the Self within the Other.” The only aspect that still distinguishes them from the 
Western Self is the geographical distance. Apart from that, those positive actors are, for example, 
peaceable in their political action, politically moderate and democratic, personally committed, educated, 
intelligent, and culturally modern. The analysis has revealed that the majority of these actors can be 
categorized in three central types that reflect three different ways of integrating positive actors in 
the overall concepts of Self and Other: 
Table VI.4: The Self Within the Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance65 
Before 9/11 After 9/11 
 
Germany USA Germany USA 
Type 11:  The Role Model Other 3.9 3.0 3.0 1.3 
Type 12:  The Unchallenged Alliance After 9/11 - - 2.6 3.9 
Type 13:  The Political Critic of the West - 0.9 - 1.3 
                Other Positive Actors 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.8 
 
In the following subchapter, those types of external actors that can be regarded as representatives 
of the Self within the geographical space of the Arab and Muslim Other are further outlined and 
discussed. 
 
5.1. Type 11: The Role Model Other 
The first actor type that can be identified on this fourth level is that of the “role model.” This 
image can be found in U.S. and German articles before as well as after 9/11. Before the event, 
3.9 % of all occurring Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers can be ascribed to Type 
11, compared to 3.0 % in the analyzed U.S. articles. These numbers drop after 9/11, when Type 
11 actors make up 3.0 % in German and only 1.3 % of all actors in U.S. print media. With role 
                                                 
65 In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to 
all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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model actors, positive features and ambitions are especially highlighted. These positive features 
are mainly political, but we can also find cultural or positive personal attributes ascribed to these 
actors. In an article in the German SZ that reports on the cultural conflict between conservative and 
more liberal, western-oriented lifestyles in Yemeni society, we find the example of a businesswoman 
who is described as follows: 
Eine, die das weiss, ist Intissar. Intissar, die Unternehmerin. “Ich bin eine selbststaendige 
Frau. Ich bin Sozialistin. Ich bin Muslima. […] Islam,” sagt Intissar, “bedeute Liebe, fordere 
Hilfsbereitschaft, foerdere Selbststaendigkeit und Bildung.” […] Da nahm sie ihr Erspartes, 
ging nach Indien, belegte Computer- und Englischkurse, kam nach Aden zurueck und 
gruendete eine Firma. (SZ-01-08-16: 3) 
Her portrayal is regarded as representative for the positive attempts of some parts of the Yemeni 
population to bring liberal thoughts, emancipated ideas, and economic self-realization to a country 
that is generally regarded as culturally, socially or economically underdeveloped and backward. 
Another example of this type is the portrayal of Iraqi opposition groups. By contrasting them 
with an actor like Saddam Hussein who is described as solely negative, hostile, and violent in U.S. 
print media (see also VI.2.1), they are portrayed not only as a positive counter-image to the 
former Iraqi leader but are also seen as a crucial spearhead of the West in the fight against this 
actor. The NY TIMES writes: 
Iraqi opposition groups will open a new front in their battle to topple Saddam Hussein when 
a satellite television program financed by the United States goes on the air in a few days to 
beam news, political profiles and even call-in shows and music videos throughout the region. 
(NYT-01-08-28: 6) 
Role model figures or positive counter-examples can also be found after the attacks. In DER 
SPIEGEL, for example, the social engagement and cooperation of an Afghan worker for a UN 
reconstruction group in Afghanistan is emphasized. In the context of an article published in late 
September 2001 shortly before the offensive against the Taliban, and that deals with the 
humanitarian and political situation in the border region between Pakistan and Afghanistan and 
the reconstruction of the country after the possible disempowerment of the Taliban regime, we 
learn that… 
Die afghanischen Helfer der Uno berichten, dass sie trotz der Wirren weiterarbeiten, so gut 
es geht. Das Kinderhilfswerk Unicef etwa nehme noch immer Impfungen vor. Und 
Mohammed Jan, der eine Wiederaufbaugruppe leitet, kümmert sich um die 
Wasserversorgung für zahlreiche Dörfer. “Wir säubern den Zugang zu unseren Quellen und 
erhöhen so die Wasserzufuhr,” teilt er mit. (Sp-01-i40: 158) 
The news magazine adds here that “Jan is a good example for the willpower of the Afghan 
people.”66 Actors like the Afghan UN worker are described as positive counter-figures in the 
context of articles that discuss negative issues like cultural or political conflicts, deficits or – 
especially after 9/11 – terrorism and focus on negative actors like the Taliban. In those contexts, 
Type 11 actors serve as examples for the way in which things “should run.” 
 
                                                 
66 Own translation, original quote in German: “Jan ist ein gutes Beispiel für die Willenskraft der Afghanen” (Sp-01-
i40: 158). 
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Political Leaders of the Past 
In some cases, these positively highlighted actors are political figures from the past, i.e. former 
presidents or political leaders who no longer actively influence and control political decisions. In 
the NY TIMES, for instance, the images of former Indonesian president Habibie and the former 
Egyptian and Jordanian leaders, president Mohammed Anwar el-Sadat and King Abdallah 
Hussein, can serve as examples. Habibie is described as a political leader who advocates the 
institutionalization of Western standards like political freedom, democratic structures, and respect 
for human rights. As the newspaper argues… 
It was under his successor, B. J. Habibie, that the press, political parties, labor unions, 
student activists and human rights groups were set free. (NYT-01-07-25: 3) 
In this article, the positive political initiatives of Habibie are referred to for comparison and to 
highlight the deficits of the outgoing Indonesian President Wahid (see VI.2.3), and to indicate the 
political expectations that are addressed to his successor Megawati (see VI.4.1). 
Similar to that, in another context, former King Hussein of Jordan and the former president of 
Egypt, el-Sadat, are praised for their peace negotiations with Israel in an article that discusses the 
difficulties of a political peace process with Palestinian President Arafat, who is regarded as an 
ambivalent figure when it comes to the practical realization of political agreements and cease-fires 
(see also VI.4.1). In the article, former Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak positively highlights the 
two former political leaders as follows: 
“I feel very confident that at a certain point a leader will come with the character of Sadat or 
King Hussein,” a reference to President Anwar el-Sadat of Egypt and King Hussein of 
Jordan, who during their periods of leadership each signed peace treaties with Israel.  
(NYT-01-08-06: 3) 
Thus, we can say that those positive political figures “from the past” are referred to to indicate 
what political actions are regarded as adequate in the respective conflicts or situations. 
Last but not least, in BILD we find a third way of highlighting a Type 11 actor. The Jordanian 
King Abdullah II is positively referred to as a modern “man of the people” who uses unorthodox 
methods to fight corruption and mismanagement in his country. As the tabloid writes… 
Bemerkenswert, wie Jordaniens König Abdullah II. (39) sein Volk verblüfft. Der Herrscher 
zog sich ein abgenutztes, arabisches Gewand an, Kopfbedeckung und Sonnenbrille und fuhr 
zum Finanzamt. Dort stellte er sich brav in die Schlange wartender Menschen. Dann bat er 
um die Überprüfung eines Antrags auf Steuerrückzahlung, den zuvor sein Bruder unter 
falschem Namen eingereicht hatte. (Bild-01-07-31: 7) 
This portrayal of the Jordanian king as an ambitious and clever politician and a “man of the people” 
changes after 9/11, however, when he becomes one of the strategic and contradictory Type 9 actors 
who take sides with the West in the anti-terror coalition (see also VI.4.1). 
 
The Former Afghan King Zahir Shah 
One actor that can be introduced here as a prototype example for a Type 11 actor in both 
countries’ newspapers after 9/11 is the former Afghan king Zahir Shah, who gets into the 
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Western focus after the attacks as one potential successor of the Taliban regime. In this context, 
he is regarded as a positive counter-image to the Taliban: His pro-western orientation, his 
cooperation with the West after the attacks, and his interviews with Western media in which he 
publicly supports a military overthrow of the Taliban regime and the search for Osama bin Laden 
give him the image of a positive role model and the ideal successor for Afghanistan. Although it 
is also mentioned that Zahir Shah has one central deficit – his old age – DER SPIEGEL, for 
instance, positively highlights the actor as follows: 
Ein greiser Aristokrat offeriert sich als “Vater der Nation”: Ex-Regent Zahir Schah 
organisiert aus dem römischen Exil den Neuanfang Afghanistans. Dort ist er eine Legende. 
[…] 40 Jahre lang hatte er in dem bettelarmen Land amtiert und im Dauerkonflikt mit den 
alten Feudalherren sich an vorsichtige Reformen gewagt, mit Grundrechten für jedermann – 
selbst für Frauen. (Sp-01-i41: 152) 
We can say that the news magazine here indirectly contrasts, for example, his reform initiatives 
for more equality and social and economic improvement with the repressions of the Taliban 
regime that are outlined in other articles in the same issue of the magazine. The king is described 
as a possible liberator from the oppression and negativity that the Taliban have caused in the 
country and “for a whole generation of Afghan refugees in Pakistan Zahir Shah presents the last 
hope”67 to return to their home country. Similar to that, U.S. newspapers also portray the former 
king as a crucial figure for a post-Taliban Afghanistan. NEWSWEEK, for example, headlines an 
interview with Shah with the question: “The once and future King?”68 And in another article the 
magazine writes that… 
Some influential Afghans believe that Mohamad Zahir Shah, who hasn’t lived in Afghanistan 
since he was deposed in 1973, could be a unifying symbol and consensus-builder.  
(NW-01-v138-i15: 40) 
The NY TIMES quotes a member of an American Congressional Delegation who met with the 
former King in Rome and afterwards stated that… 
“We think that perhaps he is the person that can rally those against the Taliban most 
effectively.” (NYT-01-10-01: 2) 
…and in another article on this topic argues: 
The king, himself a Pashtun from Kandahar – although his mother tongue is Persian – 
plausibly represents the continuity of the Afghan nation. That continuity, through decades of 
conflict and devastation, has all but disappeared from the Afghan scene; the king may well be 
the only means of bringing it back. (NYT-01-10-07: 13) 
However, in contrast to the German image, in American newspapers the former king is not 
specifically emphasized in his former political attempts but is instead rather seen as a crucial 
factor to stabilize and unify a post-Taliban country. In contrast to the analyzed timeframe before 
9/11 other significant examples of Type 11 actors could not be identified in the two countries’ 
newspapers after the attacks. 
                                                 
67 Own translation, original quote in German: “Für eine ganze Generation afghanischer Flüchtlinge in Pakistan ist 
Zahir Schah die letzte Hoffnung.” (Sp-01-i41: 152). 
68 NW-01-v138-i15: 46 
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Altogether, we can say that the Type 11 actors are usually less relevant in the context of the 
articles in which they appear, which basically means that the major focus in the respective articles 
lies on other Arab or Muslim actors. Furthermore, as has already been noted, the quantitative 
significance of this actor type decreases after 9/11. We do find a number of actors who carry 
positive features after the attacks, however, those actors often also carry weakening or even 
contradicting features which limit their potential to be regarded as role models (see VI.3.2 and 
VI.4.1). If solely positive role models of Type 11 occur, they appear in contrast to negative or 
ambivalent actors and can be seen as an antithesis to those figures. In the respective contexts, they 
reflect the political, cultural, personal, social, or economic features that the Self applies as a 
standard to evaluate the Other. 
Thus, Type 11 actors could be regarded as a constructed “ideal” image of what the Other could 
look like according to the evaluation of the Western observer. However, these role model actors 
are rare individual figures who are highlighted in an environment that forms the complete 
opposite to them. They implicitly reflect the Western ideal and the shortcomings of the Other 
with regard to the expected standards and principles that are involved in this ideal. We could 
conclude by saying that Type 11 actors represent the “pioneers” for the institutionalization of 
Western principles and standards in Arab and Muslim countries. Those actors are allies of the 
Self that are differentiated from the Self only by their geographical distance, as they act within 
Arab and Muslim countries. 
 
5.2. Type 12: The Unchallenged Alliance after 9/11 
A second actor type that was identified in the German and U.S. print media is again closely 
connected with the event around which this analysis is based – the 9/11 attacks. Type 12 is 
characterized by the fact that it summarizes actors who are all of the same opinion, or express 
one and the same standpoint. Actors of this type all condemn terrorism and speak out against the 
9/11 attacks. In addition a number of those actors also express their sorrow and compassion for the 
victims of the event. These actors often only occur once and their image is basically built around 
these two aspects. As they condemn the attacks they are positively highlighted in both countries’ 
newspapers as part of the anti-terror coalition. Thus, this actor type is only part of the post-9/11 
actor typologies of both countries’ print media sets. In this post-9/11 timeframe, Type 12 forms 
the second-largest group on this fourth level of actor portrayal and encompasses 2.6 % of all 
occurring actors in German articles. In the U.S. newspapers, it forms the largest group on this 
level of difference, with a proportion of 3.9 %. 
Type 12 actors round off the overall image of actors in Arab and Muslim countries with those 
parts of the Other that condemn the attacks and “really mean it” – since their expressed anti-terror 
position is not challenged or weakened in a certain way in the analyzed articles. At the same time, 
their images again reflects the Western standpoint that demands a condemnation of the attacks 
and compassion for the victims as the only appropriate reaction. Thus, Type 12 actors are not 
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only another form of “the Self within the Other’s space” but they also form a positive counter-
image to those Arab and Muslim actors that supported or even carried out the 9/11 attacks, such 
as Osama bin Laden, the Taliban or the cheering Palestinian demonstrators (see also VI.2.1) and 
are therefore denounced by the Self. 
Examples for Type 12 actors are to a large extent from the private sector, which may also be one 
explanation for the fact that their positions are not as much challenged or at least critically 
observed as those of the diverse political actors that have been introduced so far. In BILD, for 
instance, we find the example of a Jordanian princess who expresses her disapproval of terrorist 
actions: 
Prinzessin Haya von Jordanien (27, Springreiterin, trainierte jahrelang in Deutschland): “Ein 
guter Moslem zu sein heißt vor allem, ein guter Mensch zu sein. Aggression hat keinen 
Glauben, keine Religion.” (Bild-01-09-19: 12) 
In the NY TIMES, we find Palestinian private actors that are contrasted with the already 
mentioned group of anti-western demonstrators that took to the streets after the attacks to cheer 
for the 9/11 terrorists: 
Some in Nablus condemned any violence against civilians. Amin Amira, a 43-year-old fruit 
vendor, said he was dismayed by Tuesday’s demonstration. “I don’t believe that this reflects 
the feeling of the Palestinian people,” he said. (NYT-01-09-13: 18) 
But also Arab and Muslim actors of other countries express their compassion and support for the 
United States. The NY TIMES, for example, reports that many Pakistanis expressed their 
condolence: 
On Islamabad’s streets today, many Pakistanis offered sympathy for the United States. “Not 
good,” said a 40-year-old minivan driver, Ejaz Hussain, when asked about the attacks. “Not 
good for New York, not good for America, not good for Pakistan.” American reporters were 
greeted with handshakes in malls and hotels. (NYT-01-09-15: 17b) 
This is again mentioned in another article that contrasts the different opinions in the Pakistani 
population with reference to the attacks and the planned military operation in Afghanistan. Here, 
a number of different people are quoted, most of them expressing rather anti-western opinions. 
However, we also learn of some pro-western positions. As the article reports, “one man proudly 
says he has visited 27 American states,”69 and a Pakistani woman from Karachi is quoted as 
follows: 
A woman says she loves New York, and was there when the attack came and it broke her 
heart. (NYT-01-10-01: 1b) 
In yet another article, two Iranian politicians are positively highlighted for the letter of 
condolence that they addressed to the NY mayor Guiliani: 
In Iran, Tehran’s mayor, Morteza Alviri, and Mohammad Atrianfar, the head of Tehran’s city 
council, sent a letter of condolence to Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani of New York, the first 
government-to-government communique in two decades, a gesture that hinted of possible 
Iranian cooperation against terrorism. (NYT-01-09-17: 2b) 
                                                 
69 NYT-01-10-01: 1b 
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In addition to those individual figures, after 9/11 some countries are also regarded as solely 
positive and unchallenged strategic partners in the anti-terror policy of the U.S. government. One 
of those countries – Oman – is seen as one of the forefronts for possible military actions, but 
differs in this role from other strategic partners of the U.S. insofar as the countries’ image is not 
contrasted with any negative facets but remains solely positive. As the NY TIMES writes: 
Thanks to geography and a long history of quiet military cooperation with Washington and 
London, Oman has emerged as a critical staging ground for the United States’ war against 
Osama bin Laden. […] Oman has been a far more willing partner. […] Now the Bush 
administration is looking to mobilize political support and to secure a crucial logistics base. 
(NYT-01-10-05: 2) 
We can say that like Type 10 actors, which comprises actors that are regarded as strategically 
important for the Self but at the same time have negative facets that the Self accepts only 
reluctantly because of the political or other usefulness of the respective actors (see also VI.4.2), 
Oman is also regarded as a strategic partner by the Self. But compared to Type 10 actors, this 
actor is not contradictory but is presented as reliable. 
In more general terms, and again just like the role model actors of Type 11, Type 12 actors are 
portrayed rather like those of Type 8 and Type 9 (see VI.3.2 and VI.4.1) who position themselves 
on the pro-western side of the anti-terror coalition after 9/11. But compared to those types, the 
“alliances” of Type 12 are not weakened or challenged in their pro-western positioning. Compared 
to the expressed condolences of the contradictory or weakened governments and nation states or 
other political actors, the compassionate remarks of the predominantly private Type 12 actors or 
of politically less important and less well-known actors like the mayor of Teheran are not 
critically observed or even questioned. 
Nonetheless, these “unchallenged alliances” are also part of the overall Other, since they can be 
geographically distanced from the West, they appear relatively rarely and are highlighted in an 
environment that forms the complete opposite to them. Their pro-western position is mostly 
contrasted with the anti-western positions of other Arab and Muslim actors in the articles in which 
they appear, and like the actors of Type 11, we could assume that the image of Type 12 actors 
implicitly reflects the Western ideal and the shortcomings of the Other with regard to this ideal, 
since the majority of Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed German and U.S. newspaper 
articles does not clearly and undoubtedly condemn the 9/11 attacks and terrorism. So, just like 
the former Type 11, actor images of Type 12 also reflect an “ideal” image of what the Other 
could look like according to the Western observer. 
 
5.3. Type 13: The Political Critic of the West 
The third actor type that can be identified is to some extent quite similar to Type 12, since 
especially after 9/11 actors of this type are portrayed in the context of that event and are also 
described according to their position with reference to the attacks. This actor type can be labeled 
as the “political critic of the West,” and actors of this type can be summarized as politically 
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positive (pro-western, reform-oriented, or diplomatic) but also critical with reference to Western political 
actions and viewpoints. Even though these actors carry political features and fulfill or support 
standards that the Western observer may regard as central and relevant for its own self-concept, 
they distance themselves from the West at the same time by criticizing the same. Images of Type 
13 actors can only be found in U.S. print media and here especially after 9/11 when this actor 
type becomes slightly relevant with 1.3 % of the occurring actors being described as politically 
positive critics of the West. 
Type 13 actors in U.S. newspapers criticize, for instance, the policies of the U.S. government 
toward certain Arab and Muslim countries, or more specifically, the U.S. role in the peace 
negotiations in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Before 9/11, in the NY TIMES, for 
example, the Egyptian government on the one hand is regarded as a moderate and loyal ally of the 
U.S. government, but on the other hand is also reported criticizing the political strategy of the 
U.S. in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In one article the newspaper reports that… 
Egypt’s top foreign policy official warned that the Bush administration’s “inaction” in the 
Middle East could allow extremists to take hold in moderate Arab countries. This would be a 
consequence far graver than the administration’s apparent fear of risking its prestige with an 
Israeli-Palestinian peace initiative, said Osama el-Baz, President Hosni Mubarak’s national 
security adviser. […] In addition to its effect on Arab states, Mr. Baz said in an interview, the 
United States’ approach in the region was helping to weaken the forces of moderation in 
Israel, where many people were hoping that the Bush administration would take what he 
called “a clear-cut position to check the mad spiral of violence.” (NYT-01-08-16: 1) 
In another article, the newspaper takes up this issue again by reporting that… 
Egypt pressed the Bush administration today to take a more active role in the Middle East 
and to consider sending American monitors as soon as possible to defuse the violence 
between Israelis and Palestinians, officials said. […] “We need a drastic change of the present 
situation,” Mr. Baz told reporters after he met with Secretary Powell. “We need peace and 
quiet in the region. And unless this is done, the interests of all parties are going to be 
damaged and hurt.” (NYT-01-08-18: 3b) 
Clearly promoting a positive vision for the solution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Other 
in this case is presented as the driving force, leaving the criticized American Self in the position 
of the passive and even inactive actor. 
After 9/11, we find an article in USA TODAY that summarizes some of the mass media reactions 
of Arab and Muslim print media to the attacks. In this context, the Indonesian newspaper 
KORAN TEMPO is quoted saying: 
We condemn the (World Trade Center) bombing […] but an inaccurate stereotype is a 
mistake that would only worsen future relations for the American people. 
(USAT-01-09-19: 15A) 
The newspaper thus holds a position that, on the one hand, condemns the attacks and the violent 
deaths of people but, on the other, also warns the American Self not to overreact and categorize 
Arabs and Muslims identically. In another article in USA TODAY, a representative of a German-
based organization that fights for the national liberation of Afghanistan is quoted. The newspaper 
writes here: 
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At the Islamic-Afghani Cultural Center and Mosque, Abdul Hai Zakarwal, who represents 
the Afghan National Liberation Front in Hamburg, said both bin Laden and the Americans 
are wrong because violence in any form is not the solution. “Our people have had enough 
suffering,” Zakarwal said. “For 20 years, we have been engaged in war. We believe there 
must be a political solution.” (USAT-01-10-09: 11Ae) 
What again becomes obvious with these examples – and this is especially the case with the 
American newspapers – is that the event also causes a shift of perspective of the Self: Western 
(and here mainly U.S.) media after the attacks now increasingly look at the country’s own actions 
and positions when discussing Arab and Muslim topics. As mentioned before (see VI.3 or VI.4) 
this implication of Western deficits or at least consideration of the idea that the attacks might also 
have been caused by Western mistakes in interaction with the Arab and Muslim Other can be 
found in a number of the analyzed articles. Thus, with Type 13 actors, the Self is also examined. 
For example, in one article in USA TODAY, which has already been referred to in previous 
subchapters, the roots of Islamic and terrorist extremism in the Arab and Muslim countries are 
highlighted. In this context, Yahia Said, an Iraqi lecturer on globalization at the London School 
of Economics is quoted, who criticizes that… 
“The level of wealth (elsewhere) is so much more visible in poor countries now, through 
television, movies […] There is this profound sense of being left out. These are people who 
don't have a hope of ever getting out of this poverty, and so they are willing to do something 
desperate.” (USAT-01-09-19: 1A) 
Another passage from the same article illustrates that this criticisms is taken seriously by the 
observing American media; the newspaper explicitly reflects upon this criticism and comes to the 
following conclusion: 
But beyond that, say scholars and other experts, the reason hatred, resentment or deep 
dislike exists in one degree or another among many Muslims in the Arab world, lies in a 
complicated web of U.S. policy, repressive foreign regimes, poverty, religious 
fundamentalism and, even, American naivete. There’s resentment over U.S. economic, 
military and political power. There’s disgust from many in the male-dominated Muslim world 
over the strong role women play in America and the “suggestive” way they dress. Then add 
on top of all that the way U.S. culture dominates the world, often steamrolling religious and 
cultural institutions that have existed for thousands of years, and there is fertile ground for 
anti-American fervor to take root. […] “America is seen as this very glittery place, and it’s 
easy to portray it as a kind of Sodom and Gomorrah,” Falk says. “It’s a very powerful 
mobilizing message.” And one that plays well to a generation of Muslims growing up with 
few civil rights or comforts and yet aware of the free sexuality and material wealth of the 
West. Frustrated by inept or repressive leadership in their own countries and facing a 
hopeless future, many buy into anti-American sentiment, and some buy into the extremist 
groups themselves." (USAT-01-09-19: 1A) 
As the examples indicate, the perspective of the Arab and Muslim Other is critically observed by 
the American media, and the arguments of these actors are also critically discussed. At the same 
time, however, the statement above also reveals that the Self in this context still perceives itself as 
a role model and does not question its own principles. Again, as has been argued before, what is 
basically reflected by the imaging of Type 13 actors is a certain self-criticism with regard to the 
way in which the Self has treated the Other or has interacted with Arab and Muslim countries 
and actors. But the quote also reveals that this wrong treatment is not regarded as the one and 
only reason for conflict between Self and Other, since it is argued as well that the people of Arab 
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and Muslim countries are frustrated with their own lives and the political, cultural, social, or 
economic conditions in their countries. This argument again indicates that the cause for upheaval, 
violence and conflict in Arab and Muslim countries – or even against the West as is the case with 
9/11 – lies mainly with the Other. 
However, we could say that actors of Type 13 are mediators in the interaction between Self and 
Arab and Muslim Other – and here mainly on the level of a dialogue. With their criticism of 
Western political actions these actors also present the perspective of the Other: The arguments 
that are reported on in the articles inform the Self about the opinions and views about the West 
(and the United States in particular) that are prevalent and common among Arab and Muslim 
actors. What can be concluded therefore is that even though Type 13 actors, on the one hand, 
support Western principles and reveal a certain degree of similarity with the self-concept of 
belonging, on the other hand, they also distance themselves from the Self by criticizing the 
United States or the West in general. In the case of Type 13 actors we could argue therefore that 
the demarcation line between Self and Other is not constituted via a differentiating image of the 
counterpart actor but via the distance between views that is reflected in the communication 
process between the two sides. 
 
Summary: The Self within the Other 
Level four illustrates that some Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed newspapers are by all 
means positively depicted. As was outlined in VI.5, both German and U.S. print media also 
identify actors in Arab and Muslim countries that carry or support Western principles and 
standards in Arab and Muslim societies and are not weakened or evaluated in those features and 
views. These actors could be labeled as the “Self within the Other”; they are identified before as 
well as after the 9/11 attacks and they are highlighted as positive counter images to other 
negative actors in the respective articles. However, the introduced actor types are usually less 
relevant in the context of the articles in which they occur, which basically means that other Arab 
or Muslim actors receive the major focus in the respective articles. Actors of the “Self within the 
Other” mainly appear in contrast to negative or ambivalent actors (see VI.2 and VI.3) and thus can 
be seen as a counterpart to those figures. 
In both countries’ analyzed print media, the most frequently ascribed images thereby are role 
model actors of Type 11. Those actors as a constructed “ideal” image of what the Other could 
look like according to the Western observer. These role model actors are mostly individual 
figures who are highlighted in an environment that forms the complete opposite to them, or they 
present positive examples of the past that are consulted as a comparison for the present situation. 
After the attacks, the second most frequently constructed image on this level is that of the 
“unchallenged Western alliances” in the anti-terror coalition. Those actors all hold the same 
opinion, or express one and the same standpoint: they condemn terrorism and particularly speak out 
against the 9/11 attacks and they express their sorrow and compassion for the victims. Type 12 
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rounds off the overall image of actors in Arab and Muslim countries with those parts of the 
Other that condemn the attacks and “really mean it” – since their expressed anti-terror position is 
not challenged or weakened in the analyzed articles. At the same time, their image again also 
reflects the Western standpoint that demands condemnation of the attacks and compassion for 
the victims as the only appropriate reaction. 
The third actor type – Type 13 – is similar to Type 12 insofar as actors of this type also take sides 
with Western views and positions on certain issues or conflicts. The “political critic of the West” 
is described as politically positive (pro-western, reform-oriented, or diplomatic) but, on the other hand, is 
also referred to as critical with reference to Western political actions and viewpoints. Images of 
Type 13 actors were only found in U.S. print media. Like other actor types before, they also 
reflect the increasing self-observation and self-criticism of the United States with regard to its 
political, economic, or military interplay with Arab and Muslim actors and countries. With their 
criticism of Western political actions these Type 13 actors present the perspective of the Other. 
The arguments that are depicted here also inform the Self about the opinions and views that are 
prevalent and common with Arab and Muslim actors, and confront the Self with its own deficits 
and behavior. 
Altogether, the three actor types implicitly reflect the Western ideal and the shortcomings of the 
Other with regard to the expected standards and principles that are involved in this ideal that 
shapes the German or American concept of belonging. We could say that these mainly individual 
actors reflect the behavior and attitudes that the Western observer expects from the Other. Role 
model actors are the “pioneers” for the institutionalization of Western principles and standards in 
Arab and Muslim countries, and actors like the “unchallenged alliances” after 9/11 reflect the 
expectations that are indirectly communicated to all Arab and Muslim actors. At the same time, 
all three actor types are nevertheless part of the overall Other. They can be distanced because 
they are external actors from geographically distant Arab and Muslim countries, and they are role 
models for approved Western features, values, and behavior compared to the rest of the Arab 
and Muslim Other. If they are politically developed, democracy-oriented, or committed to solving political 
conflicts like in Israel/Palestine etc., they distance themselves from the Self by criticizing the 
West from outside, i.e. from within the Other. 
Therefore, the “Self within the Other” implicitly reflects the German or American concept of 
belonging as it is mirrored by some actors within the Other’s space. Level four indicates that both 
German and U.S. print media reflect upon the fact that the (external) Arab and Muslim Other is 
not completely different from the German or U.S. Self, even though it might be dominated by 
difference. The print media note and emphasize identified similarities like institutionalized 
Western principles in Arab and Muslim countries as well. However, on a quantitative scale, 
unchallenged similarity or even sameness between Western Self and external Arab and Muslim 
Other is still rare, and solely positive actors form a minority in the analyzed data sample. The 
representatives of the “Self within the Other” are internal opponents or individual voices that are 
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actually drowned out by other, more powerful or quantitatively more dominating negative or 
ambivalent actors in Arab and Muslim countries. 
 
6. Level 5: When the Other Enters the Western Space 
The actor types that have been outlined in the last four subchapters summarize the different ways 
in which external Arab and Muslim actors, i.e. actors from Arab and Muslim countries, are 
portrayed in the analyzed U.S. and German newspapers around 9/11. Even though the images of 
these different actors reveal different degrees of similarity with the German or American self-
concept of belonging, the discussed actors so far all share one common feature that distinguishes 
them from the Self. They are demarcated from the West by their geographical origin and by the 
geographical distance between them and the observing Self. When we now add the identified 
internal Arab and Muslim actors to the established typology, a fifth level of difference comes into 
play when Arab and Muslim actors cross the national boundaries of the Self.70 Thus, the portrayal 
of internal actors is marked first and foremost by a geographical closeness to the Self. 
As already outlined in chapter IV.2 and IV.3, Arab and Muslim actors within the United States or 
Germany are only marginally focused on before 9/11. In the analyzed American newspapers we 
only find two internal actors, one of them being a Libyan spy and the other one being Ahmed 
Ressam, a terror suspect who was caught in 1999 as he was trying to smuggle explosives from 
Canada into the United States to bomb Los Angeles airport. In German newspapers only eight 
internal Muslim and Arab actors were identified, the majority of them in the tabloid BILD. The 
significance of internal actors changes with the attacks, however, and we now also find a much 
larger variety of images of internal actors after the event in both countries’ print media. 
Internal Arabs and Muslims in both German and U.S. print media can be identified and 
differentiated according to the following criteria: First and foremost, they are explicitly referred to 
as being Arabs or Muslims, so what identifies them as an internal Other is either their country of 
origin (as immigrants), their ethnicity (as Arabs) or their religion (as Muslims). Apart from that, 
internal Arab and Muslim actors also carry a large variety of different features just like the 
occurring external actors. These features were already broadly summarized in chapter V. In the 
following subchapter, the relevance of these features will be surveyed with regard to their 
occurrence with the images of internal Arab and Muslim actors in the analyzed newspapers. At 
first sight, the overall image of internal actors is less complex than that of the external actors, but 
when we take a closer look at the images of Arabs and Muslims in the Western space we see that 
they reveal a number of similarities with the external actor images as well. In the following, it will 
be shown that before as well as after 9/11, the images of internal Others resemble those for the 
identified external Arabs and Muslims. Thereby, the lack of geographical distance is compensated 
for by the heightened emphasis on features of the other character dimensions, e.g. the emphasis 
                                                 
70 The term “internal Arab and Muslim actors” refers to those actors that are identified as Arab or Muslim of origin 
or religion but who, at the same time, live in or come from either the United States or Germany. 
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on certain cultural, political, or personal characteristics of the respective actors. Altogether, four 
different empirically significant types of actors can be formed from the set of identified internal 
actors in both countries’ analyzed print media: 
Table VI.5: The Internal Other – Actor Types and Quantitative Relevance71 
Before 9/11 After 9/11  
Germany USA Germany USA 
Type 14:  The Culturally Distant Internal Other 1.6 - 2.2 0.8 
Type 15:  The Peaceful Arab and Muslim Communities 0.4 - 6.7 3.1 
Type 16:  The Murderers Among Us 1.2 0.9 8.6 7.8 
Type 17:  The Internal Other as a Victim of the West - - 1.5 5.2 
               Other Internal Actors - - 0.7 0.5 
 
 
6.1. Type 14: The Culturally Distant Internal Other 
The first actor type that can be introduced with reference to the portrayal of internal actors 
summarizes the images of half of the occurring internal actors in German media before 9/11 
(overall proportion: 1.6 %) and about 2.2 % of all actors in the German newspaper articles in the 
timeframe after the attacks: Those actors are mainly described according to their cultural features. 
Thereby, Type 14 illustrates one significant difference between the images of internal actors in 
the analyzed German and U.S. print media, because in U.S. articles this type of actors is rather 
insignificant in the U.S. context: in American articles before 9/11, this actor type cannot be 
found at all, and after the event it is only minor relevant with a proportion of 0.8 % of all 
occurring internal actors. 
Compared to that, German articles reflect a stronger emphasis on an observed cultural distance 
between internal Arab and Muslim actors and their German host society. Especially before 9/11 
when Arabs and Muslims within the West are not yet regarded as a potential threat for the Self 
and the national security, German newspapers – and here predominantly the tabloid BILD – 
frequently use cultural features or religious affiliation and traditions when internal actors are 
described. In BILD, for example, we find a story about the fate of a young German woman who 
is shot dead by her Turkish-German boyfriend. In this article, the boyfriend is described as 
follows: 
Kurtulus D. (24) schwieg, als er auf der Anklagebank saß. […] Der junge Döner-Verkäufer 
hatte seine schöne Freundin Mandy R. (21) erschossen, weil sie keinen Sex wollte. In einer 
Kneipe hatten sie sich zum ersten Mal gesehen. Sie fand ihn attraktiv, er machte ihr 
Komplimente. Mandy verliebte sich in den Türken. Aber der zunächst zärtliche Geliebte 
wurde zum Tyrann. Die Anklage beschreibt das Leiden der schönen Verkäuferin: Mandy 
                                                 
71 In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to 
all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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durfte keinen Schmuck mehr tragen, keine Männer ansehen. Ihre schönen, langen Haare 
musste sie zu einem Zopf knoten. Ging sie allein aus, prügelte er sie nach Hause. Dann 
erfuhr sie: Ihr Geliebter war längst verheiratet, Vater eines Kindes. Sie wollte ihn verlassen. 
Die Staatsanwältin: “Zwei Mal wollte Mandy Schluss machen. Zwei Mal hielt ihr Kurtulus 
eine Pistole an den Kopf, drohte: ‘Wenn du gehst, erschieße ich dich!’ ” (Bild-01-08-24: 5) 
The story may be classified as one of the sensational tabloid stories about a family drama that are 
reported on frequently in newspapers. However, in this specific context, we learn that the 
murderer is of Turkish origin. In addition to that the article describes him as culturally narrow-
minded, conservative, repressive, and violent, and outlines in great detail how he forces his girlfriend into 
a lifestyle that is guided by his patriarchal views. To top it off, we even learn that the man was 
untruthful to his partner since he is already married. 
In another context, the SZ reports on the lawsuit of a Muslim woman to be allowed to wear a 
headscarf at her workplace. In this article, the newspaper also mentions the frictions that are 
caused by this legal case in the German public discussion and that revolve around the question of 
whether or not Muslim women should generally be allowed to wear a headscarf in public 
institutions or at work. As the SZ writes: 
Ein Arbeitgeber darf einer bei ihm beschaeftigten Muslimin verbieten, ein Kopftuch zu 
tragen. […] Die Richter wiesen die Klage einer tuerkischen Verkaeuferin gegen ein Kaufhaus 
in einer hessischen Kleinstadt zurueck und erklaerten die personenbedingt ausgesprochene 
Kuendigung fuer zulaessig. Nachdem die Frau mehrere Jahre ohne Kopftuch in “westlicher 
Kleidung” in dem Kaufhaus taetig gewesen war, bestand sie nach einem Erziehungsurlaub 
auf der Kopfbedeckung waehrend der Arbeit. (SZ-01-08-08: 6) 
Both introduced examples concentrate on different cultural facets, but in both cases the cultural 
dimension of these actors or, in other words, the cultural views of these actors lead to a conflict 
with German society, either because of delinquent actions of the one actor against his German 
girlfriend or because of the legal protest of the Muslim woman who is not allowed to wear a 
headscarf at work. And in both cases, the image of the respective actor reflects a cultural distance 
between the actor and the German Self. 
After the attacks, the focus of the German newspapers shifts largely to the religious context of 
internal actors of Type 14. Especially Islamic fundamentalist groups within Germany are now not 
only frequently described as fanatical, but in addition to that are also regarded as a security threat 
for the German Self. DER SPIEGEL, for instance, warns that… 
Seit Jahren rufen in einzelnen Moscheen und Islamischen Zentren fanatische Prediger zum 
“Dschihad” auf. (Sp-01-i39: 20) 
In another article, the news magazine reports that… 
Die “Front der islamischen Kämpfer” ist in Hessen für brutale Erpressungen verantwortlich. 
[…] Die Gangster waren allerdings keine gewöhnlichen Schwerverbrecher, sondern 
Anhänger der religiös-fundamentalistischen “Front der islamischen Kämpfer des Großen 
Ostens” (IBDA-C), die mitten in Deutschland mit einer Entführung ihren Glaubenskrieg 
finanzieren wollten. […] Schon 1992 wollten gewaltbereite Muslime Geld für die in der 
Türkei wegen mehrerer Mordanschläge verfolgte Gruppe eintreiben. (Sp-01-i40: 52.) 
Another actor that is mainly focused on with regard to its fundamentalist facets is the Egyptian 
Muslim Brotherhood that is already before 9/11 described as “the most significant of all militant 
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Islamist movements in the Arab world.”72 Even though the organization is largely based in Egypt, 
after the attacks it becomes relevant to mention because it also has members in Germany, since 
“also Al-Khalifa from Munich is a charismatic representative of Islam. But, on the other hand, he 
appears as a Muslim brother in the annual report of the Federal Office for the Protection of the 
Constitution.”73 Therefore, the organization also presents an internal threat now. 
It has to be noted here that – in the same article – the newspaper also highlights positive 
examples of Islamic groups in Germany and writes, for example, that… 
Es gibt hervorragende islamische Gespraechspartner: Nadeem Elyas, der Vorsitzende des 
Zentralrats der Muslime in Deutschland, Hossein Fatimi, ein gebuertiger Afghane, der die 
beispielhafte christlich-islamische Gesellschaft in Pforzheim mit ins Leben gerufen hat, 
Scheich Bashir Dultz und andere. (SZ-01-10-9: 12) 
At the same time, however, it is skeptically remarked that “Muslim partners for dialogue are rare 
– and often hard to evaluate.”74 As the SZ writes: 
Bei einigen Dialogpartnern ist die Einordnung aber schwierig: Amir Zaidan, ein intelligenter 
junger islamischer Theologe, hat die “Islamische Religionsgemeinschaft Hessen” (IRH) 
gegruendet; dort bekennen sich muslimische Gruppen bis hin zu Milli Goerues 
ausdruecklich zum Grundgesetz. Ein ehrenwertes Anliegen: Vertreter moeglichst vieler 
Muslime werden zum Gespraechspartner des Staates. Doch Amir Zaidan war Mitglied der 
Muslim Studenten Vereinigung (MSV) gewesen. Die steht laut Verfassungsschutz mit der in 
Aegypten und Syrien beheimateten islamistischen Muslimbruderschaft in Verbindung; in der 
Satzung vom Maerz 1994 ist Zaidan noch als MSV-Sekretaer aufgefuehrt. Zaidan hat eine 
Zweitfrau nach muslimischem Recht geheiratet. Von ihm stammt auch die “Kamel-Fatwa”, 
dass Frauen nicht mehr als 81 Kilometer weit unbegleitet reisen koennen – so weit, wie eine 
Kamelkarawane in 24 Stunden kommt; deshalb durften Maedchen nicht mit auf einen 
Schulausflug. (SZ-01-10-9: 12) 
Especially the Turkish organization Millî Görüş is frequently mentioned as one religious/political 
group in Germany that presents a potential threat due to its political and cultural aims. As DER 
SPIEGEL writes, Millî Görüş is an “Islamistic Turkish organization with 27,000 members and 
more than 100,000 followers in Deutschland,”75 and is furthermore regarded as dangerous and 
hypocritical because… 
“Auf die Terroranschläge in den USA reagierte die IGMG nach außen mit Betroffenheit”, 
heißt es in dem Papier. “Im inneren Zirkel jedoch konnte eine unverhohlene Freude über die 
Anschläge gegen den Erzfeind USA festgestellt werden.” (Sp-01-i40: 46) 
Similarly, the SZ also notes that… 
Nach dem 11. September haben alle wichtigen Vertreter des Islam die Terror-Akte 
konsequent als Terror-Akte bezeichnet. Doch in den Milli Goerues nahe stehenden 
Zeitungen Milli Gazete und Akit ist von “Heimzahlung” die Rede. (SZ-01-10-9: 12) 
                                                 
72 Own translation, original quote in German: “die bedeutendste aller militant-islamistischen Bewegungen in der 
arabischen Welt” (Sp-01-i30: 106). 
73 Own translation, original quote in German: “Auch Al-Khalifa aus Muenchen ist ein charismatischer Islam-
Vertreter. Andererseits taucht er im Verfassungsschutzbericht als Muslimbruder auf” (SZ-01-10-9: 12). 
74 Own translation, original quote in German: “Muslimische Dialogpartner sind selten - und oft schwer 
einzuschaetzen.” (SZ-01-10-09: 12) 
75 Own translation, original quote in German: “islamistische Türkenorganisation mit 27 000 Mitgliedern und über 
100 000 Anhängern in Deutschland” (Sp-01-i40: 46). 
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But apart from this potential terrorist threat that may emanate from the group, the German SZ also 
determines a cultural threat, since… 
Die islamische Gemeinschaft Milli Goerues ist die deutsche Filiale der tuerkisch- 
islamistischen Partei von Necmettin Erbakan. Der nordrhein-westfaelische 
Verfassungsschutz wirft der Organisation mit 27000 Mitgliedern vor, fuer Muslime “auf der 
Scharia basierende Minderheitenrechte” durchsetzen zu wollen, die aber faktisch bedeuteten, 
dass “im Wege des Gruppenzwangs Muslime Pflichten auferlegt werden, die sowohl eine 
Einschraenkung der Grundrechte bedeuten, als auch eine Ausgrenzung der Muslime aus der 
pluralistischen Gesellschaftsordnung bezwecken.” (SZ-01-10-9: 12) 
Therefore, the religious differentiation – and here especially a negative portrayal of religious 
fanaticism – can be classified as a central dimension of difference that is ascribed to the images of 
internal Muslim and Arab actors in the German newspapers. This cultural difference is also 
critically observed in connection with the level of integration of the Muslim community in 
German society. Especially after 9/11, it is discussed how far cultural tolerance for Islamic 
fundamentalism and cultural difference of the internal Other should go. The societal integration 
of Muslim rules and practices are observed here rather skeptically as the following quotation 
from the SZ may illustrate: 
Vor zwanzig Jahren galt die Existenz von Muslimen in Deutschland als voruebergehend; da 
erlaubt die Scharia bis zu einem gewissen Grad die Anpassung an die Regeln des Gastlandes. 
Nun, wo klar ist, dass Muslime dauerhaft in Deutschland leben werden, hat die Auffassung 
an Bedeutung gewonnen, dass es in Deutschland Raeume geben muesse, in denen glaeubige 
Muslime nach ihren Regeln leben koennen. Bereits jetzt gibt es Fiqh-Raete, die 
Schiedssprueche – Fatwas – aussprechen, die sich an der Scharia orientieren. Innerhalb der 
Gemeinden mag das sinnvoll sein; die Scharia ist pragmatischer als meist angenommen. 
Schwierig wird es, wenn die Empfehlungen mit Grundrechten kollidieren: Darf man Frauen 
eine Reise von mehr als 81 Kilometern ohne maennliche Begleitung untersagen? Darf eine 
Frau nur den halben Erbteil eines Mannes erhalten? Darf es in Deutschland Zweitfrauen 
nach muslimischem Recht geben? (SZ-01-10-9: 12) 
The focus on cultural facets of the internal Other is not solely a German way of actor portrayal; 
we also find references to cultural features and religious fanaticism in U.S. newspapers after 9/11. 
Nevertheless, this aspect is altogether less relevant for the discussion of internal actors in the 
American print media. This difference between the German and the American actor portrayals 
has already been noted in previous chapters (see V.2 for instance), and was also outlined in the 
context of the images of the external actors of Type 2 (see also VI.2.2). Just like with those 
actors, with the example of Type 14 we can show once again that the focus on cultural and 
especially religious features of Arab and Muslim actors is a crucial element of the image of the 
Other in German newspapers. Before the attacks, the cultural dimension dominates the image 
and thus Type 14 can also mainly be found in the analyzed German articles. 
Compared to that, the next actor type that can be identified with internal actors is relevant in 
both countries’ newspapers and here predominantly after 9/11. 
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6.2. Type 15: The Peaceful Arab and Muslim Communities 
After 9/11, as frequently mentioned throughout this work, the close linkage of violence, and here 
especially of terrorism, and Islam not only becomes a central topic but it also shapes the German 
and U.S. perspective on Arab and Muslim actors. Thus, the attacks in New York and Washington 
also put all Muslims and Arabs in Germany and the United States under a stronger focus and 
under general suspicion, since the attackers are not only assumed to be religiously motivated but 
also crossed the national borders to plan and carry out their action. To draw a picture of these 
suspicious internal Others, the print media in Germany as well as in the U.S. thus frequently 
focus on the reactions of the internal Arabs and Muslims towards the attacks, and those internal 
Others are implicitly as well as explicitly expected to distance themselves from the attacks and the 
perpetrators that are behind them. Type 15 summarizes those parts of the Arab and Muslim 
communities in Germany and the U.S. that both countries’ newspapers identify as peaceful and 
non-terrorist. 
On a quantitative scale, Type 15 forms the second most relevant actor type of the occurring 
internal actors in German newspapers after the attacks; altogether the significance of this type 
increases from a pre-9/11 proportion of 0.4 % to a proportion of 6.7 % of all occurring actors. 
In the U.S. newspapers before the event we do not find any representatives of this type; after 
9/11 it presents the third largest form of internal actor portrayal and can be found with 3.1 % of 
all appearing actors. 
The peacefulness of Type 15 actors is contrasted in some articles with Type 14 actors that also exist 
within those communities. We learn of Muslim organizations and individual private actors that 
explicitly and publicly speak out against terrorism. The German SZ, for example, reports right after 
the attacks that… 
Der Islamrat fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat die Anschlaege in den USA aufs 
Schaerfste verurteilt. Dieser “barbarische Akt der Unmenschlichkeit” sei durch nichts zu 
rechtfertigen, hiess es in einer Erklaerung. “Wer immer die Drahtzieher sein moegen – ihr 
moerderisches Handeln kann niemals mit den Grundsaetzen jeglicher Religionen vereinbart 
werden.” (SZ-01-09-13: 11b) 
Similarly, BILD reports that… 
Der Zentralrat der Muslime in Deutschland unterstützt die Bundesregierung im Kampf 
gegen den Terror, sagte der Vorsitzende Nadeem Elyas. Er begrüßte die geplante Streichung 
des Religionprivilegs für extremistische Organisationen. (Bild-01-09-19: 2) 
In an article in the SZ the peaceful image even includes the overall majority of the German Muslim 
community that is said to reject terrorism and that emphasizes the peacefulness of Islam: 
In den Moscheen der ganzen Republik beteten am Freitag Glaeubige fuer die 
Anschlagsopfer und ihre Angehoerigen. Vertreter muslimischer Organisationen erklaerten, 
Terroristen duerften sich nicht auf den Islam berufen. “Die Bestuerzung ist gross, viele 
haben bei uns angerufen und gefragt, wie sie helfen koennen”, sagte Eren Uensal, Sprecherin 
des Tuerkischen Bundes Berlin-Brandenburg. Wie zahlreiche andere Verbaende der 
Hauptstadt habe man zur Kundgebung aufgerufen, “weil es ungeachtet der Community oder 
Ethnie wichtig ist, Anteilnahme zu zeigen.” (SZ-01-09-15: 9) 
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This positive overall image of the German Muslim community is also referred to by BILD, which 
emphasizes that… 
Die Muslime im heutigen Deutschland sind in der überwältigenden Mehrheit rechtschaffene 
und gesetzestreue Bürger der Bundesrepublik. (Bild-01-10-01: 2) 
Especially BILD quotes a wealth of statements of condolence from private individuals expressing 
their disapproval of the attacks and their compassion for the victims as well as the United States, as 
the example of a young German Muslima may illustrate: 
Ayse (22), Bürokauffrau-Azubi: “Als europäische Muslima kann ich den Terror genau so 
wenig nachvollziehen, wie eine europäische Christin. Der Islam ist eine friedliche Religion.” 
(Bild-01-09-19: 12) 
Also U.S. newspapers emphasize the peacefulness of the majority of the internal Muslims and Arabs 
after the attacks. NEWSWEEK, for example, reports that… 
Hossam Mohamad, a 30-year-old computer consultant from Egypt, e-mailed friends, urging 
them to go. “I feel as if my own house is burning,” he said. “Muslims have made a conscious 
decision to make America our home. We are part of the community as much as anyone else. 
We just hope to be part of the rebuilding.” (NW-01-v138-i13: 18) 
Similarly, in the NY TIMES we find the pro-American statement of a Pakistani immigrant: 
Lt. Col. Anwar K. Malik, an Army doctor who emigrated from Pakistan 22 years ago, said he 
had no hesitation about the American military mission. “I have very strong feelings,” he said. 
“We should do everything we can to recompense for the attacks.” (NYT-01-10-07: 1b) 
And in USA TODAY we find the example of Imam Yahya Hendi, the Muslim chaplain at 
Georgetown University who is quoted saying that… 
“The Koran does not in any fashion promote violence. Actually, in the Koran, you find the 
opposite. It is very clear. God made lives sacred, and no one has the right to take them,” 
Imam Hendi says. “Muslims deplore this kind of violence, and we do not want this to 
happen again to America, our nation.” (USAT-01-09-19: 1A) 
Thus, what can be noted as well is that Type 15 actors in both German and U.S. newspapers 
themselves frequently emphasize the peacefulness of Islam and very often argue that they are against 
terrorist attacks especially because violence and terrorism are irreconcilable with their religion. 
Therefore, Type 15 constructs an image not only of political but also and especially of religious 
peacefulness for the majority of the Arab and Muslim communities. Indirectly, especially those 
statements that come from private actors who speak out against the attacks reflect a perspective 
that the Self strongly favors itself. By increasingly emphasizing those views and statements in the 
portrayal of internal Arab and Muslim actors after the attacks the media implicitly reflect the 
reactions and views that the Self expects from the Arab and Muslim communities in the West: 
namely to disapprove of terrorism, especially against the West. If we compare this portrayal with the 
images of external Arab and Muslim actors we can see that Type 15 actors strongly resemble the 
way in which the “unchallenged alliances” of Type 12 are described (see VI.5.2). Just like Type 12 
actors, the majority of the introduced Type 15 actors receive their main relevance from the fact 
that in the articles they are directly confronted with a negative group of actors that weaken the 
positive image of these peaceful Type 15 figures. At the same time as German and U.S. articles 
emphasize the peacefulness of their Arab and Muslim communities, they confront this positive 
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group with the potential threat that emanates from parts of it. The SZ explicitly refers to that 
problem by stating that… 
Das Bekenntnis, man achte die deutsche Gesellschaftsordnung, ist – bis auf extreme 
Ausnahmen – allgemein. Doch wenn Tuerkischkundige das Freitagsgebet besuchen, sind sie 
oft entsetzt ueber Imame, die den Westen pauschal verdammen, die Aufklaerung als Ursache 
von Drogensucht und Sittenlosigkeit sehen. (SZ-01-10-9: 12) 
Thus, the peacefulness and, more generally speaking, the acceptance and the adoption of the 
Western principles and standards of the host societies are an implicitly communicated 
precondition that the Self demands from the internal Other for an integration of the same. If the 
focused internal actors want to remain within the Western space – it is communicated – they 
have to fulfill those mentioned criteria. For Type 15, these conditions are assumed to be fulfilled, 
however, the images of the next actor type indicate, that the pro-western, anti-terror positions of 
some parts of the internal Other are also called into question. 
 
6.3. Type 16: The Murderers among Us76 
As already noted with the portrayal of external actors, the 9/11 attacks caused huge uncertainty 
in both German and U.S. society with reference to the perception of internal security. This 
shattered confidence is also reflected in the way in which the internal Arab and Muslim actors are 
looked at. One way of portrayal that reflects the uncertainty and skepticism towards the internal 
Other after 9/11 can be formed of actors that are assumed to intend to “destroy the Self from 
within.” In both countries’ analyzed newspapers, the 9/11 terrorists as well as a number of other 
terrorist or politically hostile actors fit into this category of actors that have crossed the geographical 
boundaries between Self and Other and now present an internal threat to the Self. 
Already before the attacks, those negative and hostile actors within the national boundaries are 
noticed. In the German newspapers, three actors (1.2 %) of all identified actors can be ascribed 
to Type 16 before the attacks. In the American newspapers both internal actors (0.9 %) that are 
occur in timeframe are Type 16 actors. One of them, Ahmed Ressam, an Algerian terrorist 
suspect who was accused of having planned a terrorist attack on Los Angeles International 
Airport is especially focused on after the attacks, but before 9/11 is already referred to in the 
American NEWSWEEK as… 
Ahmed Ressam, the would-be bomber who was caught in late ’99 trying to smuggle 
explosives from Canada into the United States, recently turned government witness and 
confessed he had plotted to bomb the Los Angeles airport. (NW-01-v138-i05: 6) 
With the 9/11 attacks as a shocking illustration of the consequences that the infiltration of hostile 
Others can have for Western societies, Type 16 becomes the most frequently used form of actor 
portrayal in both countries’ newspapers. Almost every second occurring internal actor in the 
German and U.S. articles is regarded as an internal threat (overall relevance in Germany: 8.6 %, in 
                                                 
76 Indirect quote and own translation; original quote in German: “Die Mörder sind unter uns” (Bild-01-09-15: 4c). 
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USA: 7.8 %). Actors of Type 16 are now not only described as a threat to the political institutions 
of the West, but also to public safety and to Western principles and values. 
 
The 9/11 Terrorist 
One prototype example for Type 16 are the 9/11 terrorists. Besides the most frequently 
occurring external terrorist actor, Osama bin Laden, the 9/11 terrorists dominate the news 
coverage in both countries’ newspapers after the attacks. The impact that those terrorists have 
had on the Western Self may be illustrated, first of all, with a quote from the American 
NEWSWEEK that asks: 
How could a small band of religious zealots knock down the World Trade Center, the most 
visible symbol of capitalism, killing thousands in lower Manhattan, and come so close to 
destroying the executive mansion of the most powerful nation on earth?  
(NW-01-v138-i13: 26.) 
To describe these terrorist infiltrators as a threat to the Self seems reasonable since these actors are 
murderers who killed innocent people in their self-proclaimed war against the West and the United 
States in particular. Thus, DER SPIEGEL writes that… 
[D]ie Terroristen, die in der Weltmacht USA den “Satan,” den Inbegriff der “Ungläubigen” 
oder auch - etwas irdischer – die verhasste Garantiemacht für Israels Existenz sehen. 
(Sp-01-i40: 152) 
…and NEWSWEEK argues that… 
Nothing like this has ever happened to America before. With chilling skill, terrorists struck at 
our heart last Tuesday, hijacking commercial jets, then crashing into the World Trade Center 
and the Pentagon – cold-blooded murder on a mass scale. (NW-01-v138-Sonder: 2) 
Furthermore, these terrorists are not only hostile towards the Self, but they are also portrayed as 
enemies of the – peaceful – internal and external Other, because they see themselves as “[…] self-
claimed disciples of Allah, who not only hijacked four airplanes but also a whole world 
religion.”77 However, what makes these terrorists most threatening for the Self is the fact that 
they did not carry out their negative plans in a distant place but operated from within the West. 
More than that, they not only carried out the attacks within the national boundaries of the Self 
but also planned them within Germany and the U.S. Both countries’ print media strongly 
emphasize this aspect. DER SPIEGEL, thereby, mainly focuses on the terrorist network within 
Germany and reports that… 
Mindestens drei der Hijacker, womöglich Piloten, hatten zeitweise in Hamburg gelebt. Zwei 
der Araber waren eingeschrieben als Elektrotechnik-Studenten an der Technischen 
Universität Hamburg-Harburg, ein vierter Mann wurde Donnerstagnacht noch gesucht – 
eine krude Spur in die islamisch-fundamentalistische Szene in Deutschland. (Sp-01-i38: 16) 
In another article, the news magazine even talks about a national terrorist network in Germany 
because… 
                                                 
77 Own translation, original quote in German: “[…] selbst ernannter Jünger Allahs, die nicht nur vier 
Passagiermaschinen gehijackt hatten – sondern auch eine ganze Weltreligion. ” (Sp-01-i40: 174). 
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Um die drei Entführer herum haben die Ermittler zudem ein Geflecht aus mehreren 
Dutzend Verbindungen aufgedeckt, das quer über Deutschland liegt. […] Eine weitere Spur 
führt von der Hamburger Zelle ins Münsterland zu Osama A. (Sp-01-i39: 20) 
But also the NY TIMES mentions the German terrorist network that is assumed to have planned 
and coordinated the attacks in the United States: 
But German officials now say a third man who studied in Hamburg was involved. He was 
Ziad Jarrahi, 27, born in Lebanon, a Sunni Muslim from the village of Al Marj in the Bekaa 
Valley. He took courses here in flight engineering and aircraft construction and had a 
Hamburg pilot’s license. […] Mr. Shehhi was at the Harburg university just a year, and rarely 
attended courses, but was inseparable from Mr. Atta here and later in Florida, where both 
took flight training courses and shared an apartment.(NYT-01-09-17: 4) 
Apart from that, U.S. newspapers also frequently mention that a number of the 9/11 suspects 
already seem to have been in the United States long before they carried out the attacks. USA 
TODAY reports, for instance, that… 
Al Midhar and an accomplice, Salem Alhamzi, who also was on the Pentagon flight, already 
had entered the USA in late August. […] Another hijacker, Hani Hanjour, who authorities 
say piloted the jet that hit the Pentagon, lived in Arizona for the past 5 years.  
(USAT-01-09-17: 3A) 
Another aspect that is frequently emphasized in German and U.S. articles is that from the 
Western perspective those actors are, on the one hand, obviously different from the Self because 
they are hostile, fanatical, and religiously fundamentalist but, on the other hand, are to some extent 
difficult to demarcate because they seem to be like the Self. As DER SPIEGEL puts it: 
Terroristen fliegen die gleichen Flugzeuge wie wir und telefonieren mit den gleichen Handys. 
So gesehen sind sie Menschen wie wir. Mit dem kleinen Unterschied, dass sie an den 
sofortigen Einzug ins Paradies glauben, wenn sie sich opfern. (Sp-01-i38: 168) 
Similar to that, the NY TIMES argues that it is rather difficult to identify these hostile Others 
within the own national boundaries since they present themselves as unobtrusive and polite. As the 
newspaper writes: 
“These were not people who made themselves conspicuous,” said Hannelore Haase, who 
owns a nearby kiosk where she sells newspapers and snacks. Their neighbors said they were 
very quiet and polite. (NYT-01-09-15: 1b) 
This observation can also be found in the German news coverage. The SZ reports that… 
Die 19 jungen Maenner kamen mit offenem Visier ins Land, mit ordentlichen Papieren, 
sogar mit Visa. Sie stellten sich als Studenten, Piloten oder Mechaniker vor und lebten Tuer 
an Tuer mit amerikanischen oder deutschen Nachbarn – friedlich, freundlich, unauffaellig. 
Manche waren Singles, andere hatten Familien mit bis zu vier Kindern, die mit Maedchen 
und Jungen in der Nachbarschaft spielten. Einige lebten wie glaeubige Muslime, fromm, 
doch ohne Eifer oder gar Fanatismus. Andere fuehrten das Leben des Westens, gingen in 
Discos, tranken Alkohol. (SZ-01-09-17: 2) 
And BILD reports that… 
Sie tarnten sich als Autohändler – Sie wohnten unauffällig zur Miete – Einer heiratete sogar 
(Bild-01-09-15: 1b) 
As the last quotes illustrate, both countries’ newspapers frequently highlight the seemingly 
Western lifestyle of the terrorists. In both countries’ newspapers, we find whole articles that 
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elaborate on the lives of the terrorists, their preparations for the attacks, and their cultural and 
personal backgrounds to learn more about their motivations. Those actors are not only unobtrusive 
and friendly, but also seem culturally, socially and economically assimilated and Westernized and they 
use the technical tools of the West. The NY TIMES argues, for example, that… 
What makes them super-empowered, though, is their genius at using the networked world, 
the Internet and the very high technology they hate, to attack us. Think about it: They turned 
our most advanced civilian planes into human-directed, precision-guided cruise missiles – a 
diabolical melding of their fanaticism and our technology. (NYT-01-09-13: 27) 
And the SZ emphasizes that… 
Ein Duzend Terroristen haben vier Passagierflugzeuge gekapert. Sie haben das offenbar mit 
Messern getan, die als Waffen nur wenig juenger sind als die Faustkeile der Steinzeit. Die 
Klingen in der Hand, die Opferbereitschaft des Fanatikers im Herzen und das Wissen des 
21. Jahrhunderts im Kopf haben die Verbrecher die Jets zu fliegenden Bomben 
umfunktioniert. (SZ-01-09-13: 4d) 
One actor who is especially highlighted in this context is the assumed leader of the group of 9/11 
terrorists, Mohammed Atta. NEWSWEEK remarks on him that… 
Mohamed Atta was, according to investigators, the perfect soldier in bin Laden’s army. He 
was a citizen of the world. Traveling on a passport from the United Arab Emirates, he lived 
in Germany for a time, studying at the Technical University in Hamburg. He frequented a 
nightspot named Sharky’s Billiard Bar […] wore black jeans, and rented – but failed to return 
– a video of John Carpenter’s “Vampire.” At the same time, he requested and received a 
prayer room at the university for himself and about 20 other Muslim students. In the last two 
years, he began to wear Muslim dress. (NW-01-v138-i13: 26) 
Those quotes implicitly reflect that the main threat that emanates from the 9/11 terrorists arises 
from the fact that they cannot be distinguished from the image of the Self, and become seemingly 
assimilated with it. But the seemingly positive and Western features of those actors can be 
unmasked as false and as adapted for strategic reasons – namely to infiltrate the Self and destroy 
it from within. As the NY TIMES notes… 
They were adults with education and skill, not hopeless young zealots. At least one left 
behind a wife and young children. They mingled in secular society, even drinking forbidden 
alcohol, hardly typical of Islamic militants. […] Those suspected of perpetrating Tuesday’s 
destruction had, in some cases, spent years studying and training in the United States, 
collecting valuable commercial skills and facing many opportunities to change their minds. 
(NYT-01-09-15: 2d) 
Those Type 16 actors reflect the disturbance, the shock and the concern of the German and U.S. 
Self about the fact that these evil Others were able to become part of the Western collectivity, that 
not all of those terrorists were simply naïve and poor but rather educated and inconspicuous persons, 
and that they pretended to identify with the Western concept of belonging and to share Western 
principles and values of the Self. As NEWSWEEK writes: 
It is very difficult for a free and open society to defend against terrorists who are at once 
patient, smart and willing to die. (NW-01-v138-i13: 26) 
This disturbance is also reflected in another context when the NY TIMES writes: 
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We are chilled as we learn more about how the Middle East terrorists mad with murder 
breached our walls and lived brazenly among us for years, mocking our hospitality, exploiting 
our freedoms. (NYT-01-09-19: 27b) 
Thus, we can say that the inconspicuousness and “Western” appearance of the terrorists seem to 
make them even more dreadful than the “villain” Osama bin Laden (see also VI.2.6) who is 
regarded as the mastermind of the attacks and who is still at large. In contrast to Osama bin 
Laden, special focus is on the personal lifestyles of the 9/11 terrorists and their borderline status 
between Western world and Arab/Muslim origin. 
In a way, the images of the 9/11 terrorists resemble those of the “strategic” Type 9 actors 
introduced in subchapter VI.4.1. Their seeming similarities with the Self are unmasked as false 
and are described as being strategically adopted by the actors to cover their true intentions and 
remain inconspicuous, and to find access to those Western societies that they actually disapprove of 
and want to destroy. The overall image of the 9/11 terrorists is thus clearly negative and these 
actors are assumed to be different from the Self despite their seeming similarities. Apart from 
that, the portrayal of the 9/11 terrorists also reflects the insecurity and uncertainty that these 
actors and the attacks have produced within the West and with reference to the internal but also 
the external Arab and Muslim Other. This insecurity is also reflected in the fact that Arab and 
Muslim communities are observed more skeptically after the attacks, and that parts of these 
communities are frequently referred to as identified or suspected “hidden extremists.” 
 
The Hidden Extremists within the West and Their Accomplices 
Both German and American newspapers not only mention the evil 9/11 terrorists or the peaceful 
majority of the internal Arab and Muslim communities but also contrast those communities with 
a more or less undefined group of militant, Islamic extremists among them. Especially in the 
German newspapers those “sleepers of Islamic terrorism”78 within the country are argued to be a 
subliminal threat for German society and the West in general, and are suspected to be involved in 
subversive, anti-western activities and support terrorists like those behind the 9/11 attacks. As a 
reaction to the attacks, DER SPIEGEL, for example, reports that… 
“Freudig erregt” und geradezu “euphorisch” hätten militante Islamisten in Deutschland den 
Anschlag aufgenommen. (Sp-01-i38: 26) 
…whereas the SZ announces that… 
Deutsche Fahnder kamen im Fruehjahr einer Gruppe algerischer Terroristen auf die Spur, 
die einen Anschlag in Strassburg planten. (SZ-01-09-13: 6) 
All three analyzed German newspapers also give quantitative numbers of potential hostile actors 
that are assumed to be hidden within the country. In this context, BILD reports that… 
In Deutschland sind derzeit 58 000 Ausländer als politische Extremisten aktiv. Hasserfüllte, 
lebende Brandbomben. Diese Personen müssen ausnahmslos ausgewiesen und von jetzt bis 
zur Ausreise überwacht werden. (Bild-01-09-17: 6f) 
                                                 
78 Own translation, original quote in German: “Schläfer des islamischen Terrorismus” (Sp-01-i39: 28). 
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In DER SPIEGEL we learn that… 
Potenzielle Rekruten für den Heiligen Krieg gibt es dennoch genug. 20 islamistische 
Organisationen mit rund 31 000 Mitgliedern werden vom Verfassungsschutz beobachtet. 
Zumeist leben sie als Asylbewerber in Deutschland, weil ihnen – paradox genug – die 
Zugehörigkeit zu einer terroristischen Gruppierung in ihren Heimatländern die Abschiebung 
erspart. (Sp-01-i38: 32) 
In another article the magazine emphasizes that… 
[…] mindestens 3000 Muslime seien zu Gewalttaten bereit. […] Einige beschränken sich auf 
religiöse und politische Aktivitäten, andere hingegen propagieren Gewalt oder unterstützen 
gar terroristische Aktionen in ihren Heimatländern (Sp-01-i39: 28) 
This threatening scenario is also picked up by the SZ that reports that… 
Diese radikalen Islamisten, die zumeist eine militaerische Ausbildung in Afghanistan 
absolviert haetten, stuenden vermutlich auf Abruf fuer einen neuen Anschlag oder 
Kampfeinsatz bereit, meinte Behrens. Nach juengsten Erkenntnissen lebten diese 
“Schlaefer” voellig unauffaellig. (SZ-01-09-21: 9b) 
This general assumption of a wider network of hidden extremists within the West that moreover 
represent a potential threat for the Self can also be found in the U.S. newspapers. NEWSWEEK, for 
example, in one article looks at the Al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, N.Y and reports that… 
Bonded by combat, full of religious zeal, the diaspora of young Arab men willing to die for 
Allah congregated at the Al-Kifah Refugee Center in Brooklyn, N.Y., a dreary inner-city 
building that doubled as a recruiting post for the CIA seeking to steer fresh troops to the 
mujahedin. The dominant figures at the center in the late ’80s were a gloomy New York City 
engineer named El Sayyid Nosair, who took Prozac for his blues, and his sidekick, Mahmud 
Abouhalima, who had been a human minesweeper in the Afghan war (his only tool was a 
thin reed, which he used as a crude probe). The new immigrants were filled not with 
gratitude toward their new nation, but by implacable hatred toward America, symbol of 
Western modernity that threatened to engulf Muslim fundamentalism in a tide of blue jeans 
and Hollywood videos. (NW-01-v138-i14: 38) 
Similarly, the NY TIMES reports on a Somali immigrant who is said to be connected with the 
9/11 terrorists: 
The intensified scrutiny of hazardous-material licenses came as federal prosecutors increased 
the pressure on a Virginia man whose name and phone number were found in a car 
registered to one of the hijackers of the jet that slammed into the Pentagon. That man, 
Mohamed Abdi, 44, a naturalized citizen from Somalia, was ordered jailed without bond 
today by a federal magistrate judge who said Mr. Abdi might otherwise flee the United 
States. (NYT-01-09-27: 5) 
Here, we learn that some Arab immigrants in the U.S. are not grateful for finding refuge in the 
country but instead have an antipathy for their host country due to its cultural modernity and 
openness. In more general terms, the NY TIMES quotes the American Secretary of State Collin 
Powell who argues that this new conflict that arises from the attacks cannot be compared to 
other previous military conflicts since it is a war that will take place on a global scale and thus will 
be fought with enemies that cannot be easily located in one single place: 
This is different. The enemy is in many places. The enemy is not looking to be found. The 
enemy is hidden. The enemy is, very often, right here within our own country. And so you 
have to design a campaign plan that goes after that kind of enemy, and it isn’t always blunt-
force military, although that is certainly an option. It may well be that the diplomatic efforts, 
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political efforts, legal, financial, other efforts, may be just as effective against that kind of an 
enemy as would military force be. (NYT-01-09-15: 16) 
As the examples above may indicate, not only the hidden extremists are seen as a potential threat but 
in both German and U.S. articles after the attacks also individual private persons are frequently 
mentioned because they have supported, for instance, the 9/11 terrorists or simply express their 
approval of the attacks. Especially BILD frequently reports on private actors among the Arab and 
Muslim immigrants in the country that are regarded as a potential danger or at least are described 
as hostile towards their host society or the West. We learn, for example, that after the 9/11 
attacks… 
Abgeschoben werden soll eine palästinensische Familie aus Hannover, die vor Kameras in 
Jubel ausbrach. […] Der Taxifahrer, der mich gestern zum Bahnhof brachte, bekundete 
klammheimliche Freude über den Schmerz der Amerikaner. Ein Mitläufer Osama bin 
Ladens? Oder nur ein armer Irrer? Soll ich mit ihm diskutieren? Dafür ist sein Deutsch zu 
schlecht. (Bild-01-09-15: 4) 
…and in another article, the newspaper reports that… 
Die Deutschland-Zentrale von Terroristenführer bin Laden soll sich nach den 
Informationen eines ausländischen Geheimdienstes im Raum Frankfurt/M. befinden, 
berichtet “Die Welt”. Ein libanesischer Autohändler besorge Wohnungen, Papiere, 
Fahrzeuge und halte Kontakt mit dem Irak. (Bild-01-09-19: 2d) 
In DER SPIEGEL we find the example of a religious preacher in Münster, Germany who is 
reported to have had contact with the 9/11 suicide attackers who came from Hamburg. As the 
magazine writes: 
Noch ein zweiter alter Kunde der Staatsschützer spielt jetzt in den Ermittlungen eine Rolle: 
der ägyptische Prediger Osama A., 35, Vorsitzender des Islamischen Zentrums Münster e. V. 
Der Verdächtige, der den Verfassungsschützern als radikaler Prediger gilt, soll über 
Mittelsmänner Kontakte zu den Selbstmördern aus der Hansestadt gehabt haben.  
(Sp-01-i39: 20) 
For the American context, NEWSWEEK reports on a Boston taxi driver who is suspected of 
having financially supported the 9/11 terrorists: 
Nabil al-Marabh, a former Boston taxi driver of Kuwaiti descent, is suspected of funneling 
thousands of dollars in wire transfer through Fleet Bank to the Middle East. […] Al-Marabh, 
who like a number of terrorists seems to have used Canada as a sometime sanctuary, was 
hard to track down. (NW-01-v138-i14: 38) 
And USA TODAY mentions another suspect in San Diego: 
FBI agents have arrested a San Diego man authorities suspect of giving money to at least 
two hijackers and teaching them to use the Internet, a key method of communication for the 
terrorists. Omer Bakarbashat, 26, was taken to New York for questioning by the FBI. 
(USAT-01-09-21: 1Ab) 
Altogether, we can thus say that the occurrence of Type 16 actors in the analyzed articles of both 
countries is closely connected with the previous Type 15 in the aftermath of the attacks. The 
peaceful Arab and Muslim communities are contrasted with the new threat for the Self that arises 
from the “sleepers” and potential or actual terrorists and terror supporters who live among those 
Others within the West. Especially in the German newspapers, Type 16 actors are frequently 
consulted to illustrate this new threat. Those actors thus also reflect the shock that the event has 
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caused with reference to the German security perception, despite the fact that the attacks actually 
took place on U.S. territory, and largely due to the fact that some of the 9/11 terrorists had lived 
in Germany before the event. At the same time, the combination of Type 15 and Type 16 actors 
indicates the skepticism that is communicated in German newspapers with respect to the internal 
Other in general, a skepticism that cannot be found to this extent in the U.S. media images and 
that reflects a German perception of Arab and mainly Muslim immigrants as culturally different 
and unwilling to integrate in German society, adopt Western standards and share the Western 
principles that the German Self regards as central for its own concept of belonging. This 
perception indicates that the internal Other is still predominantly regarded as an out-group, an 
assumption that seems to have been proved by the fact that some of the 9/11 terrorists lived 
within in the country for years. 
Compared to that, we find slight attempts to take a more integrating perspective in the U.S. 
articles after the attacks. However, this perspective is slightly weakened by the last actor type that 
will be introduced in this subchapter and that – compared to the quantitative relevance of Type 
15 actors in German newspapers after 9/11 – dominate the U.S. news coverage after the attacks 
besides the 9/11 terrorists: 
 
6.4. Type 17: The Internal Other as a Victim of the West 
As McAlister (2005) has also emphasized, despite President Bush’s calls for tolerance in the 
aftermath of 9/11, there were more than one thousand registered incidents of violence against 
Arab and Muslim Americans in the U.S. during the weeks after the attacks (McAlister 2005: 275-
276), incidents that are also discussed in the analyzed print media articles, and here specifically in 
the American ones. Type 17 comprises the images of Arab and Muslim Americans who became 
victims of rage and hate crimes in the aftermath of 9/11. Compared to the German newspapers, 
in the U.S. articles we find a significant focus on those members of the Arab and Muslim 
communities who became victims of angry reactions by other American citizens in the aftermath 
of the attacks. On a quantitative scale, nearly one third of all identified internal actors in U.S. 
newspapers after 9/11 can be ascribed to Type 17 (overall relevance: 5.2 %).79 Victims of violent 
assaults are also mentioned in the analyzed German newspapers, but here they are much less 
relevant with a proportion of only 1.5 %. 
                                                 
79 This observation was also made by Nacos and Torres-Reyna (2003): In their data set, of four American 
newspapers (NY TIMES, NEW YORK POST, DAILY NEWS, and USA TODAY) analyzed over a time period of six 
months after the attacks, civil rights issues and the violation of those rights, and here especially physical attacks 
against Arab Americans and Muslim Americans, are the most frequently addressed topic as well with one-third of all 
themes (see Nacos and Torres-Reyna 2003: 145). And Weston (2003) emphasized in her analysis that after 9/11 
Arab Americans turned out to be depicted much more positively and sympathetically, either as loyal and patriotic 
citizens of the American nation, or as victims of harassment by other citizens as well government detention (see 
Weston 2003). 
VI. How Different is the Other? 
 - 240 -
All analyzed U.S. print media frequently discuss such negative occurrences as verbal accusations, 
ascriptions of guilt, or even violent assaults and hate crimes that took place against Arab and 
Muslim actors within the country after the attacks. NEWSWEEK, for example, reports that… 
In the immediate aftermath of the attacks there were scattered reports of tauntings, even 
beatings, of Arab-American children by schoolmates. (NW-01-v138-i13: 18) 
…and in another article reports on a whole series of violent assaults against Arab and Muslim 
actors: 
As America reels from last week’s deadly terrorist attacks, Muslims and Arab-Americans are 
experiencing an isolating terror all their own. In Washington, D.C., Muslim women have had 
hijab scarves snatched from their heads. A mosque in San Francisco was splattered with pig’s 
blood. A bomb threat at a mostly Arab school in Dearborn, Mich., sent frightened teens 
running into the streets. (NW-01-v138-i13: 69) 
Similar incidents are mentioned in the NY TIMES which reports, for example, that… 
Some mosques closed their doors out of fear. The Islamic Center of Irving, a mosque in 
suburban Dallas, had its windows shattered by gunshots. One mosque in San Francisco 
found on its doorsteps a bag of what appeared to be blood. And in Alexandria, Va., a vandal 
threw two bricks through the windows of an Islamic bookstore; handwritten notes with anti-
Muslim sentiments were found attached to the bricks. (NYT-01-09-13: 24) 
In another article a few days later, the newspaper furthermore writes: 
In Mesa, Ariz., in what appeared to be an attempt at revenge for the Trade Center attack, an 
unidentified assailant shot and killed a man who had moved to the U.S. from India 10 years 
ago. Other reports of physical and verbal harassment of people believed to be Middle 
Eastern are coming in from all parts of the country, including reports of firebombings and 
the cruel harassment of schoolchildren. (NYT-01-09-17: 15b) 
Finally – and just to name one of a number of examples – USA TODAY writes that… 
In Laramie, Wyo., a Muslim woman and her children were chased from a Wal-Mart by angry 
shoppers, and a Pakistani woman was nearly run over in a shopping-mall parking lot by an 
enraged 75-year-old man. (USAT-01-09-19: 15A) 
All of the newspapers also explicitly object to these violent attacks, and strongly emphasize that 
the victims be regarded as part of the national Self. Nevertheless, these incidents also reflect the 
gap in U.S. society that seems to exist between the discursively proclaimed disapproval of these 
verbal and violent attacks against Arab and Muslims as part of U.S. society and identity, and the 
fact that those hostilities do take place nevertheless. In a way, this violent behavior on behalf of 
the Self seems to indicate that the ideal of the integration of Arab and Muslim Americans does 
not fully work or is not fully adopted by all parts of U.S. society. 
On the other hand, the frequent portrayal of those victims, the explicit disapproval of the 
violence against those actors, and the emphasis that the internal Other (to large parts) is seen as 
part of the American Self also reveals a stronger ideological and conceptual integration of the 
internal Other in the U.S. self-concept, despite the fact that this ideal might still not be fulfilled. 
The images of Arab and Muslim American victims in U.S. newspapers also seem to reflect a 
request to society to re-strengthen its own principles like tolerance and peacefulness despite the 
violation of those principles by some parts of the internal Other. Therefore – and similar to the 
self-criticism that was already identified in the context of the images of external Arab and Muslim 
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victims (see VI.3.1) – this shift in focus towards the Self can again be found with the portrayal of 
Type 17 actors. 
 
Summary: When the Other Enters the Western Space 
The typology of internal Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. newspapers around 9/11 is 
less complex than that of the external actors. As outlined, four different actor types can be 
identified: 
Type 14 comprises the images of internal actors that are mainly described according to their 
cultural features, and also illustrates one difference between the images of internal actors in 
German and U.S. print media that is worth mentioning: German articles reflect a stronger 
emphasis on an observed cultural distance between internal Arab and Muslim actors and their 
German host society, an aspect that is altogether less relevant for the portrayal of internal actors 
in the analyzed American print media. As outlined, this difference between the German and the 
American actor portrayals can also be found in the context of external actor types like Type 2. 
Therefore, we may say that the emphasis of cultural and especially religious features of Arab and 
Muslim actors is a crucial element of the image of the Other in German newspapers. 
Type 15 summarizes the images of large parts of the Arab and Muslim communities in Germany 
and the U.S. that receive a stronger focus and are under general suspicion after 9/11. On a 
quantitative scale, Type 15 forms the second most relevant internal actor type in German 
newspapers after the attacks and the third most relevant form of internal actor portrayal in the 
U.S. articles. Both countries’ print media focus on the reactions of these actors to the attacks and 
emphasize the overall peacefulness of the Muslim and Arab communities not only on a political but 
also on a religious dimension. The actor type implicitly reflects the expectations and demands 
that the Self has towards the Arab and Muslim communities in the West: namely to disapprove of 
terrorism, especially against the West. Peacefulness and, more generally speaking, the acceptance and 
the adoption of the Western principles and standards of the host societies are an implicitly 
communicated precondition that the Self demands from the internal Other to integrate them in 
this collectivity. Here, Type 15 is similar to the external “unchallenged alliances” of Type 12. 
At the same time, the peacefulness of their Arab and Muslim communities is confronted with the 
threat that arises from parts of it. The shattered feeling of national security that was caused by the 
attacks is also reflected in the third actor type that was identified in the newspapers, Type 16. 
Those predominantly terrorist or politically hostile actors have crossed the geographical boundaries 
between Self and Other and now present an internal threat to the Self. We also find 
representatives of this type before 9/11, but Type 16 is THE central form of portrayal of internal 
actors after the attacks, where nearly every second actor can be ascribed to this category. Actors 
of Type 16 are not only described as a threat to the political institutions of the West, but also to 
the public safety and to the Western principles and values. These actors are furthermore closely 
connected with Type 15, since the group of positive peaceful internal Others is frequently 
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contrasted with the newly perceived threat for the Self that arises from the “sleepers” and 
potential or actual terrorists and terror supporters that live among those peaceful Others within the 
West. Here, Type 16 actors also reflect the shock that the event caused with reference to the 
German security perception, despite the fact that the attacks actually took place on U.S. territory, 
mainly because some of the 9/11 terrorists lived in Germany for years. However, the 
combination of Type 15 and Type 16 actors also indicates a stronger skepticism of the German 
Self with respect to the internal Other in general than of the U.S. Self. Arab and mainly Muslim 
immigrants in Germany are not only predominantly regarded as culturally different, but are also 
regarded as lacking the will to integrate in the German society, adopt Western standards, and 
share the Western principles that the German Self regards as central for its own concept of 
belonging. 
In contrast to that, U.S. newspapers reflect a more integrative perspective that is weakened 
however to some extent by the last actor type that was introduced in this subchapter. Type 17 
summarizes the images of Arab and Muslim Americans who became victims of rage and hate 
crimes in the aftermath of the event. Compared to the German context, in the U.S. articles these 
victims make up one third of all identified internal actors after 9/11. The analyzed newspapers 
explicitly object to these violent attacks, and in the U.S. context also strongly emphasize that the 
victims are regarded as part of the national Self. However, this violent behavior on the part of the 
Self also seems to indicate that the ideal of the integration of the internal Other is not yet fully 
achieved in U.S. society. Nevertheless, U.S. newspapers explicitly disapprove the violence against 
those actors, and emphasize that the internal Other is seen as part of the American Self. 
Therefore, Type 17 also reflects a request to the Self to re-strengthen its own principles like 
tolerance and peacefulness, and again reveals the increased self-criticism on behalf of the Self that 
has already been identified in the context of the images of external Arab and Muslim victims of 
Type 7. 
Altogether, the images of the internal Others in German and U.S. newspapers around 9/11 are 
therefore to a large extent similar to those of the external actors. The only difference is that they 
lack the geographical distance that is the common element of distinction with the four other 
levels of actor construction. Thus, this distance does not present the crucial factor for the 
demarcation of Arabs and Muslims, and the internal actor types can also be classified according 
to the four other levels of difference, as Table VI.6 summarizes: 
Table VI.6: Levels of Difference of the Internal Actor Types 
Levels of Difference Internal Actor Types 
Level 1:  The Devaluated Other Type 14: The Culturally Distant Evaluated Other 
Level 2:  The Weak Other Type 17: The Internal Other as a Victim of the West 
Level 3:  The Strategic Other Type 16: The Murderers Among Us 
Level 4:  The Self Within the Other Type 15: The Peaceful Arab and Muslim Communities 
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The images of Type 14 actors reflect a significant difference to and distance to the German or 
American self-concepts of belonging that are communicated in the analyzed media mainly by 
devaluating the features of those actors or the actors as a whole. Type 17 actors could be 
classified on the level of weak otherness (even though actors here do not directly suffer from the 
negative behavior of other Arab and Muslim actors but of the aggression and violence of 
members of the Self). Type 16 actors could be located on the level of strategic otherness, especially 
because some of those actors have been argued to strategically blend into their Western host 
society. Finally, Type 15 presents the largest similarity between Self and Other, therefore, actors 
of Type 15, i.e. the peaceful Arab and Muslim communities in Germany and the United States, 
could also be seen as another representative of “the Self within the (internal) Other.” 
  
7. Conclusion: Distance and Similarities between Self and Other 
The analysis of the German and U.S. print media articles around the 9/11 event has revealed that 
Arab and Muslim actors – those abroad as well as those located within the German or American 
national boundaries – receive quite a large variety of different images. The quantitatively most 
frequently used characteristics and features for the portrayal of these actors in both countries’ 
newspapers were outlined in chapter V. However, as was argued at the beginning of chapter VI, 
to simply collect the most frequently used features and lump them together to one overall image 
would not grasp the variety of different kinds of actor portrayals. As outlined, the appearing 
actors do not only possess adverse features that the Self disapproves of or does not tolerate. 
Instead, we also find actors that appear to be rather similar to the way in which the German or 
American Self perceives itself in the analyzed articles of both countries. 
Thus, it was also crucial to look at the way in which characteristics and features are ascribed to 
the individual actors and how those actors are connected with each other in the respective articles 
to learn more about the qualitative relevancies of the ascribed features or images and the 
respective actors. To recapitulate, the first distinction made in this chapter was between internal 
and external actors, on the basis of geographical closeness to or distance from the observing 
German and American Self. In a second step, we looked at the different images that those 
external and internal actors receive in the analyzed print media of both countries before and after 
the focused event, in order to illustrate the similarities and construction patterns that can be 
identified. In Table VI.7, the overall typology is summarized that was established from the 
occurring set of internal and external actors in German and U.S. print media before and after 
9/11. 
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Table VI.7: Overall Typology of Internal and External Actors80 
Actor Type Before 9/11 After 9/11 
 Germany USA Germany USA 
1:   Gunmen, Terrorists And Hostile Politicians 28.4 28.9 17.8 24.1 
2:   The Culturally Backward and Fundamentalist Other 12.8 11.6 12.3 8.0 
3:   The Politically Devaluated Other 5.8 5.2 3.3 3.6 
4:   The Poor and Underdeveloped Other 1.2 3.9 1.9 2.3 
5:   The Wealthy Political Elite 5.4 3.0 0.4 0.3 
6:   The Villain - - 2.2 2.3 
7:   The Victim 20.2 24.1 10.8 9.6 
8:   The Weakened Similar Other 6.6 10.8 9.3 10.6 
9:   The Strategic Other 2.7 3.4 6.3 6.2 
10: The Strategically Used Other - 1.3 4.8 3.6 
11: The Role Model Other 3.9 3.0 3.0 1.3 
12: The Unchallenged Alliance after 9/11 - - 2.6 3.9 
13: The Political Critic of the West - 0.9 - 1.3 
14: The Culturally Distant Internal Other 1.6 - 2.2 0.8 
15: The Peaceful Arab and Muslim Communities 0.4 - 6.7 3.1 
16: The Murderers Among Us 1.2 0.9 8.6 7.8 
17: The Internal Other as a Victim of the West - - 1.5 5.2 
        other Actors 9.7 3.0 6.3 6.0 
Total Number of Actors 257 232 269 386 
 
External Others 
13 types of external actor images have been derived from the analysis and introduced as 
empirically significant forms of actor images. As was outlined, these 13 actor types are of varying 
significance in both countries’ newspapers, or they are of varying relevance before and after the 
analyzed event. 
The largest actor type that was identified among the occurring Arab and Muslim actors in both 
countries’ newspapers before as well as after 9/11 is that of violent actors, terrorists, or hostile 
politicians of Type 1 (see VI.2.1). The devaluation of violence and hostility is one of the most 
frequently focused on aspects in the context of external Arab and Muslim actors. At the same 
time, this focus reflects a Western disapproval of violence and terrorism, and the demand for a 
more peaceful political interaction within Arab and Muslim countries but also, and especially after 
9/11, with the Self. Less often, actors are also devaluated on other dimensions, for example, for 
                                                 
80 In %, given the proportion of all Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to the different types in relation to 
all occurring actors in the indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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their economic lavishness, in their social and economic development or with regard to their 
political actions. 
The second largest actor type before 9/11 in both countries consists of victims (see VI.3.1). 
Victimized Arab and Muslim actors mostly suffer from the negative conditions in their Arab and 
Muslim home countries or have to bear the negative behavior by other Arab and Muslim actors 
who may also be responsible for the negative societal conditions. Type 7 summarizes this form of 
portrayal. This actor type indirectly also criticizes certain negative aspects of the Other, not by 
devaluating the victims, but rather by devaluating the conditions that are, directly or indirectly, 
seen to be responsible for the victims’ situation. Thus, especially before 9/11 but also after the 
attacks, the Victim type is another central way of exemplifying the consequences that result from 
a lack of Western standards and principles like democratic structures, freedom, and economic 
progress in Arab and Muslim societies. However, compared to the solely negative Type 1 actors, 
Type 7 actors are not completely different from the Self. Both the observing Self and the victim 
implicitly criticize the lack of Western standards in Arab and Muslim countries, the latter mainly 
because they have to face and bear the negative consequences that may result from this lack of 
Western standards and principles. 
The ranking in Table VI.7 also shows that before the attacks we find a rather similar quantitative 
relevance of the different actor types in German and U.S. newspapers. This changes slightly after 
the attacks. In the German context, Arab and Muslim actors are now described more strongly 
with regard to their cultural backwardness and religious fundamentalist views or actions (see VI.2.2). 
Culturally devaluated actors of Type 2 form the second largest actor group in the German print 
media after the 9/11. 
Compared to that, U.S. newspapers more often describe actors who bear a certain degree of 
similarity with the Self, to the extent that they possess features that can also be regarded as part 
of the U.S. or German self-concept of belonging, or that they support Western views and 
principles. Those Type 8 actors (see VI.3.2), for instance, stand up for the improvement of 
democratic structures, have modern cultural views, and especially after 9/11 speak out or take action 
against terrorism and take sides with the West in the anti-terror coalition. However, at the same 
time, they are weakened in their positive or similar images with certain negative aspects, because 
they are also politically undemocratic, culturally conservative, or economically extravagant. Their level of 
institutionalization of Western standards is limited, or they lack the political power to accomplish 
their attempts. Those weak external Arab and Muslim actors indicate an increased skepticism on 
behalf of the Self with some of the focused on Arab and Muslim actors, especially after 9/11. 
The positive involvement of some of those actors in the coalition against terrorism, or their 
political and military alliance with the West in the effort to fight terrorism and find the supporters 
and masterminds of the attacks in New York and Washington does not automatically make them 
equal partners of the Self. This perception seems to be especially crucial for the American 
perspective on the Other after 9/11, since the proclaimed “war on terrorism” is also combined 
with the professed aim to bring more democratic structures to the Other in order to prevent the 
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spread of terrorist structures and tendencies, religious extremism, and violent upheaval in the 
Muslim and Arab countries. 
Apart from this quantitative ranking, some of the introduced actor types are relevant in both 
countries’ print media on the qualitative level, i.e. for the different issues and topics with which 
they appear. According to this criterion, actor types like Type 6 (“the Villain,” see VI.2.6) or the 
strategic Others of Type 9 or 10 (see VI.4.1 and VI.4.2) are most relevant for the respective 
articles in both countries’ newspapers. Compared to other actors types (such as Type 1), whose 
representatives do not necessarily have to be central for an article and may also appear only once 
or as one example among many others in the respective articles, actors of Type 6 or the strategic 
Others of Type 9 or 10 are often central for an article or dominate the news coverage of certain 
topics or events. Actors like Osama bin Laden, the Taliban regime, the strategic partners of the 
West in the post-9/11 anti-terror coalition or the contradictory but useful allies like Saudi Arabia are 
discussed in great detail in the context of a few articles in both countries’ analyzed media sets 
after 9/11, and thus form qualitatively central actor figures in the timeframe of analysis. 
In conclusion we can stress that despite slight quantitative differences, the types of external Arab 
and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media are nearly identical before as well as after 
9/11, and that both German and American Self evaluated the Other quite similarly (for instance, 
with regard to the institutionalization of Western principles). 
 
Internal Others 
The analysis of internal Arab and Muslim actors has revealed that despite their geographical 
closeness to the observing Self they are described and distinguished from the same according to 
similar patterns as the external Other. Internal actors also vacillate between similarity and 
distance to the Self, and sometimes the constellations between different internal actors are crucial 
for the resulting images of these Others within the national boundaries of the Self. Four ways of 
portrayal were derived from the occurring images of internal Arab and Muslim actors in German 
and U.S. print media. 
One notable difference between German and U.S. print media is that especially before 9/11 
internal Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers are mainly distanced according to their 
cultural features (see VI.6.1). Type 14 summarizes those actors who are mainly described 
according to negative cultural features, and are described, for instance, as culturally conservative, 
backward, misogynistic, or religiously fundamentalist, and those features often lead to a conflict with 
the actor’s host society. Thus, the cultural dimension is also a central focus of demarcation with 
regard to Arab and mainly Muslim actors within Germany. 
One correspondence between the German and U.S. portrayals of internal actors is that after the 
attacks the overall shift of focus to issues like “terrorism” and “Islamic fundamentalism” also 
affects the images of internal actors. In both German and U.S. newspapers, nearly half of the 
actors within the national contexts after 9/11 are described as potentially or actually violent, hostile, 
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or supportive of terrorist actions. These actors are summarized in Type 16 (see VI.6.3). Type 16 actors 
also reflect the potential threat that both countries’ media assume to emanate not only from parts 
of the external but also of the internal Arab and Muslim Other, an aspect that is explicitly 
communicated in the articles, as well. As mentioned before, some of those actors even 
strategically blend into their host societies as well and adapt Western features, which even 
increases the Western skepticism for those actors. 
Hostile Type 16 actors are explicitly distinguished from and contrasted with the peaceful Arab and 
Muslim communities in both countries that form the third type of occurring internal actors (Type 
15, see VI.6.2). On a quantitative scale, type 16 actors thereby outdo these peaceful actors. 
Especially for the German context, the confrontation of pro-terror and anti-terror positions among 
the Arab and Muslim actors within Germany after 9/11 indicates that the internal Other is still 
predominantly regarded as an out-group that differs from its host society in its basic political or 
cultural features, and is not regarded as an integrated part of the German society and the concept 
of belonging that this society is assumed to share. Instead, the peacefulness of the majority of 
Muslim actors communities in Germany is continuously confronted with the minor but decisive 
group of militant Islamic extremists (Type 16). In this confrontation, the peaceful communities are 
repeatedly asked to distance themselves from the aforementioned extremists and their hostile and 
fundamentalist views. Even though only the extremists are explicitly constructed as a subliminal 
threat to the German society and the West in general, the fact that most of them are hidden 
WITHIN the peaceful communities also increases the skepticism against those Type 15 actors. 
Thus, in German print media after the attacks internal Arab and Muslim actors are, on the one 
hand, expected to choose sides and follow the norms, standards, and principles and values of 
their host society. On the other hand, the communicated skepticism in the different articles also 
reflects that these internal actors are regarded as not equal, nevertheless. Even the peaceful and 
assimilated internal Other is still regarded as different by the observing Self. 
In contrast to that, in U.S. print media Arab and Muslim communities in the U.S. are 
predominantly asked to decide whether or not they see themselves as Americans and as part of 
the Self after the attacks. This is also reflected in the second largest internal actor type in U.S. 
articles – Arab and Muslim victims of the 9/11 attacks (Type 17), even though on a different 
level than the direct victims of the attacks. Every third internal actor in U.S. media after 9/11 is 
described as a victim – mainly of violent assaults and negative reactions by other U.S. citizens 
who put some of the blame for the event on those Arabs and Muslims who live in the United 
States. 
U.S. newspapers frequently emphasize their disapproval of these violent reactions since those 
Arab and Muslim victims are seen as PART of the American nation (at least the peaceful American 
Arabs and Muslims), whereas the German Self still distances those internal Others within its 
national boundaries even when they present themselves as peaceful and assimilated. So, at least for 
the Type 15 and Type 17 actors in the analyzed U.S. newspapers after 9/11, we can say that they 
are regarded as part of the Self rather than of the Other, at least on an ideological level and 
VI. How Different is the Other? 
 - 248 -
despite the fact that this ideal might still not be fulfilled completely as the attacks of internal 
Arabs and Muslims by members of the American society indicates. 
 
The Overall Distance and Similarities between Self and Other 
Altogether, the images of internal and external actors in both countries’ print media around 9/11 
reflect nearly the same structures of portrayal. Thus, the geographical distance does not present 
the crucial factor for the demarcation of an Arab and Muslim Other. The occurring internal 
actors in the newspaper articles are also distinguishable from the Self on one of the other four 
levels of difference that have been derived for the images of external actors in German and U.S. 
print media. 
Type 14 actors reflect a significant difference from and distance to the German or American self-
concepts of belonging that are communicated in the analyzed media mainly by devaluating the 
features of those actors or the actors as a whole. Type 17 actors are weak Others, even though 
they do not directly suffer from the negative behavior of other Arab and Muslim actors but of 
the aggression and violence of members of the Self. Type 16 actors present a form of strategic 
otherness, especially because some of those actors have been argued to strategically blend into 
their Western host society. And actors of Type 15, i.e. the peaceful Arab and Muslim communities 
in Germany and the United States, could also be seen as another representative of “the Self 
within the (internal) Other.” 
Therefore we can sum up that the images of the Arab and Muslim Other in the analyzed German 
and U.S. newspapers around 9/11 reflect four central levels of difference from the German and 
American Self: (1) Actors are either completely different from the Self and are devaluated with 
regard to their features. (2) They are similar to some extent but are weakened in their similar 
features or their overall status. (3) Actors are similar to some extent but their similarity is 
neglected since the similar features are adopted to reap certain benefits of this approach towards 
the Self, or certain actors who are actually not regarded as similar to the Self are approached 
nevertheless since they are assumed to be useful for the Self despite their negative facets. (4) Or, 
actors present a “mirror” of the Self, i.e. they are solely described as positive and carry features, 
or support standards and principles that the Self regards as part of its own agenda, as well. Those 
four levels of difference and distance between Self and Other differ in their quantitative 
significance in both countries’ newspapers around 9/11, as is summarized in Table VI.8: 
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Table VI.8: Quantitative Significance of the Levels of Difference81 
 Before 9/11 After 9/11 
 Germany USA Germany USA 
Level 1:  The Devaluated Other 55.6 53.5 42.0 42.0 
Level 2:  The Weak Other 26.8 35.2 20.4 25.4 
Level 3:  The Strategic Other 3.9 5.6 19.7 17.6 
Level 4:  The Self Within the Other 4.7 4.3 12.6 10.4 
               Occurring Actors – total 257 232 269 386 
 
As can see in the table, the majority of Arab and Muslim actors in both German and U.S. 
newspapers are devaluated with regard to their features and actions. Before 9/11, more than half 
of the occurring actors in both countries’ print media (55.6 % in German media and 53.5 % in 
U.S. media) are devaluated. With the event the numbers of devaluated Arabs and Muslims drop 
slightly, but still 42.0 % of all occurring actors in both countries’ newspapers receive a devaluated 
image. Thus, the perception of the Other as the negative counterpart of the Self can be seen as 
the most central form of portrayal. 
The second most frequently used way in which Arab and Muslim actors are described is that of a 
weak otherness. Before the attacks, every fourth actor in German newspapers (26.8 %) and more 
than one third (35.2 %) of all occurring actors in U.S. newspapers receive a weakening image. 
After 9/11, this form of portrayal decreases and actors who are seen as similar but are at the 
same time weakened in their similar features or in their position and status now make up a 
proportion of 20.4 % in German newspapers and 25.4 % in U.S. newspapers. 
One reason why those first two levels of difference become slightly less relevant after 9/11 is the 
third level of difference construction in both countries’ print media. Before the attacks, actors 
who possess (similar) features to the Self but who are either mistrusted in their “Western 
appearance” because they are unmasked as strategic and false, or whose contradictions and deficits are 
ignored because they are regarded as strategically useful for the Self, are only of minor relevance. 
Only 3.9 % of all occurring actors in the German newspapers before 9/11 and 5.6 % of those in 
the U.S. articles of this timeframe are denied their similarities as strategic. After 9/11 however, 
this perspective on the Other becomes much more frequent; now 19.7 % of all actors in 
Germany and 17.6 % of those in the U.S. print media are viewed as strategic, contradictory or useful. 
The increased relevance of this level of difference and similarity reflects the uncertainty and 
skepticism that arose from the 9/11 attacks and with regard to the Arab and Muslim Other – not 
only in the U.S. as a direct victim of those acts but also in Germany. 
The fourth form of actor portrayal is the detection of the “Self within the Other.” Only 4.7 % of 
all occurring actors in German newspapers and only 4.3 % of those in the U.S. print media 
                                                 
81 In %, given the proportion of all occurring Arab and Muslim actors that can be ascribed to this level in the 
indicated timeframe of the analysis for the indicated country. 
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before the attacks are evaluated as positive or, in other words, as reflections of the Self who 
possess features or support views and standards that the Self favors. After 9/11, the observing 
German and U.S. Self identifies more actors in the Other who it regards as unchallenged similar 
or as unchallenged partners, for instance in the confrontation of terrorism: Now, 12.6 % of all 
occurring Arab and Muslim actors in German newspapers and 10.4 % of those in U.S. articles 
can be seen as representatives of the “Self within the Other.” Even though, these actors still 
present the smallest group in both countries, we can say that besides the increasing skepticism 
against the Other another result of the attacks seems to be that the stronger focus on the Other 
has also revealed a larger number of actors that are evaluated as positive and equal. 
To recapitulate, we can say that Arabs and Muslims are seen as mainly different from the Self. A 
large number of them are devaluated as negative counter-examples to the standards and 
principles that the Self proclaims as crucial and central for its own society. They possess negative 
features that not only affect the societies in which they are embedded but also have consequences 
for the Self. Especially this latter aspect mainly becomes relevant for the observing German and 
U.S. print media after the attacks. However, the analysis has also revealed that when the Self 
evaluates Arab and Muslim actors it also identifies and highlights similarities between Other and 
Self. We find a number of actors in both countries’ analyzed print media around 9/11 who 
promote Western principles like democracy, freedom, or progress, and explicitly take sides with 
the Self on certain issues. At the same time, however, these actors are often distanced from the 
Self by weakening the similarities or even neglecting them. Only a small number of Arab and 
Muslim actors are actually regarded as similar without challenging their “Western” features. 
Thus, we also have to say that not all Arab and Muslim actors are portrayed as evil, negative, and 
completely different from the Self. The media reality does integrate similarities of the Other in 
the overall conception of the counterpart and does not solely regard the Other as completely 
different from their own concept of belonging. However, when we look at the interplay between 
the different types of actors that have been introduced in this last chapter we also have to note 
that the overall tendency in both countries’ print media, before as well as after 9/11, is to 
perceive Arab and Muslim actors as solely or predominantly negative. Positive actors who could 
be seen as mirror images of the Self are simply eclipsed by the dominating quantitative 
occurrence of the negative or ambivalent and weakened actors types, and are furthermore less 
relevant with regard to their qualitative significance for the different topics and issues that are 
discussed in the articles in which they appear. 
 
Self-observation after 9/11 
The last thing that can be noted with regard to the construction of actors in the analyzed German 
and U.S. print media is that especially after the 9/11 attacks, the focus on the Arab and Muslim 
Other involves an increasing reflection upon the German, American or even Western Self as well. 
This has already been noted in the last two chapters, but in the analysis of the different actor 
types we were able to illustrate in what contexts this self-reflection becomes relevant: 
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First of all, in the context of the portrayal of Type 10 actors (see VI.4.2) we find explicit 
references to these actors as being negative or at least contradictory in their views, behavior, or 
features but useful for the Self at the same time.82 Their explicitly communicated role as strategic 
partners is thereby often connected with a critical discussion of this ambivalence on behalf of the 
Self who rejects the negative characteristics of the respective Other but nevertheless needs this 
Other for various reasons and therefore cooperates with it and somewhat downgrades the 
negativity of the actors. German and U.S. newspapers after 9/11 frequently focus on this 
Western ambivalence and reflect the awareness of the (German and U.S.) Self of its own strategic 
perspective that also distorts the evaluation of the Other. 
Second, we find a more critical self-reflection in the context of the portrayal of Type 7 actors as 
well. After 9/11, the Self also increasingly reflects upon the Western responsibility for deficits in 
Arab and Muslim countries (e.g. due to foreign policies, exploitation with regard to economic 
resources, humanitarian deficiencies, etc.). Whereas U.S. print media in this context are also self-
critical, German print media concentrate more on the responsibilities and mistakes of the United 
States, especially as one cause and explanation for the 9/11 attacks, and do not really focus on 
their country’s own role in the interplay with the Other as much as the U.S. newspapers do. 
Nevertheless, even when the Self reflects upon its own mistakes and political misbehavior to 
explain the terrorist aggression of Arab and Muslim Others that comes to the fore in the 9/11 
attacks, its own principles and values are thereby not called into question. The only thing that 
might be questioned is the way in which those principles have been conveyed to the Other. 
                                                 
82 Hashem (1995) made a similar observation for news magazines in the timeframe between 1990 and 1993. He 
noticed a rise of more neutral or even more positive images of Arabs and argues that this increase may result from 
the new alliances of many Arab nations with the United States since the Gulf War – a situation that can be regarded 
as similar to the new anti-terror alliance formed by the West with Arab and Muslim countries after 9/11. As in our 
case, Hashem (1995) also notes that “even though few Arab ‘villains’ still support international terrorism […] the 
number of moderate Arabs has increased over the years, which may account for the changing view of Arabs in the 
media” (Hashem 1995: 154-155). 
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VII. FINAL CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION 
Throughout the last pages we have looked at the way in which Arabs and Muslims are portrayed 
in German and U.S. newspapers around 9/11. The main questions I wanted to answer in this 
book were (a), how Arabs and Muslims are portrayed and why they are constructed that way, and 
(b), how the German and American national self-concepts shape the perception and the images 
of Arabs and Muslims. This combination of two sides – an observed object and an observing 
subject – was supposed to give us an idea of how different and distant from the German and 
American Self Arabs and Muslims are regarded to be. 
To answer those questions, the analysis has looked at the one platform from which we learn most 
about Arabs and Muslims, the mass media, as it was assumed that people predominantly rely on 
mass media when they gather information about the world. Thus, the topics, the actors, and the 
stories that are communicated by mass media are very central in our perception of the 
environment that surrounds us and that forms our reality. 
The analysis was guided by three basic theoretical assumptions: First of all, I have assumed that 
the German and U.S. perspective on Arabs and Muslims and the evaluation of the same is guided 
by Western cultural patterns, i.e. a set of Western principles, norms, values, and myths, etc. that 
not only define and structure the social life but also and especially become relevant when 
Western countries like Germany and the United States observe and evaluate their environment. 
Arab and Muslim countries and actors have been chosen as one representative of this perceived 
environment and have been looked at in this book in more detail. Secondly, I have argued that 
one crucial aspect of the Western perspective on Arabs and Muslims is the Oriental myth which 
provides the taken for granted knowledge that Arabs and Muslims are part of an overall Oriental 
Other that presents the antithesis to Western culture and standard values. This taken-for-granted 
and commonly shared societal myth I have assumed to be reflected in the images of Arabs and 
Muslim in both countries’ mass media as well. Thirdly, I have assumed that collective (national) 
groups need a certain outgroup to construct national collectivity which supports the impression 
that in the analysis of the image of Arabs and Muslims, the self-perceptions of Germany and the 
United States also have to be taken into account. In this context I have expected that the process 
of collectivity construction mainly works via the demarcation of an outside Other that is not only 
demarcated but also mainly devaluated by the Self to enhance the own national ingroup concept 
and strengthen ingroup coherence. 
The chapters IV, V, and VI have outlined the results of the print media analysis. In chapter IV, I 
looked at the relevance of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. newspaper before and after 
the event. It was outlined in how many articles Arab and Muslim actors are referred to, what 
topics and issues those articles focus and discuss, and what kinds of actors occur in the contexts 
of those topics and issues. 
In chapter V, we took a more detailed look at the perception of those occurring actors as it is 
reflected in the respective articles of both countries and have gathered the most frequently used 
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characteristics and features that can be found to describe Arabs and Muslims in the analyzed 
German and U.S. print media around 9/11. At the same time, we contrasted and compared those 
features with the characteristics and perceptions that can be derived and are – to some extent – 
even explicitly communicated as crucial for the German and American self-concept. In doing so 
we were able to draw out the general, overall boundaries that are communicated between the 
German or American Self and the Arab and Muslim Other. 
Subsequently, in chapter VI, we looked more closely at the internal composition of those overall 
images of the Other and elaborated how the Other is evaluated and subclassified on the basis of 
the Self’s own standards and principles. On the basis of different types of actors it was shown 
how complex the images of Arab and Muslim actors are. Furthermore, the degrees of difference 
and similarity of the Arab and Muslim Other and the Western Self that results from this 
evaluation process were described. 
This final seventh chapter will summarize the basic findings of the study and will discuss the 
methodical and theoretical implications of the research results. 
 
1. The German and U.S. Worldview and Self-perception 
With regard to the first research aim – to learn more about the basis on which Arabs and 
Muslims are observed and evaluated in German and U.S. print media – we can come to the 
following results: 
 
German and American Self-perceptions in the Mass Media 
The analysis has revealed that both German and U.S. print media not only report on Arabs and 
Muslims, but in this context derive the criteria for the evaluation of these Others from the own 
national or even transnational self-conceptions. In addition to that, we have seen that both 
countries’ print media sometimes even explicitly compare Arab and Muslim actors with the Self. 
Altogether, the worldview that forms the basic pattern for the German and U.S. observation of 
Arab and Muslim actors and countries can be summarized as a two-sided concept that – on the 
one side – regards the (German or American) ingroup as part of a Western hemisphere that 
shares a set of central principles, norms, institutions, and views.1 The self-references that were 
found in German and U.S. print media before as well as after the 9/11 attacks clearly reflect a 
self-perception of both countries as part of a Western collectivity. We find references to the 
United States or European countries as “the West” when contrasting or comparing the German 
or American positions, views, or political, cultural, social, or economic situations with those of 
Arab and Muslim countries or actors. Both countries thereby reflect the perception that they are 
                                                 
1 As noted in the beginning of this book, in our case “ingroup” basically refers to the communicated perception of 
the German or U.S. nation state as a collective concept of belonging. 
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more or less equal with regard to their political, cultural, social, economic, or personal 
development, as well as with regard to the institutionalization of certain standards and values. 
It was shown furthermore that – on a quantitative scale – the number of explicit self-references 
increases tremendously with the terrorist attacks of 9/11. Those self-references reflect a shattered 
feeling of security which is mainly done by redefining and emphasizing self-identity, and the 
values, ideals, and self-conception as a country or a Western nation. This strong shift of focus 
towards the Self was not only observed for the American news media but also for the analyzed 
German newspapers. Here, Germany is regarded as an indirect victim of the attacks as well, not 
only because some of the terrorists had lived in the country before the attacks and had planned 
the attacks here, but also because the country perceives itself as part of the Western community 
whose values, institutions and ideals have been attacked by those terrorists as well. Thus, the 
event is not only perceived as an attack in a physical dimension (with the airplanes being 
navigated into the three buildings in New York City and Washington). It is also perceived as a 
symbolical attack against those institutions that are seen to represent Western achievements and 
values that go beyond the national borders of the United States. The 9/11 attacks thereby can be 
seen as a catalyst that pushed the Arab and Muslim Other to the center of Western attention and, 
at the same time, increased the ambition on behalf of the German and U.S. Self to re-emphasize 
and strengthen its own collectivity to cope with the event. Therefore, we now also find an 
increased explicit reference to the Self. 
 
The Communicated Western Principles 
Apart from this emphasis of an overall Western unity, those references to the Self also include 
concrete definitions of what this Western collectivity is about or, in other words, what Occidental 
rational principles define the German, American, and Western identity. The different features and 
characteristics on the basis of which the occurring Arabs and Muslims are evaluated reflect a 
rather abstract set of Western principles, values, or standards that define, structure and guide the 
social life of German and U.S. society and shape the self-concept of belonging in both societies. 
The analysis has revealed that those principles form the basic cultural pattern in both countries’ 
print media to define the national or Western self-concept and to evaluate and demarcate the 
Arab and Muslim Other. The self-image of both countries is largely identical and can be mainly 
characterized by abstract principles such as democracy, openness of society, freedom, equality, 
equity, rationality, and personal self-discipline, tolerance, and progress. 
The principle of democracy – as a political concept – is not only explicitly referred to when the 
German or American Self is described, but is also implicitly reflected by the strong focus that is 
put in the political dimension of Arab and Muslim actors and countries. The concept of 
democracy thereby also carries a strong cultural connotation, since democratic structures are, for 
example, equated with cultural modernity and progress, and are thus located on a higher 
developmental scale than undemocratic political systems. 
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The principle of an open society – reflected for instance in the degree of social mobility and here 
especially hierarchical mobility with regard to economic or social status – is consulted in the 
analyzed media to emphasize for instance the importance of freedom of choice with regard to the 
different concepts of living of its members. In the German and U.S. self-conception, this 
openness is expressed in the demand for such as aspects as freedom of speech, freedom of 
religion, and the call for tolerance of other religions besides the dominating Christian tradition 
that especially refers to tolerance of Islam after the 9/11 attacks. Both the German and the 
American self-portrayals are characterized by the emphasis of tolerance that should be exercised 
with respect to other political opinions, other religious beliefs, ethnic differences, and different 
lifestyles. 
In a personal as well as in a cultural dimension, the communicated self-concepts include the 
assumption that the members of the ingroup inherit a certain degree of rationality that is the 
result of the Western cultural development, the Western Enlightenment and a certain degree of 
civilization that is expressed for instance in personal self-discipline. Both countries’ print media 
frequently stress that the West is modern, secular, and civilized. Furthermore, both the German and 
U.S. media communicate the self-conception of being equal with regard to the possibilities for 
their members to participate, for instance, in political decision processes. In addition, German 
and U.S. media also communicate the view that a society has to offer its members a certain 
degree of equality with regard to economic or educational opportunities. 
Last but not least, both countries’ newspapers emphasize the aspect of progress as a crucial 
principles of the German, American, or even Western Self. The concept of progress thereby is 
contained to some extent in most of the criteria that have been mentioned so far. It refers to all 
dimensions and includes the permanent development and improvement of political, cultural, 
economic, scientific, or social conditions and technological standards. What is communicated 
here is that the German and American or, more generally, the Western Self is characterized by 
the permanent striving for progress and rationalization. 
Those abstract principles that have been listed here can either be derived from the special 
emphasis of the lack of features that represent those principles with the focused on Arab and 
Muslim actors or from the explicit emphasis of features that represent those principles in the 
communicated reference towards the own German or U.S. society. The analysis has confirmed 
that both countries basically present the Self – and consequently also demarcate the Other – quite 
similarly. Both countries are very much alike with regard to their self-perception as far as the 
analyzed media around 9/11 are concerned. 
 
Differences between the German and the U.S. Self-concept 
However, following the world polity approach of Meyer et al. (2005) I expected that the German 
and U.S. self-concepts may emphasize those outlined principles somewhat differently due to 
underlying historic, cultural, or political differences or to different geographical foci has been 
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confirmed only to some extent. This assumption was only corroborated to some extent. Both 
countries’ analyzed media focus on and emphasize a similar set of values and principles. 
Especially after the 9/11 attacks both explicitly emphasize that Germany and the United States 
are part of an overall Western unity that shares the same common values, ideals, and principles. 
The analysis has illustrated that the application of Western principles for the comparison and 
classification of the respective non-German, non-American, or simply non-Western environment 
is a provable condition. 
What is different however, is the role that both countries ascribe to themselves when it comes to 
the distribution and institutionalization of those principles on a global scale and when both 
countries locate themselves in the collectivity of a Western hemisphere. What can be noted 
especially for the timeframe after the event is that both countries ascribe themselves to different 
levels in the overall Western collectivity and indicate a different level of institutionalization and 
relevance of the different Western standards and principles for the own collectivity: 
The analyzed U.S. media indicate that the United States regards itself not only as a nation or one 
state in the Western collectivity. Instead, American articles reflect and communicate a national 
self-image that sees the United States as the LEADING ROLE MODEL of modernity, 
democracy, progress, openness, equality and rationality. These findings coincide to some extent 
with the studies on American national identity that have been introduced in chapter II.1.2 This 
self-conception indicates that the United States perceives itself as superior to other nations. As 
noted in chapter II.1, this self-perception of superiority is shaped by the notion of exceptionalism 
as well as by the notion of an American civil religion according to which the United States claim 
to be a role model for the world. The image that is communicated here is that of a so-called “city 
upon the hill,” a virtuous community that forms a counterpart to the countries of the “Old 
World,” i.e. of Europe that emigrants originally left behind when they traveled to the American 
continent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. But this role model position can also be 
seen in the context of the rest of the World, if we apply this perception to the present day 
context and the focus on Arab and Muslim countries. This religious symbolism strongly shapes 
the American self-perception and the rhetoric of the country’s role in the world. 
Especially after the 9/11 attacks, U.S. articles consult those religious connotations to describe its 
own role in the global context, for instance, when U.S. media try to grasp the dimensions of the 
impact that the event has had on the American nation. These religious conceptions come to the 
fore as well when – in this context – the reactions and consequences are discussed that have to 
result from the event – nationally and internationally – as the following quote from the American 
USA TODAY may once more illustrate: 
America today is about God and country, but then it always has been. We just lost track. We 
lost track when we evicted God from our public institutions and when we stopped honoring 
our nation with the songs and rituals that defined American childhood until a few decades 
ago. (USAT-01-10-01: 15A) 
                                                 
2 See, for instance, Bellah (2005; reprint), or Dittmer (2005), Maidment and McGrew (1991), Schirmer (1998), or 
Vorländer (2001). 
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Based on this believed virtue, the American destiny after 9/11 now also includes the mission to 
spread the American ideals, principles, and values to those countries and areas where the 9/11 
terrorists and their accomplices come from. One of the new proclaimed aims that is discussed in 
the analyzed media and that also presents the driving force for the soon to be formed anti-terror 
coalition and the initiated “war on terrorism” is to fight the “enemies” of democracy, tolerance, 
and freedom and to change the political and social situations of countries like Iraq or Afghanistan 
that are argued to be the hotbed of terrorism and of the evil that threatens the West. The American 
exemplary status as a “city upon the hill” is now explicitly and predominantly directed towards 
Arab and Muslim countries. Thus, when Arabs and Muslims are evaluated on the basis of 
Western principles the American newspapers reflect the perspective that those principles are first 
and foremost regarded as American principles. By comparing the occurring actors with those 
standards, the American media also openly communicate this American status – implicitly but 
after the attacks also explicitly as some quotations have illustrated. We may thus argue that U.S. 
print media reflect a stronger national focus in the way in which the Self is perceived and defined, 
and only after that place the United States in the concept of a transnational Western identity 
concept. 
In contrast to that, Germany regards itself as PART of the Western world and German print 
media predominantly refer to German membership in a Western collectivity. As I have outlined 
on the basis of other studies in chapter II.1,3 this result reflects a German national self-definition 
that is shaped by a stronger integration into transnational political and other alliances. The strong 
identification and self-conception as part of a Western collectivity reflects this substitution of 
national collectivity to a significant extent. 
In addition to that, German print media reveal a different perspective on internal Others, i.e. on 
Arabs and Muslims within the German national context. The national status of the internal Arab 
and Muslim Other is a central aspect in the communication of the German self-image in the 
analyzed media. In the analyzed German media, the internal Other is frequently asked for an 
identification with the greater good of the overall society, and only when this identification with 
the Self and, more concretely, with the principles, standards, values, and guidelines of the Self has 
been internalized, is the individual actor accepted or, in other words, permitted to stay within the 
German territory and society. Arabs and Muslim within Germany are thus (implicitly or 
explicitly) criticized for not assimilating into the German society and for not accepting, adopting, 
or supporting German values and standards. Furthermore, with the 9/11 attacks the internal 
Other becomes centrally focused on as a potential terrorist threat, as well, because some of the 
terrorists behind the attacks came from Germany and had lived there as part of the communities, 
invisible and seemingly assimilated. As the analysis has shown, this fact has extremely raised the 
skepticism towards ALL internal Others in Germany, and caused the increasing attempt on 
behalf of the German Self to re-emphasize the boundaries between Arab and Muslim Others and 
the Self within the national territory. In the analyzed media this is reflected for example by the 
                                                 
3 See, for instance, Piper (1998) or Schirmer (1998). 
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fact that internal Arabs and Muslims are now repeatedly asked to distance themselves from 
terrorism, and are basically classified as good or bad on the basis of this position towards terrorism. 
Compared to that, U.S. print media emphasize the perception that sees internal Arabs and 
Muslims as part of the American national Self, at least on an ideological level and despite the fact 
that this ideal might still not be fulfilled completely. The analyzed newspapers strongly 
communicate the idea of a “cultural pluralism” and the American self-perception of being a 
“nation of people of remarkably diverse racial, religious, and ethnic origins and variety”4 in those 
contexts in which internal Arabs and Muslims are focused on. 
 
2. The Perception of the Arab and Muslim Other 
A second aim of the analysis was to redraw the German and American perception of Arabs and 
Muslims as it is reflected, for example, in mass media contents. I assumed in the beginning of the 
book that the German and American self-conceptions (and the Western principles that are 
central criteria of those concepts of belonging) form the German and American worldview and 
provide the framework for the observation, structuring, and categorization of social reality and 
the everyday events, issues, and actors that are identified in this reality. Thus, they also become 
relevant when Germany and the United States look at Arab and Muslim countries and actors, and 
they shape the images of those actors and countries in the mass media. According to the analyzed 
print media, the overall image of Arabs and Muslims in both countries’ print media contexts can 
be summarized as follows: 
 
Who is the Arab and Muslim Other in German and U.S. Mass Media? 
The observed Arabs and Muslims are to a large extent similar if not identical in German and U.S. 
print media. Even though the diversity of occurring actors may differ to some extent in both 
countries’ media sets (and to some extent also internally, i.e. between the different print media in 
one country) the overall perspective on the Other is shaped by rather similar geographical and 
topical foci, before as well as after the attacks. 
First of all, Arabs and Muslims are focused in the internal and the external news coverage, but in 
both countries the overall focus lies on external Arab and Muslim actors in the context of the 
foreign news coverage. Before as well as after 9/11, this external focus is characterized by a large 
variety of topics and a geographical focus that ranges from countries in Southwest, Southeast or 
Central Asia, to North Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and even Europe. Despite minor 
quantitative differences in the geographical focus, the overall map for external Arabs and 
Muslims is rather similar in both German and U.S. newspapers. Similar to that, the topics in 
which context external Arabs and Muslims occur are predominantly identical. Both countries 
focus mainly on political conflicts, social and economic problems, or cultural clashes between 
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modern and conservative views in the focused on countries. German and U.S. print media frequently 
discuss the lack of democratic structures, the deficits and disputes of the political elites, or 
economic mismanagement. 
Especially after 9/11, both countries shift their focus to the political dimension of the Other, and 
especially U.S. articles now increasingly discuss the political, social or economic usefulness of 
certain Arab and Muslim countries. They measure the advantage and disadvantages of political 
relations with certain external Others mainly in the context of a new form of alliance of Self and 
Other in an international anti-terror coalition. Furthermore, the issue of terrorism now dominates 
the news coverage and forms the central frame in which Arabs and Muslim are discussed. 
Terrorism determines not only the selection of issues, events, and actors in the two countries’ 
newspapers, but also shapes the images of the observed actors. 
In addition to that, both countries’ media now frequently turn their attention towards actors 
within the national or Western boundaries after the attacks. Before 9/11, Arabs and Muslims 
within Germany or the U.S. are only marginally referred to. In Germany, they mainly appear in 
the contexts of articles that discuss the status of immigrants and their degree of integration in and 
conflicts with the host society. After 9/11, internal Arabs and Muslims become significantly 
relevant, and here especially in the context of terrorism. This focus is shaped by questions about 
(a) the interrelation between terrorism and Islam, (b) how a modern, secular Western society can 
prevent terrorist and fundamentalist tendencies not only in Arab and Muslim countries but also 
within its own boundaries, and (c) what threat emanates from the internal Other for the own 
(German and U.S.) society and the West. As has been outlined, the infiltration of Arab and 
Muslim terrorists into the Western space is regarded as a development that is perceived to clearly 
threaten the national ingroup in both countries. This puts also internal Arabs and Muslims on 
trial and thus pushes them into the arena of public attention. 
As noted, German print media – in this context – put a stronger focus on religious topics and 
more frequently discuss the potential threat of Islamic fundamentalism than the analyzed U.S. 
newspapers. By comparison, U.S. articles put more emphasis on the new foreign relations with 
the external Arab and Muslim Other after the attacks, and focus on the pursue of terrorist groups 
abroad. With regard to the introspection, U.S. media especially discuss the consequences of the 
attacks and of terrorism in general for civil liberties, democratic values, and the American self-
concept. 
Secondly, the image of Arabs and Muslims encompasses the whole society. Both countries’ print 
media report on actors of all branches of society, and do not solely look at governments, political 
elites, or other state representatives, despite the strong focus of political topics. The constructed 
Other therefore embraces the totality of the focused societies, the resulting media reality is 
quantitatively complex, multifaceted, and by no means one-dimensional. We learn about political 
parties and organizations, terrorist groups, members of the police and the military, or are 
                                                                                                                                                        
4 See also Han (2000): 289-292. 
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introduced to private people. On a quantitative scale, mainly actors in Palestine, Iran, 
Afghanistan, and after the attacks also in Pakistan and Saudi Arabia are focused on. The internal 
Others that are observed in German and U.S. media come mainly from the private sector or, 
especially after 9/11, are (potential) members of terrorist groups. 
Thus, we can say that the introduced Arabs and Muslims are largely identical in German and U.S. 
print media discourses. This is of course also due to the fact that certain events and issues find 
greater attention in both countries – the attacks themselves are the best example here. But also 
issues that may include a differing geographical focus are looked at for similar reasons,5 like for 
instance economic relationships with the respective Arab or Muslim country, or political changes 
within the respective country. 
  
The Images of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. Mass Media around 9/11 
The second question that was raised in the beginning of this work with regard to the perception 
of Arab and Muslim actors was: how are Arabs and Muslims portrayed? Here we can summarize 
that the boundary between the German and American self-concept and the Arab and Muslim 
Other is constructed and emphasized in a number of different dimensions, and a distinction 
between both sides is made on the basis of a number of observed characteristics. 
First and foremost, the majority of Arabs and Muslims that appear in both countries’ print media 
are geographically DISTANT since they are located in countries of the Middle East, Southeast 
Asia, or North Africa. The national origin of Arab and Muslim actors is almost always 
identifiable, either because they occur in the context of articles on Arab and Muslim countries or 
because their nationality is explicitly mentioned. The latter geographical location is especially used 
to point out the national origin of actors within Germany and the United States. 
The geographical origin of Arab and Muslim actors is accompanied by a large set of political, 
cultural, social, economic, and personal features, or ascriptions of delinquency. These features are 
to a significant extent derived from the German and U.S. national or Western self-concepts. They 
reflect implicit or even explicit comparisons of the features of the Other with the standards and 
values of the Self. Here, German and U.S. print media images of Arabs and Muslims reveal nearly 
the same criteria to classify and evaluate the observed characteristics of the Other. 
The introduced study reinforces but at the same time extends the results of the other studies that 
have been introduced in the beginning of this book (see I.2.1),6 by showing that a large 
proportion of the identified Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media are 
described as violent, terrorists, or criminals, construction a dividing line between a violent Other and a 
non-violent Self. A similar and clear cut dividing line can be identified in the cultural dimension. 
                                                 
5 Like the political and economic situation in Indonesia as it is focused in the American newspapers and the political 
and economic events in Turkey as they are focused in the German print media 
6 See, for instance, El-Farra (1996), Ghareeb (1983), Hafez (2002b), Hashem (1995), Kliche (1998, 1999), or Shaheen 
(1984, 2001). 
VII. Final Conclusion and Discussion 
 - 262 -
Actors are classified according to the central distinction of being either civilized and modern, or 
uncivilized and culturally backward. In the personal dimension, the boundary between Self and 
Other is constructed between good and evil actors, a distinction that also includes personal features 
that shape the actors as irrational or unrestrained. 
Additionally, the study has revealed social and economical boundaries. Here, we find two basic 
contrasts. One is made between wealth and poverty, a contrast that is however not constructed 
mainly between self and otherness, but more among Arabs and Muslims. It becomes relevant in 
contexts in which internal dynamics and conflicts within the respective societies of the Other are 
focused. The other contrast is drawn between a (technologically) developed West and an underdeveloped 
Arab and Muslim Other that lacks most of the Western economic or social standards like a well-
established infrastructure, a good educational system, or a good health care system. 
Last but not least, after 9/11 Arabs and Muslims are most frequently classified according to their 
attitudes towards the West – and in U.S. articles towards the United States in particular. Actors 
and countries either take an anti-western position by implicitly or explicitly supporting views and 
actions that deviate from the German or American positions, e.g. political agendas, or military 
strategies like the “war on terrorism.” Or they take sides with the Self as they explicitly support 
Western ambitions, actions, and policies. This distinction is especially made with regard to the 
issue of “terrorism,” which is clearly disapproved of by the German and American Self. 
The study has revealed that in German and U.S. print media Arabs and Muslims are by no means 
reduced to dimensions that would be sufficient to cover the political, social, economic or other 
issues and topics of the news coverage. The overall image of Arabs and Muslims is much more 
complex and includes a large variety of features and peculiarities. Nevertheless, we often find 
implicit or even explicit comparisons of the Others with the German and American Self, for 
instance when the political, social, or economic situations of both Self and Other are compared. 
Altogether, the images of the diverse actors and societies to a large extent oppose the national 
self-concepts of Germany and the United States. 
Differences between the overall German and American perception of the focused Other are few. 
One aspect that is much more emphasized in the U.S. print media than in the German context is 
the comparison of the technological progress of American Self and Arab and Muslim Other. 
Here, U.S. media frequently distinguish between the leading technological progress and 
achievements of the United States and the underdevelopment and technological weakness of the 
Other. Compared to that, German media more often focus on the cultural dimension of 
difference between German or Western Self and Arab and Muslim Other. German articles more 
often (implicitly and explicitly) draw a boundary between a culturally Christian West and a 
Muslim Other and more frequently emphasize the religious affiliation of occurring actors. 
Furthermore, in German media we more often find discussions about religious matters and the 
history and political level of Islam in Arab and Muslim countries than in the American context. 
In this context, before as well as after 9/11, the internal Other in Germany is also predominantly 
regarded as different and deviating from the national self-concept, especially with regard to its 
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central cultural difference from the German Christian tradition – its religion, Islam – a 
constructed difference that the internal Other is not really able to overcome. We could explain 
this stronger emphasis of religious facets in German print media discourses with the fact that in 
the United States – due to the proclaimed separation of state and church – religious affiliation is 
primarily seen as a private matter. We could assume here, that this aspect does also have an effect 
on communication processes: When U.S. print media look at actors of foreign origin or ethnic 
minorities within the country, religious affiliations are not primarily consulted to describe and 
classify actors. 
However, and apart from this dichotomy that forms the basic pattern according to which actors 
are perceived and evaluated, the analysis has revealed that the comparison between self and 
otherness on the basis of Western principles and standards can lead to various different results. 
One important result of this study is that the overall image of the Arab and Muslim Other in U.S. 
and German print media around 9/11 is by no means only shaped by negative features and does 
not result in an image of Arabs and Muslims that forms the complete opposite to the Western 
self-perception.7 Instead, the analysis was able to show that the perceived difference between a 
collective group and an outside Other that is demarcated from this collectivity can be constructed 
in different ways and can also integrate similarities between ingroup and outgroup, Self and 
Other. This result also reveals that the German and American perception of Arabs and Muslims 
is not solely negative, which leads us to the third aim of the study: 
 
3. The Boundary between Self and Other: How Difference Is Constructed 
In order to attain the third aim – finding out how difference between the German or American 
self-concept and Arabs and Muslims is constructed – and to learn how fixed the boundary 
between both sides is perceived to be from the German and U.S. perspective, we have looked 
more closely for similarities between the self-concepts and the images of the Other as well. 
 
How Different Is the Other? 
The study has revealed first of all that the Arab and Muslim Other is not a homogenous group. 
Instead, different degrees of similarity or difference and distance are constructed in both 
countries’ print media. The typological analysis of the identified Arab and Muslim actors and 
their images in both German and U.S. print media over the analyzed time period has shown that 
actors can be basically sorted on the basis of five levels of difference. 
As can be derived from the quantitative number of occurring actors, the Arab and Muslim Other 
before as well as after 9/11 is basically perceived as geographically DISTANT. That this distance 
is a crucial criterion of distinction becomes especially obvious when in the course of the 9/11 
attacks it is revealed that some of those Arabs and Muslims who live within the geographical 
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boundaries of the Self turn out to be a potential or even actual threat for the Self due to their 
hostility and violent potential. Those actors cannot be geographically distanced from the Self, 
therefore they have to be distanced on the basis of other features and levels of difference. But 
also those actors, who can be distanced geographically, are evaluated in other dimensions as well: 
Apart from geographical distance, the majority of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print 
media are thereby regarded as completely different from the Self since they are devaluated. They 
possess features and characteristics that the Self disapproves of or regards as deviant from the 
own standards and principles. Thus, and as other studies have also noted (see I.2), the perception 
of Arabs and Muslims as the negative counterpart of the Self can be seen as the most central 
form of portrayal. 
The second most frequently ascribed image is that of WEAKNESS. Some of these weak actors 
are similar to the Self to a certain extent but are weakened in their similarity. Others share the 
position of the Self that certain aspects about their own societies or certain Arab and Muslim 
governments are negative and destructive for their own country or for the Self. Yet another 
group of weak Others have to face and physically bear the negative actions and characteristics of 
other Arab and Muslim actors and, in so doing, further emphasize and illustrate the negativity of 
some parts of the Arab and Muslim Other. These weak Others reveal a certain degree of similarity 
with the Self – either by possessing similar features or by sharing the positions and views of the 
Self and by also disapproving of certain features of their own Arab and Muslim countries or 
actors. However, weak actors are not able to accomplish their views and features in their own 
societies or communities. They are not able to change the criticized negative conditions, 
behaviors and structures that they face and disapprove, and in a way they all suffer from this 
situation, either implicitly or explicitly by being depicted as victims. 
A third level of difference comprises Arabs and Muslims who are, on the one hand, similar to the 
Self to some extent but who, on the other hand, are also questioned with regard to this similarity 
by the Self. Some of these CONTRADICTORY actors are assumed to adopt and support the 
views or the ideals of the Self to reap certain benefits of this approach towards the Self. They 
reflect skepticism and mistrust on behalf of the observing Self who unmasks their “Western 
appearance” as strategic and false. Other actors who are actually not regarded as similar to the Self 
are approached by the same nevertheless since they are assumed to be USEFUL despite their 
negative facets. Here, the contradictions and deficits of the Other are ignored by Self because of 
the Self’s own strategic motives. Especially after 9/11, this perspective on Arab and Muslim 
actors becomes increasingly relevant. The focus on contradictions of the Other and of the Self 
reflects the uncertainty and skepticism that arose from the 9/11 attacks and with respect to the 
Arab and Muslim Other – not only in the United States but also in Germany. The contradictory 
Other is only apparently similar to the Self, which makes it especially difficult to classify from the 
perspective of the Self with regard to the actual distance from the Self’s own national concept. 
The boundary between Self and Other seems to blur because either the Other or the Self 
                                                                                                                                                        
7 As most of the media studies introduced in chapter II.2 have argued 
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strategically conceals the difference between itself and the respective counterpart. 
Last but not least, the Other appears as a MIRROR image of the Self. Some actors in German 
and U.S. print media are described as positive and only possess or support standards and 
principles that the Self regards as central for its own society as well. After 9/11, both Germany 
and the U.S. identify an increasing number of these mirror images of themselves within the 
Other, and here especially in those actors who are identified as partners of the Self in the 
confrontation with terrorism. Even though these actors appear less frequently in both countries, 
we can say that besides the increasing skepticism against the Other another effect of the attacks is 
that the stronger focus on the Other has also led to the increased realization that not all Arabs 
and Muslims are as different as one might have expected. Nevertheless, in the overall 
composition of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media these Others who are like 
the Self (or as phrased throughout the analysis, the “Self within the Other”) are still eclipsed by 
the quantitative dominance of the devaluated, ambivalent and weakened Others. Furthermore, they 
appear to be less relevant with regard to their qualitative significance for the different topics and 
issues that are discussed in German and U.S. media. 
With regard to Arabs and Muslims WITHIN the national boundaries, the study has shown that 
apart from the lack of geographical distance, which is the common element of distinction for the 
external Other, the majority of internal actors is evaluated quite similarly to the external Others in 
German and U.S. print media. Thus, on a qualitative level the geographical distance does not 
represent the only factor for the demarcation of an Arab and Muslim Other. As the analysis has 
revealed, internal actors in both countries’ newspapers can also be distinguished according to 
different degrees of similarity with the Self. Some internal Others present a large difference and 
distance to the German or American self-concepts of belonging and are, for instance, devaluated 
with regard to their cultural features. Some actors are weakened as victims after the 9/11 attacks. 
Some internal Arabs and Muslims are described as ambivalent and are perceived as a potential (or 
actual) “threat from within.” Others are regarded as rather similar by the Self, if not even as part 
of the Self already, which is especially the case for some actors in the American media. In the 
German context, internal Others are observed much more skeptically and are still largely 
regarded as different, mainly due to their religion and cultural facets, but especially after 9/11 also 
due to the presumed terror connection or support of those actors. The assumption of a potential 
terror threat that may emanate from some of the internal Arabs and Muslims is also expressed in 
the American print media, but here, a significant part of the internal Others is still seen as PART 
of the national ingroup, or is referred to as victims of the 9/11 attacks as well.8 
To recapitulate, Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media are predominantly regarded 
as different from the Self, but the Self also appreciates and integrates similarities between Self and 
Other in its own perspective. Arabs and Muslims are to large extent observed, evaluated and, if 
                                                 
8 Even though they suffered from the event on a different level than the “direct” victims of the attacks, since they 
became victims of hate crimes and discrimination on behalf of the members of the ingroup in the aftermath of the 
event – behavior that is explicitly disapproved of the observing American media. 
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relevant, distanced from the German and American Self on the basis of the Western principles, 
values, and ideals that have been outlined before and that shape the national self-concepts of 
both Germany and the United States. Thus, the overall image of Arabs and Muslims in German 
and U.S. print media also reflects what was assumed in chapter II, namely that Western rational 
principles have become increasingly institutionalized on a global scale and therefore are 
institutionalized in Arab and Muslim societies to some extent as well. 
The analysis has furthermore shown that the evaluation of Arabs and Muslims on the basis of the 
Self’s own (Western) principles and standards does not consequently lead to the denial of 
Western standards with those actors. From the perspective of collectivity identity construction, 
we may therefore conclude that the construction of national collectivity does not consequently 
lead to devaluation of an observed outgroup in order to strengthen the national coherence and 
positively evaluate the national Self (as was assumed on the basis of the social identity approach 
in chapter II. 3). Instead, German and U.S. media images of Arabs and Muslims reveal that the 
complexity of an outgroup as well as the possible sameness of Self and Other is definitely 
reflected upon by the Self. However, this does not necessarily mean that the boundary between 
both sides is diminished, but the degree of difference and thus the geographical, cultural, political, 
economic, or personal distance between Self and Other may differ. Arabs and Muslims in both 
German and U.S. newspapers are perceived as both different and similar, even though – on 
quantitative scale – actors are predominantly regarded as different and as unequal with respect to 
the institutionalization of Western principles and standards. Arab and Muslim countries and 
actors are not excluded Others. They can rather be seen as incomplete but nevertheless 
integrated parts of a world society. Most of them lack the full institutionalization and realization 
of the Western norms and values. On the basis of these incomplete Others, the Western observer 
(in our case, German and U.S. mass media) can illustrate to itself (in our case, German and U.S. 
society) for what reasons the Other societies do not work or face certain conflicts, which also 
strengthens the legitimacy of the Western cultural account. 
The study has shown that the construction and definition of a national concept of belonging is 
not only a permanent but also a multifaceted process. A large variety of persons and features 
have to be either integrated in the self-concept or distinguished from it. Sometimes the 
boundaries between ingroup and outgroup even seem to blur, and a clear-cut definition and 
classification of difference becomes difficult to make. Thus, the Self always has to have a concept 
in mind about its own national collectivity to distinguish those actors that are not regarded as part 
of this collectivity. Even though before 9/11 explicit references to the German or U.S. self-
concept can rarely be found in the media communication processes, the national self-concept is 
permanently reflected in the way in which the Others is perceived and portrayed. We can 
conclude that the demarcation process of the Other – in itself – presents a central element of 
German and U.S. national identity. 
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The Impact of the 9/11 Attacks 
One question that was raised in the beginning of the book was whether the images of Arabs and 
Muslims predominantly result from the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. I assumed that 
the event has not only changed the Western focus on Arabs and Muslims but has also increased 
the perception that this group presents a threat to the own national collectivity and the central 
values, standards and institutions, and that as a consequence of that, both Germany and the 
United States have started to emphasize the national or even transnational collectivity and the 
difference of the threatening Other from the same to distance it. 
The analysis has shown that, first of all, the event has caused a geographical shift of focus in 
German and U.S. print media, since after the attacks countries like Afghanistan and Pakistan 
become the focus of attention, and are accompanied by an increasing focus on those countries 
where the 9/11 terrorists were assumed to come from like Saudi Arabia. The perspective on the 
Other has also shifted from the external Other to Arab and Muslim actors within the national or 
Western boundaries. 
Second, the focus on Arabs and Muslims now strongly concentrates on a new confrontation line 
that increasingly ignores the internal political or cultural conflicts within the different Arab and 
Muslim countries and instead basically classifies Arabs and Muslims according to their position 
on terrorism and their cooperation with the West. This classification of good versus evil actors may 
be explained with the fact that the event has shattered the feeling of national security, not only in 
the United States, but also in Germany. As the American NEWSWEEK phrased it: 
The change in the nation’s collective psyche will be even more profound. The attacks have 
broken the illusion, deeply embedded in the American mind, “that we are more protected, 
and safer, than other countries,” says trauma specialist Terrence Real of Massachusetts’ 
Family Institute of Cambridge. (NW-01-v138-SpIss: 40) 
The event seems to have threatened both societies especially because the national or Western 
territory was infiltrated. One reaction that was observed in this study is that group boundaries are 
drawn now on a much broader level and create a larger distances between the Self and the 
threatening, evil Other. As already noted, especially internal Arabs and Muslims are now observed 
much more critically than before the attacks since they cannot be distanced geographically. In the 
German context, this skepticism and suspiciousness towards the Muslim and Arab communities 
reflects that those communities are also regarded as distant – even though they might be 
geographically close.9 We may suggest, however, that this skepticism was already part of the 
                                                 
9 It has to be noted however, that even though the introduced analysis has not revealed such results for the American 
media, later analyses have revealed that the skepticism against the Arab and Muslim communities in the U.S. has also 
increased tremendously since 9/11. McAlister (2005) has pointed out that in the aftermath of the attacks, hundreds 
of Arab and Muslim men were arrested or people who appeared to be Arab and Muslim were profiled at airports and 
other public places. Furthermore, in November 2001, the American Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act, which 
limited certain civil and rights for both citizens and noncitizens (McAlister 2005: 275-276).  
A conference at the CAAS in Dearborn, Michigan, in May 2006 looked among other things at the changed political 
and societal status of Arab and Muslim Americans in the United States since 9/11, and has presented a number of 
alarming developments with regard to this issue. Saliba (2006) from Evergreen State College, WA, USA, for instance 
presented a paper on “Diasporas in Detention in the Pacific Northwest,” where the author reports on the numerous 
detentions of Arabs and Muslims after 9/11, for instance in the Northwest Detention Center in Tacoma, WA, that 
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German or U.S. perspective before the attacks, but the event has provoked the Self to openly 
express those sentiments. Events like the 9/11 attacks did not create images of Arabs and 
Muslims but they have strengthened certain assumptions and myths that were already part of the 
image before the attacks. The attacks can thus rather be seen as a catalyst that sharpened the 
focus on Arabs and Muslims and intensified the attempts of the German and U.S. Self to 
distance and demarcate itself from large parts of this focused group. 
A third effect of the event is the increased effort in both countries’ print media to emphasize 
those Arabs and Muslims who present no threat to the Self, who are peaceful, and who take sides 
with the Self after the attacks and express their compassion. It can be interpreted here that by 
also emphasizing those Others, the Self reassures itself that not all the Others are evil and that not 
all of them present a threat for the Self. The existence of good Others makes the overall Other less 
threatening; it weakens the impact of the hostile and negative parts of it, and plays down the 
perceived threat that is assumed to emanate from the Other. 
Fourthly, the analysis has shown that both German and U.S. print media communicate the 
perception that the event was an attack on the Western world as a cultural and political unity, and 
therefore also presents a threat to the German and American or, more general, to the Western, 
values, principles, and institutions. Reflected in the media discourses, the attacks on the World 
Trade Center are, for instance, perceived as an attack against the symbols of national modernity 
and progress, and also the attack against the Pentagon are described as a symbolic attack, this 
time against the authority of the government of the leading nation of the Western world. We can 
argue, therefore, that this emphasis of the central national or even transnational Western 
principles is also done in order to strengthen the own group’s self-esteem, security, and identity. 
As was noted for the last aspect already, we may say that by bringing to mind that also within 
Arab and Muslim countries or communities we find actors who support Western principles and 
values, the potential strength and perceived threat of the Other can be weakened. 
Last but not least, the event has not only caused a stronger reflection upon the German, 
American, or Western Self but has led to self-criticism as well. Especially U.S. newspapers reflect 
upon the American’s own guilt in the interplay with the Arab and Muslim Other that might have 
caused such negative backlashes like the 9/11 attacks. We now also find a more intensive 
examination of the own German, American, or Western weaknesses and the ambivalence of the 
Self in the interaction with the Other. Even though the Self rejects the negative characteristics of 
some Others, the usefulness (e.g. possible economic or military resources) of certain actors leads to 
cooperation with the outgroup and causes the Self to somewhat downgrade the negativity of the 
respective actors. After 9/11 these ambivalences of the Self become increasingly relevant and the 
                                                                                                                                                        
was opened under the head of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) in 2004. As Saliba argues, the case 
studies show a tremendous negative impact on Arab diaspora communities in terms of threat, intimidation, and 
insecurities, and the author criticizes that the America government has frequently used immigration courts after 9/11 
to conduct terrorist and other criminal investigations in ways that “strip Arabs and Muslims of their constitutional 
protections on the basis of ethnicity or religion.” However, for the analyzed timeframe we cannot say that U.S. 
media focus as strongly on the potential threat that may emanate from the overall Arab and Muslim communities as 
the analyzed German newspapers. 
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Self looks more carefully and also more skeptically at the reciprocal relationship with the Arab 
and Muslim Other. Both countries’ media now increasingly reflect upon the Western 
responsibility for certain conditions, conflicts, or deficits in Arab and Muslim countries, and 
critically discuss the own foreign policies, exploitations in economic relations, or Western 
humanitarian failures. Whereas U.S. print media are rather self-critical in these contexts, German 
print media concentrate more on the responsibilities and mistakes of the United States, especially 
as one cause and explanation for the 9/11 attacks instead of discussing Germany’s own national 
deficits and behavior in the interaction with the Other. 
Thus, the German Self does not distinguish between Germany and the United States when 
referring to its own victim status after the attacks, but clearly distinguishes between itself and the 
United States when it comes to the causes of those attacks against the Western Self. Here, 
German media mainly reflect the assumption that those causes have to be looked for in the 
American Self. In a way, the German Self – by doing so – puts itself in a double-victimized 
position. As part of the Western Self, the country regards itself as a symbolic victim of the attacks 
of some parts of the Arab and Muslim Other. As a national unity it also sees itself as an indirect 
victim of American foreign policy.10 
Nevertheless, for both countries we can sum up that even when the Self reflects upon its own 
mistakes and political misbehavior to explain the terrorist aggression of Arab and Muslim Others 
that comes to the fore in the 9/11 attacks, its own principles and values are thereby not called 
into question. What might be questioned is the way in which those principles have been 
conveyed to the Other. 
 
The Relevance of the Oriental Myth 
I also assumed in the beginning of the book that the taken-for-granted myth of an Oriental 
Otherness has a decisive influence on the way in which difference between the German and U.S. 
self-concept and Arabs and Muslims is perceived and constructed. As was outlined in chapter 
II.2, a number of studies already before 9/11 have shown that this taken-for-granted myth of an 
Orient that forms a counter-image to the Occidental hemisphere is crucial for the perception of 
Arabs and Muslims in Germany and the United States.11 The perception that results from this 
myth is that of two units, the Orient and the West, that are predominantly different and distant 
from each other, not only geographically, but also in a political, economic, personal and especially 
cultural dimension. I have argued here, that in the specific context of Arab and Muslim actors, 
                                                 
10 However, and in contrast to our results, other authors have also critically remarked the lack of self-criticism for the 
U.S. context. McAlister (2005), for instance, argues that in the long run (i.e. beyond the timeframe of our introduced 
analysis) the larger questions about the relationship between U.S. Middle East policy and terrorist acts were 
effectively marginalized, and which “framed the attacks as an act of ‘evildoers’ who hated something as broad and 
vague as ‘freedom’ – rather than […] something as concrete and specific as U.S. foreign policy” (McAlister 2005: 
279). This leads to a narrative that centers around the central question “Why do they hate us?” which is basically 
answered, “They hate liberty and freedom,” (McAlister 2005: 303) two central Western principles, but which largely 
omits the political or cultural roots of terrorism and conflict with the West. 
11 See, for instance, Hafez (1997, 2002, 2002b), Kamalipour (1995), Sardar (1999) or Shaheen (2001). 
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the classification and evaluation of these actors according to the raster of Western principles is 
centrally guided by the ideological myth of a basic difference between a Western and an Oriental 
hemisphere. 
As the analysis has confirmed, the German or U.S. media perspectives on Arabs and Muslims are 
shaped by the facets that characterize this Oriental myth as it was outlined in chapter II.2. This 
myth has, for instance, an influence on the way in which the observed Arab and Muslim actors 
are evaluated but in equal parts also how the Self is perceived and defined. Especially the 
predominant negativity of actors – despite the fact that similarities are also identified in both 
countries’ print media – can be explained with this taken-for-granted myth. Both German and 
U.S. newspapers reflect subliminal perceptions and stereotypical assumptions that are 
accompanied with a classification of the majority of Arab and Muslim countries as a cultural and 
political (Oriental) unit and as an anti-thesis to the West. Especially in the direct aftermath of the 
analyzed event a number of quotes have been identified that fall into this two-sided construction: 
Newspaper articles talk about a “Western hemisphere” or “the Arab and Muslim world,” refer to 
the Arab and Muslim Other as “Oriental” or use the contrast of a “battle of good versus evil.” 
At the same time, the 9/11 attacks seem to have reinforced some elements of this myth. For 
instance, the taken-for-granted assumption that the Oriental Other is violent, hostile, and culturally 
underdeveloped with regard to the Western standard of secularism and enlightenment has been 
clearly reinforced by the attacks. The attacks have thus strengthened assumptions about the 
Other that already existed before the attacks, because also before the event the violent threat that – 
according to this Oriental myth – emanates from the Oriental Other and that is strongly tied to 
religious fanaticism and cultural backwardness was increasingly used to describe Arabs and Muslims 
in the analyzed media before 9/11 as well. 
However, and unlike other studies have argued that have focused on the Western perception of 
the Orient or the interplay between Occident and Orient so far,12 the analysis has also shown that 
even though this two-sided concept is central for the German and U.S. perspective on and 
evaluation of Arabs and Muslims, it does not consequently and solely lead to an evaluation and 
portrayal of those Others as one homogenous negative counterpart of the Self, just as the 
Oriental myth does not solely include negative facets but is characterized by an ambivalent 
otherness. The images of Arab and Muslim actors in German and U.S. print media are multi-
faceted – geographically, culturally, politically, economically, personally, as well as socially – and 
the occurring actors present a cross-section through society. We do find Arab and Muslim actors 
that are evaluated as similar to the Self, and not all actors are regarded as underdeveloped or medieval, 
even though a large number of Arabs and Muslims in both countries’ print media are described 
as culturally underdeveloped, irrational, unrestrained, and violent – features that reflect some of the 
central facets that shape the Oriental myth. Events like 9/11 threaten the ingroup security, which 
leads to a stronger emphasis of the boundaries between the own collectivity and an outside Other 
that is represented here by Arabs and Muslims. This also and especially leads to an increasing 
                                                 
12 See, for instance, Hippler and Lueg (1995) or Kliche et al. (1998, 1999). 
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identification with and strengthening of a transnational concept of collectivity after the attacks – 
namely that of a Western world that confronts an Oriental Other. 
 
To come to a final conclusion, we can say that Western principles and standards form a crucial 
frame of reference for the observation and evaluation of events, processes, and actors. The 
German and U.S. concept of belonging is shaped by this fixed set of principles and standards that 
are not questioned but are permanently consulted by the Self to observe and structure its 
environment and Arabs and Muslims, who are regarded as one potential outgroup in this context. 
The Self constantly reflects upon its own evaluation process of the Other and is conscious of the 
fact that its own interests and needs may be more relevant than moral considerations for the 
institutionalization of its own standards with the Other. Thus, the observation of Arabs and 
Muslims is not an objective process, because the observing (German and American) Self is 
regarded as the ideal. Furthermore, the observation and evaluation of events and actors is 
influenced and distorted not only by the Self’s own (political, cultural etc.) standards and 
principles, but also by certain myths (here especially the Oriental myth). Events like the 9/11 
attacks can reinforce those myths – in the way of a self-fulfilling prophecy – and they can 
increase an ingroup’s demand to strengthen the ingroup boundaries by explicitly emphasizing 
those principles, standards and myths. 
Comparing Germany and the United States, we can conclude that both countries not only reveal 
rather similar self-perceptions but also – as a result of that – evaluate and portray Arabs and 
Muslims in a similar way. The approach towards Arabs and Muslims is predominantly but not 
solely shaped by an assumed difference between both sides. However, the analysis was able to 
show that this does not solely result in an overall negative image of Arabs and Muslims. The Self 
also emphasizes and integrates similarities in its overall perception of the Other. The analysis has 
revealed that Arabs and Muslims can even form a mirror reflection of the Self, even though those 
representatives of the Other only form a minor proportion in the overall set of focused Arab and 
Muslim actors and countries. Nevertheless, both completely different and more or less similar 
Others reflect crucial aspects of the German and U.S. self-image nevertheless, either by deviating 
from those self-conceptions or by fulfilling the criteria that the Self regards as central for its own 
concept of belonging. And either way, we can conclude that Arabs and Muslims are crucial for 
the German and American self-perception. Thus, to understand the way in which Arabs and 
Muslims are perceived in German and U.S. media we have to understand how Germany and the 
United States perceive themselves. 
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4. Benefits and Limits of the Study 
I have argued in the beginning of this book, that Arabs and Muslims have a difficult stand in the 
West today: They are observed skeptically by the populations of Western countries like Germany 
and the United States due to such tremendously shocking incidents like the 9/11 attacks and the 
terror wave that many people in the West perceive to have swept over Europe in the aftermath of 
this event, reflected in attacks such as the those in Madrid (2004) and London (2005). However, 
as the introduced analysis has shown, the assumption of a (terrorist, cultural or other) threat that 
emanates from Arabs and Muslims has already existed before the 9/11 attacks, and the 
perceptions of Arabs and Muslims as they are reflected in Western mass media today do not only 
result from such incidents as the mentioned terrorist attacks. The critical observation and the 
predominant focus on negative aspects of Arab and Muslim countries, for instance, with regard 
to their economic development, certain cultural features, or political structures and actions have 
shaped the image of Arabs and Muslims already before the attacks. In addition to that, with 
regard to Arab and Muslim immigrants and communities in the West, I have illustrated that those 
actors are also largely observed as different and geographically, politically, culturally etc. distant 
from their (German or U.S.) host society and the respective national self-concept – even though 
with those internal Others this distance becomes only explicitly obvious in the mass media after 
the attacks. And it is especially after 9/11, that (internal as well as external) Arabs and Muslims 
are observed more carefully not only with regard to their opinions on terrorism, Islamic 
fundamentalism or modernity, but also with regard to their loyalty or attitudes towards the West. 
 
Theoretical Remarks 
Theoretically, this book has introduced one specific perspective on this critical relationship 
between Arabs and Muslims and the West and has offered one possible way in which the 
Western perception of the other side could be understood. This explanation was shaped by the 
crucial assumption that (a), the images of Arabs and Muslims are centrally shaped by the Western 
self-perception, that (b), the self-perception and the perception of Arabs and Muslims in 
Germany and the United States is shaped by a Western cultural account, and that (c), due to 
social group-formation processes and the construction of national collectivity, the image of a 
hypothetical Other has to deviate from the own national self-concept to draw a boundary 
between Self and Other. We were able to test those assumptions on two comparative levels, as 
well: On one level, we compared two Western countries (i.e. Germany and the United States) and 
on a second level, we analyzed whether the 9/11 attacks have had an influence on the Western 
perception of Arabs and Muslims. 
Based on the assumption that a set of Western principles, standards and myths (such as the 
Oriental myth) shapes the every day observation and the process of structuring of reality as it is 
done by actors in Germany and the United States, we were not only able to integrate the fact that 
similarities exist between Arab and Muslim Other and Western Self on a structural level (in 
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political, economic or other institutions). We were also able to define the central pattern 
according to which the West (here: Western mass media) observes and evaluates Arabs and 
Muslims. The study has shown that the theoretical concept of Western principles (of the world 
polity approach13) provides a useful framework to analyze and interpret the way in which Arabs 
and Muslims are perceived and portrayed in Western mass media. Furthermore, this theoretical 
concept allows for the integration of the Self (i.e. the German and U.S. self-perceptions) in the 
analysis of the images of the Arab and Muslim Other, since Western principles are not only used 
by the Self to observe the Other but also to define the own (national) concept of belonging. The 
study provides findings about how Western countries define the relevance of those Western 
principles and standards. By illustrating, for instance, the lack of those principles and standards in 
Arab and Muslim countries or with certain Arab and Muslim actors, the observing media also 
exemplify the consequences of a lack of Western principles and thereby also illustrate why those 
principles and standards are relevant for the Self AND for the Other. At the same time, the book 
provides more concrete findings about conception of those Western principles and standards, 
and has shown that the national self-concepts of both Germany and the United States are very 
similar and can be summarized as concepts of a transnational Western collectivity, that was not 
merely derived from the 9/11 attacks. 
With regard to the theoretical conceptions of collective identity construction, we were able to 
show that this construction is based on the central assumption of difference and distance. 
However, the demarcation of actors as nonmembers of a certain collective concept of belonging 
is not solely marked by a devaluation of these actors. We were able to show that the Other is not 
solely negative and not solely constructed as different from the Self. I have illustrated in this book 
that even though both German and U.S. mass media, to a large extent, regard (internal and 
external) Arabs and Muslims as different and distant from the own national self-concept, they 
also see a certain degree of similarity and closeness between both sides. By collecting and 
analyzing the totality of occurring Arab and Muslim actors we have not only seen that the images 
of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media are quite complex and multifaceted and 
comprise a large variety of nationalities and societal levels. We can also say that German and U.S. 
mass media reflect a large interest in the Other, i.e. in Arabs and Muslim countries’ politics, 
culture and economic or other issues. As the study has shown, both countries perceive those 
actors and countries rather similar, since we have found similar structures and patterns in the 
actor images in both countries media. 
Further studies could concentrate on the question whether we can trace the identified structures 
of collectivity construction and construction of otherness in other time contexts or in the context 
of other events as well. Those studies could also analyze whether the forms of perception and 
evaluation can also be found with regard to other countries, ethnic groups, religions or certain 
actor groups, to find out whether the levels of difference and distance that have been derived 
                                                 
13 Adopting largely the approach of the Stanford School (see, for instance, Meyer et al. 1994 and 2005, but see also 
Dierkes and Koenig 2006). 
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from the introduced analysis are general forms of social structuring and difference construction. 
Studies could furthermore concentrate on the question, whether Western countries are also as 
similar in their perception of the focused group in other contexts – especially in the context of 
the Iraq War which started with a United States-led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, and which 
has disunited the West in its position towards the country – and here especially Germany and the 
United States. It may be possible that the Western principles but also the observed Arab and 
Muslim Other are weight and evaluated slightly different – especially when we look at those 
contexts in which the Western Self enters the space of the Other. Those studies could also show 
whether the self-reflections are similar or different when other ethnic groups, countries or 
religions are observed. 
 
Methodical Remarks 
Methodically, with the used methodical approach of a quantifying qualitative content analysis we 
were able to first gather ALL Arab and Muslim actors of the selected media set over a defined 
timeframe and trace the basic structures of perception and evaluation for this entire set of 
occurring actors. The study thus presents a detailed description and summary of the image of 
Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media. I have captured the WHOLE spectrum of 
the image of Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media, and can thus make quantitative 
statements about the relevance of certain actors or certain ways of actor portrayal as well. In 
doing so, the study provides merely a quantifying qualitative description of the media images of 
Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. print media that mainly focuses on the linguistic level of 
the text and summarizes the words and images with which actors are described. Such a research 
perspective does not fully take into account the individual articles as separate independent units 
but regards them as part of overall communication processes about Arabs and Muslims, and 
about the perceptions of a German or American national collectivity that are reflected in these 
communication processes. 
Only in a second step I have specified the quantitatively found patterns of actor images on the 
basis of selective qualitative text analyses. From the perspective of a more case-focused in-depth 
analysis it has thus to be admitted that a detailed qualitative analysis of all occurring actors could 
not be provided, because this detailed analysis would have gone beyond the scope of the project, 
as it would have taken too much time to do so. Only selected (prototype) actors have been 
analyzed more closely in a second step in the context of the articles in which they occur, to 
qualitatively re-construct and further elaborate the structures and patterns that have been found 
in the images of Arabs and Muslims in the first step of the analysis, and to trace the interplay of 
different actors and actors types in the contexts of the articles. In contrast to in-depth analysis 
methods, the analysis thus has not reconstructed the patterns of the media images of Arabs and 
Muslims from only a few actor cases but from a broad description of all occurring images in a 
broad spectrum of different data over a certain timeframe. The results of this study may be used 
as a basis for further analyses that look more closely at the roles of individual actors in the 
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context of certain topics, or carry out a more detailed analysis of linguistic varieties and semantic 
peculiarities in the images of actors in different media. 
 
The Production of Mass Media Contents 
Furthermore, the introduced research project has only looked at the product of mass media 
production processes, i.e. the constructed media reality in the newspaper article. The question of 
intentions, attitudes or views of the actors who produce the analyzed media reality was of no 
interest here, mainly because I have argued that these processes and factors are not relevant when 
a reader consumes an article. I have only focused on HOW actors are portrayed in this media 
reality and what images those actors receive, and can only assume but not prove WHY certain 
actors are focused on in the analyzed mass media, or to what extent and why they receive certain 
images. The study has only captured mass media contents as a collective set of knowledge that 
reflects the perceptions and views of the German and U.S. society and at the same time also 
shapes the views and perceptions of the same with regard to Arabs and Muslims. I have not 
looked at the concrete selection circumstances and the selection criteria that become relevant in 
the production process of newspapers and print media in general. Furthermore, the introduced 
study has not analyzed how relevant the identified worldviews and German and U.S. self-
concepts in the media contents are for those actors who produce news about and images of 
Arabs and Muslims, an aspect that could be focused on more closely in further studies as well. 
 
Impact on Attitudes towards Arabs and Muslims 
The results of the introduced analysis may also provide the basis for further studies that look on 
the question, what impact the mass media images of Arabs and Muslims have on the members of 
the (German and U.S.) society in which those images are produced and communicated. This 
book has concentrated on print media, since we assumed that mass media are a crucial platform 
in modern societies for the communication of basic information and knowledge about the world, 
events and actors, and therefore also present a central source of knowledge about Arabs and 
Muslims on the basis of which the German and U.S. public forms its opinion about events, issues 
and actors. Surveys and studies that look at public opinions about (external but also internal) 
Arabs and Muslims in German and U.S. society, or analyze political relationships and conflicts 
between Arab and Muslim countries and the West, could stronger take into account the media 
realities in those societies that not only reflect public perceptions but may also shape the very 
same. 
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Impact on Arabs and Muslims 
But even more than that, further studies should also include the examination of the impacts of 
the outlined images of Arabs and Muslims in Western mass media on the Arab and Muslim 
communities in Western countries, because those images are consumed by the same as well. On 
the basis of the introduced print media analysis we may analyze, for example, how the 
predominantly negative, weakening or skeptical images and distancing features of Muslims and 
Arabs in countries like Germany or the United States are perceived by the distanced and 
devaluated Arabs and Muslims, and how those images thus also shape those people’s perception 
of Germany and the United States. 
One research project that has taken up those questions already is the ethnographic study of 
Ostermann (2007) who has looked, among other things, at the way in which Moroccan 
immigrants in Germany cope with the attitudes, perceptions and the resulting living conditions in 
their host society. As the author has found out, for example, the Moroccan community (in 
Frankfurt, Germany) is generally uninformed about current political developments, but 
Moroccan immigrants do take notice of German media. Even though they do not regularly read 
German newspapers, Ostermann (2007) reports that her informants often stated that they have 
heard about what is written in German print media about Arabs and Muslims. They reported that 
they know what newspapers write and they were clear about their dislike of the articles’ contents. 
Those internal Arabs and Muslims feel that they are not accepted in the country they are living in, 
an impression that is further intensified by the experienced attitudes of Germans in the everyday 
interaction with the host society (in hospitals, civil services etc.). 
This feeling of demarcation and distance can have consequences for the behavior of those 
minorities in their host societies, as well. As Ostermann (2007) indicates, some of the Moroccan 
immigrants strengthen their ties to their home countries or retreat to their ethnic communities 
and thus distance themselves from the host society (besides being distanced or at least ignored by 
the same as well). Others adopt features that are used by the West to distance Arabs and Muslims 
and turn them into features that foster their own group and thus adopt some of the images that 
are ascribed to them by the German and U.S. media and society. They use markers of difference 
like religious symbols (e.g. the headscarf) to distance themselves from a society that proclaims 
standards and values that those features do not fulfill. Here, those actors turn themselves from 
distanced Others into separated but autonomous persons who themselves emphasize their 
otherness to a society that demarcates them. What is problematic about this reaction on behalf of 
the internal Other is their behavior may again be picked up by the (German and U.S.) host 
society (and mass media) as an indicator for the unwillingness of the Other to integrate and as a 
confirmation for the Self of the difference that was assumed between Self and Other in the first 
place. This falseness of respective perceptions leads to a constant circle of wrong imaging. 
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WHY WE ARE NOT ABLE TO UNMAKE DIFFERENCE 
If we ask for a more positive imaging of Arabs and Muslims, for an more well-balanced image of 
the ethnic groups in mass media, and thus for a greater awareness of the rating scales that we 
apply to portray and evaluate other countries, political systems, cultures and actors, the question 
that arises from this book is: How do we unmake difference and reduce negative images of Arabs 
and Muslims when the counter image of a (different or even negative) Other is crucial for the 
definition of self? 
As was outlined in this book, the concept of community or, in other words, the construction of 
collectivity, mainly rests on the assumption of DIFFERENCE and DISTANCE. Even though 
Weller (2000) argues that, in the world society, states increasingly lose their significance for 
collective identity formation because perceptions of international relations are increasingly 
affected by other institutions that offer alternative categorizations and alternative collective 
identity concepts (Weller 2000: 67), national collectivities are still relevant. The nationality of 
actors may become less relevant on the global stage, but for certain contexts (for instance, when 
Arabs and Muslims are observed) it is still a relevant level of difference besides other larger 
transnational community concepts like that of the European Union, a community of democratic 
states or a “Western hemisphere” that was also discussed in the introduced study. 
The definition of a (national) concept of belonging always works via a differentiation between 
two sides, an ingroup and outgroup, on the basis of which individuals position themselves in the 
social contexts in which they act. The assumption and construction of difference is crucial for the 
construction and structuring of reality. It helps to integrate the complexity of life, define the own 
position in the world, and evaluate other actors that are perceived as part of this reality. Due to 
this basic relevance of differentiation, a universal “world community” or a community concept 
without a conception of boundary, difference and actors that are excluded is hard to achieve, 
since the community formation rests on the demarcation of an outside Other. Therefore, even if 
we observe collective concepts on a transnational level, an out-group seems inevitably to be part 
of this concept of belonging. We can thus say that to ask for an unmaking of difference is a claim 
that might be rather difficult to achieve. Rottenburg (2006) summarizes this unpromising attempt 
as follows: 
We should not regard difference as something to be avoided as much as possible, but rather accept it as a 
precondition for saying anything at all about the world. For this reason, any statement necessarily includes 
difference within itself [...] that cannot be overcome. The desire to overcome such difference remains an 
aporia. (Rottenburg 2006: 11) 
If we ask for a change of the current imaging of Arabs and Muslims, or more generally speaking, 
a change in the German and American perception of Arabs and Muslims, one step could be that 
the Self becomes more aware of the own presumption or taken-for-granted myths that shape the 
negative, contradictory or even the positive images of the observed Other. Of course, Arabs and 
Muslims can appear to be different simply because they ARE different (for example because the 
9/11 terrorists have indeed been violent and hostile). However, the observing Self should also look 
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more differentiated at the actions and facets of the Other, and it should take into account to what 
extent the own views, principles and value systems shape and guide the Western perception of 
Arabs and Muslims. One should ask oneself, what facets are actually observed and highlighted 
with other people, and what facets are ignored. The facets that German and U.S. media notice 
and highlight when they observe Arabs and Muslims do not have to be the only features of the 
observed counterpart. 
This claim for more awareness is not reduced to mass media, but is directed towards all societal 
branches. We should become more aware of the fact that our own perspective creates only ONE 
of many possible realities. Our own perspective may fail to see, or ignore other facets due to 
certain presumptions and evaluation patterns that shape the own perception. To dissolve this 
distortion, one crucial step is to overcome the distance towards the Other, for instance, by 
improving the communication not ABOUT but WITH the Other, or by listening to those 
groups, actors or countries when they criticize negative or one-sided images of themselves. This 
request does not consequently mean that we have to unmake the differences between our own 
national self-image and Arab and Muslim otherness completely, but rather asks for a reduction of 
the assumed or actual distance between both sides, not only on the geographical level, but also in 
the other dimensions that have been outlined in this book. 
It may only cause further alienation and distance between Self and Other, if we ask for more 
integration of Arab and Muslim communities within the West, demand more democratization 
from Arab countries, or simply claim that the other side does not meet the own standards and 
expectations without knowing and trying to understand the perspective of the other side. This 
distance and lack of dialogue and knowledge again may cause further misperceptions, not only on 
behalf of the Self but also among Arabs and Muslims, because they also create their own myths 
and construct their own distorted images about the “distant Western Other.” A Moroccan 
immigrant from Germany who was interviewed by Ostermann (2007) during the author’s 
fieldwork may be presented here as a final example, to close this book and to illustrate this 
distorted perception on behalf of the Arab and Muslim Other. Just like the quotation of a 
German woman talking about “the Arabs” that was presented in the very beginning of this book, 
this statement of a Moroccan woman who lives in Frankfurt/Main, Germany, illustrates that not 
only Germans do have distorted perceptions of Arabs and Muslims, but that also those Others 
may develop a distorted image of “the Germans” due to non-communication and lack of 
knowledge. The Moroccan woman describes this image as follows: 
“Real Germans are rich, they own houses, drive expansive cars and they don't like us, the 
'Ausländer'.” (Ostermann 2007) 
As this quotation indicates, the lack of real contact between Self and Other can lead to a constant 
circle of misperception that is hard to resolve. The daily interaction of Self and Other needs to be 
recognized as a platform for potential change. Thus the first step to unmake difference is to 
unmake distance. 
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